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RECOVERING THE ORIGINAL
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Thomas Y. Davies*
"The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there."**
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OVERVIEW

Claims regarding the original or intended meaning of constitu
tional texts are commonplace in constitutional argument and analysis.
All such claims are subject to an implicit validity criterion - only his
torically authentic assertions should matter. The rub is that the origi
nal meaning commonly attributed to a constitutional text may not be
authentic. The historical Fourth Amendment is a case in point.
If American judges, lawyers, or law teachers were asked what the
Framers intended when they adopted the Fourth Amendment, they
would likely answer that the Framers intended that all searches and
seizures conducted by government officers must be reasonable given
the circumstances. That answer may seem obvious - the Amendment
begins with a clause that states that "[t]he right of the people to be se
cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated ... ."1 Indeed, this lan
guage has been identified as a prime example of how the original un
derstanding can be gleaned directly from constitutional text - what
could "unreasonable" mean if not inappropriate in the circum
stances?2
1.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The full text reads:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

2. For example, Justice Antonin Scalia has asserted that "reasonableness" is the "first
principle" of the Fourth Amendment, and has interpreted "reasonableness" to create a bal
ancing standard based on the totality of the circumstances. See California v. Acevedo, 500
U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting "the first principle that the 'reason
ableness' requirement of the Fourth Amendment affords the protection that the common
law afforded"); Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (majority
opinion by Scalia, J.) ("As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate meas
ure of the constitutionality of a government search is 'reasonableness.' "); Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996) (majority opinion by Scalia, J.) ("It is of course true that in
principle every Fourth Amendment case, since it turns upon a 'reasonableness' determina
tion, involves a balancing of all relevant factors.''); see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw
as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1186 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, The Rule of
Law] (claiming that assessments of reasonableness are factual, and thus the law of searches
and seizures should be an exception to the usual principle that the law should be stated as
rules). Justice Scalia is a leading proponent of "originalism.'' See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATIER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND TIIE LAW (1997) [hereinafter
SCALIA, A MATIER OF INTERPRETATION] ; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57
U. ClN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
See also Edwin Meese III, Address to the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society Law
yers Division (Nov. 15, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITIEN
CONSTITUTION 33 (Federalist Society ed., 1986); Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original
Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 825, 826 (1986) (referring to "un
reasonable searches and seizures" in a discussion of the "core values" evident from the
Constitution's text, structure, and history).
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Of course, the reference to "unreasonable searches and seizures"
does not exhaust the intended meaning of the text - the standards for
valid arrest or search warrants that are set out in the second clause
also show that the Framers intended to ban the use of too-loose, or
"general," warrants. Thus the Framers intended to require· that all
searches and seizures be reasonable and also to forbid use of general
warrants.
There is a difficulty embedded in the apparently obvious me�gs
of the two clauses, however - the text does not indicate how they fit
together. It does not say whether a valid warrant should be the usual
criterion for a "reasonable" police intrusion, or whether "Fourth
Amendment reasonableness" should be assessed independently of use
of a warrant. Put more concretely, it does not indicate whether or in
what circumstances arrests or searches must be made pursuant to a
warrant. Thus, it does not say when an officer should be allowed to
intrude on the basis of his own judgment, or when he should be re
quired to obtain prior approval from a judge. Largely because of this
silence in the text, the need for warrants has been the central issue in
the modern debate regarding search and seizure authority.
A number of the historical commentaries on the Fourth Amend
ment have either favored or rejected a warrant requirement. How
ever, none have supported their answer with persuasive historical evi
dence. If one turns to the historical sources themselves, the mystery
initially deepens: the participants in the historical controversies that
stimulated the framing of the Fourth Amendment simply did not dis
cuss when a warrant was required. Odd as it may seem, the Framers
simply were not troubled by the most salient issue in the modern de
bate.
However, upon closer examination, the historical sources do pro
vide a solution to the silence. They show that the Framers did not
perceive the problem of search and seizure authority in the same way
we now do. In fact, they reveal that the Framers did not even use the
term "unreasonable searches and seizures" the way we do.
The historical statements about search and seizure focused on con
demning general warrants. In fact, the historical concerns were almost
exclusively about the need to ban house searches under general war
rants. Thus, the Framers clearly understood the warrant standards to
be the operative content of the Fourth Amendment, as well as the
earlier state search and seizure provisions. Moreover, the evidence
indicates that the Framers understood "unreasonable searches and
seizures" simply as a pejorative label for the inherent illegality of any
searches or seizures that might be made under general warrants. In
other words, the Framers did not address warrantless intrusions at all
in the Fourth Amendment or in the earlier state provisions; thus, they
never anticipated that "unreasonable" might be read as a standard for
warrantless intrusions.
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Perplexing as that omission may appear from a modern perspec
tive, it made sense in the context of the Framers' understanding of the
problem of search and seizure. They saw no need for a constitutional
standard to regulate the warrantless officer because they did not per
ceive the warrantless officer as being capable of posing a significant
threat to the security of person or house. That was so because the ex
officio authority of the peace officer was still meager in 1789. Warrant
authority was the potent source of arrest and search authority. As a
result, the Framers expected that warrants would be used. Thus, they
believed that the only threat to the right to be secure came from the
possibility that too-loose warrants might be used.
The modern interpretation of "unreasonable searches and sei
zures" is the product of post-framing developments that the Framers
did not anticipate. During the nineteenth century, courts and legisla
tures responded to heightened concerns about crime and disorder by
expanding peace officers' ex officio authority to arrest and search.
That expansion marginalized warrant authority and thus undercut the
premises that had led the Framers to believe that they could control
the officer by controlling the warrant. As a result, the new discretion
ary arrest and search authority of the officer posed a novel threat to
the security of person and house.
In the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court belatedly re
sponded to the new threat to the right to be secure by extending con
stitutional search and seizure doctrine to the warrantless officer. It
was at that time that the "warrant requirement" emerged as a salient
issue. And it was at that time that the reference to "unreasonable
searches and seizures" in the constitutional text was reinterpreted as
though it articulated the relativistic concept of reasonableness-in-the
circumstances. In sum, the authentic history of constitutional search
and seizure doctrine is not a simple story of continuity; rather, it is a
story that includes drastic change.
Overview of the Argument in this Article

This Article begins the presentation of the authentic history of the
Fourth Amendment by recovering the original understanding from the
historical sources.3 The experience of working out the authentic his
tory has convinced me that one cannot grasp the original meaning un3. I previously presented some aspects of my historical research in Congressional testi
mony. See The Jury and the Search for the Truth: Hearing on S. 3 Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 121, 123-33 (1995) [hereinafter Hearings]. My discussion of
Fourth Amendment history appears in id. [hereinafter Davies's Testimony]. My historical
research was still incomplete on that occasion; for example, I was still unaware of how the
Framers understood "unreasonable," a crucial aspect of the authentic history. See also infra
notes 62, 308.
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til one first accepts the invalidity of the usual modem assumptions
about the concerns the Framers "must have" experienced. For that
reason, this Article makes two passes through the historical evidence.
Parts II through IV refute the now commonplace assumption that the
Framers must have meant to create a broad reasonableness standard
for warrantless intrusions.
Part II briefly reviews the two currently competing constructions of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness: the more conventional warrant
preference construction, which treats the warrant process as the cen
tral protection called for by the Amendment, and the generalized
reasonableness construction, which rejects the need for, or value of,
warrants. Part m next reviews the existing historical accounts associ
ated with the two constructions and shows that each account is signifi
cantly flawed. The conventional accounts, which are linked to the
warrant-preference construction, posit both a historical reasonable
ness standard, as well as the importance of warrants, but fail to clarify
the Framers' understanding of when a warrant need be used. In con
trast, the generalized-reasonableness accounts claim that the Framers
meant for "unreasonable" to constitute the essence of the Amend
ment, while the warrant clause was meant only to discourage use of
warrants. However, they are based in large measure on erroneous his
torical premises. Moreover, all of the previous accounts suffer from
having made prochronistic assumptions of one sort or another; that is,
at critical points they have each imposed contemporary concepts, defi
nitions, or concerns on the historical sources and thus have misper
ceived the actual content of those sources.
Part IV completes the historical critique of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness by exposing the inauthenticity of the shared but pro
chronistic assumptions that have misdirected prior commentaries. It
first exposes the lack of any actual evidence of a broad
reasonableness-in-the-circumstances standard in framing-era arrest
and search law. It next shows that the Framers' complaints were not
about warrantless intrusions but were almost exclusively about reve
nue searches of houses under general warrants. Additionally, it shows
that early interpretations of the Fourth Amendment and of the related
state provisions did not include the regulation of warrantless intru
sions; rather, post-framing court decisions interpreted the constitu
tional provisions banning "unreasonable searches and seizures" as
regulating only the issuance of warrants.
After exposing the defects in current treatments of the original
meaning, Parts V through VII make a second pass through the histori
cal sources to recover the Framers' understanding of the constitutional
provisions. Part V consults common-law sources to reconstruct how
the Framers perceived the problem of search and seizure authority
and to explain why the Framers thought that control of warrant
authority - and, more precisely, the prohibition of general warrant
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authority - would suffice to preserve the right to be secure in person
and house. The explanation consists of two strands. First, common
law sources indicate that it made sense for the Framers to focus only
on clarifying warrant standards because the ex officio authority of the
framing-era officer was still rather meager. For example, the framing
era constable's arrest authority was much narrower than is generally
supposed, and nowhere near that of a modem police officer.4 Like
wise, the justifications available for a warrantless entry of a house
were especially limited. At common law, controlling the warrant did
control the officer for all practical purposes.
The second reason the Framers did not address warrantless intru
sions was that they did not anticipate that a wrongful act by an officer
might constitute a form of government illegality- rather, they viewed
such misconduct as only a personal trespass by the person who held
the office. Thus, there was neither a need nor a basis for addressing
the conduct of a warrantless officer in a constitutional provision regu
lating government authority. (Likewise, because unlawful acts by offi
cers were only personal, it never occurred to the Framers to apply an
exclusionary principle to such misconduct.) The modem notion that
an officer's misconduct constitutes government illegality appears to
reflect a redefinition of the boundary of government action articulated
during the late nineteenth-century formulation of "state action" doc
trine under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, that constituted a
low-visibility revolution in constitutional thought; the Framers had no
such concept.
Part VI traces the initial textual development of search and seizure
language in the state constitutional provisions adopted prior to the
Fourth Amendment. It demonstrates that each of those provisions
dealt only with the banning of general warrants, and that the addition
of a rhetorical invocation of a "right" regarding searches and seizures
in several of those provisions was not meant to introduce a new search
standard. Rather, a variety of evidence shows that the statement of
the "right" may have been introduced to insert a listing of the interests
to be protected and thus define the scope of the protection against
general search and seizure authority - "persons, houses, papers, and
possessions." (The last term was altered to "effects" in the Fourth
Amendment.)
Part VI also discusses the significant fact that John Adams person
ally introduced the phrase "unreasonable searches and seizures" when
he wrote the 1780 Massachusetts provision - the state provision that
most closely anticipated the Fourth Amendment. Adams's authorship
4. The framing-era constable could not justify a felony arrest by showing "probable
cause," but could usually justify an arrest only if there was "felony in fact" (a point that has
been widely misstated in court opinions and commentaries). See infra notes 227-228.
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reveals that "unreasonable" was derived from Sir Edward Coke's ear
lier use of "against reason" as a synonym for inherent illegality or un
constitutionality.5 Thus, "unreasonable searches and seizures" was a
label that denoted the inherent illegality of intrusions made under gen
eral warrants.
Part VII traces the actual framing of the Fourth Amendment. It
shows that James Madison, who proposed the draft that ultimately be
came the Fourth Amendment, viewed his proposal only as a ban
against "general warrants"; hence, he also understood "unreasonable
searches and seizures" as a label for intrusions under general warrants.
Although Madison's draft was modified by the House of Representa
tives to produce the final two-clause text of the Fourth Amendment,
this Part demonstrates that there is no historical support for the con
ventional claim that this change was made to provide a reasonableness
standard to regulate warrantless intrusions. Rather, the evident pur
pose for the change - which inserted the words "and no warrants
shall issue but ..." - was simply to make the ban against any authori
zation of general warrants more explicitly imperative than Madison's
language had made it. Thus, like the earlier state provisions, the lan
guage of the Fourth Amendment was simply aimed at banning legisla
tive authorization of general warrants for searches of houses or arrests
of persons.
The post-framing transformation of the original meaning into
modem search and seizure doctrine is a complex story in its own right;
thus, a full account is beyond the scope of this initial Article. How
ever, Part VIII briefly identifies the key events. The conferral of dis
cretionary authority on the warrantless officer during the nineteenth
century was the catalyst for the transformation. The expansion of ex
officio authority marginalized the warrant process as a means of con
trolling police intrusions. As a result, police began to assert broader
authority to make searches "incident to arrest," including warrantless
searches of houses and offices. The Supreme Court responded to that
novel threat to the right to be secure by creating the basic elements of

5. In 1610, Coke had asserted in Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Coke Rep. 113, 77 Eng. Rep. 646
(C.P. 1610), that a statute was unconstitutional and void if it was "against common right and
reason" - that is, if it violated basic principles of the common law. 8 Coke Rep.at 118a, 77
Eng. Rep. at 652-53. Adams's mentor, James Otis, invoked Coke's dictum when he con
demned British legislative authority for general writs of assistance as being "against reason"
in the 1761 Writs ofAssistance Case
the initial American controversy over general war
rants. Adams took notes of Otis's argument. (There is no case report; the sources on the
case are discussed infra note 20.) Adams would also have been aware of similar invocations
of Coke's "against reason" - often converted to "unreasonable" - in other legal and politi
cal writings of the time. Thus, Adams understood "unreasonable" to mean inherently illegal
or unconstitutional, and he used "unreasonable searches and seizures" as the perfect pejora
tive label for a search or seizure under a general warrant - a search or seizure that would
have been so violative of the law of the land that it could not have been authorized even by
legislation. This argument is presented in detail infra notes 382-421 and accompanying text.
-
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modem search and seizure doctrine. The 1914 decision Weeks v.
United States extended the Fourth Amendment to a federal officer's
warrantless search of a house and papers, constitutionalized the com
mon-law warrant requirement for such searches, and adopted exclu
sion as the means for enforcing the right to be secure.6 Next, the 1925
decision in Carroll v. United States assumed that the Fourth Amend
ment broadly protected all privately owned property but adopted a
relativistic reasonableness standard to assess the constitutionality of
warrantless police intrusions.7 Notably, Chief Justice Taft's Carroll
opinion was grounded on a historically false description of the original
meaning of "unreasonable searches and seizures." The two currently
competing constructions of the Fourth Amendment have emerged
from the tensions arising between the doctrinal elements announced in
Weeks and Carroll.
Finally, Part IX considers the normative implications of the
authentic original meaning - and of the deep differences between the
original meaning and modem doctrine. I argue that neither of the cur
rently competing constructions of the Fourth Amendment adheres to
the historical meaning, though the warrant-preference construction is
more faithful to the Framers' concerns than the generalized
reasonableness construction. In fact, the latter is nearly the antithesis
of the Framers' understanding. However, I also express doubts that
the original meaning can be directly applied to address modem issues.
In particular, I argue that any attempt to return to the literal original
meaning - that is, to an understanding that the text only banned gen
eral warrants but did not address warrantless intrusions - would sub
vert the larger purpose for which the Framers adopted the text;
namely to curb the exercise of discretionary authority by officers. I
also argue that it would be inappropriate to employ framing-era doc
trines selectively to answer specific modem issues because historic
doctrines often do not accomplish the same ends in the modern con
text as they did during the framing era. Instead, I conclude that the
authentic history is useful primarily for providing a larger perspective
of the overall trajectory of the evolution of search and seizure doc
trine: we now accord officers far more discretionary authority than
the Framers ever intended or expected.

6. 232 U.S.383 (1914).
7. 267 U.S.132 (1925).
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OF "F OURTH AMENDMENT

REASONABLENESS"
The Fourth Amendment was adopted by Congress in 1789 and
ratified by the states in 1791 as one of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights. It reads:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.8
There has been a widespread consensus during the twentieth cen
tury about the basic meaning to be attributed to each of the two
clauses of the text. The first clause has been understood to state a
comprehensive principle - that the government shall not violate the
"right to be secure " by conducting "unreasonable searches and sei
zutes."9 The Supreme Court has endorsed this understanding in nu
merous modem opinions, asserting, for example, that "[t]he essential
purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a
standard of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by gov
ernment officials ...."10 In fact, Justices from across the ideological
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. The basic meanings assigned to the two clauses of the text and the difficulties that
arise when one tries to mesh the two clauses have been discussed in numerous commentar
ies. See, e.g., Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The
Limits ofLawyering, 48 IND. LJ. 329 (1973); Luis G. Stelzner, The Fourth Amendment: The
Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses, 10 N .M. L. REV. 33 (1979-80); Richard A Posner,
Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. Cr. REV. 49, 72; Craig M. Bradley, Two Mod
els of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468 (1985); Ronald Bacigal, Dodging a
Bullet, but Opening Old Wounds in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 SETON HALL L.
REV. 597 (1986); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
Constitutional Theory, 77 G E O. LJ. 19 (1988); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amend
ment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383 (1988); Ja
cob W. Landynski, Comments on H. Richard Uviller's Reasonability and the Fourth Amend
ment, 25 CRIM. L. BULL. 51 (1989); H. Richard Uviller, Reasonability and the Fourth
Amendment: A (Belated) Farewell to Justice Potter Stewart, 25 CRIM. L. BULL. 29, 33 (1989);
Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth Amendment's Two Clauses, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389
(1989) [hereinafter Wasserstrom, Two Clauses]; Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Fourth Amendment
Today, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING
184 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1990); Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, 35 WM. & MARYL. REV. 197, 207-28 (1993) [hereinafter Maclin, Central
Meaning]; 1 WAYNER. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: ATREATIS E ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 5-7 (3d ed. 1996).

I previously discussed the two clauses of the text in Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right
by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v. Rodriquez Contorts Consent, Trivializes Fourth
Amendment Reasonableness, and Exaggerates the Excusability of Police Error, 59 TENN. L.
REV. 1, 45-59 (1991). My discontent regarding the uncertain relationship between the two
clauses was one reason I undertook this historical research.
10. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979).
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spectrum have treated the first clause as the essence of the Fourth
Amendment - even quoting it by itself as though it were the Fourth
Amendment.11
The second clause of the text - which starts "and no Warrants"
and is commonly called "the Warrant Clause" -has been understood
to serve the more specific purpose of regulating warrant authority. Its
effect is to ban the use of a "general warrant" -a framing-era term
for an unparticularized warrant (for example, ordering a search of
"suspected places"), which was also commonly applied to a warrant
lacking a complaint under oath or an adequate showing of cause.12
It is not difficult to understand why the Fourth Amendment is
widely thought to contain an overarching reasonableness-in-the
circumstances standard. To begin with, modem readers have ap
proached the text with the assumption that the Framers must have in
tended it to serve as a comprehensive regulation of all government
searches or seizures -an assumption that derives, in tum, from the

11. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968) (opinion of the Court by Warren, C.J.);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971)
(opinion of the Court by Brennan, J.); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 550 (1980)
(opinion of the Court by Stewart, J.); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 613 (1989) (opinion of the Court by Kennedy, J.); Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct.
1297, 1300 (1999) (opinion of the Court by Scalia, J.). Other opinions simply assert "the
constitutional guarantee against 'unreasonable searches and seizures' " without quoting the
text of the amendment at all. E.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.177, 183 (1990) (opinion of
the Court by Scalia, J.); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concur
ring).
12. The most common meaning of "general warrant" was a warrant that lacked specific
ity as to whom to arrest or where to search; for example, a warrant directing arrests of "sus
pected persons" or a search of "suspicious places." In addition, because the lack of specific
ity often reflected a lack of information, "general warrant" was also often used to denote a
warrant that lacked an adequate showing of justification for a search or arrest. See the con
trasting uses of "general warrant" in the 1776 Virginia provision set out infra text accompa
nying note 347 (using "general warrants" in the wider sense), and in the 1776 Maryland pro
vision set out infra note 351 (using "general warrants" only in the more specific sense of
unparticularized warrants).
"General warrant" could also carry an entirely innocent meaning - a warrant that was
directed to and executable by any of the constables in a county and/or was made returnable
to any justice of the peace in the county. See, for example, the form for a particularized ar
rest warrant for assault denoted "a general warrant" in CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 445
(James Parker ed., New York 1788) (This was a justice of the peace manual composed by a
former Justice of the Peace of Middlesex County, New Jersey, which was published in nu
merous versions. The version cited here was "Printed by John Patterson, for Robert Hodge,
No. 237 Queen-Street" in New York). Warrants of this latter type were not meant to be pro
hibited by the Fourth Amendment. This innocent usage of "general warrant" persisted into
the early nineteenth century. See United States v. Bollman, 24 Fed. Cas. 1189, 1196
(C.C.D.C. 1807) (No. 14,622) ("In all general warrants for arresting a supposed offender, the
direction to the officer is, to bring the party before the person issuing the warrant, or some
other justice of peace, &c."). Note that this innocent usage of "general warrants" may ex
plain why that term was not used in several of the state provisions and not included in the
language of the Fourth Amendment. This Article uses "general warrant" only to refer to
illegal warrants that lack adequate cause or particularity.
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broader assumption that the Bill of Rights was intended to be a com
prehensive catalog of rights. If one assumes the Fourth Amendment
must reach all intrusions by officers, the word "unreasonable" in the
first clause is the only term that could serve as a comprehensive stan
dard.13 Moreover, the reasonableness reading resonates with modern
lawyers who are comfortable with the idea that constitutional provi
sions often, even usually, contain relativistic balancing notions like
"reasonableness."
Because the first clause has been assumed to set out a broad rea
sonableness principle, modern debate over search and seizure doctrine
has focused not on whether reasonableness should be the central con
cept in search and seizure doctrine, but instead on competing con
structions of "Fourth Amendment reasonableness." For most of this
century, the Supreme Court has endorsed what is now called the
"warrant-preference" construction of Fourth Amendment reason
ableness, in which the use of a valid warrant - or at least compliance
with the warrant standard of probable cause - is the salient factor in
assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure.14 The warrant
preference construction is favored by advocates of civil liberties be
cause it enhances the potential for judicial supervision of police con
duct. Supporters of the warrant-preference construction also tend to
endorse the exclusion of illegally obtained items or information from
use as evidence as the proper means for enforcing government com
pliance with the Fourth Amendment.
For several decades, the Supreme Court has been shifting away
from the warrant-preference construction and toward what is now
called the "generalized-reasonableness" construction, in which the
value of the warrant is discounted and the constitutionality of a search
or seizure is determined simply by making a relativistic assessment of
the appropriateness of police conduct in light of the totality of the cir
cumstances.15 The generalized-reasonableness construction is favored

13. As then Justice Rehnquist once observed, "The Framers of the Fourth Amendment
have given us only the general standard of 'unreasonableness' as a guide in determining
whether searches and seizures meet the standard of that Amendment in those cases where a
warrant is not required." Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973).
14. See, e.g., Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967). In the Katz formulation, any warrantless arrest or search is presumptively
"unreasonable" unless it falls within one of the recognized and well delineated "exceptions"
to the warrant process.
15. The first full statement of the generalized-reasonableness approach appeared in
Justice Minton's majority opinion in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950)
("The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether
the search was reasonable."). More recently, a generalized-reasonableness approach was
reasserted in Justice Rehnquist's majority opinions in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 448,
see quotation supra note 13, and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (treating the
common-law rule authorizing search incident to arrest as deriving from a "reasonableness"
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by law and order advocates because it tends to allow greater leeway
Supporters of the
for police aggressively to enforce the law.
generalized-reasonableness construction also tend to disapprove of the
exclusionary rule.
The running debate over the proper construction of the reason
ableness standard should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the
competing constructions share common assumptions regarding the
Fourth Amendment's intended meaning. Both assume the text was
meant to regulate all government searches and seizures comprehen
sively, and both accept the centrality of a sweeping reasonableness
standard or concept of some sort. They disagree only about the con
tent of that concept.
ill . PREVIOUS TREA1MENTS OF THE HISTORICAL FOURTH
.AMENDMENT-AND THEIR SHORTCOMINGS
The literature on the history of search and seizure doctrine has also
almost uniformly accepted the interconnected assumptions that the
text was meant to regulate government intrusions comprehensively
and that it was meant to articulate a broad reasonableness standard.
As in the normative commentary, the principal divide in the historical
literature relates to the content of "reasonableness."
A.

The Conventional Historical Accounts by Lassan and Cuddihy

The conventional account of Fourth Amendment history (which
tends to parallel the warrant-preference construction) has been
shaped primarily by the first serious historical treatment, a monograph
by Nelson B. Lasson published in 1937.16 Lasson appears to have de
fined the goal of his project largely as connecting modem search and
seizure doctrine to the historical Fourth Amendment; as a result, he

principle). In recent terms, the Justices of the Rehnquist Court have broadly assessed com
pliance with the Fourth Amendment according to "objective reasonableness." See, e.g.,
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 {1990) (concluding that it was "reasonable" for police to
enter an apartment on the basis of a nonresident's apparent consent to their entry); Wilson
v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 {1995) (replacing the common-law knock-and-announce rule for
executing warrants with a "reasonableness" standard).

16. See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITIJTION {1937). Of course, Lasson was not

the first to write about the Fourth Amendment. One earlier commentary that probably in
fluenced his analysis was Osmond K. Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV.
L. REV. 361 {1921). Other constitutional commentators had also referred to the history of
the Fourth Amendment within broader discussions of constitutional history. See, e.g.,
CHARLEs WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 508-09 {1928).
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assumed away the fundamental question of whether there really was a
high degree of continuity in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.17
Lasson rooted the Framers' motivation for constitutional search
and seizure provisions in three episodes of controversy regarding
search and arrest authority that preceded the American Revolution.
The first arose in Boston where customs officials had used general
writs of assistance18 (which Americans perceived as a form of general
warrant19) as authority to search for untaxed imported goods. In the
1761 Writs ofAssistance Case, James Otis argued that the general writ
violated common-law principles and the statutory authority for the
writ was therefore unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the colonial court
upheld the legality of the general writ.20
17. Lasson's orientation may reflect the period during which he wrote - that is, after
the Court had already asserted in Carroll that "reasonableness" was the essence of the his
torical Fourth Amendment, see infra notes 525-530 and accompanying text, but prior to the
emergence of the skeptical academic attitude toward judicial pronouncements associated
with legal realism.
18. The writ of assistance attested to the authority of the bearer to search places in
which the bearer suspected uncustomed goods were hidden. It took its name from its com
mand that all peace officers and any other persons who were present "be assisting" in the
performance of the search. It was initially issued only to commissioned customs officials
(though it was used by their subordinates as well) but was later issued to naval officers as
well. The statutory authority for the writ made it applicable to searches of "houses" as well
as of ships, warehouses, and shops. See generally Joseph Raphael Frese, Early Parliamentary
Legislation on Writs of Assistance, 38 PuBLICATIONS COLONIAL SOC'Y MASS. 318 (1959)
[hereinafter Frese, Article].
19. See, e.g., William Henry Drayton's complaint quoted infra note 83; Mercy Otis
Warren's statement quoted infra text accompanying note 496. See generally JOHN PHILLIP
REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF
RIGHTS 194-98 (1986) (discussing the general warrant and general writ of assistance griev
ance).
Unfortunately, Professor Akhil Amar has recently muddied this point by asserting that
the Framers sought to ban only general warrants but not general writs of assistance. See
Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs ofAssistance, 30 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 53, 77-80 (1996) [hereinafter Amar, Boston]. Amar relied primarily on a state
ment by Lord Mansfield in a 1785 English case. Id. at 79-80 (discussing Cooper v. Boot, 4
Doug. 339, 99 Eng. Rep. 911 (K.B. 1785)). Americans would not have paid Cooper much
heed, however, because it construed an English excise statute never in effect in the
American colonies. Moreover, it is unlikely they ever heard of Cooper prior to 1789 because
the earliest published report was Cooper v. Booth, 3 Esp. 135, 170 Eng. Rep. 564 (K.B.
1785). Publication of Espinasse's reports began with the first volume in 1796. See 1 A
LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS 335, entry 5 (W.
Harold Maxwell & Leslie F. Maxwell eds., 2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY]
(showing the volumes of the first edition were published "1796-1811"). Although I cannot
determine the precise year in which the third volume was published, it reported cases tried in
1799 through 1801, see 170 Eng. Rep. 517 (1927) (reprinting title of 3 Esp. (1819 ed.)); thus,
the third volume was published no earlier than 1801. The reason the 1785 decision in Cooper
was included among the later cases was that an 1800 case included in the reports referred to
Cooper, but Cooper had not previously been published. See 3 Esp. 127, 170 Eng. Rep. 562
(note on inclusion of cases). The report that Amar cites, 4 Doug. 339, 99 Eng. Rep. 911, was
not published until 1831. See 1 LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra, at 299, entry 44.
20. There is no case report. I style the case the Writs ofAssistance Case because it is the
most descriptive title, although it is sometimes called "Paxton's Case" or "Petition of Lech-
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The second episode occurred in England- when the Tory govern
ment employed general warrants to initiate seditious libel prosecu
tions against John Wilkes - an opposition politician - and his sup
porters. Those warrants directed officers to determine who was
responsible for several allegedly seditious publications, to arrest those
persons, and to seize their papers. Officers used the general warrants
to arrest Wilkes and numerous other men and often searched houses
and seized papers. Wilkes and his supporters then brought trespass
actions against the officers. In several high-visibility Wilkesite cases
decided between 1763 and 1765, English courts ruled that such general
warrants violated common law, and juries ordered the executing offi
cers to pay trespass damages to Wilkes and other victims. In 1769,

mere" (after the names of customs officials). The record consists of notes taken at the two
hearings. John Adams took notes at the first hearing. See Petition of Lechmere, in 2 LEGAL
PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 123-34 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965). Josiah
Quincy took notes at the second hearing. See Paxton's Case, Mass. (Quincy) 51 (1761). The
most important aspect of the case is James Otis's argument, during the first hearing, that
such writs were illegal. See discussion infra notes 405-412 and accompanying text. The Mas
sachusetts court was presided over by Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson, however,
and it ultimately upheld the writs. For a brief treatment of the case, see LASSON, supra note
16, at 55-63. For more detailed treatments, see MAURICE H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF
ASSISTANCE �ASE (1978); 2 William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and
Original Meaning 757-825 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Oaremont Graduate
School).
It is difficult to assess how widely news of Otis's argument may have spread within the
colonies, or exactly when it might have spread. It is evident that Otis's argument was widely
known in Boston because many members of the bar and merchant community actually heard
the argument and also because Otis published part of it in a newspaper column in 1762. See
BOSTON GAZETTE & COUN1RY JOURNAL, Jan. 4, 1762 (article) [hereinafter Otis's 1762 Ar
ticle] (probably authored by James Otis), reprinted in SMITH, supra, at 563-66. Moreover,
general warrants once again became an issue in Massachusetts in 1762 when the colonial
legislature, in which Otis was a leader, passed a statute banning the use of general warrants;
however, it was vetoed by the governor. See Mass. Writs of Assistance Bill (1762), reprinted
in SMITH, supra, at 567-68. In addition, Adams's abstract of Otis's argument was circulated
to some degree and was published in a Boston paper in 1773. See John Adams, Abstract,
MASS. SPY, Apr. 29, 1773, reprinted in SMITH, supra, at 548, 551-55 . We do not know
whether news of the case reached other colonies because there are substantial gaps in the
surviving copies of important colonial papers. It seems likely, however, that some informa
tion about Otis's argument spread during the latter 1760s because Otis was a delegate to the
Stamp Act Congress in 1765, see infra note 400, and became acquainted with other colonial
leaders at that time. For example, he met John Dickinson of Pennsylvania, with whom he
later corresponded regarding the general writ of assistance. See infra note 138.
Amar has asserted that Otis's argument exerted less influence than the Wilkesite cases
on the framing of the Fourth Amendment because Otis's argument was invoked only once
during the debates over a federal Bill of Rights in 1787-88. See Amar, Boston, supra note 19,
at 53, 66, 76. The absence of specific references in 1787-88 is not significant, however, be
cause the illegality of general warrants was so settled at that time that writers rarely cited
any authorities for that point. It is noteworthy that Amar has not provided any evidence
that the Wilkesite cases were widely discussed in 1787-88.
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Wilkes also won a verdict against the Secretary of State who had is
sued the general warrant.21
Americans learned of the arrests and searches of Wilkesites under
the general warrant and of the subsequent trespass cases through brief
accounts that appeared in London and colonial newspapers. The ac
counts of the trials exclaimed the importance of the issue for English
liberty and the sanctity of the house while condemning general war
rants as "illegal," "unconstitutional," "void," "oppressive," and "un
warrantable."22 Similar accounts also appeared in pamphlets that cir-

21. I use "Wilkesite cases" as a collective label for the English trespass cases brought by
Wilkes and his supporters. The first set of cases were brought by victims of a "nameless"
general warrant (issued by the Secretary of State, Lord Halifax) that had directed king's
messengers to identify the persons responsible for publishing The North Briton No. 45,
which had carried a satirical account of a speech by the King. See GEORGE NOBBE, THE
NORTH BRITON: A STUDY IN POLffiCAL PROPAGANDA (reissued 1966) (1939). The mes
sengers arrested upwards of forty men and also searched houses and seized private papers.
The victims then brought trespass cases in the Court of Common Pleas presided over by
Charles Pratt (later Lord Camden), Chief Justice of that court. Pratt instructed the London
juries that the general warrant was illegal, and the juries awarded trespass damages to the
plaintiff victims. The more prominent cases in this first set were Huckle v. Money (C.P.
1763), Lindsay v. Money (C.P. 1763), Wilkes v. Wood (C.P. 1763), and Leach v. Money (C.P.
1763). The Court of King's Bench reviewed and upheld the judgment in Leach in 1765.
Thereafter, a number of other cases were settled.

A second set of cases related to an earlier round of arrests and searches involving publi
cation of The Monitor. Those warrants named the persons to be arrested, but were general
as to the papers to be seized. These later trespass cases followed the same scenario as the
earlier cases. The main case was Entick v. Carrington (C.P. 1765), in which Lord Camden
(Pratt) ruled that the papers search warrant was illegal because there was no existing
authority in common law or statute for any magistrate to issue a search warrant to seize pa
pers for use as evidence.
Following these cases, Parliament in 1766 passed resolutions condemning general war
rants as illegal, at least for certain uses, unless Parliament itself authorized them.
The final development came in the 1769 trial of Wilkes v. Halifax, in which John Wilkes
won a judgment of 4000 pounds against Halifax for having issued the "nameless" general
warrant. See infra note 222.
Citations to the case reports for the Wtlkesite cases are provided infra note 25. For a
brief account of the Wilkesite cases, see LASSON, supra note 16, at 42-50. For more detailed
accounts, see 2 Cuddiliy, supra note 20, at 884-927, and NOBBE, supra.
22. The following examples typify the press reports that shaped American perceptions
of the Wilkesite cases. A Boston newspaper account of the initial Wilkesite trials in Huckle
and Lindsay reported the 200 pound verdicts against the officers, noted that the verdicts
condemned "the dangerous practice of issuing general and unconstitutional warrants," and
exclaimed that "no age has produced a determination of more general and extensive conse
quence to every free born ENGLISHMAN." BOSTON GAZETTE & COUNTRY JOURNAL,
Sept. 19, 1763 (no. 441), at 2, cols. 2-3.

A London press report of the December 1763 trial of Wilkes v. Wood listed all of the at
torneys and jurors involved and declared that the case involved "a Cause, that, in the highest
degree, affected the most sacred and inviolate Rights and Liberties of Englishmen." It also
exclaimed:
By this important decision, every Englishman has the satisfaction of seeing, that his house is
his castle, and is not liable to be searched, nor his papers pried into, by the malignant curios
ity of King's Messengers, and an utter end is put to this unconstitutional practice; and it may
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be truly said, that no question was ever agitated in a Court of Judicature of more interesting
consequences to Society.

LONDON CHRON., Dec. 6-8, 1763 (No. 1082), at 550, cols. 1-2. This entire report was re
printed virtually verbatim in some colonial papers. See, e.g., BOSTON GAZETIB &
COUNTRY JOURNAL, Feb. 20, 1764 (no. 464), at 4, col. 1.
A London press report of the trial of Leach, held a week after that in Wood, carried a
quotation of Chief Justice Pratt's speech from the case:
This warrant is unconstitutional, illegal, and absolutely void: It is a general warrant, directed
to four Messengers, to take up any persons, without naming or describing them with any cer
tainty, and to bring them together with their papers. If it be good, a Secretary of State can
delegate and depute any one of the Messengers, or any even from the lowest of the people,
to take examinations, to commit or release, and in fine to do every act which the highest ju
dicial officers the law knows can do or order. There is no authority in our law books that
mention these kinds of warrants, but in express terms condemn them.
I do venture to pronounce this warrant illegal . . . .

LONDON CHRON., Dec. 10-13, 1763 (no. 1084), at 562, col. 2. (This account does not identify
Pratt as the speaker, but his identity was evident from the context.) This account was also
reprinted verbatim in some colonial papers. See, e.g., BOSTON GAZETIB & COUNTRY
JOURNAL, Mar. 26, 1764 (no. 469), at 2, cols. 2-3 ; see also the report discussed infra note 24
(attributing this statement to Pratt).
The 1765 Court of King's Bench review of the verdict against the messengers in Leach
prompted only a brief report in the London press that the verdict "was affirmed by the
unanimous opinion of the Court of King's Bench." LONDON CHRON., Nov. 7-9, 1765 (no.
1387), at 452, col. 3. Nothing was reported regarding the content of the legal arguments. I
have not located any account of this ruling in an American paper - possibly colonial atten
tion was fixated on the Stamp Act crisis at that date.
London press coverage of Entick was also more limited than that of the earlier cases.
Beyond the personages and verdict, the report simply noted that
Lord Camden, in a very learned and eloquent speech, which lasted two hours and a half, de
clared it was the unanimous opinion of the whole court, that Secretaries of State had no
manner of right to grant warrants to enter any persons houses, in order to seize their papers,
&c. By this noble determination, Englishmens houses may be now again considered as their
castles, and not so liable to be exposed to the wanton sport or resentment of the iron hand of
arbitrary power.

LONDON CHRON., Nov. 26-28, 1765 (no. 1395), at 516, col. 2.
I have not located any report of Entick in a Boston paper. However, a very brief report
appeared in the Williamsburg paper:
Lord Camden gave his opinion upon the granting of warrants by Secretaries of State. After
enlarging on and explaining numbers of cases, which lasted two hours and twenty minutes,
his Lordship declared such warrants (except in cases of high treason) to be illegal, oppres
sive, and unwarrantable.

VA. GAZETIB

(Purdie), Mar. 7, 1766 (no. 772), at 2, col. 1. (This is virtually the entire report
and does not refer to Entick by name; however, the date implied for Camden's speech, Nov.
27, 1765, matches the decision in Entick.)
Finally, the facts of the 1769 verdict of 4,000 pounds (against the Secretary of State who
issued the general warrant) in Wilkes v. Halifax was widely reported (along with the disap
pointment of Wilkes's supporters at the amount of the damages). Those accounts were de
void of the rhetorical flourishes of the earlier accounts, however, probably because the ille
gality of the general warrant was by then old news. See, e.g., LONDON CHRON., Nov. 9-11,
1769 (no. 2014), at 450, cols. 2-3; BOSTON GAZETTE & COUNTRY JOURNAL, Feb. 5, 1770
(no. 774), at 1, col. 1.
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culated on both sides of the Atlantic,23 as well as in other periodicals
that probably reached the colonies.24 (The case reports that are com
monly cited in modem commentary, however, were not published con
temporaneously with the cases but mostly appeared a decade or more
later
after American hostility toward general warrants had already
hardened.25)
-

The colonial press accounts discussed in
Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1631-34.

this note are among those identified in 3

23. The most important pamphlet was probably FATIIBR OF CANDOR, AN ENQUIRY
INTO TiiE DOCTRINE LATELY PROPAGATED CONCERNING LIBELS, WARRANTS, AND TiiE
SEIZURE OF PAPERS {1764, reprinted 1970) (criticizing Parliament for not condemning gen
eral warrants and paper searches in stronger terms). See also infra note 78. "Father of Can
dor" may have been a pseudonym of Pratt's. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF TIIB
FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RlGIIT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 391 {1968).
24. For example, a London publication, the Annual Register, provided a yearly survey of
important events. The survey of 1763, first published in 1764, carried an account of the gen
eral warrant issued for the North Briton No. 45, Wilkes's arrest and the search of his papers,
his release under a writ of habeas corpus, and the proceedings in Wilkes v. Wood. THE
ANNuAL REGISTER FOR 1763, APPENDIX TO CHRONICLE 135-47. The account of Wood
reports a portion of Chief Justice Pratt's charge to the jury in which he declared that "[t]his
warrant is unconstitutional, illegal, and absolutely void . . . ." Id. at 145. {However, the
quoted passage appears to be a somewhat more elaborate version of the statement reported
in the press accounts of Leach. See supra note 22. No similar statement appears in Lofft's
later report of Wood. See infra note 25.)

25. The case reports of the Wilksite cases were not published contemporaneously with
the trials. In fact, the report of Wilkes v. Wood and the longer report of Entick v. Carrington
- the two case reports that are most heavily cited and quoted by modem commentators did not appear until after the American controversies over general writs of assistance had
largely run their course. {As I explain in the text infra, the widespread colonial controver
sies over the general writ ran from the enactment of the Townshend Duties Act in 1767 to
about 1774, at which time they were displaced by more dire developments such as the mili
tary occupation of Boston.) Only three case reports from the Wilksite cases reached the
colonies during the period of legal controversies over general writs.
The first two Wtlksite case reports were published in London in 1770 in Wilson's Re
ports: Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 {C.P. 1763) {denying the messengers'
motion for a reduction of damages); Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807
(C.P. 1765) (a short report of Lord Camden's ruling that a search warrant could not be le
gally issued for a search of papers because no such warrant was authorized by common law
or statute). Although the conventional citations for these cases are to the second volume of
Wilson's Reports, that citation is actually to the three-volume format of the third London
edition published in 1799 and subsequently reprinted in 95 English Reports. Wilson's Re
ports were originally published in "3 p[ar]ts in 2 vol[ume]s" - volume one in 1770 and vol
ume two in 1775. See 1 LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 310, entry 131. A second
edition was also printed in that format. See id. I have been unable to locate a surviving copy
of either of those three-parts-in-two-volumes editions, but it is reasonably certain that parts
one and two comprised volume one of the first edition, while part three comprised volume
two of the first edition. Thus, notwithstanding the conventional citations to the second vol
ume, the Huckle and Entick reports were originally published in volume one of the first edi
tion in 1770.
The only other case report published during the period of intense colonial controversy
over general writs was a report of the King's Bench proceeding in Leach published in 1771:
Leach v. Money, 3 Burr. 1692, 1742, 11 St. Tr. 307 {Francis Hargrave's 4th ed.), 19 Howell St.
Tr. 1001, 97 Eng. Rep. 1050, 1075 {K.B. 1765). See 1 LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 19,
at 294, entry 20 {showing that 3 Burr. was published in 1771).
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The third episode of controversy over search authority broke out
when Parliament reauthorized the use of the general writ for customs
searches in the American colonies in the Townshend Act of 1767.
That round of controversy produced legal disputes over general writs
throughout the American colonies and persisted until nearly the eve
of the Revolution. During that period, customs officials petitioned for
the issuance of general writs, but colonial judges usually ignored or
denied the petitions and often described the requested general writs as
"illegal" notwithstanding the specific statutory authority.26 The colo-

The report of the 1763 trial in Wilkes v. Wood appeared in 1776. Lofft 1, 19 Howell St.
Tr. 1153, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763). See 1 LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 304,
entry 83 (showing that Lofft Rep. was published in 1776).
The more elaborate version of Camden's statements in Entick, which is virtually always
quoted in modem judicial opinions and commentaries, was not published until 1781: Entick
v. Carrington, 11 St. Tr. 313 (Francis Hargrave's 4th ed.), reprinted in 19 Howell St. Tr. 1029
(C.P. 1765) (not reprinted in Eng. Rep.). See 1 LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at
369, entry 8 (showing that the final, eleventh, volume was published in 1781). It does not
seem likely that Hargrave's edition of State Trials, an eleven-volume set of reports of trea
son, sedition, and prominent criminal cases from the time of Henry IV through the 1760s,
would have been widely obtained by American lawyers during the 1780s. References to this
reporter in American sources are rare; the earliest I have found is in the 1794 justice manual
by William Waller Hening. See WILLIAM WALLER HENING, NEW VmGINIA JUSTICE 415
(entered for publication 1794; the version cited was printed in Richmond by "Aug: Davis" in
1799) (citing "11 State Trials 321"). Moreover, as I describe below, virtually all of the lan
guage in the Fourth Amendment, including "unreasonable searches and seizures," had ap
peared as of the 1780 Massachusetts provision; hence, it is unlikely that Camden's state
ments in the longer version of Entick influenced the Framers' views. See also infra notes
212, 508.
No formal case report was ever published of the 1769 trial in Wilkes v.
described in newspapers and magazine articles. See infra note 222.

Halifax, but it was

26. In 1766, the authorities in London concluded that the statutory authority for the use
of the writ in the American colonies was inadequate, so Parliament reauthorized use of the
writ in the Townshend Act of 1767, 7 Geo. m, ch. 46, § 10 (Eng.). Other sections of the act
imposed increased customs taxes on a wide range of imported products. Thereafter, legal
controversies erupted in most of the colonies when customs officers petitioned the colonial
courts to issue general writs. After some initial uncertainty, the colonial courts refused to
issue the writs in a general (unparticularized) form. See infra note 82. Both Virginia and
Pennsylvania witnessed several rounds of controversy in which customs officers repetitioned
for a general writ after the judges of those courts had refused to issue it. In fact, the judges
persisted in their refusal even after the English Attorney General weighed in with an opin
ion that the general writ was legal. In Connecticut, the judges simply refused to rule on the
customs officers' petitions. In South Carolina, the judges initially refused to issue the writ
until the judges were replaced by Tory appointees. See infra note 83. There was no legal
controversy over the Townshend writ in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, however, be
cause the 1761 ruling in the Writs ofAssistance Case was taken to have settled the legality of
the writ in those colonies. Even so, public opposition in Boston to the use of the writ was
intense during this period. See infra note 139.
The first substantial historical account of the Townshend Act writ controversies was
Oliver M Dickerson, Writs ofAssistance as a Ca11Se of the Revolution, in THE ERA OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1939) [hereinafter Dickerson, Writs of
Assistance]. That account is still the most useful for an overview, although it has been super
seded on some details. See also Joseph R. Frese, SJ., Writs of Assistance in the American
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nial judges were undoubtedly influenced not only by the earlier press
accounts of the Wilkesite cases, but also by Blackstone's s ummary of
the condemnation of general warrants in those cases and , perhaps, by
the appearance of the first formal reports from Wilkesite cases.27 In
1774, the First Continental Congress also included general writs
among the colonial grievances against Parliament.28
Lasson's account clearly established that the memory of these
three episodes provided the stimulus for the Framers' subsequent
adoption of constitutional search and seizure provisions. The only
disagreements among later commentators concern the relative impor
tance of these episodes. (I think that the widespread and protracted
controversies over the reauthorization of the general writ in the
Townshend Act exerted the most direct influence on the American
Framers.29)

Colonies: 1660-1776, at 225-300 (1951) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard Univer
sity) [hereinafter, Frese, Dissertation]; 2 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1017-84.
27. A series of developments probably reignited American interest in the condemnation
of general warrants in the Wilkesite cases concurrently with the colonial legal controversies
over the Townshend Act writ. One was that John Wilkes became embroiled in a second
controversy when he was denied a seat in the House of Commons despite his electoral vic
tory in 1768. Because that controversy dovetailed with American complaints about lack of
representation in Parliament, "Wilkes and Liberty" became a Whig slogan on both sides of
the Atlantic, and a number of American Whigs endorsed and corresponded with Wilkes at
that time. That controversy renewed American interest in Wilkes's earlier legal battle
against general warrants. See PETER D.G. THOMAS, JOHN WILKES: A FRIEND TO LIBERTY
159-75 {1996). Moreover, in early 1770, colonial papers carried reports of the verdict for
Wilkes in Wilkes v. Halifax. See supra note 22; infra note 222. In addition, Americans un
doubtedly heeded Blackstone's 1769 condemnation of general warrants, which was based on
the Court of King's Bench proceedings in Leach. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 288 n.i (1769, reprinted facsimile The Univer
sity of Chicago Press, 1979), quoted infra note 78. The case reports of three Wilkesite cases
Huckle, Entick (the shorter version), and Leach also became available during the early
1770s. See supra note 25.

-

-

28. See infra notes 139, 142.
29. Lasson did not emphasize the Townshend Act writ controversies, but he wrote be
fore Dickerson's seminal account of those legal controversies was available. See supra note
26. I think the memory of Parliament's 1767 reauthorization· of general warrants for customs
searches of houses was the principal stimulus for the adoption of bans against general war
rants in the state declarations of rights adopted between 1776 and 1784, and for the anti
Federalist calls for a federal ban against general warrants during the constitutional ratifica
tion debates of 1787-88. As I explain below, the concerns about search authority raised by
anti-Federalists during the ratification debates of 1787-88 were primarily about revenue
searches of houses. See infra notes 164-166; ct Dickerson, Writs ofAssistance, supra note 26,
at 48 (asserting that the controversy over the Townshend Act writ "became an issue
throughout the colonies, involving nearly every judge and prominent lawyer in America out
side of Massachusetts and New Hampshire"); Frese, Dissertation, supra note 26, at 300 (con
cluding that "with such a widespread legal discussion [regarding the reauthorization of the
writ of assistance in the Townshend Act] it is hardly to be wondered if a fourth amendment
was proposed for the American Constitution").
Commentators who have relied primarily on case reports have tended to omit or under
state the significance of the Townshend Act writ controversies, probably because those con
troversies were never formally reported. See infra note 62.
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As to the actual drafting of the state and federal search and seizure
provisions, Lasson asserted that the Framers meant to ban general
warrants but that their concerns over searches and seizures broadened
into a comprehensive "principle [of] freedom from unreasonable
search and seizure."30 Although he conceded that Madison had ad
dressed only general warrants in the draft for a federal provision,
Lasson asserted that a subsequent language change made in the House
of Representatives injected the broader reasonableness principle.
Thus, he asserted that the first clause of the Fourth Amendment was
meant to state a broad reasonableness standard for government intru
sions, while the second was specifically meant to ban general war
rants.31
Lasson also described the subsequent historical development of
Fourth Amendment law as though modem doctrine reflected a con
tinuous development from the original meaning of the text. Although
he noted that the federal courts had little to say about the Fourth
Amendment during the early 1800s,32 he treated the Supreme Court's
1886 ruling in Boyd v. United States33 - that a statute was unconstitu
tional because it authorized an unreasonable seizure of a commercial
invoice - as though it were an application of the original meaning of
the text.34 He also treated the Court's subsequent recognition of a
broad exclusionary rule in the 1914 decision Weeks v. United States35 as
a more or less continuous development from Boyd.36 Thus Lasson
claimed that a broad reasonableness standard was always central to
the Fourth Amendment's meaning.37
Numerous commentators have relied upon and repeated Lasson's
historical treatment, often claiming it supports the warrant-preference
30.

LASSON, supra note 16, at 81.

31. See id. at 100-03. Lasson was not the first commentator to assert this construction.
See the earlier statement by Fraenkel discussed infra note 527. Madison's focus on banning
general warrants is discussed infra notes 430-439 and accompanying text. The subsequent
language change is discussed infra notes 477-499 and accompanying text.
32

See id. at 106-07.

33. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
34. See LASSON, supra note 16, at 107-10. Lasson accepted at face value the originalist
claims Justice Bradley made about the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment in Boyd,
but those claims were actually groundless. See infra notes 512-513.
35. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
36.

See LASSON, supra note 16, at 111-12.

37. Because Lasson assumed the presence of a broad reasonableness standard, he did
not identify Carroll's use of a reasonableness-in-the-circumstances standard as a significant
development. See id. at 125-26, 130 n.84, 131 n.90. However, Carroll, which approved of a
warrantless search of an automobile for illegal liquor, in part because of the exigency pre
sented by the mobility of the vehicle, was the first Supreme Court case to treat "unreason
able" in the Fourth Amendment as a relativistic reasonableness-in-the-circumstances stan
dard. See infra notes 523-529 and accompanying text.
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interpretation.38 Likewise, a number of Supreme Court opinions have
cited Lasson's as the authoritative historical account.39
In addition, William J. Cuddihy essentially replicated Lasson's
analysis in a massive 1990 Ph.D. dissertation that added considerably
to the historical documentation of the origins of the Fourth Amend
ment.40 Like Lasson, Cuddihy treated the first clause as stating a

38. Numerous co=entaries draw on Lasson's co=entary to describe Fourth
Amendment history; those that address the subject in some detail include (in chronological
order): JACOB w. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND TIIE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN CONSTIIUTIONAL INTERPRETATION {1966); Joseph J. Stengel, Background ofthe
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (pts. 1 & 2), 3 U. RICH. L. REV.
278 (1969), 4 U. RICH L. REV. 60 (1969); Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 395-99 (1974); Luis G. Stelzner, The Fourth Amendment:
The Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses, 10 N.M. L. REV. 33, 35-41 {1979-80); POLYVIOS G.
POLYVIOU, SEARCH & SEIZURE: CONSTIIUTIONAL AND COMMON LAW 1-19 (1982); Jo
seph D. Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 603 {1982); Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a 'Prin
cipled Basis' Rather than an 'Empirical Proposition'?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 571-79
(1983); Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development,
and Future ofthe Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases, 83 COI:.UM. L. REV. 1365,
1372-80 (1983); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 257, 281-95 (1984); Martin Grayson, The Warrant Clause in Historical Con
text, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 107 {1987); John MA. DiPippa, Is the Fourth Amendment Obsolete?
- Restating the Fourth Amendment in Functional Terms, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 483, 503-14
(1987-88); and Clark D. Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis of the Meanings of 'Search' in
the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 IOWA L. REV. 541, 550-59 (1988).
See also 1 LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 3-ll.
39. Supreme Court opinions have frequently cited Lasson's co=entary (as well as that
by LANDYNSKI, supra note 38) as a general authority on Fourth Amendment history. Cita
tions to Lasson that relate to key aspects of the history addressed in this Article include (in
chronological order): Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 454-55 (1963) (Brennan, J., dis
senting) (citing Lasson for the proposition that the first clause sets out a "more encompass
ing principle" than the warrant standards); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 303, 317 (1967)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Lasson regarding the enlargement of the text to include a
broad reasonableness principle); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297,
328-29 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Lasson for the proposition that the Amend
ment was aimed at curbing abusive warrants); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 183
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Lasson regarding the enlargement of the text to in
clude a broad reasonableness principle); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 429 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring) (citing Lasson for the proposition' that the Framers were uncon
cerned with warrantless intrusions); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979) (opinion
of the Court by Powell, J.) (citing Lasson for the proposition that the Framers believed a
specific warrant was needed for a search of premises); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
585 (1980) (opinion of the Court by Stevens, J.) (citing Lasson regarding the enlargement of
the text to include a broad reasonableness principle); id. at 611 (White, J., dissenting)
(same); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (opinion of the Court by Powell, J.)
(same); and United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 971 {1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (citing Lasson for the proposition that the Amendment was aimed at
curbing abusive warrants).
40. See Cuddihy, supra note 20. Cuddihy's study examines search and seizure from the
mists of time to 1791 but does not address the understanding of the Fourth Amendment
during the nineteenth century. See also William J. Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man's
House Was Not His Castle: Origins of the Fourth Amendment, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 371
(1980).
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broad reasonableness principle. In fact, he described the Fourth
Amendment as the culmination of a long development of a "concept"
of unreasonable searches and seizures that ultimately took the form of
a strong preference that searches be based on specific warrants.41 Al
though Cuddihy's work is not yet as widely known as Lasson's,42 one
Supreme Court opinion has cited it,43 and Professor Tracey Maclin has
summarized Cuddihy's analysis and offered it as support for the
warrant-preference interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.44 Pro
fessor Leonard W. Levy, Cuddihy's dissertation adviser, has also en
dorsed a similar view of the original meaning of the Fourth Amend
ment, although he placed greater stress on the vagueness of the
reasonableness concept.45
I have found Cuddihy's thorough research to be of immense value in identifying relevant
historical sources; the citations in this Article do not adequately reflect how much I have
learned from his work. However, I disagree with a number of Cuddihy's interpretations of
the historical sources. See infra notes 107, 145, 163-166, 206, 297, 299, 349, 350, 377, 434, 473.

41. Cuddihy described the reference to "unreasonable searches and seizures" in the first
clause of the Fourth Amendment as a general principle in the same way Lasson did:
The most significant element of the amendment was . . . the generic concept of [unreason
able search and seizure]. The amendment's first clause, which explicitly renounces all unrea
sonable searches and seizures, overshadows the second clause, which implicitly renounced
only a single category, the general warrant. The Framers of the amendment were less con
cerned with a right against general warrants than with the broader rights those warrants in
fringed

2 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1545.

Sinillarly,

[t]he history that preceded the Fourth Amendment . . . reveals a depth and complexity that
transcends language. To think of the amendment as a right against general warrants dispar
ages its intricacy. The amendment expressed not a single idea but a family of ideas whose
identity and dimensions developed in historical context.

Id. at 1555.
42. But see the favorable review of Cuddihy's dissertation in Morgan Cloud, Searching
Through History: Searchingfor History, 63 U. cm. L. REv. 1707 {1996) (book review).
43. See Vernonia School Dist 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 669 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dis
senting) (citing 3 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1402, 1499, 1555, for the proposition that the
Framers intended that searches be based on individualized suspicion).
Cuddihy's conclusions in that regard.

I agree with

44. See Tracey Maclin, The Complexity ofthe Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review,
77 B.U. L. REV. 925 (1997) [hereinafter Maclin, Complexity]; Tracey Maclin, When the Cure
for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994) [hereinaf
ter Maclin, Cure].

45. See LEONARD w. LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION,
ch. 11 (1988) [hereinafter LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING]. That chapter has been twice repro
duced. See Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fourth Amendment, 114 POL. SCI. Q. 79 (1999)
(reprinting the 1988 chapter but deleting a number of footnotes showing reliance on
Cuddihy's dissertation); LEONARD w. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, ch. 7 (1999)
(reprinting the text of the 1988 chapter but deleting all footnotes). I do not cite either of the
redundant publications.
Although Levy's account largely tracks that of Lasson and Cuddihy, he has stressed the
supposedly open-ended and undefined character of the supposed "reasonableness" princi
ple. For example, he has asserted that "[the Fourth Amendment] contained principles that
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The Shortcomings ofthe Conventional Accounts

The historical accounts given by Lasson and Cuddihy suffer from a
serious shortcoming; neither clarifies the basic mystery that resides in
the Fourth Amendment's two-clause text. As noted above, the text
appears incomplete or incoherent insofar as it fails to state whether or
in what circumstances a warrant is required; thus, it does not say when
the warrant standards, or when only the "reasonableness" standard,
apply. Given Lasson's and Cuddihy's interpretation, the silence is
mysterious, even perverse, because the question of whether or when a
warrant is required would seem central to any practical application of
the text.46
It is clear that the Framers did not intend that warrants be required
for all searches and seizures conducted by officers. For example, the
common law permitted a constable to make a warrantless arrest for a
felony in some circumstances.47 Likewise, framing-era customs stat
utes permitted officers to search ships without a warrant.48 Yet the use
and regulation of warrant authority was obviously important to the
Framers - the inclusion of the warrant standards in the second clause
of the Fourth Amendment demonstrates that.
So what did the
Framers intend regarding warrant use? When were each of the two
clauses meant to apply? Both Lasson and Cuddihy failed to answer
these questions.
C.

The Generalized-Reasonableness Accounts by Taylor and Amar

The absence of any clear warrant requirement in the text, and the
absence of any solution to that mysterious omission in the conven
tional historical accounts, left an opening for competing interpreta
tions of the historical Fourth Amendment. Professor Telford Taylor
leveled the seminal challenge in a 1967 lecture.49 He noted that the
earliest state search and seizure provisions had addressed only warrant
standards, but had been silent as to warrantless intrusions.50 Largely
on that basis, he asserted that the Framers viewed "the warrant" as

were as vague as they might be comprehensive," referring to the open-endedness of the
"reasonableness" standard. LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING, supra, at 245.
46. See co=entaries cited supra note 9.
47. See, e.g., Grano, supra note 38, at 621 ("[H]istory indicates that warrantless felony
arrests did not cause consternation [among the Framers]."). See also the discussion of the
co=on-law of arrest authority infra notes 217-230 and accompanying text.

48. See infra notes 146-159 and accompanying text.
49. See TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
SEARCH, SEIZURE AND SURVEILLANCE AND FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 19-46 (1969)
(printing 1967 lecture).
50. See id. at 41-42.
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"an enemy."s1 Thus, he concluded that the Framers had feared rather
than preferred warrants, and that the modem notion of a warrant re
quirement "stood the Fourth Amendment on its head."s2 Because he
interpreted historical sources as showing that warrantless arrests and
warrantless searches incident to arrest had long been approved in
English common law, he also asserted that the Framers were "[not] at
all concerned" with controlling warrantless intrusions by officers, and
that they viewed warrantless searches made incident to arrest as
"quite normal and, in the language of the fourth amendment, 'reason
able.' "s3
Proponents of the generalized-reasonableness construction gave
Taylor's reading a warm welcome. Perhaps because of his personal
prominence, several Supreme Court opinions uncritically recited his
claims,54 and Judge Richard Posner also gave them increased visibility
through his own commentary.ss In addition, Taylor's treatment also

51. Id. at 41 (asserting also that the Framers did not see "the warrant as a protection
against unreasonable searches" but "as an authority for unreasonable and oppressive
searches, and sought to confine its issuance and execution . • .").
52

Id. at 23-24.

53. Id. at 39. Note, however, that Taylor expressed some agnosticism regarding the in
tended meaning of "unreasonable." See id. at 43 ("Nothing in the legislative or other history
of the fourth amendment sheds much light on the purpose of the first clause. Quite possibly
it was to cover shortcomings in warrants other than those specified in the second clause;
quite possibly it was to cover other unforeseeable contingencies.").
54. Supreme Court opinions have cited Taylor's commentary as authority for a variety
of historical points; those that relate to the historical meaning of the Fourth Amendment
include (in chronological order): Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 492 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Taylor's claim that a warrant requirement "st[ands] the
amendment on its head"); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 233 (1973) (opinion of
the Court by Rehnquist, J.) (citing Taylor's treatment of the historical basis for warrantless
searches incident to arrest); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 116 (1975) (opinion of the Court
by Powell, J.) (citing Taylor for proposition that the stolen goods search warrant was the
Framers' model for a "reasonable" search); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 327-28
(1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Taylor as authority that the Framers were concerned
with "circumscrib[ing] the warrant power" rather than controlling warrantless searches);
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 621 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Taylor's
claim that the Framers did not intend to require or encourage use of warrants); Steagald v.
United States, 451 U.S. 204, 228 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Taylor's claim that
warrantless searches of houses could be made incident to arrest at time of franiing); Robbins
v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Taylor's claim that a
warrant requirement "st[ands] the amendment on its head"); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 972 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Taylor's claim that
the Framers were more concerned with controlling warrants than with controlling the war
rantless officer); and California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citing Taylor as supporting the view that the Fourth Amendment was meant to restrict the
issuance of warrants so as to preserve the jury's role in regulating searches and seizures).
See also United States v. Brown, 64 F.3d 1083, 1085 (7th Cir. 1995) (opinion by Easterbrook,
J., joined by Posner, J.) (reciting Taylor's claim that the warrant requirement "st[ands] the
amendment on its head").
55. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 9, at 52 n.9, 72 n.56. Although this commentary was
primarily an economic argument for replacing the exclusionary rule with a tort remedy, Pos-
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provided a jumping-off point for several further lines of commentary
that rejected the conventional history, including commentaries by
Professor Gerard Bradley56 and Professor William Stuntz.57
Professor Akhil Amar has produced a series of articles constituting
the most ambitious attempt to craft a textual and historical case for
the generalized-reasonableness construction.58 Amar has followed

ner did follow Taylor in asserting that the Fourth Amendment was inspired by "English
cases." Id. at 52 & n.9. He also followed Taylor in asserting that the Framers did not want
to encourage use of warrants but "to discourage their use by imposing stringent require
ments on their issuance," and that the Fourth Amendment was not aimed at warrantless
searches, but at the possibility "that magistrates might issue unreasonably broad warrants."
Id. at 72 n.56. Finally, Posner followed Taylor in expressing skepticism as to "what exactly
[the Framers] meant by the term 'unreasonable' in the first clause of the Fourth Amend
ment." Id. at 74; see also Taylor's statement supra note 53.
56. Professor Gerald Bradley has argued that the Framers only meant to ban general
warrants and that the reference to "unreasonable searches and seizures" was mere rhetoric.
On that basis, he has asserted that the Fourth Amendment should not be understood to im
ply any limit on the conduct of officers who do not use a warrant. See Gerard V. Bradley,
The Constitutional Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 817, 833-55
(1989). In a narrow sense, Bradley's conclusion that the text addressed only warrant stan
dards is correct. He arrived at that conclusion, however, only on the basis of a mistaken un
derstanding of the drafting of the Fourth Amendment. See infra note 485. Moreover, his
claim that the Framers did not mean to restrict warrantless officers ignores the reason that
the Framers banned the general warrant - they opposed giving discretionary authority to
officers, as discussed below.
57. Professor William Stuntz has argued that the Framers sought to ban general war
rants only to protect against persecution of political dissidents, as in the English Wilkesite
cases, but that they did not mean for the Fourth Amendment to reach criminal justice. See
William Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE LJ. 393, 396-403
(1995). That treatment of the Framers' concerns, however, is based largely on the usual
"three cases." Id. at 396-97; see also infra note 62. In addition, Stuntz's analysis rests on a
number of faulty premises.
For example, Stuntz stated that "[s]earch warrants in ordinary criminal cases were ap
parently unknown [at the time of the framing]." Stuntz, supra, at 411 n.66 (citing Juuus
GOEBEL, JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK:
A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1664-1776, at 428-29 (1944)). Goebel and Naughton
actually concluded, however, that arrests and searches for stolen property were usually made
by warrant. On the pages cited by Stuntz, Goebel and Naughton wrote that "[p]recepts or
dering an officer to search must certainly have been in general use considering the great
number of larcenies, robberies, and burglaries . . • ." GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra, at 428.
("Precept" was one of several generic terms used to refer to warrants. See infra note 201.}
Likewise, they identified several references to search warrants for stolen goods that had
been preserved in the colonial records. They also concluded that "the normal rule of no
search [of a house] without a warrant was settled law." GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra, at
394.
Stuntz also uncritically accepted Taylor's incorrect claim that warrantless searches could
be made of houses. See Stuntz, supra, at 401 n35; see also infra note 276. He likewise un
critically repeated Amar's incorrect claim that the Framers were motivated by opposition to
the "immunizing" effect of a warrant. Stuntz, supra, at 409-411; see also infra notes 95-98
and accompanying text; infra note 222.
58. Professor Amar initially addressed the Fourth Amendment in Akhil Reed Amar,
The Bill ofRights as a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131, 1175-81 (1991} [hereinafter Amar,
Bill of Rights]. He addressed the text and history at more length in Akhil Reed Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994) [hereinafter Amar,
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Taylor's lead in attacking the conventional understanding that the
Framers valued the warrant as a protection against arbitrary intru
sions, and in insisting that any warrant requirement is contrary to the
Framers' intention. However, he has departed from Taylor's position
that the Framers were simply unconcerned with warrantless intrusions
and instead has asserted that the Framers intended for a reasonable
ness standard to be the essence of the Fourth Amendment. Thus,
Amar has asserted that the first clause of the text should be under
stood as a "Reasonableness Clause" that articulates a freestanding
reasonableness standard. He has also insisted that the Framers in
tended for reasonableness to be the "global" standard by which all
government searches or seizures should be judged. In his reading, the
warrant standards in the second clause were meant only to discourage
the use of warrants.59
Amar's attack is novel because, in addition to repeating Taylor's
claim that the Framers viewed the warrant as "an enemy," he has at
tempted to provide a historical explanation for that hostility. Specifi
cally, he has asserted that the Framers were hostile toward the use of
warrants because a warrant provided an officer with an "absolute de
fense" against trespass liability. Thus, if an officer used a warrant to
make an arrest or search, the victim was prevented from obtaining a
jury's assessment, in a subsequent trespass suit, of whether the search
or seizure was actually reasonable (and thus lawful). In contrast,
Amar suggests that the Framers approved of warrantless searches and
arrests because no legal bar prevented a jury from subsequently as
sessing the reasonableness of those intrusions.60 Not surprisingly, a
Supreme Court opinion has cited Amar's key historical assertion.61

Fourth Amendment]. Amar cited these articles in his testimony, see Hearings, supra note 3,
at 12-15, and the latter has also been reprinted without significant changes as Chapter One
of AKIIlL REED AMAR THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES (1997). However, I cite only the article. Amar has also reiterated his claims
about the Fourth Amendment in three additional publications: Amar, Boston, supra note 19
(1996); AKIIlL REED AMAR THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 6477 (1998) [hereinafter, AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS BOOK] (this discussion appears to be a brief
overview of some of the arguments Amar made in prior commentaries; it does not set out
new claims to any significant degree); and Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment
First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1097 (1998) [hereinafter Amar, Terry].
,

,

59. See, e.g., Amar, Bill of Rights, supra note 58, at 1178-80 (asserting that the ban
against "unreasonable searches and seizures" was meant to be distinct from the warrant
standards); Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at 758 (commenting on the Amend
ment's "global command that all government searches and seizures be reasonable"); id. at
759 (claiming that the Amendment does not require warrants but does require that all
searches and seizures be reasonable); id. at 801 ("The core of the Fourth Amendment . . . is
neither a warrant nor probable cause, but reasonableness."); id. at 807 (referring to the first
clause of the Amendment as "the Reasonableness Clause").
60. See Amar, BILL OF RIGHTS BOOK, supra note 58, at 69-71; Amar, Boston, supra
note 19, at 60; Amar, Bill of Rights, supra note 58, at 1178-80; Amar, Fourth Amendment,
supra note 58, at 771-74; Amar, Terry, supra note 58, at 1111. Amar also claims that the
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The Flaws in the Generalized-Reasonableness Accounts

Neither Taylor nor Amar undertook to present the sort of system
atic account of the original meaning that Lasson or Cuddihy offered.
Taylor addressed the history to set the stage for arguing that the
Supreme Court should not curb warrantless searches made "incident
to arrest."62 Likewise, Amar has addressed only selective aspects of
the history to muster support for his normative proposals for revising
search and seizure doctrine.63 Thus, if one examines Taylor's and
Framers' concern for jury assessments of searches was shaped largely by the case reports of
Wood and, to a lesser extent, Entick. See, e.g., Amar, Bill of Rights, supra note 58, at 1176
n.208. (Like Taylor's earlier account, Amar's account of the origins of the amendment
places heavy emphasis on the Wtlkesite case reports. See infra note 62.)
The specific claim that the Framers feared the immunizing effect of "warrants" may have
been suggested by a previous comment by Posner, supra note 9, at 72 n.56 (stating that po
lice might seek a warrant, even if they had grounds for warrantless intrusion, "in order to
have a more secure defense of legal process if sued for torts committed in the course of the
search").
Amar's assertions on this point are discussed in more detail and criticized infra notes 63104 and accompanying text.
61. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581-82 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that
"[b]y restricting the issuance of warrants, the Framers endeavored to preserve the jury's role
in regulating searches and seizures," and citing Amar, Bill ofRights, supra note 58, at 117890, and Posner, supra note 9, at 72-73); see also infra note 62.
62. Taylor's discussion of the general warrant controversies was superficial insofar as it
was based almost entirely on the case reports of two Wilkesite cases, Wood and Entick
(without noting the late publication dates of those reports, see supra note 25), and on Otis's
speech in the 1761 Writs ofAssistance Case, but virtually ignored the important colonial con
troversies over the Townshend Act writ. See TAYLOR, supra note 49, at 29-38; cf. Grano,
supra note 38, at 616 (describing Taylor's historical account as "cursory" and noting that it
failed to support the broad claim that the Framers were hostile to warrants).
The reduction of the historical search controversies to reported "cases," without atten
tion to publication dates, is a common failing. See, for example, the commentaries by Amar
discussed supra note 58, and by Stuntz discussed supra note 57. See also Eric Schnapper,
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L REV. 869 (1985). This oversimpli
fication also appears in judicial opinions. See, e.g., City of West Covina v. Perkins, 119 S. Ct.
678, 684 n.2 (1999) (opinion of the Court by Thomas, J.) (citing commentaries by Taylor,
Amar, and Stuntz as authority for the proposition that the case reports in Wood and Entick
"profoundly influenced the Founders' view of what a 'reasonable' search entailed"). I was
previously guilty of the same oversimplification. See Davies's Testimony, supra note 3, at
127.
63. Amar is an engaging writer, but his treatment of text and history is often loose and
uninformed. Criticisms of his claims appear throughout the text and footnotes to this Arti
cle. See supra notes 19-20; infra note 62; infra notes 65-104, 109-115 and accompanying text;

•�m�����m��m�������
But see note 485.

450, 467, 470, 489, 533.

For other criticisms of Amar's Fourth Amendment claims, see, for example, Susan
Bandes, We the People and Our Enduring Values, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1376 (1998) (book re
view); Ooud, supra note 42; Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Con
stitutional Law: "Here I Go Down that Wrong Road Again," 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559 (1996);
Susan R. Klein, Enduring Principles and Current Crises in Constitutional Criminal Proce
dure, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 533 (1999) (book review); Maclin, Complexity, supra note 44;
Maclin, Cure, supra note 44; Carol S. Steiker, "First Principles" of Constitutional Criminal
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Amar's accounts closely, one finds that each offered little evidence for
·
their central historical claims - that the Framers broadly approved of
warrantless intrusions and that the Framers viewed "the warrant" as
"an enemy." Moreover, both ignored salient features of the history
that are not easily reconciled with their claims.

1.

The Framers' Attitude Toward Warrantless Intrusions

There is no question that common law sometimes permitted war
rantless arrests or searches. The significant question is how broadly
they were permitted. Neither Taylor nor Amar presented significant
evidence on that point. Taylor merely recited a historical description
of arrest law circa the thirteenth century and a single endorsement of
broad warrantless search authority from a mid-seventeenth-century
pamphlet of dubious authority.64 Likewise, Amar observed only that
common law permitted warrantless arrests "in a variety of circum
stances" and quoted Taylor's summary - but never identified the
common-law rules that actually defined warrantless arrest authority.65
Neither demonstrated that the Framers broadly approved of warrant
less intrusions.
In addition, neither Taylor nor Amar confronted significant fea
tures of historical doctrine that collide with any claim that the Framers
would have broadly approved of warrantless intrusions. The modem
warrant-preference construction favors prior judicial approval of
searches as a means of preventing unjustified intrusions. The prefer
ence for warrants is premised on the expectation that magistrates will
be more likely than officers to perceive when justification for a pro
posed search is inadequate. The historical evidence indicates that the
Framers preferred use of specific warrants rather than warrantless in
trusions for essentially the same reason. The Framers sought to pre
vent unjustified searches and arrests from occurring, not merely to
provide an after-the-fact remedy for unjustified intrusions. For exam
ple, the complaints they voiced about searches concerned the breach
of the security of the house.66 Likewise, the constitutional texts they

Procedure: A Mistake?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 680 (1999) [hereinafter Steiker, Mistake] (book
review); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820
(1994) [hereinafter Steiker, Second Thoughts]; George C. Thomas III, Remapping the
Criminal Procedure Universe, 83 VA. L. REV. 1819 (1997) (book review). But see Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Dirty Harry and the Real Constitution, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1457 (1997) (book
review) (giving a positive review of Amar's criminal procedure book).
64. See TAYLOR, supra note 49, at 27-30. The deficiencies in those sources are discussed
in some detail infra notes 276-277.
65. See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at 764, n.13 (citing generally to com
mon-law treatises).
66.

See infra notes 104, 136-142 and accompanying text.
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wrote did not simply seek to provide a post-intrusion remedy or con
demn only the actual use of a general warrant; rather, the constitu
tional texts adopted a preventive strategy by consistently prohibiting
even the issuance of a too-loose warrant.67
The historical evidence also demonstrates that the Framers be
lieved that the orderly and formal processes associated with specific
warrants, including the judicial assessment of whether there was ade
quate cause for the intrusion, provided the best means of preventing
violations of the security of person or house. In particular, the
Framers thought that magistrates were more capable than ordinary of
ficers of making sound decisions as to whether a search was justified.68
The principal difference between framing-era statements and the
modem warrant-preference construction is that the former sometimes
expressed outright disdain for the character and judgment of ordinary
officers.69 Indeed, the Framers' perception of the untrustworthiness of
the ordinary officer was reinforced by class-consciousness and status
concerns. It was disagreeable enough for an elite or middle-class
householder to have to open his house to a search in response to a
command from a high status magistrate acting under a judicial com
mission; it was a gross insult to the householder's status as a "free-

67. The Framers' concern with preventing breaches of the privacy of the house is evi
dent from their determination to prevent issuance of general warrants. As I explain below,
all of the state constitutional provisions and anti-Federalist proposals for a federal provision
stated that too-loose warrants "ought not be granted" or "shall not be issued." See infra
note 494 and accompanying text. Indeed, the final motion to amend Madison's draft lan
guage for the Fourth Amendment was aimed precisely at inserting this imperative language
to make it clear that non-specific warrants "shall [not be] issue[d]." See infra notes 478-497
and accompanying text.
68. There is a discrepancy between Amar's historical and policy arguments on this
point. In his historical discussion, Amar wrote as though the Framers sought only to pre
serve the availability of suits for trespass for "unreasonable" searches that could be brought
after such searches had been made. However, when he discussed current policy, he endorsed
the value of having a judge assess the grounds for a search before privacy is violated in what
he calls "judicial preclearance" of searches. See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at
810. The value of "judicial preclearance" (that is, a specific warrant process) as a means of
preventing violations of house and person was as evident to the Framers as it now is to
Amar.
69. For example, Blackstone commented, while discussing the office of constable, that
"considering what manner of men are for the most part put upon these offices, it is perhaps
very well that they are generally kept in ignorance [of the full extent of the authority of their
office]." 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 344. Likewise, the press accounts of chief justice
Pratt's jury instruction in Leach indicated that he complained that a general warrant allowed
the decision to search, properly left to the judges, to be delegated to king's messengers or
"even
the lowest of the people." Cuddihy has observed that complaints about delegation
of authority to lower class officers, coupled with derogatory descriptions of such officers, was
a consistent theme in the prerevolutionary grievance against the general writ of assistance.
See 2 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1126-27 (noting descriptions of officers employing writs as
"odius harpies," "servants," "villains," "dreggs," "most despicable wretches," and "ruffi
ans"). Similar expressions of contempt for ordinary officers are commonplace in the fears
anti-Federalists expressed regarding customs searches by federal revenue officers.
. • .
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man" to be bossed about by an ordinary officer who was likely drawn
from an inferior class.
For example, during the 1761 Writs of Assistance Case, James Otis
complained that the delegation of authority to a petty officer by a
general writ of assistance reduced a householder to being "the servant
of servarits."70 Thus, the Framers were not unconcerned about war
rantless intrusions because they had any confidence in officers' judg
ment - rather, they were unconcerned with warrantless intrusions be
cause they did not perceive ordinary officers as possessing any
significant discretionary authority at common law to initiate arrests or
searches.71
The common-law tradition viewed any form of discretionary
authority with unease - but delegation of discretionary authority to
ordinary, "petty," or "subordinate" officers was anathema to framing
era lawyers. Contrary to Amar's claims, framing-era common law
never permitted a warrantless officer to justify an arrest or search ac
cording to any standard as loose or flexible as "reasonableness."72 In
stead, as I explain in detail below, the common law imposed rigid lim
its on the ex officio authority of ordinary officers. For example, under
framing-era common law, an officer could not even justify a warrant
less arrest by showing "probable cause" to believe an offense had been
committed (let alone by a loose "reasonableness" standard); rather, a
framing-era peace officer (like a private person) could justify a war
rantless arrest only by proving "felony in fact" (that is, that a felony
had actually been committed).73
Common-law authorities repeatedly gave a consistent reason for
condemning general warrants: if such warrants had been permitted,
they would have conferred on ordinary officers discretionary authority
to arrest or even to search houses. In the early seventeenth century,
Sir Edward Coke had labeled unspecific arrest warrants "against rea
son. "74 In the late seventeenth century, Sir Matthew Hale condemned

70. 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 20, at 142 (reprinting John Adams's
abstract of Otis's argument in the Writs ofAssistance Case that shows Otis complaining that
the use of a general writ of assistance was not even limited to commissioned customs collec
tors but could also be used by "not only deputies, &c. but even THEIR MENIAL
SERVANTS ARE ALLOWED TO LORD IT OVER US - What is this but to have the
curse of Canaan with a witness on us, to be the servant of servants, the most despicable of
God's creation").
71.

See infra notes 217-230, 260-275 and accompanying text.

72. Although Amar's writings convey the impression that "reasonableness" was a com
mon-law standard, he has not identified a single framing-era legal authority that actually
employed "reasonableness" as a standard for assessing the lawfulness of a warrantless intru
sion. See infra notes 109-115 and accompanying text.
73.

See infra notes 227-228 and accompanying text.

74. See infra note 397. Coke had such a constrained view of arrest authority that he
even disputed the authority ofjustices of the peace to issue arrest warrants before an indict-
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general warrants in his treatise on criminal law because they allowed
the party executing the warrant to act as his own judge.75 Later,
Serjeant William Hawkins (the leading eighteenth-century authority
on criminal procedure) converted these abstract rejections of general
warrants into a more concrete expression of distrust of the common
officer when he condemned general warrants because "it would be ex
tremely hard to leave it to the discretion of a common Officer to arrest
what Persons, and search what Houses he thinks fit."76
The same theme runs throughout the condemnation of general
warrants in the Wilkesite cases. In the 1765 proceedings in Leach v.
Money, even the Tory Lord Mansfield condemned the unparticular
ized general warrant as illegal at common law because it was "not fit"
for an officer to exercise any judgment as to whom to arrest or where
to search.77 Mansfield's statement was made especially visible when
ment. See SIR EDWARD COKE, FOURTH PART OF THE lNSTITU1ES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 176-77 (1817, reprinted by Professional Books Ltd. 1986) (originally published in
1644, see 1 LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 258, entry 6).
75. See 2 SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 150 (Solemn
Emlyn ed., 1736). Hale wrote his two-volume treatise prior to 1676 (the year of his death),
but it was not published until 1736 (after the appearance of the treatise by Hawkins, dis
cussed in the following note). See 1 LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 362, entry 36.
76. 2 SERJEANT WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 82 (1721). Hawkins's trea
tise was the most complete and "current" treatment of criminal procedure available to the
Framers. Volume one, published in 1716, dealt largely with crimes; volume two, which dealt
largely with procedure, was published in 1721. See 1 LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 19,
at 362, entry 37. The importance of Hawkins's treatise is discussed in 12 WILLIAM
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 361-62 (1938). Further editions of Hawkins's
treatise were published throughout the eighteenth century. The sixth edition, edited by
Thomas Leach [hereinafter LEACH'S HAWKINS] is especially useful as evidence of English
common-law procedure at the time of the framing as Leach had updated the text and notes
to reflect current rulings. The sixth edition of the second volume was published in London
in 1787. See 1 LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 362-63, entry 37. However, the
copy I have used is a 1788 Dublin printing which may be the version most commonly pur
chased by Americans.
77. Mansfield said:

It is not fit, that the receiving or judging of the information [regarding cause to arrest or
search] should be left to the discretion of the officer. The magistrate ought to judge; and
should give certain directions to the officer. This is so, upon reason and convenience.
. . . ['I']he [common law] authorities
Hale and all others hold such an uncertain warrant
void: and there is no case or book to the contrary.
-

Leach v. Money, 3 Burr. 1742, 1766, 19 Howell St Tr. 1001, 1027, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1088
(K.B. 1765). The other judges of the King's Bench also condemned the general warrant in
the same way. See 3 Burr. at 1767, 19 Howell St. Tr. at 1027, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1088. This case
report was published in 1771. See supra note 25.
The Supreme Court has recognized the relevance of Mansfield's statement for the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. United States District Court, 497
U.S. 297 (1972). Justice Powell's opinion for the Court noted that "[o]ver two centuries ago,
Lord Mansfield held that common-law principles prohibited warrants that ordered the arrest
of unnamed individuals who the officer might conclude were guilty of seditious libel" and
then quoted the passage from Leach quoted immediately above. Id. at 316 (emphasis in
original).
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Blackstone paraphrased it to condemn general warrants because offi
cers ought not be left to judge whom to arrest (as well as reiterating
Coke's assertion that unspecific criminal warrants were "unreason
able").78 Judge Pratt (Lord Camden) also condemned the discretion
ary character of the authority conferred by a general warrant in a
number of statements made during other of the Wilkesite cases.79
Likewise, the English pamphleteer "Father of Candor" complained
that general warrants permitted arrests or searches to be "made at dis
cretion [by] any common fellows . .. upon their own imaginations, or
the surmises of their acquaintances, or upon other worse and more
dangerous intimations."80
Hostility to conferring discretionary search authority on common
officers is also the theme of American complaints about the general
writ of assistance. In addition to complaining that householders were
reduced to the status of a servant, Otis repeatedly condemned the dis
cretionary authority conferred on "petty" officers by the writ of assis
tance when he argued the 1761 Writs of Assistance Case. He com-

78. Blackstone wrote:
A general warrant to apprehend all persons suspected, without naming or particularly de
scribing any person in special, is illegal and void for its uncertainty [citing Hale and
Hawkins]; for it is the duty of the magistrate, and ought not be left to the officer, to judge of
the grounds of suspicion.
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 288 (note that I have not followed the common practice of
citing to the "star" page numbering of Blackstone, because those numbers are not to the first
edition). As authority for the illegality of a general warrant, Blackstone cited "Money v.
Leach, Trin. 5 Geo III B.R. . . . (Com. Journ. 22 Apr 1766)." Id. at n.i. He did not cite any
formal case report because none had been published in 1769. See supra note 77.
Blackstone's reiteration of Coke's condemnation of unspecific criminal warrants ap
peared in the first volume of his commentaries. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 133.
For a discussion, see infra note 418 and accompanying text
Blackstone's Commentaries became very popular in the American colonies on the eve of
the Revolutionary War. Volume one, which addressed the inherent rights of English sub
jects, was published in 1765; however, volume four, which dealt with criminal law and proce
dure, was not published until 1769. See LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 27, entry 8
(showing "1st ed., vol. l" published 1765; "1st ed., vol. 4" published 1769). Because
Blackstone aimed at providing a broad overview of English law, his treatment of criminal
procedure topics was considerably less detailed than that in the treatises by Hawkins and
Hale. For example, Blackstone discussed only arrest warrants, not search warrants.
79. In Huckle, Pratt assailed the use of a "nameless" general warrant as a violation of
Magna Carta and "worse than the Spanish Inquisition." Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 206, 207,
95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (C.P. 1763). (This case report was published in 1770. See supra note
25.) In Wood, Pratt condemned the general warrant because "a discretionary power given to
[officers] to search wherever their suspicions may chance to fall . . . is totally subversive to
the liberty of the subject" Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 18, 18, 19 Howell St. Tr. 1153, 1167, 98
Eng. Rep. 489, 498 (C.P. 1763). (This case report was published in 1776. See supra note 25.)
In Leach, Pratt condemned the general warrant because it delegated decisions that were
properly reserved to judicial authority to mere messengers. See the press accounts of Leach,
set out supra note 22.
80. FATIIER OF CANDOR, supra note 23, at 57.
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plained that the general writ was "a power that places the liberty of
every man in the hands of every petty officer," that it allowed officers
"to enter our houses when they please," that it was an instrument of
"arbitrary power," that it transformed officers into "tyrant[s]," that it
" [delegated] vast powers," and that it failed even to impose the usual
safeguard of requiring the officer to file a "return" with the issuing
court.81
Likewise, the Pennsylvania judges who later refused to issue gen
eral writs authorized by the Townshend Act of 1767 did so because
they felt "that arming officers of the Customs with so extensive a
power, to be exercised totally at their own discretion would be of dan
gerous consequences and was not warranted by Law"; the Virginia
judges asserted that it was "unconstitutional to lodge such a Writ in
the hands of the officer which gave him unlimited power to act under
it according to his own arbitrary Discretion" ; and William Drayton,
chief justice of the colonial court for East Florida, declined to issue a
general writ that might "be used discretionally, (perhaps without
proper Foundation) at the will of subordinate officers
."82 Like
wise, in 1774 William Henry Drayton, a judge in Charleston, com
plained of the discretionary authority delegated to "a petty officer" by
a writ of assistance when he called on the First Continental Congress
to include a ban against general writs and warrants in a declaration of
.

.

.

81. 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 20, at 140-43. John Dickinson later
echoed Otis's complaint that no return was required with a general writ. See discussion infra
note 94.
82. Dickerson, Writs of Assistance, supra note 26, at 60-61 {Pennsylvania judges), 69
(Virginia judges), 64 (East Florida judge). Similarly, the Connecticut judges unofficially in
dicated they would issue particular writs but not "a general writ to be used at
discretion."
2 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1082.
. . •
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American rights.83 And Patrick Henry later voiced the same concern
in the Virginia ratification convention in 1788.84
The repeated objections to allowing "subordinate" officers to ex
ercise discretionary search or arrest authority cannot be explained
away simply as a concern with the "immunizing" effect that a general
warrant might have had if allowed. Rather, the nature of the com
plaints that were actually made about general warrants - that it
would be "extremely hard" to leave the decision to intrude to an ordi
nary officer, that it would not be "fit" to have ordinary officers decide
whom to arrest or where to search - demonstrate a deep-rooted dis
trust and even disdain for the judgment of ordinary officers. Given
that distrust, it is wholly implausible that the Framers would have ap
proved of broad use of warrantless intrusions, because such intrusions
would necessarily have rested solely on the officers' own judgment.85

83. Drayton complained that American rights were injured
[b]y Judges now-a-days granting to the Customs to lie dormant in their possession, writs of
assistance in the nature of general warrants, by which, without any crime charged and with
out any suspicion, a petty officer has power to cause the doors and locks of any man to be
broke open, to enter his most private cabinet, and thence to take and carry away, whatever
he shall in his pleasure deem uncustomed goods.
William Henry Drayton, A Letter from Freeman, Aug. 10, 1774, reprinted in I
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 11, 15 (R.W. Gibbes ed., 1855,
reprinted 1972). Although Drayton at one point called the general writ "of a more perni
cious nature than general warrants," he also condemned "the general writ, or rather the gen
eral warrant." Id. at 21. (The reference to "Judges now-days" refers to the fact that the
court in Charleston had refused to issue general writs until the judges were removed and
replaced by more compliant judges. See id. at 21-22.) Drayton also proposed that the
Congress declare that only warrants "in the nature of
warrants to search for stolen
goods" - that is, specific warrants - be allowed. See quotation infra note 94.
. . •

84. See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 587-88 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1838, reprinted in facsim
ile 1937) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]. Henry stated that:

general warrants, by which an officer may search suspected places, without evidence of the
commission of a fact, or seize any person, without evidence of his crime, ought to be prohib
ited. As these are admitted, any man may be seized, any property may be taken, in the most
arbitrary manner, without any evidence or reason. Every thing the most sacred may be
searched and ransacked by the strong hand of power.
Id. at 588.
85. This is hardly a novel insight on my part. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 38, at 575
(asking, in connection with the colonial protests against the Townshend Act writ, "[c]an
there be any doubt that the colonists would have vigorously opposed warrantless searches
exhibiting the same characteristics as general warrants and writs and thus impairing privacy
and freedom to the same degree?"); Maclin, Complexity, supra note 44, at 970-71 ("The pur
pose of [the condemnation of overbroad warrants in a constitutional search and seizure pro
vision] was to restrain the discretion of officers and executive officials. With this in mind,
one can read [the warrant standards in the text of a constitutional search and seizure provi
sion] and properly conclude that promiscuous warrantless intrusions exhibiting the same
traits as general warrants also violate the principle embodied in [the constitutional text].").
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However, neither Taylor nor Amar confronted any of the historical
condemnations of officers exercising discretionary authority.86

2.

The Framers' Attitude Toward Specific Warrants

No one questions that the Framers despised and sought to ban
general warrants.
The modern doctrinal debate has been about
whether use of specific warrants - warrants that comply with the con
stitutional standards - should be required or at least preferred over
warrantless intrusions. Thus the significant historical inquiry is about
the Framers' view of specific warrants. Taylor did not claim in so
many words that the Framers were hostile to specific warrants, but he
made statements criticizing the warrant requirement that implied as
much. For example, Taylor's complaint that the modern warrant re
quirement "st[ands] the Fourth Amendment on its head" and his re
lated generic-sounding assertion that the Framers viewed "the war
rant" as "an enemy" both connote that the Framers held a negative
view of specific warrants as well as general warrants.
Likewise, Amar has repeatedly made the generic-sounding claim
that the Framers viewed "judges and warrants" as "heavies,"87 and has
also asserted that their disapproval was "not merely of general war
rants, but of .
all search warrants."88 Thus, his statements also con
note that historical hostility toward use of "warrants" had been dif
fuse, and had reached specific as well as general warrants.89 However,
.

.

86. Taylor and Amar each discussed other aspects of Mansfield's statements in Leach,
but neither mentioned his statement that it was "not fit" for the officer to exercise discre
tionary authority. See TAYLOR, supra note 49, at 31-32; Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra
note 58, at 776. Likewise, Amar selectively recited from Blackstone's condemnation of gen
eral warrants (quoted supra note 78) without noting that Blackstone also wrote that it ought
not be left to the officer to decide whom to arrest See id. at 779 (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 27, at *286-90). And Amar referred to Wood at numerous points without men
tioning Pratt's salient condemnation of discretionary authority (quoted supra note 79). See,
e.g., id. at 775-76.
87. See, e.g., AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS BOOK, supra note 58, at 70; Amar, Bill ofRights,
supra note 58, at 1179; see also Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at 774 ("Warrants
then, were friends of the searcher, not the searched."); id. (quoting TAYLOR, supra note 49,
at 41, in claiming that the Framers viewed "a warrant" as an "enemy"); Amar, Bill ofRights,
supra note 58, at 1178-80 ("A warrant issued by a judge or magistrate . . . had the effect of
taking a later trespass action away from a jury of ordinary citizens."); Amar, Boston, supra
note 19, at 60 ("Warrants . . . were the friends of the officer, not the citizen; and so warrants
had to be strictly limited.").
88. Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at 778 (emphasis in original). Amar made
this assertion with regard to several post-framing statements, see infra note 92, but his text
does not lead the reader to understand that its import should be limited to that setting.
Moreover, the cited sources do not actually show hostility to specific search warrants. See
infra note 92.
89. Some readers of drafts of this Article indicated they interpreted Amar as claiming
only that the purpose of the second clause of the Fourth Amendment consisted solely of
banning general warrants, and that the Framers were indifferent to whether specific war
rants should be used. In that regard, it may also be relevant that when I previously criticized
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neither Taylor nor Amar has made out a persuasive historical case
that the Framers felt any generic hostility toward all "warrants"; like
wise, neither has provided evidence that the Framers preferred a post
intrusion remedy over pre-intrusion protection of the right to be se
cure.
Taylor's assertion that the early constitutional provisions treated
"the warrant" as "an enemy" was overgeneralized. The texts clearly
treated the general warrant as "an enemy," but there is nothing in the
texts to suggest any hostility toward the use of specific warrants. The
constitutional texts do not say "no Warrants shall issue." Rather, they
set out standards to distinguish legal, specific warrants from too-loose,
general warrants. Neither the Fourth Amendment nor any of the ear
lier state search and seizure provisions ever undertook to limit the use
of specific warrants90 - except for requiring that the purpose for
which a search is made pursuant to a warrant must be authorized by
law.91
Likewise, Taylor did not identify any historical expressions of hos
tility toward the use of specific warrants. Amar has held out some
post-framing statements as evidence of hostility toward "all search
warrants" - however, the complaints he cited were actually about
house searches which could be made only under warrant authority, not
complaints about specific warrants as such.92 None of the complaints

Amar for making generic-sounding claims that the Framers were opposed to "warrants," he
responded that I had misstated his position {but did not explain the nature of my error). See
Davies's Testimony, supra note 3, at 135 n. 31; Amar, Boston, supra note 19, at 80 n. 122. I
readily concede that Amar's commentary need not be read to claim that the Framers were as
opposed to specific as they were to general warrants. Nevertheless, I think that Amar's
generic-sounding claim that the Framers viewed "judges and warrants" as "heavies" will of
ten be understood as a claim that the Framers disliked specific as well as general warrants.
In addition, I do not see how his claim that historical statements show disapproval of "all
search warrants," see text supra, can be read as anything other than a claim of broad hostility
toward specific as well as general warrants. Moreover, only that reading of his generic
sounding claims lends much support to the generalized-reasonableness construction that he
favors. Amar's commentary does not make much of an attack on the warrant preference
unless it is read as a claim that the Framers disapproved of specific warrants to some degree.
90.

This point has also been noted by Maclin, Complexity, supra note 44, at 967-70.

91. See the third statement of the 1780 Massachusetts provision, discussed
379-381 and accompanying text.

infra

notes

92 See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at 778 (citing Reed v. Rice, 25 Ky. (2
JJ. Marsh) 44, 46 (1829), and Robinson v. Richardson, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 454, 457 (1859));
see also THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON 1HE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REsT UPON 1HE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF 1HE STATES OF 1HE AMERICAN UNION 303 (1st
ed. 1868). None of those sources indicated a preference for warrantless searches over
searches by warrant; all they showed was hesitation to allow certain searches even with the
protections associated with a specific warrant. Reed complained that "the execution" of a
search warrant for a house search was distressing; the warrant was drawn into that complaint
only because it was understood that a house search could be justified only by a search war
rant. See 25 Ky. (2 JJ. Marsh) at 46.
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he cited indicated a preference that house searches be made without
warrant, or even that house searches be allowed without warrants.93 In
addition, Taylor and Amar overlooked direct evidence that the Fram
ers approved of specific warrants. For example, during the Writs of
Assistance Case, Otis endorsed the legality of the "special" (that is,
specific) warrant and used it as the model for contrasting and con
demning the general warrant.94

Similarly, Cooley argued that, because a search warrant could authorize a search of a
house, legislators should resist recognizing new purposes for which search warrants could be
issued; however, he said nothing that would imply that warrantless searches should be per
mitted as an alternative to searches under search warrants. See COOLEY, supra, at 303-07.
(Cooley's understanding of the Fourth Amendment and the need for a warrant for a house
search is discussed infra note 191.)

Robinson involved a different context: it refused to allow a search warrant to be used to
authorize private persons to search for concealed property in a civil proceeding to settle an
estate; it did not express hostility to the traditional uses of search warrants by the govern
ment in criminal or revenue matters; and it did not suggest allowing a warrantless search in
stead of use of a search warrant. See 79 Mass. (13 Gray) at 457.
93. Some commentators have interpreted the fact that the common law recognized a
search warrant only for stolen property as though it placed a limit only on the use of war
rants for searches but not on warrantless searches. See, e.g., Amar, Fourth Amendment, su
pra note 58, at 765-66 & n26. That treatment overlooks the fact that a warrant was usually
the only justification for a house search; warrantless searches of houses were not available as
an alternative. See infra notes 271-274 and accompanying text. When the common law lim
ited the purposes for which search warrants could be issued, it limited the purposes for which
houses could be searched. See infra notes 203, 273.
94. See, e.g., 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 20, at 141 (quoting Adams's
abstract of Otis's argument: "special [that is, specific] warrants only are legal"); see also
SMITH, supra note 20, at 334-36. There is other evidence of the approval of specific war
rants. The colonial judges who refused to issue general writs of assistance under the
Townshend Act were willing to issue specific writs based on specific sworn allegations of cus
toms violations. See, e.g., Dickerson, Writs ofAssistance, supra note 26, at 60-61 (Pennsylva
nia), 68-72 (Virginia). Likewise, John Dickinson echoed Otis's contrasting of the general
writ to the specific warrant when he attacked the Townshend Act writ for lacking a require
ment of a "return" to the issuing court. See JOHN DICKINSON, LETTERS FROM A FARMER IN
PENNSYLVANIA TO TiiE INHABITANTS . OF TiiE BRITISH COLONIES (1768), reprinted in
TRACTS OF TiiE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: 1763-1776, at 127, 150-151 (Merrill Jensen ed.,
1967) [hereinafter Jensen]. William Henry Drayton also explicitly approved of specific writs
of assistance. See Drayton, supra note 83, at 17 (proposing that the Continental Congress
should declare "[t]hat no writs of assistance ought to be issued to the customs but in the na
ture of writs or warrants to search for stolen goods - general writs or warrants being ille
gal"). The approval of specific warrants was implicit throughout the condemnations of gen
eral warrants.
Oddly, Taylor recognized that Camden and Otis "contrasted [the general writ] with the
common-law warrant for stolen goods" but seems to have overlooked the implications of
that contrasting treatment when he announced the overbroad conclusion that the Framers
viewed "a warrant" as "an enemy." See TAYLOR, supra note 49, at 36-37, 41.
Levy has also muddied this point by asserting that "[i]n all the American rhetoric
[against general warrants, William Henry Drayton was the only writer who] seems to have
urged special warrants in place of warrantless searches and general warrants." LEVY,
ORIGINAL MEANING, supra note 45, at 235 n.54 (citing the statement by Drayton quoted
supra). Levy has even asserted that "[John] Dickinson did not recommend specific warrants
in [place of general writs] or condemn any warrantless searches." Id. at 234. Levy's is a
rather crabbed reading of the colonial attitudes regarding search authority. The colonists

586

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:547

Amar's claim that the Framers viewed "judges and warrants" as
"heavies" because they feared the "immunizing" effect of a "warrant"
also lacks historical support.95 The Framers did not express any gen
eral antagonism toward judges regarding search matters. In fact, Lord
Camden, a judge, emerged as the hero of the Wilkesite cases, and the
colonial judges who refused to issue general writs under the
Townshend Act provided an example that may well have stimulated
the developing American conception of judicial review.96
In addition, the "immunizing" claim that Amar makes so much of
is more in the nature of a hypothesis than a historical observation: it is
not evident in historical statements.97 For example, Amar cited ten
sources to document a supposed "linkage" between the Framers' con
cerns about "warrants" and about preserving jury trials in civil trescomplained only about general writs because they understood specific warrants were appro
priate and legal at common law; and they did not explicitly condemn warrantless customs
searches of houses because it was generally understood that only a valid warrant could jus
tify a search of a house.
95. See Amar, Boston, supra note 19, at 63 (referring to "the guarantee of immunity
provided by a warrant"); see also supra note 87; infra note 97.
96. The Framers certainly did perceive some judges as heavies; for example, they vilified
Thomas Hutchinson, who presided over the Writs ofAssistance Case while he also was lieu
tenant governor of the colony of Massachusetts. That and similar experiences no doubt con
tributed to the Framers' views on the importance of an independent judiciary. However,
judges generally emerged as the heroes of the struggle against general writs and warrants.
For example, Charles Pratt {Lord Camden), the judge in the Wilkesite cases that Amar
relies upon so heavily, instructed the juries that general warrants were illegal and void and
could not provide justification for the searches and arrests. See statements by Pratt quoted
supra notes 22, 79. {As Amar has often noted, Lord Camden was such a hero to Americans
that they named towns and counties after him. See, e.g., Amar, Boston, supra note 19, at 6566. It should be clarified, however, that Camden's fame probably was based at least as much
on his championing of the colonial position in the House of Lords as on his judicial rulings;
for example, Camden was instrumental in the repeal of the hated Stamp Act.)
Likewise, the colonial judges blocked the use of general writs for customs searches of
houses when they almost uniformly refused to issue general writs under the Townshend Act.
See supra note 26. If anything, the judges who refused to issue statutorily authorized general
writs because such writs were contrary to basic principles of common law provided an exam
ple that contributed to the American tradition of judicial review. Cf. Cloud, supra note 42,
at 1732-37; Maclin, Cure, supra note 44, at 22 (quoting Frese, supra note 26, at 300, and
Dickerson, Writs ofAssistance, supra note 26, at 74) .
97. The principal historical support Amar offers for the emphasis he places on the im
munizing effect of a legal warrant is a statement by Lord Mansfield. In Amar's words: "In
deed, the immunity conferred [by a warrant] was part of its very purpose, its definition; as
Lord Mansfield put it in 1785, it would be a 'solecism' if 'the regular execution of a legal
warrant shall be a trespass.' " Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at 778 (quoting
"Cooperv. Boot, 99 Eng. Rep. 911, 916 {K.B. 1785)").
However, this statement by Mansfield was unknown to the Framers, because the earliest
case report of Cooper was published in the third volume of Espinasse's Reports sometime
after 1801. See the discussion of the publication history of Cooper, supra note 19. In addi
tion, this statement was made in support of a departure from the common-law rule that an
officer was liable for a fruitless search made under even a legal warrant if the officer had ini
tiated the warrant. See infra note 294.
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pass cases. However, those sources expressed concern only that "gen
legal - not concern regarding the "im
munizing" effect of specific warrants.98 Amar has never identified a

eral warrants" might be made

98.

Amar claimed that there was a "Fourth-Seventh Amendment linkage." Amar,
As evidence of that purported linkage, Amar
discussed ten historical sources that mentioned both search and seizure and jury trial con
cerns, along with other concerns. (I pass over the question of whether that constitutes a
"linkage.") The significant point is that none of them expressed any concern about the im
munizing effect of a specific warrant; rather, they usually condemned only "general war
rants."

Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at 777-78.

Amar discussed four sources in his text: (1) Essay by a Fanner (I), MD. GAZETIE, Feb.
15, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 5, 14-15 (5.1.13) (Herbert J.
Storing ed., 1981) (expressing fear of loss of jury trial and specifically posing the question
"are general warrants illegal by the constitution of the United States?" but not expressing
any complaint about specific warrants); (2) Mr. Martin's Infonnation to the General Assem
bly ofthe State ofMaryland, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 27,
70-71 (expressing dismay at the failure of the constitution to protect jury trials in civil and
criminal actions involving the government and government officers, but not expressing any
specific concern about search and seizure authority); (3) Samuel Chase Notes of Speeches
Delivered to the Maryland Ratifying Convention (IIA), reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI
FEDERALIST, supra, at 81, 82 (miscited by Amar as IIB) (quoting section 3 of the Maryland
declaration of rights, a broad provision endorsing trial by jury, and quoting section 23 of that
declaration which condemned too-loose and "general" warrants, but saying nothing against
specific warrants); and (4) Address of a Minority of the Maryland Ratifying Convention, re
printed in 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 73334 (1971) (also reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 92, 95 (5.4.6))
(calling for jury trial in "all cases of trespasses" and for prohibiting magistrates to issue
"general warrants," but saying nothing about the immunizing effects of specific warrants).

In footnote 79 to his discussion, Amar identified six additional sources that supposedly
provided "further, more subtle, linkages between what would become the Fourth and Sev
enth Amendments." Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at 778 n.79. These six
sources again complain about "general warrants" but are devoid of concern regarding the
immunizing effect of a specific warrant (1) Letter from James Madison to George Eve (Jan.
2, 1789), reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra, at 997 (also reprinted in 11 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 404, 405 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977)) (explicitly referring to the
need to ban "general warrants" and to preserve jury trial, but not mentioning the immuniz
ing effect of specific warrants); (2) LETIERS OF CENTINEL, No. 1, reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 136 (expressing fear of the loss of protections
against "general warrants" and of the right to jury trial, but saying nothing about the immu
nizing effect of a specific warrant); (3) Letter from the Federal Farmer (IV), reprinted in 2
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 245, 249 (expressing fear of "hasty and unrea
sonable search warrants, warrants not founded on oath, and not issued with due caution"
(that is, general warrants) and fear of loss of jury trial, but saying nothing about the immu
nizing effect of a specific warrant); (4) Brutus, To the Citizens of the State ofNew York, No.
II, N.YJ., Nov. 1, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 372, 375
(quoting the provisions of the Maryland declaration of rights forbidding too-loose and "gen
eral" warrants and preserving the right of trial by juries, but saying nothing about the immu
nizing effect of a specific warrant); (5) An Old Whig (V), reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 34, 37 (expressing the need for jury trials and for protections
against searches and arrests "upon general suspicion or general warrants," but saying noth
ing about the immunizing effect of specific warrants); and (6) Objections by a Son of Liberty,
reprinted in 6 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 34, 34-35 (discussing the loss of
jury trials, searches of papers under "general warrants," and revenue searches of houses un
der pretense as "curses" of the new Constitution, but saying nothing about the immunizing
effect of specific warrants (emphasis in the original)).
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single historical complaint about the "immunizing" effect of a specific
warrant. In addition, Amar's renditions of the effect a "warrant" had
on trespass liability have been oversimplified and incomplete. Be
cause a general warrant was clearly deemed illegal by the framing era,
it did not protect either the issuing magistrate or the executing officer
against trespass liability.99 Only a legal (that is, specific) warrant in
demnified the officer against trespass liability.
Amar's "immunizing" argument would be valid if it were con
strued to mean only that, as a logical matter, there was a potential that
a general warrant might confer immunity on an executing officer if
general warrants were somehow made legal in the future. That poten
tial could have added to the Framers' motivation for barring future
authorization of general warrants (although no explicit statement by a
Framer to that effect has been identified). However, even that con
cern indicates a basis for hostility only toward general warrants; it does
not provide any ground to infer that the Framers feared or objected to
the indemnifying effect of a specific warrant. Indeed, what possible
reason could the Framers have had to object to the indemnification of
an officer who simply executed a valid, specific warrant, within the
terms of the judicial command to search or arrest?100

Although Amar invoked ten sources, none of them expressed any complaint about the
indemnifying effect of a specific warrant. That simply was not a concern that troubled the
Framers.
99. The trespass liability that attached to an officer's execution of a general warrant was
evident in the press accounts of the early Wilkesite cases, Huckle, Leach, and Wood. (Each
imposed trespass liability on officers for arresting and searching under a general warrant.
See supra note 21.) Likewise, the press accounts of Halifax showed a magistrate's liability
for issuing a general warrant. See supra note 21. These doctrines were understood by early
American judges. See, e.g., Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 39, 47 (1814) (holding magistrate
liable for issuing irregular search warrant and officer liable for searching house under an un
particularized warrant); Sanford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. (1 Tyng) 287, 288-89 (1816) (same); see
also lIENING, supra note 25, at 415-16 (recounting the trespass liability of officers who executed
illegal warrants in Wood and Entick), 462 (observing that "false imprisonment lies against
him that issues [a general arrest] warrant").
Unfortunately, Amar has recently muddied this point by asserting that "an overbroad
warrant lacking probable cause or specificity - in other words, a general warrant - was per
se unreasonable, in part because it unjustifiably displaced the proper role of the jury."
AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS BOOK, supra note 58, at 71. The claim that a general warrant "dis
placed" the jury implies that the general warrant immunized the officer - but that was not
the understanding at the time of framing. A general warrant was a legal nullity that had no
effect on trespass liability - that is the basic rule that was consistently affirmed in the
Wilkesite cases.
100. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 288 (stating that a valid warrant will "indem
nify the officer who executes the same ministerially"). However, it is unlikely that the
Framers thought that a valid specific warrant provided the officer with an absolute defense
against trespass liability if the officer acted maliciously. Amar quoted part of a statement
from a 1787 essay by a Pennsylvania anti-Federalist to demonstrate how "Americans entltu
siastically embraced" trespass actions as remedies for excessive searches. As Amar related
it, the essay stated that "[if a federal constable searching] for stolen goods, pulled down the
clothes of a bed in which there was a woman" during the search, he would face trespass
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Moreover, a valid warrant's indemnification of the executing offi
cer did not "preclud[e]" the victim of an unjustified intrusion from ob
taining legal recourse, as Amar has asserted.101 Rather, Amar over
looked an aspect of common law that has disappeared from modem
doctrine but was well known at the time of the framing: the complain
ant who swore out a valid search warrant was subject to trespass li
ability if the search proved fruitless (and that rule also applied to offi
cers who acted as complainants). Common law assigned trespass
liability for inappropriate searches under warrants where it belonged
- on the complainant who initiated the search rather than on the exe
cuting officer who only did his duty.102
Most importantly, Amar's insistence on the "immunizing" effect of
a valid warrant has deflected attention away from the more salient
concern noted above: like modem courts, the Framers understood
that the magistrate's review of the factual allegations offered as cause
for a search could prevent an unjustified invasion of a house.103 Like
modem judges, the Framers understood that no post-search remedy
could adequately restore the breached security of the house. They
valued the specific warrant, in large part, because the magistrate's
judgment offered the best available protection against too-hasty inva
sions of houses. They did not perceive any post-intrusion remedy as
an adequate substitute for preventing unjustified intrusions.104

damages. Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at 776 (quoting Essay ofa Democratic
Federalist, 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 98, at 58, 61); AMAR, BILL OF
RIGHTS BOOK, supra note 58, at 74 (same). The bracketed language was provided by Amar.
The quoted passage actually began: "Suppose . . . that a constable, having a warrant to
search for stolen goods, pulled down the clothes . . ." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the actual passage indicated that even an officer searching under a specific warrant (the warrant to
search for stolen goods was the model for the specific warrant) was subject to suit for outra
geous conduct during a search. Amar's alteration of the context addressed in the passage
obscured the implication that even a valid warrant would not provide absolute protection to
an officer.
.

101. See, e.g., Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at 771-72 ("The Framers did not
exalt warrants[,] for a warrant . . . had the purpose and effect of precluding any common law
trespass suit the aggrieved target might try to bring before a local jury.").
102. I discuss this aspect of framing-era law infra notes 293-295 and accompanying text.
In his search and seizure writings, Amar has never mentioned the common-law accountabil
ity of complainants who swore out warrants.
103. Some commentators have asserted that framing-era magistrates could not refuse to
issue warrants. However, that is not what the common-law authorities say. See infra notes
296-297 and accompanying text.
104. Otis addressed the inadequacy of a post-search damage remedy in the 1762 Boston
newspaper column in which he repeated his arguments from the Writs ofAssistance Case:
[If a search of a house has occurred under a writ without genuine information of a specific
customs violation,] is it enough to say, that damages may be recover'd against [the searching
officer] in the law? I hope indeed this will always be the case; - but are we perpetually to be
expos'd to outrages of this kind, & to be told for our only consolation, that we must be per
petually seeking to the courts of law for redress? Is not this vexation itself to a man of a well
disposed mind?
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At bottom, Taylor's and Amar's claims that the Framers feared
"the warrant" only blurred the Framers' focused fear of general war
rants into a diffuse-sounding disapproval of all warrants. But the his
tory, like the texts, contradicts that overgeneralized disapproval of
"warrants."
E.

Summary

To sum up, the conventional historical accounts of Lasson and
Cuddihy and the generalized-reasonableness accounts of Taylor and
Amar have all failed to solve the puzzle of the two-clause Fourth
Amendment. All of the existing treatments are seriously flawed in
some substantial way. Those flaws, in turn, are rooted in these com
mentators' acceptance of a set of false assumptions that obstruct re
covery of the Framers' thought.
Each of the historical commentaries have taken for granted that
the Framers must have intended to create a comprehensive constitu
tional standard or principle that would reach all searches or seizures
conducted by officers, with or without warrant. Likewise, each of
these commentaries has assumed the Framers must have intended for
"unreasonable" to serve, in some fashion, as that broadly applicable
constitutional standard or principle. But these assumptions are only
prochronisms derived from modem doctrine.
The historical record indicates that the Framers perceived the
threat to the right to be secure more precisely than we do today. They
did not have a diffuse concern about the security of person and house
- the common-law rules regarding search and arrest authority pro
vided sufficient protection against unjustified intrusions. Instead, they
were concerned about a specific vulnerability in the protections pro
vided by the common law; they were concerned that legislation might
make general warrants legal in the future, and thus undermine the
right of security in person and house. Thus, the Framers adopted con
stitutional search and seizure provisions with the precise aim of en
suring the protection of person and house by prohibiting legislative
approval of general warrants.
In the next Part, I demonstrate that the Framers did not conceive
of the problem of search and seizure as diffusely as we do. Then, in
subsequent Parts, I explain why the Framers' concern was focused on
general warrants, and how they expressed that focused concern in the
constitutional provisions they adopted.

Otis's 1762 Article, supra note 20, at 562, 563-64 (emphases in original). {Otis's reference to
an action for damages may refer to the liability of an officer who conducted a fruitless reve
nue search, based only on his personal suspicion, pursuant to a writ of assistance. See infra
note 294.)
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THE PROCHRONISTIC ASSUMPTIONS THAT HAVE OBSCURED
THE AUTHENTIC MEANING OF T.HE TEXT

If one examines the historical statements, and also listens for un
expected silences of the dog-that-did-not-bark-in-the-night variety,105
there is abundant evidence that the Framers did not mean for the first
clause of the Fourth Amendment to create a broad "reasonableness"
standard at all. For one thing, the historical sources show that
framing-era law did not recognize any "reasonableness" standard for
arrests and searches. For another, they also show that the Framers fo
cused their complaints about search and seizure authority on searches
of houses under general warrants.
A.

There Was No Historical "Reasonableness" Standard

The near-universal assumption that the first clause of the Fourth
Amendment was meant to articulate a broad reasonableness-in-the
circumstances standard runs afoul of two historical facts. The first is
the widespread opposition to allowing officers to exercise discretion
ary search authority, as described above. That opposition is inconsis
tent with the use of a relativistic reasonableness standard, which would
have facilitated officers' discretion to initiate intrusions. The second
fact is a silence: reasonableness was not used as a standard for as
sessing searches or arrests in framing-era legal sources, and there is
also no persuasive evidence of the use of any such standard during the
framing of the state or federal constitutional provisions.

1.

The Absence of a Broad Reasonableness Standard in
Framing-Era Law

Unfortunately, the absence of a historical reasonableness standard
is not as obvious as it should be in the existing literature. One reason
for the oversight is that previous commentaries did not undertake to
recover a systematic understanding of the common law of arrest and
search as a necessary first step toward understanding the Framers'
thinking. As I explain in the next Part, common-law arrest and search
authority consisted of a set of rules that were often more stringent

105.

People rarely write down what they do not think; hence, unexpected silences in his
torical statements indicate aspects of contemporary thought without analogs in historical
thought. One can learn a good deal about what the Framers did not think about search and
seizure by tracing modem concepts backwards in time - and finding they sometimes disap
pear from the historical record. Of course, the classic statement on significant silences
comes from Sherlock Holmes, who perceived that the theft of a horse must have been an
"inside job" because the stable watchdog had not barked the night the horse was taken. See
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES l, 27
Dogs that do not bark in the night are essential guides to the past.

(1930).
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than modern search and seizure law. Thus, had the prior commentar
ies confronted the actual rules used to assess arrests and searches at
the time of the framing, they would have discovered the incongruity of
a broad reasonableness standard. They did not, however, confront the
actual content of the common law.
Another reason that the absence of a broad reasonableness stan
dard has gone unnoticed is that previous commentators have not
treated a reasonableness standard as an inquiry, but rather as an as
sumption; thus they have tended to impose a modern reasonableness
standard on the historical sources. For example, Lasson failed to di
rectly ask and answer the question "Where did 'unreasonable' in 'un
reasonable searches and seizures' come from, and what did it mean?"
Instead, he referred uncritically to several historical circumstances as
though they involved the use of a "reasonableness" standard - even
though the historical sources regarding those situations did not use
that term. For example, he referred to "[t]he principle that search and
seizure must be reasonable" in a discussion of English law following
the Restoration of 1660, without citing any historical source that men
tioned such a principle.106 There was none. Cuddihy has done the
same.107
Taylor and Amar have also tended to assume the existence of a
historical reasonableness standard. When discussing historical doc
trine, Taylor used the terms "reasonable" and "unreasonable" as they
are used in modern doctrine, but never actually claimed to find evi
dence of a historical reasonableness standard.ms In contrast, Amar has
conveyed the impression that evidence of a historical reasonableness
in-the-circumstances standard is abundant - for example, he has re
cently claimed that, " [a]t the Founding, civil juries often played a role
in helping to define the idea of Fourth Amendment reasonable-

106. LASSON, supra note 16, at 34; see also id. at 42-43 (describing the Wilkesite cases as
"the final establishment of the principle of reasonable search and seizure").
107. Cuddihy also finessed the absence of evidence of a historical reasonableness stan
dard by describing the entire development of Anglo-American search and seizure law lead
ing up to the framing as though it constituted a development of an overarching "concept" of
unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus, he repeatedly referred to a concept of "unrea
sonable search and seizure," even though he sometimes acknowledged that historical sources
did not use that terminology. See, e.g., 1 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 3 (stating that English
men by 1642 had come to believe earlier methods of search "were fundamentally unreason
able and illegal"); id. at 48 (referring to "the concept of unreasonable search and seizure" in
England circa 1600). There are numerous similar examples. Notwithstanding Cuddihy's
occasional acknowledgments that the historical sources do not actually employ the concept
of "unreasonable search and seizure," the constant use of that terminology lulls the reader
into thinking that it must reflect historical thought, even though no direct evidence of any
such concept is ever offered.
108.

See TAYLOR, supra note 49, at 43.
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ness." 109 However, there is a large gap between his assertions and his
evidence.
The only mention of a supposed reasonableness standard that
Amar has identified in the framj.ng-era legal sources was a statement
Lord Mansfield made during the 1765 proceedings in Leach v. Money,
one of the Wilkesite cases. In Amar's words:

[Mansfield's statement in Leach] featured the following noteworthy pas
sage: " 'Whether there was a probable cause or ground of suspicion' was
a matter for the jury to determine: that is not now before the Court. So
[too with the issue] 'whether the defendants detained the plaintiff an un
reasonable time.' " Here we have clear evidence of the role of the civil
jury in deciding the reasonableness of government searches and sei
zures . . . .110
Amar's quotation ends too abruptly. Although Mansfield did repeat a
lawyer's argument that the king's messengers should not be liable for
false imprisonment if they detained the plaintiff only a reasonable
time (note the internal quotation marks in Mansfield's statement),
Mansfield went on to say, in the lines that immediately follow those
quoted, " [b]ut if it had been found to have been a reasonable time; yet
it would be no justification to the [officers] . . . . "111 Thus, Mansfield

109. Amar, Terry, supra note 58, at 1125; see also Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note
58, at 774 (noting that illegality depended on "[i]f the jury deemed the search or seizure un
reasonable - and reasonableness was a classic jury question"); statements cited supra note
63.
110. Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at 776 (quoting Le"ach v. Money, 3 Burr.
1742, 1765, 19 Howell St. Tr. 1001, 1026, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1087 (K.B. 1765) (emphasis and
second bracketing by Amar)). This passage is the only framing-era legal source Amar has
ever identified as evidence of a historical reasonableness standard.
treatment, see Amar, Terry, supra note 58, at 1126.

For his most recent

111. Here is a fuller quotation of Mansfield's language in Leach; the asterisk indicates
the start of Amar's quotation, the double asterisk indicates the end:
[Lord Mansfield:] A bill of exceptions [filed by the messengers] supposes the evidence true;
and questions the competency or propriety of it.
*"Whether there was a probable cause or ground of suspicion," was a matter for the jury to
determine: that is not now before the Court. So - "whether the defendants detained the
plaintiff an unreasonable time."**
But if it had been found to have been a reasonable time; yet it would be no justification to
the defendants; because it is stated "that this man was neither author, printer, or publisher:"
and if he was not, then they have taken up a man who was not the subject of the warrant.
Money v. Leach, 3

Burr. 1742, 1765, 19 Howell St. Tr. 1001, 1026, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1087
(K.B. 1765).
To put this statement in context, it is apparent from the report of the case that the Mes
sengers did not attempt to justify the arrest on their own authority. (Note that the offense of
seditious libel was a misdemeanor, so even Leach's actual guilt would not have provided a
justification for the arrest. See infra note 222.) Rather, they pleaded "the general issue, 'not
guilty' " (meaning they had not done what was alleged) and, alternatively, a "special justifi
cation" (that is, a legal defense). The special justification asserted was that the Messengers
had acted pursuant to the warrant issued by Halifax and thus were within the terms of a
statute (24 Geo. II, ch. 44) that protected an officer who acted in obedience to the terms of a
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actually stated that the reasonableness of the duration of the detention
was irrelevant to the lawfulness of the officers' conduct. And almost
immediately thereafter, Mansfield condemned the discretionary
authority claimed by the officers under the general warrant because it
was "not fit" to allow officers to make a judgment as to whom to ar
rest.112 Mansfield did not endorse a relativistic reasonableness stan
dard for assessing the lawfulness of arrests or searches; rather, he con
demned the attempt to confer discretionary authority on an officer.113
If Amar's evidence is examined closely, it turns out that he has
never identified a single framing-era source that endorsed a warrant
less arrest or search on the ground that it was reasonable in the cir
cumstances.114 That is because none did.115
warrant. See Leach, 3 Burr. at
Eng. Rep. at 1075, 1077, 1079.

1742, 1745, 1749, 19 Howell

St. Tr. at

1003, 1006, 1010,

97

When understood in the context of the actual legal issues, the phrase "whether the de
fendants detained the plaintiff an unreasonable time" was not part of an argument that there
were legal grounds to arrest Leach other than the general warrant (as Amar implies).
Rather, it appears that the Messengers' not-unreasonable-time claim was part of the "not
guilty" argument; namely, that there had not really been an actionable arrest or that Leach
had not suffered any actionable harm upon which damages could be predicated. In that con
text, Mansfield responded to the not-unreasonable-time argument by declaring that, if any
such factual evaluations had been relevant, they would have been for the jury, but that they
were not germane to the review by the King's Bench of the legal issues of the applicability of
the statutory protection or, potentially, of the validity of the general warrant. Because the
King's Bench judges concluded that Leach was not within the description of the persons to
be arrested in the general warrant, they concluded that the Messengers' conduct could not
come within the terms of the statute (thus, the King's Bench ruling did not formally reach
the lurking constitutional question of whether the statute could protect officers who acted
within the terms of a general warrant illegal at common law).

112 See statement quoted supra note 77.
113. I previously noted that Amar's treatment of Mansfield's statement did not show a
historical reasonableness standard for arrests or searches. See Davies's Testimony, supra
note 3, at 119, 129 n.17. Amar has responded that Blackstone's later report of Leach and an
1827 English case "confirm [his] initial reading [of Leach]." Amar, Boston, supra note 19, at
61 n36 (citing Money v. Leach, 1 Black. W. 555, 560, 96 Eng. Rep. 320, 323 (K.B. 1765), and
Beckwith v. Philby, 6 B. & C. 635, 638, 108 Eng. Rep. 585, 586 (K.B. 1827)). Blackstone's
report only confirms that Mansfield repeated but rejected the Messengers' counsel's "rea
sonable time" argument. Amar is correct that the 1827 Beckwith opinion did construe the
passage in Leach in the same way he treated it. However, Beckwith must be read in context;
it initiated a radical relaxation of the common-law standard for justifying a warrantless arrest
and cited Leach as part of an exercise of pretending that the novel rule it announced (the
modern probable cause standard for warrantless arrests) was consistent with earlier common
law. It was not a sound exposition of Leach. I discuss Beckwith infra notes 241-242, 248-251
and accompanying text.
114. The purported evidence Amar has offered of a historical reasonableness standard
consists of the Leach passage, see supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text, and three calls
for a federal protection from "unreasonable searches and seizures" made during the ratifica
tion debates of 1787 and 1788, see discussion infra notes 120-132 and accompanying text.
The only other evidence Amar has offered is what he terms "a smattering" of mid- to late
nineteenth-century legal statements that used the word "reasonable." Amar, Fourth
Amendment, supra note 58, at 818 n.228. This "smattering" is far too little and a hundred
years too late to constitute evidence of the intended meaning of the search and seizure texts.
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The Absence of a Broad Reasonableness Standard
in the Records ofthe Framing

There is also a dearth of evidence of a broad reasonableness stan
dard in the records of the framing of the American search and seizure
provisions. Indeed, the phrase "unreasonable searches and seizures"
did not appear until relatively late in the formulation of American
constitutional search and seizure language. In all, nine states or proto
states adopted search and seizure provisions prior to the Fourth
Amendment.116 No one disputes that "unreasonable" was not intro
duced until the 1780 Massachusetts provision, the seventh of the nine
provisions, began with the declaration that "[e]very subject has a right to
be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his
house, his papers, and all his possessions."117 Why, if reasonableness

115. It is difficult to document a negative, but Professor Taylor illuminated the sort of
searches that were actually conducted and litigated when he noted that "[m]ost of the court
decisions [assessing the lawfulness of searches] during the nineteenth century relate to stolen
goods warrants, and the requirements for their valid issuance and execution." TAYLOR, su
pra note 49, at 44 & n.71 (citing the following eight cases [brackets show corrected citations]:
Sandford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. 286 (1816); Gardner v. Neil, 4 N. Car. 104 (1814); Beaty v.
Perkins, 6 Wend. 382 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1831); Reed v. Rice, 2 JJ. Marsh 4[4] (Ky. 1829);
Halsted v. Brice, 13 Mo. [171] {1850); Larthet v. Forgay, 2 La. Ann. 524 {18[4]7); Chipman v.
Bates, 15 Vt. 51 {1843); and Humes v. Taber, 1 R.I. 464 (1850)).
Oddly, Amar cited the cases collected by Taylor as evidence that "the civil trespass ac
tion tried to a jury flourished as the obvious remedy against haughty customs officers, tax
collectors, constables, marshals, and the like." Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at
786 & n.105. Putting aside the question of whether eight appellate cases can show a "flour
ishing" remedy (especially when the defendant searchers won several of them), Amar's
characterization of these cases omitted the salient fact that each arose from a warrant search
and involved issues regarding the validity and scope of the warrant. Taylor's cases undercut
Amar's claims regarding use of a reasonableness standard because they show (1) that offi
cers who attempted to search houses used warrants, and (2) the principal issues that arose
with regard to the legality o.f searches concerned whether the search warrant was valid and
whether the officer's search conformed to the command of the search warrant. None of
these cases employed a broad "reasonableness" standard.
116. See infra note 326.
117. The full text of the 1780 Massachusetts provision is set out infra text accompanying
note 379, and is discussed in detail infra notes 379-387 and accompanying text. For commen
tary recognizing that this was the first appearance of "unreasonable," see, for example,
LASSON, supra note 16, at 82; LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING, supra note 45, at 239; and 3 Cud
dihy, supra note 20, at 1240-41. Cf. TAYLOR, supra note 49, at 42 (noting that the Massachu
setts provision was the clearest ancestor of Fourth Amendment).
Unlike the other commentators, Amar has omitted any direct discussion of the initial
appearance of "unreasonable searches and seizures" - even when he discussed the
Massachusetts provision. See, e.g., Amar, Boston, supra note 19, at 66-68 (discussing the
Massachusetts provision without mentioning it was the first to use "unreasonable searches
and seizures"). In fact, Amar has obscured the initial appearance of "unreasonable" by in
cluding the earlier Pennsylvania provision along with the Massachusetts provision among the
state provisions that "most closely anticipated the eventual language of the federal Fourth
Amendment" - without noting the absence of "unreasonable" in the former. Amar, Fourth
Amendment, supra note 58, at 763 n.10; see also infra note 119.
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was the "first principle" of search law, did the phrase appear so late in
the evolution of American search and seizure texts?
Previous commentators have finessed the late appearance of "un
reasonable" by directing attention to the earlier 1776 Pennsylvania
provision, which began by declaring that "the people have a right to
hold themselves, their houses, papers, and possessions free from
search and seizure . . . . "118 Lasson asserted that a broad reasonable
ness principle was "imputed" in that language, and Cuddihy, Levy,
and Amar have all followed that example.119 However, there is no fac
tual or textual basis for Lasson's claim: the Pennsylvania language
clearly asserted a "right," but it said nothing to suggest defining that
right in terms of reasonableness-in-the-circumstances .
There is also a dearth of evidence of a broad reasonableness stan
dard in the discussions of the need for a federal search provision dur
ing the ratification debates of 1787-88. Even recognizing that the sur
viving record of those debates is incomplete, it remains striking that
the prior commentaries have identified only three statements from
that period as evidence of a broad reasonableness principle. In
September 1787, Richard Henry Lee called for a federal bill of rights
including a protection "[t]hat the citizens shall not be exposed to
unreasonable searches, seizures of their persons, houses, papers or
property . . . . ";120 in December 1787, the sixth installment of the widely

118. PA. CONST. art. X {1776) {Deel. of Rights). The Pennsylvania provision is dis
cussed infra notes 352-378 and accompanying text.
119. See LASSON, supra note 16, at 81-82 n.11 (stating that "[t]he word 'unreasonable' is
imputed" in the Pennsylvania provision). Cuddihy repeated that finesse. See Cuddihy, su
pra note 20, at 1244 {"Although the Pennsylvania constitution renounced all searches and
seizures, it assumed that only unreasonable ones were prohibited."); see also id. at 1239-40,
1251-52. Levy initially described the Pennsylvania provision without imputing "unreason
able," but later wrote as though both the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts provisions had
employed a reasonableness standard. See LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING, supra note 45, at
237-38, 243. Amar has also adopted a low-key version of Lasson's finesse by treating the
Pennsylvania provision as one of the state provisions that "most closely anticipated the even
tual language of the Fourth Amendment." See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note SS, at
763 n. 10; discussion supra note 117.
In contrast, Taylor recognized that the Pennsylvania provision did not include a broad
reasonableness standard. See TAYLOR, supra note 49, at 41 {describing the initial state pro
visions except for Massachusetts and New Hampshire as being aimed only at warrant
authority).
120. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Randolph, Governor of Virginia, (Oct.
16, 1787) {postscript), in S THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 98, at 117 (5.6.5).
Immediately after the Constitutional Convention ended in 1787 without adopting a bill of
rights, Lee called on the Continental Congress (which was still sitting under the Articles of
Confederation) to adopt a bill of rights to be submitted to the states along with the proposed
Constitution. His proposal was defeated. Lee then included this call for a federal bill of
rights in correspondence:
That the new constitution proposed for the government of the United States be bottomed
upon a declaration or bill of rights, clearly and precisely stating the principles upon which
this social compact is founded, to wit: That the rights of conscience in matters of religion
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disseminated anti-Federalist pamphlet Letters of a Federal Farmer
(which may or may not have been authored by Lee121) called for a
federal protection that "[n]o man [should be] subject to ; . . unrea
sonable searches or seizures of his person, papers, or effects . . . ." ;122
and in 1788, during the Massachusetts ratification convention, Samuel
Adams made (and then backed away from) a motion that called for
amendments including a protection of "the people [against] unrea
sonable searches and seizures of their persons, papers, or posses
sions. "123

ought not to be violated • • • - That the right of the people to assemble peaceably for the
purpose of petitioning the legislature shall not be prevented - That the citizens shall not be
exposed to unreasonable searches, seizures of their persons, houses, papers or property; and
it is necessary for the good of society, that the administration of government be conducted
with all possible maturity of judgment, for which reason it hath been the practice of civilized
nations and so determined by every state in the Union. - That a council of state or privy
council should be appointed to advise and assist in the arduous business assigned to the ex
ecutive power.

Id. at 116-17 (5.6.5).

Note that it appears that Lee meant only to list subjects to be addressed
in a bill of rights, not to propose constitutional language. Contrast the more fully developed
anti-Federalist proposals for a federal search and seizure provision set out infra notes 128,
426, 429.
121. The authorship of the Letters was earlier attributed to Lee, but that attribution is
now uncertain. See 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 98, at 214-16.

122. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFI'S, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND
ORIGINS 240-41 (6.2.4.7) (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter COGAN] (excerpting Letters
from the Federal Fanner (VI) (Dec. 25, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI
FEDERALIST, supra note 98, at 262 (2.8.86)). This reference to "unreasonable searches and
seizures" appears in a listing of topics to be included in a bill of rights:
The following, I think, will be allowed to be unalienable or fundamental rights in the United
States: -

No man, demeaning himself peaceably, shall be molested on account of his religion or mode
of worship - The people have a right to hold and enjoy their property according to known
standing Jaws, and which cannot be taken from them without their consent, or the consent of
their representatives; and whenever taken in the pressing urgencies of government, they are
to receive a reasonable compensation for it - Individual security consists in having free re
course to the laws • . . - They have a right, when charged, to a speedy trial in the vicinage; to
be heard by themselves or counsel, not to be compelled to furnish evidence against them
selves, to have witnesses face to face, and to confront their adversaries before the judge No man is held to answer a crime charged upon him till it be substantially described to him;
and he is subject to no unreasonable searches or seizures of his person, papers, or effects The people have a right to assemble in an orderly manner, and petition the government for a
redress of wrongs -The freedom of the press ought not to be restrained - No emoluments,
except for actual service . . . .
Note that this brief reference to a protection against "unreasonable searches and sei
zures" appears simply to identify a subject to be addressed in a l:>ill of rights, rather than to
propose constitutional language. Contrast the more fully developed proposal set out infra
note 128; see also the anti-Federalist proposals set out infra notes 426, 429.

Id.

123. DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN TiiE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTII OF
MASSACHUSETIS HELD IN TiiE YEAR 1788, at 86-87 (Boston, William White, Printer to the
Commonwealth 1856). The motion is also quoted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 232-33
(6.1.2.2). This motion appears to have been a listing of subjects to be addressed in amend
ments rather than a proposal for actual language for such amendments:
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Previous commentaries have treated the appearance of "unreason
able searches and seizures" in these three statements as evidence of a
broad reasonableness standard because the statements failed also to
refer explicitly to general warrants.124 But that interpretation outruns
the statements. To begin with, none of the three statements appears
to have been meant as proposed language for a constitutional provi
sion; instead, they each appear merely to identify topics that should be
addressed in a federal bill of rights.125 It appears that each of the
statements simply borrowed the reference to "unreasonable searches
and seizures" from the beginning of the Massachusetts provision as a
short-hand label for the topic to be addressed.126 While it is true that
these three statements refer to "unreasonable searches and seizures"
without mentioning general warrants, it is also true that they do not
explicitly mention warrantless searches or arrests - their common
feature is brevity.

[T]hat the said Constitution be never construed to authorize Congress to infringe the just
liberty of the press, or the rights of conscience; or to prevent the people of the United States,
who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their own arms; or to raise standing armies, unless
when necessary for the defence of the United States, or of some one or more of them; or to
prevent the people from petitioning, in a peaceable and orderly manner, the federal legisla
ture, for a redress of grievances; or to subject the people to unreasonable searches and sei
zures of their persons, papers or possessions.

Id. The motion was voted down.
supra note 20, at 1421-23.

For a discussion of the politics involved, see 3 Cuddihy,

124. Lasson described Lee's call for a federal search protection as an endorsement of
the "general principle" of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. See LASSON,
supra note 16, at 87 n.82.
Cuddihy also asserted that Lee's language did "more than abrogate general warrants, for
it took in the full range of searches and seizures that had become unreasonable . . . ," 3
Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1365. Cuddihy also characterized the sixth of the Letters from the
Federal Farmer (which he described as probably being written by Lee) as "defining unrea
sonable searches to include more than general warrants." Id. at 1373. He also described
Samuel Adams's motion as "a modification of Lee's [proposal]." Id. at 1384. And he con
cluded that "Lee and Samuel Adams desired a right against unreasonable search and seizure
but did not say that general warrants were unreasonable or ask their abolition." Id. at 1471.
Levy has invoked Lee's call and the sixth of the Letters as evidence of a broad reason
ableness standard. See LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING, supra note 45, at 241.
Amar did not mention any of these three statements in his principal discussion of Fourth
Amendment history, see Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, but he invoked the three
statements described in the text as "vivid evidence" of a "standalone reasonableness re
quirement" in Amar, Boston, supra note 19, at 67 n54. See also Amar, Terry, supra note 58,
at 1108.
125. See the fuller texts quoted supra notes 120, 122, 123.
126. The link between Samuel Adams and the Massachusetts provision is obvious. It is
also evident that the author of the Letters from the Federal Farmer borrowed from the
Massachusetts text. See infra note 128. Finally, Lee was well acquainted with both John
Adams and Samuel Adams and corresponded often with the latter during the ratification
debates.
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In addition, other statements in the Lett�rs of a Federal Farmer
suggest that "unreasonable searches and seizures" was understood to
refer to the complaint against general warrants. The reference to "un
reasonable searches and seizures" quoted above, which appeared in
the sixth installment, was actually the second of three discussions of a
federal search protection in the Letters. The earlier fourth installment
called for protection against "hasty and unreasonable search warrants"
- it did not use "unreasonable searches and seizures."127 In addition,
the later sixteenth installment, which made the most detailed call for a
federal protection, proposed language for a federal provision that
tracked but condensed the Massachusetts state provision, including
the reference to a "right to be secure" against "unreasonable searches
and seizures"; but it then referred to that proposal as a protection
against "unreasonable search warrants."128 The interchange of "unrea
sonable search warrants" and "unreasonable searches and seizures"
undercuts the claim that the Letters intended to call for a free-standing
reasonableness standard distinct from the ban against too-loose war
rants.
Previous commentators, however, have either omitted or
downplayed the references to "unreasonable search warrants" in the

Letters.129
127. Letters from the Federal Farmer (IV) (Oct. 12, 1787) (emphasis added), reprinted in
2
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 98, at 249 (2.8.53) (calling for "freedom
from hasty and unreasonable search warrants, warrants not founded on oath, and not issued
with due caution, for searching and seizing men's papers, property, and persons").

THE

THE

128. Letters from the Federal Farmer (XVI) (Jan. 20, 1788), reprinted in 2
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 98, at 328 (2.8.200) (emphasis added). The pro
posed provision read:
[T]hat all persons shall have a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures
of their persons, houses, papers, or possessions; and that all warrants shall be deemed con
trary to this right, if the foundation of them be not previously supported by oath, and there
be not in them a special designation of persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure . • • .

call

Id.

A few lines later, the letter repeated the
for a federal protection but phrased it as a
protection "to be secure against unreasonable search warrants." Id.
Note that the language of the proposed provision is composed from the italicized parts
of the 1780 Massachusetts provision:

Art. XIV. Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures
of his person, his house, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are con

trary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or
affirmation, and if the order in the w
t to a civil officer, to make search in suspected
places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accom
panied with a special designation ofthe person or objects ofsearch, arrest, or seizure; and no
warrant ought to be issued, but in cases, and with the formalities prescribed by the laws.

arran

XIV

MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art.
, reprinted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 234
(6.1.3.3) (emphasis added). The Massachusetts provision is discussed in detail infra, begin
ning with text accompanying note 379.

See

129. Lassan wrote at a time when it was believed that Lee was the author of the Letters;
even so, he separated the presentation of Lee's initial
for a ban against "unreasonable"
searches and seizures, see LASSON, supra note 16, at 87 n.32 (referring to the statement dis
cussed supra note 120 and accompanying text), from the later call for a protection from

call
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The three statements offered as evidence of a broad reasonable
ness standard are also atypical; complaints about search authority
made during the ratification debates were far more likely to refer ex
plicitly to "general warrants" than to call for a ban against "unreason
able searches and seizures."130 In fact, as I describe below, the first
two anti-Federalist proposals for a federal protection actually intro
duced in state ratification conventions simply called for a ban on too
loose warrants without mentioning "unreasonable searches and sei
zures."131 Previous commentaries have not confronted the implica
tions of those focused calls for banning general warrants.132
In sum, the few isolated references to "unreasonable searches and
seizures" do not provide persuasive evidence that the Framers sought
a constitutional protection beyond prohibiting too-loose warrants. Al
though the prior commentaries have asserted that the historical
sources employed a broad reasonableness standard, they simply have
not identified persuasive evidence of a sweeping reasonableness-in
the-circumstances standard in the pre-framing- or framing-era sources.
B.

The Framers' Complaints Did Not Involve Warrantless Intrusions

The historical evidence poses an even deeper problem for prior in
terpretations. The assumption that the Fourth Amendment contains a
broad reasonableness standard rests on the more fundamental as-

"hasty and unreasonable search warrants" in the fourth Letter, see id. at 88 n.37 (referring to
the statement discussed supra note 127 and accompanying text). Lasson did not refer to the
sixteenth Letter.
Cuddihy reported the references to "unreasonable search warrants" in the fourth and
sixteenth Letters, but did not call attention to the interchangeable use of that term and " un·
reasonable searches and seizures." See 3 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1373.
Levy referred to all three of the Letters: he noted that the fourth letter mentioned a
right against unreasonable warrants {but did not quote that language); he mentioned an
other aspect of the sixth letter; and he quoted the fuller proposal for a protection in the six
teenth letter but did not mention that it also characterized that protection as one against
"unreasonable search warrants." See LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING, supra note 45, at 241.
Amar mentioned the fourth letter as evidence of a "Fourth-Seventh Amendment link
age," see supra note 98; however, he did not mention that it referred to the protection as one
against "unreasonable search warrants." He did not mention the sixteenth letter.
130. See supra note 98; infra notes 164-166.
131. See the anti-Federalist proposals advanced in the Pennsylvania and Maryland rati
fication conventions, discussed infra note 426.
132. Lasson omitted the Pennsylvania and Maryland anti-Federalist proposals; so did
Levy. Cuddihy did discuss the Pennsylvania and Maryland anti-Federalist proposals, but did
not quote them and did not draw attention to the fact that they omitted any use of "unrea
sonable searches and seizures." See 3 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1382-85. Amar lumped all
of the ratification convention proposals together as "proto Fourth Amendments" - without
quoting them or noting that two of those proposals did not include "unreasonable." See
Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at 775 n.65.
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sumption that the Framers sought to craft a comprehensive regulation
of all government search and seizure authority, including warrantless
searches and arrests. Viewed from a modem perspective, the assump
tion appears to make sense. Modem search and seizure law has be
come preoccupied with warrantless arrests and searches because the
overwhelming bulk of today's arrests and searches are made without
warrants.133 Thus, modem readers have trouble understanding how
the Framers could have been satisfied with a text banning only the use
of general warrants.
The historical record, however, reveals that the Framers focused
their concerns and complaints rather precisely on searches of houses
under general warrants. Moreover, the early interpretations of the
Fourth Amendment and of the related state provisions understood the
texts to pertain only to warrant standards.

1.

The Concerns Expressed During the Prerevolutionary
Controversies

The American Whigs consistently aimed their complaints about
search and seizure at general warrants. Controversies about general
warrants are evident in colonial legislation even prior to the beginning
of the colonists' political struggle with Parliament.134 Moreover, the
actual complaints and concerns about search and seizure expressed
during the historical controversies that preceded the Revolution were
focused on searches of houses under general warrants. Except for the
vicarious concerns over the use of general warrants for arrests in con
nection with the English Wilkesite cases, which involved both arrests
and searches of houses and papers, the prerevolutionary controversies
were devoid of any consideration of arrest authority.135
Jam.es Otis framed the initial American attack on searches made
under the general writ of assistance by describing how use of an illegal
general warrant violated " [t]he Privilege of [the] House." However,

133. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (And Still Need to
Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of
"Lost" Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. (now L. & SOC. INQUIRY) 611, 665.
134. For example, in 1626 the Virginia Council and General Court forbade use of "gen
erall warrants" because of "divers inconveniencies w'ch appeare to have happened." See 27
VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOG. 142, 145 (1919, reprinted 1968). Virginia also enacted a ban
against "blank warrants" in 1643. See 1 liENING, STATUTES AT LARGE 257-58, cited in
LASSON, supra note 16, at 33 n.73. Likewise, the Massachusetts colonial legislature (the
General Court) enacted bans against certain uses of general warrants in 1756, apparently in
response to fears of searches (or at least entries of houses) created by the Massachusetts ex
cise act of 1754. See Maclin, Complexity, supra note 44, at 94344.
135. Cf. 3 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1514 (noting that there is little mention of arrest
authority in the Framers' discussions of search and seizure issues, and that arrest authority
was not addressed in American legislation prior to 1791) ; see also supra note 47.
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he did not complain of searches of ships or warehouses. His focus on
house searches was especially noteworthy because his clients were
merchants who also owned ships and warehouses.136 Likewise, colo
nial press accounts of the Wilkesite cases typically stressed the viola
tion of the house in the searches made under general warrants, and the
"papers" involved in those cases were the kind generally kept in the
house.137 John Dickinson also criticized the general writ reauthorized
by the Townshend Act as a violation of the house.138 Samuel Adams
complained that customs searches of houses under general warrants
left citizens "cut off from that domestick security which renders [life
agreeable]."139 And William Henry Drayton attacked the general writ

136. John Adams's notes from the Writs ofAssistance Case of Otis's opening statement
regarding the "Privilege of House" are quoted infra text accompanying note 262. Otis's
stress on the violation of the house is also evident in the newspaper column he published in
Boston in 1762, in which he complained of the violation of "a DWELLING HOUSE," of a
"freeholder's house," and of a "freeman's house" - but again did not complain of searches
of ships, shops, or warehouses. See Otis's 1762 Article, supra note 20, at 562-66 (capitaliza
tion in original).
137. For example, both London and colonial press accounts of the trial and verdict in
significance of the case by stating that "every Englishman
has the satisfaction of seeing that his house is his castle, and is not liable to be searched, nor
his papers pried into by the malignant curiosity of King's Messengers." THE LONDON
CiiRON., Dec. 6-8, 1763 (No. 1082) , at 550, cols. 1-2; see also the London and Boston press
accounts of the Wilkesite cases set out supra note 22.

Wilkes v. Wood summe d up the

138. When Dickinson criticized the general writ of assistance authorized in the
Townshend Act, he initially recited the scope of the authority granted by the writ but em
phasized that the writ authorized entry into the house: "the officers of the customs are 'int
powered to enter any HOUSE, warehouse, shop, cellar, or other place . . . . ' " John Dickin
son, Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, in JENSEN, supra note 94, at 150-51
(capitalization in original). Dickinson then went on to complain specifically of the violation
of a man's "castle." Id. Dickinson corresponded with Otis about the general writ. See 2
Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1123-24.
139. A STATE OF TIIE RIGHTS OF TIIE COLONISTS (likely authored by Samuel Adams),
in JENSEN, supra note 94, at 243. This report to a Boston town meeting in November 1772,
which is usually attributed to Samuel Adams, contains a complaint about searches under
writs of assistance. After reciting the language of the writ of assistance authorizing searches
of ships and warehouses as well as houses, the report expressed emphatic complaints re
garding the violation of the house:
[O]ur homes and even our bedchambers, are exposed to be ransacked, our boxes chests &
trunks broke open ravaged and plundered by wretches, whom no prudent man would ven
ture to employ even as menial servants; whenever they are pleased to say they suspect there
are in the house wares etc. for which the dutys have not been paid. Flagrant instances of the
wanton exercise of this power, have frequently happened in this and other sea port Tovms.
By this we are cut off from that domestick security which renders the lives of the most un
happy in some measure agreable. Those Officers may under colour of law and the cloak of a
general warrant, break thro' the sacred rights of the Domicil, ransack mens houses, destroy
their securities, carry off their property, and with little danger to themselves commit the
most horred murders.

Id. at 243-44 (emphasis in original).

December 1999]

The Original Fourth Amendment

603

for its violation of "private cabinets" and "houses, the castles of Eng
lish subjects."140
Focusing criticism of the general writ on the violation of the house
made sense as a strategy for attacking the legality of the writ. As I ex
plain below, because the house enjoyed special status at common law
- expressed in the motto "a man's house is his castle" - a valitl war
rant was usually reqltjred to justify "breaking" a house.141 Thus, legal
criticism of the general warrant was especially strong when the secu
rity of a house was at issue.142
Of equal importance is the fact that the historical record of
prerevolutionary grievance reveals no legal complaints about other
kinds of searches and seizures. Some previous commentators have
adverted to complaints about warrantless searches of houses, but close
examination of the particular complaints undercuts those interpreta
tions.143 For example, the Continental Congress complained in 1774

140.

See Drayton, supra note 83, at 15, 21.

141. The castle doctrine and the common-law justifications for breaking a house are dis
cussed infra notes 259-274 and accompanying text.
142. As previous commentators have noted, there is abundant evidence that the
prerevolutionary grievance was directed at the use of general writs of assistance for house
searches. Cuddihy has collected American complaints about writs of assistance; many were
specifically addressed to violations of the house. See 2 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1026-27
(reporting that Daniel Malcolm justified his defiance of a writ of assistance as a defense of
his house); id. at 1095-96 (quoting William S. Johnson that the writ permitted officers "at
their own discretion to enter Houses"); id. at 1113-14 (reciting complaints by a meeting of
Delawarians and by a committee of Vrrginians that writs of assistance violated houses); id. at
1125-27 (quoting Arthur Lee that the writ "laid open every man's house"; quoting Hyperion
that the writ destroyed the house's status as a "castle"; quoting Reverend Sherwood that the
writ exposed "private apartments"; quoting Americanus that the writ destroyed the privacy
of houses; quoting Freeman that the writ destroyed "domestic enjoyment"; quoting Regulus
that the writ empowered "wretches" to "break up our houses").
Although Cuddihy sometimes writes as though the Fourth Amendment was meant to
apply to all government searches and seizures, he notes at other points that the Framers
were primarily concerned with searches of houses. See, e.g., 1 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at cix
(the Framers "focused their attention on searches of their houses"); 3 id. at 1545 (Framers
denounced general warrants because they "abridged the security that houses afforded"); 3
id. at 1556 ("[T]he framers fixated on the single technique that most affected personal
dwellings, the search warrant."). Unfortunately, he did not consistently recognize the full
import of that focus, and paid no attention to the meaning of "houses, papers, and effects" in
the language of the Fourth Amendment. Cf. LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING, supra note 45, at
222 ("The Fourth Amendment . . . was a constitutional embodiment of the extraordinary
coupling of Magna Carta to the appealing fiction that a man's home is his castle.").
143. In the 1750s, customs officers in Boston had asserted that they possessed ex officio
authority to search for uncustomed goods. However, that claim was questioned, and the cus
toms officers then obtained warrants from the governor. That appears to have been the end
of any custom officer claims of ex officio search authority. Likewise, when the validity of the
governor's warrant was questioned in 1755, the customs officers began to obtain writs of as
sistance from the Massachusetts courts. That appears to have ended any claim by customs
officers that an executive "warrant" was sufficient. Thus, by the time of the 1761 Writs of
Assistance Case, the issue was framed solely in terms of the validity of judicially issued gen
eral writs of assistance.
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that "[t]he Commissioners of the Customs are empowered to break
open and enter houses without the authority of any Civil Magistrate,
founded on legal information."144 Although the statement may ini
tially appear to be a complaint about warrantless searches of houses,
the concern with the lack of "legal information" suggests that it was most
likely an artfully worded attack on customs searches under illegal gen
eral writs of assistance.145
Similarly, Lasson and later commentators have treated prerevolu
tionary controversies over warrantless seizures of ships as evidence
that the Framers were concerned with warrantless intrusions, as well
as general warrants, when they wrote the constitutional search and
seizure provisions. For example, they have conflated the colonial
grievance over ship seizures with the grievance over general search
authority.146 However, the colonial complaint about ship seizures did
not arise from ships being exposed to general search authority, but
from "customs racketeering" in the form of hypertechnical applica
tions of customs rules or forfeiture proceedings based on perjured tes
timony from informers.147
Professor Amar has written as though the Framers feared issuance of "executive" war
rants. See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at 773, 780. However, he offers no spe
cific evidence beyond alluding to the issuance of the Wilkes general warrant by the English
Secretary of State, Lord Halifax.
Because executive warrants were rejected in
Massachusetts in 1755, and because Halifax's authority to issue warrants was rejected in the
1765 Entick ruling, see supra notes 21-25, I do not think that the Framers perceived any
threat from "executive" warrants.
144. Memorial to the Inhabitants ofthe British Colonies, Oct 21, 1774, reprinted in 1 AM.
ARCIDVES 921, 925 (series 4, 1837) . The same complaint was repeated in The Address to the
King, Oct 26, 1774, reprinted in 1 AM. ARCIDVES, supra, at 934-35.
145. Cuddihy has interpreted this complaint to be about warrantless "promiscuous"
searches - and it is virtually the only evidence he offers of a legal grievance about warrant
less searches during the prerevolutionary controversies. See 3 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at
1499-1501. However, it does not seem likely that a complaint about warrantless searches would
refer to a lack of "legal information" - that is, a complaint under oath before a judicial
magistrate.

Compare William Henry Drayton's call for the Continental Congress to declare the ille
gality of general warrants and his complaint, shortly before the resolutions, that general
writs were not based on "any crinie charged" - that is, not on a legal complaint. See supra
note 83. The absence of any direct mention of the writ in the language of the congressional
resolutions probably reflects the view, widespread among American Whigs by 1774, that
Parliament had no authority to legislate for the colonies. It would have been inconsistent to
complain about use of writs authorized only by statute at the same time Congress denied the
jurisdiction of Parliament to legislate for the colonies. Hence, the authors of the 1774 com
plaint showed their disdain for Parliament's pretended legislative authority by declining to
refer directly to the writs authorized by the Townshend Act.
146. See, e.g., LASSON, supra note 16, at 72 (including ship seizure controversies with the
general search warrant controversy); 2 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1200-19 (same).
147. The two most visible ship seizure controversies involved Henry Laurens's legal bat
tles with customs officers in Charleston and the seizure of John Hancock's sloop Liberty in
Boston. The former involved hypertechnical interpretations of customs rules regarding
bonding and clearance. See DAVID D. WALLACE, THE LIFE OF HENRY LAURENS 137-49
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The absence of legal complaints about general search authority re
garding ships is not mysterious. Even during the prerevolutionary
struggle with Parliament, American Whigs accepted the legitimacy of
extensive government regulation and inspection of shipping.148
Moreover, no late eighteenth-century lawyer would have imagined
that ships were entitled to the same common-law protection due
"houses, papers, and effects." Ships were not ordinary property at
common law, but personalities subject to admiralty law - a branch of
civil law.149 Indeed, the First Congress recognized as much when it ex
plicitly included revenue seizures involving ships in the exclusive admi
ralty (that is, civil law) jurisdiction of the federal courts.150 In late
(Russell & Russell 1967) (1915). The latter involved perjured testimony by an informer
which, taken at face value, provided specific cause for the seizure. See 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF
JOHN ADAMS, supra note 20, at 173-210. The most comprehensive treatment of customs
racketeering is OLIVER M DICKERSON, THE NAVIGATION ACTS AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 208.(i6 (1951). Although Dickerson had previously authored an account of
the controversies over the Townshend Act writ of assistance, see Dickerson, Writr ofAssis
tance, supra note 26, he made only a passing reference to the writs of assistance in his treat
ment of ship controversies, see DICKERSON, supra, at 250-51, and did not include general
search authority as a significant feature of the controversies over ship seizures.
148. See DICKERSON, supra note 147, at 296-97 (arguing that colonial resistance was to
excessive taxation of trade, not to the regulation of trade itself).
149. See, e.g., 4 COKE, supra note 74, at 134-47 (discussing jurisdiction and law applied
by Court of Admiralty); 1 MATIHEW BACON, NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 629 (f.
Cunningham ed., 6th ed. 1793) ("All Maritime Affairs are regulated chiefly by the Civil
Law • . . ."); Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Conven
tion (Dec. 12, 1787), reprinted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 430-31 (12.2.2.4.d) (recognizing
that proceedings against ships under revenue laws "will be at the civil law"); see also OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 25-26 (1881) ("A ship is the most living of inani
mate things . . . . It is only by supposing the ship to have been treated as if endowed with
personality, that the arbitrary seeming peculiarities of the maritime law can be made intelli
gible."); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1970) (recognizing that
" [m]aritime law had always, in this country as in England, been a thing apart from the com
mon law").
Although Cuddihy conflated ship seizures with the general search warrant grievance, he
noted that ships were entitled to less protection than houses in framing-era law. See 3
Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1508, 1548-50.
150. Shortly after adopting the Bill of Rights and the 1789 Collections Act, the First
Congress included a provision in the 1789 Judiciary Act that treated seizures of ships under
"laws of impost" (customs) as matters within federal admiralty jurisdiction:
[T]he District courts . . . shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures under laws of impost, navigation,
or trade of the United States, where the seizures are made, on waters which are navigable
from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burthen, within their respective districts as well
as upon the high seas; saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy,
where the common law is competent to give it . • . .
Act of Sep. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (emphasis added). Note that the "savings
clause" at the end of the quoted passage also demonstrates that the members of the First
Congress understood that admiralty law matters were distinct from common law.
The history of federal admiralty jurisdiction is discussed in detail in DAVID W.
Although Robertson did not discuss
directly the Framers' understanding of a ship, his analysis indicates that there was no signifi-

ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM (1970).
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eighteenth-century thought, ships were neither "houses, papers, and
effects [or possessions]" nor "places." They were ships.151
The current notion that the Framers intended the Fourth Amend
ment to address ships likely derives from Chief Justice Taft's claim in
Carroll that the Framers would have viewed warrantless searches of
"vehicles" as "reasonable" searches under the Fourth Amendment
because the First Congress had authorized customs officers to make
warrantless searches of ships in the 1789 Collections Act.152 Numerous
commentators have accepted uncritically Taft's assumption that the
1789 statute reflected the Framers' understanding of the Fourth
Amendment.153 Likewise, a number of judicial opinions have since as
sumed that the Fourth Amendment applied to admiralty matters (and
that the treatment of ship searches reflected the understanding of the
Fourth Amendment).154 In fact, Taft's assertion regarding the 1789

cant controversy over the treatment of in rem actions involving ships (such as seizures of
ships) as admiralty matters; rather, the controversial aspects of admiralty jurisdiction in
volved the extent to which it reached in personam actions connected to ships, which might
alternatively be viewed as common-law matters (for example, contracts, insurance, seamen's
wages, torts, etc.).
151. Several readers of the manuscript for this Article asked if the seizure of a ship
would not have constituted a "seizure" of the people on it, or if a search of a ship would not
have constituted a "search" of the possessions or effects of the people on it. The answer
seems to be that the people and possessions on ships were usually viewed as being subject to
maritime rather than common law, so that the issue was only whether there were grounds for
seizing the ship. See 5 NATHANIEL DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF
AMERICAN LAW 587, ch. 172, art. 9, § 9 {1824) ("Trespass for false imprisonment will not lie
at common law, where the imprisonment is merely in consequence of taking a ship as prize,
though the ship has been acquitted.").
152. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1924). Taft also cited later customs
statutes providing for warrantless customs searches of "any vehicle, beast, or person" sus
pected of transporting goods. Id. at 151-52. These provisions are discussed infra note 470.
(Carroll is discussed in more detail infra notes 523-531 and accompanying text.)
153. See, e.g., LASSON, supra note 16, at 125; LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING, supra note
45, at 245; Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at 766-67; Ooud, supra note 42, at 1740;
3 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1487-94. Commentators have also assumed, presumably be
cause of Ca"oll, that other statements in ship seizure cases can be taken to reflect the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Amar, Terry, supra note 58, at 1104 (asserting
that a 1790 statutory provision permitting warrantless searches of ships lying within four
leagues of the coast shows that the Framers intended for Fourth Amendment "reasonable
ness" to permit suspicionless searches); Daniel M. Harris, Back to Basics: An Examination

ofthe Exclusionary Rule in Light ofCommon Sense and the Supreme Court's Original Search
and Seizure Jurisprudence, 37 ARK. L. REV. 646, 656-65 (1983). See also the commentaries
misinterpreting an 1821 opinion by Justice Story in a ship seizure case as though it addressed
exclusion under the Fourth Amendment discussed infra note 320.
The persistent misunderstanding of the Framers' attitude toward ship searches may well
result, at least in part, from an unfortunate gap in the historical record regarding the debates
over the 1789 Collection Act. See infra note 470.
154. Post-Ca"oll judicial opinions have made the prochronistic error of assuming that
the Fourth Amendment was always understood to apply to ships, and thus have erroneously
cited ship seizure cases as though such cases shed light on the Fourth Amendment - even
though the cited cases never mentioned it. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 561,
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Collections Act has become a prominent historical premise for the
modem generalized-reasonableness construction.155 (It probably has
also contributed to the modem notion, which would amaze the
Framers, that a house can be declared forfeit under admiralty prize
court procedures.156)
However, Taft's assertion was ahistorical. He ignored the explicit
reference to "houses, papers, and effects" in the Fourth Amendment
Likewise, he ignored the civil-law character of admiralty law as well as
the First Congress's explicit treatment of revenue seizures of ships as
admiralty matters. Instead, he merely assumed that the authorization of
warrantless ship searches in the customs statutes mtlst have reflected the
original understanding of the Fourth Amendment.
The numerous ship seizure cases decided by the Supreme Court be
tween 1789 and 1925 provide powerful evidence of the invalidity of
Taft's assumption. Notwithstanding that many of those cases involved
seizures by federal officers in American ports or territorial waters,
none of them so much as mentioned the Fourth Amendment, let alone
applied it.157 Indeed, several of those cases upheld ship seizures under
S83-84 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804),
and Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246 (1818)); United States v. Verdugo-Urguidez,
494 U.S. 259, 267, 289 n.10 (1990) (citing Little).
lSS. For example, in the seminal statement of the generalized-reasonableness construc
tion in Rabinowitz, Justice Minton invoked Taft's clainl regarding warrantless ship seizures
as historical support for the claim that the Framers only meant to require that government
intrusions be reasonable in the circumstances. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. S6,
60 (1949). Justice Scalia has recently repeated Taft's clainl that the provision for warrantless
ship searches in early customs statutes demonstrates that the Framers intended to allow
broad warrantless search authority "where probable cause exists." Wyoming v. Houghton,
119 S. Ct. 1297, 1300 (1999). Justice Thomas has done likewise in Florida v. White, 119 S. Ct.
lSSS, 1SS8-S9 (1999).
1S6. Under admiralty prize court procedure, the seizing party did not have to prove the
ship committed a violation; rather the owners of a ship had the burden of proving it had not
violated the law. A few years before Carroll, the Court applied the forfeiture procedures
applicable to ships to automobiles that had been used to transport illegal liquor. See Gold
smith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. SOS (1921). In the decades since Prohibition,
legislation has greatly expanded the grounds for forfeiture. Under a 1984 statute, all real
property, including a house, which has been used to facilitate a violation of federal drug laws
is subject to forfeiture. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. §
881(a)(7) (1988). The court proceeding to determine the validity of a seizure of a house
follows admiralty prize court forfeiture procedures. See 18 U.S.C. § 98l(b) (1988 & Supp. IV
1992) (providing that "Supplemental Federal Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime
Claims" shall govern procedures regarding forfeiture of assets in'federal district courts).
The notion that an interest as important as a house could be subjected to the slanted
procedures employed by prize courts would have amazed a framing-era lawyer. Indeed,
chapter 29 of Magna Carta had explicitly decreed that no freeman would "be disseised of his
freehold" except in accordance with "the law of the land" - that is, in accordance with
common-law procedure. See infra note 332. The constitutional amnesia evident in the mod
ern forfeiture statutory provisions appears to stem from Carroll's conflation of personal pos
sessions, and even houses, with ships.
1S7. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S.
(3 Wheat.) 246 (1818); The Appollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824). See also Justice Story's
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statutory standards that would not be reconcilable with even the
weakest possible construction of the Fourth Amendment.158 The
Supreme Court had never suggested that the Fourth Amendment ap
plied to vessels prior to its decision in Carroll.159
In a similar vein, there is little in the historical record to support
the current assumption that the Framers intended the Fourth
Amendment to protect commercial premises in addition to houses.
Although Americans did express anger over customs officers using
general writs to search warehouses, the record does not indicate that
those complaints ever became part of the legal grievance over general
warrants. As noted above, the absence of complaints about ware
house searches is a pregnant silence in Otis's 1761 argument on behalf
of the merchants of Boston; a similar silence exists in Dickinson's 1768
complaint and in Samuel Adams's 1772 complaint.160
The most likely explanation for the repeated emphasis on house
searches, and the virtual silence regarding searches of commercial
premises, is that the Framers understood that legislative authority for
official inspection of commercial premises did not violate any com
mon-law principle comparable to the castle doctrine applicable to
houses. In contrast to the free market ideology the Supreme Court
imposed on the Constitution in late nineteenth- and early twentieth
century rulings, the Framers were apparently comfortable with a re
gime in which the colonies and then the states closely regulated com
mercial interests.161

opinion in the Circuit Court decision in United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832
(C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551), discussed infra note 320. The early federal ship seizure
cases are summarized in 7 DANE, supra note 151, at 463-97.
158. In Crowell v. McFadon, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 94, 98 (1814), the Justices unanintously
upheld a federal collector's seizure of a ship and cargo under the Embargo Act of 1808 on
the ground that all that was required by the Act was the collector's honest opinion that the
ship intended to violate the embargo. A year later, in Otis v. Watkins, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch)
339, 355-56 (1815), the Justices ruled that a jury instruction that "it was the collector's duty
to have used reasonable care in ascertaining the facts on which to form an opinion" as to the
ship's intention was an incorrect statement of the authority created by the Embargo Act,
because the Act required only that the officer "honestly entertained the opinion under
which he acted." None of the Justices or lawyers suggested that the Fourth Amendment was
involved in any way.
159. The Court began to apply the Fourth Amendment to ships shortly after Carroll.
See Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501 (1927); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
160.

See supra notes 136-139 and accompanying text

161. See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 19-20 (1992). For examples of early
statutory authority for searches and inspections regarding ships and commerce, see the stat
utes collected in Gerard V. Bradley, Present at the Creation? A Critical Guide to Weeks v.
United States and Its Progeny, 30 ST. LoUIS U. LJ. 1031, 1041 n. 64 (1986). Bradley as
sumed that the Fourth Amendment and the state provisions were meant to apply to ships
and commerce, and presented these statutes as proof there was no historical warrant re
quirement. I think they actually show that "houses, papers, and effects [or possessions]" was
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The Concerns Expressed During the Ratification Debates

The concerns and complaints about search and seizure voiced by
anti-Federalists during the ratification debates of 1787-88 were similar
to those voiced during the prerevolutionary grievance. Once again,
little concern was expressed regarding arrest authority; on the few oc
casions when it was mentioned, the concern focused on the potential
use of general arrest warrants.162 The primary concern during 1787-88
was the potential for general search authority regarding houses.
Cuddihy has noted that the anti-Federalists expressed concerns
with revenue searches of houses both under general warrants and
without any warrants.163 However, a clearer picture emerges if one
sorts out the statements made by anti-Federalists who actually called
for a federal search and seizure provision, from the more demagogic
statements made by anti-Federalists who simply sought to whip up
opposition to the proposed constitution. The latter professed rather
fanciful fears that federal officers would search and seize everything in
sight to enforce a federal "excise."164 However, these dire predictions

not understood to mean ships or commerce. None of the statutes Bradley cited provided for
a warrantless search of a house.

162. For example, when Patrick Henry addressed the possibility of abusive arrests dur
ing the Virginia ratification convention in 1788, he referred only to the possibility of the use
of a general arrest warrant, not to a warrantless arrest. See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
84, at 588, quoted in part in COGAN, supra note 122, at 238 (6.2.2.3). A sinillar focus on gen
eral arrest warrants, but not warrantless arrests, appeared in the statement by Abraham
Holmes during the 1788 Massachusetts ratification convention. See infra note 302.
163. See 3 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1375-79.
164.

These fears were based on the provision in the Constitution allowing Congress to
levy "Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises . . . ." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8. Excise taxes were
aimed at the sale of internally produced merchandise, usually liquor, rather than at imports.
Fears that excise taxes might lead to house searches were based partly on earlier colonial
controversies, such as that over the Massachusetts excise of 1754, see supra note 134, and
partly on reports of oppressive enforcement of excises in England, including a tax on domes
tic production of cider for household consumption. Those excises were enforced by requir
ing oaths regarding the amount that had been produced. The English cider tax became a
political issue contemporaneously with the Wilkesite cases. See 2 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at
943-50. Even the Toryish Blackstone decried excises as oppressive and voiced concern re
garding the potential for excise searches. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 308-10.
However, notwithstanding the fulsome terms in which excise searches were predicted, it
appears that there existed a broadly shared understanding that an excise search of a house
would have to be authorized by a warrant or writ. For example, the anti-Federalist minority
at the Maryland ratification convention expressed fears of excise searches but then proposed
a federal search protection that only banned too-loose warrants as a remedy for those fears.
See Address of a Minority of the Maryland Ratifying Convention, reprinted in 5 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 98, at 92, 96 (reciting a proposed federal provi
sion banning too-loose warrants and then explaining that "[t]his amendment" was thought
necessary to deal with "excises, the horror of a free people, by which our dwelling-houses . . .
will be laid open"). Thus, it appears that the concern with excise searches of houses col
lapsed into the concern with searches of houses under general warrants.
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were not usually connected to a call for a federal constitutional protec
tion; instead, they were aimed at convincing readers that the proposed
federal government would simply be impossible to control.165 More
salient for understanding the content of the Fourth Amendment are
those anti-Federalist complaints raised in connection with calls for a
federal bill of rights. Those anti-Federalists expressed the more fo
cused concern that a future federal government might employ general
warrants.166
In sum, the complaints expressed during the prerevolutionary con
troversies and during the ratification debates reveal that the Framers
simply did not harbor diffuse fears regarding search and seizure
165. See, e.g., Address of Cato Uticensis, reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI·
FEDERALIST, supra note 98, at 123-24 (5.1.9) (warning the reader that if you approve of the
new Constitution "you subject yourselves to see the doors of your houses, them impenetra
ble Castles of freemen, fly open before the magic wand of the exciseman"); Essay by a
Fanner and Planter, reprinted in 5 THE COl\fPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 98, at 75
(52.2), excerpted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 241-42 (6.2.4.9) (expressing fears of excise
searches); Objections by a Son ofLiberty, reprinted in 6 THE COl\fPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 98, at 35 (6.2.2), excerpted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 240 (6.2.4.6) (expressing
fears of house searches under general warrants and of excise searches of bed chambers);
Luther Martin, The Genuine Infonnation Delivered to the Legislature of the State of Mary

land Relative to the Proceedings of the General Convention Lately Held in Philadelphia, re
printed in 2 THE COl\fPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 98, at 54-55 {2.4.55-56) (ex
pressing fears of excise searches).
166. See, e.g., Brutus, supra note 98, at 375 {2.9.28) {calling for a federal protection
against general wan:ants); LEITERS OF CENTINEL, No. 1, supra note 98, at 136 (2.7.1) (ex
pressing fear of loss of the Pennsylvania state protection against general warrants);
OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION, AND ON THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONVENTIONS, BY A COLuMBIAN PATRIOT, reprinted in 4 THE COl\fPLETE ANTI·
FEDERALIST, supra note 98, at 270 [hereinafter COLUMBIAN PATRIOT] (relevant portions
quoted infra text accompanying note 496). See also the calls for a protection against general
warrants in the Letters from the Federal Fanner, discussed supra notes 127-128; in the state
ments by Patrick Henry during the Virginia ratification convention, discussed supra note
162, infra note 439; in the statement by Abraham Holmes during the Massachusetts conven
tion, quoted infra note 302; and in the statement by Robert Whitehill during the
Pennsylvania convention, PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, at
781-82 (John Bach McMaster & Frederick D. Stone eds., 1888), discussed in 3 Cuddihy, su
pra note 20, at 1382 (expressing concern that federal officers could enter houses under gen
eral warrants).
Some anti-Federalists who did not explicitly propose a constitutional protection never
theless expressed fears about federal searches only in terms of general warrants. See, e.g.,
Essay by a [Maryland] Fanner, MD. GAZETTE, Feb. 15, 1788 (likely authored by John F.
Mercer), reprinted in 5 THE COl\fPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 98, at 14 (5.1.13) (ex
pressing doubts that federal courts would treat searches of houses under general warrants as
illegal); John Dewitt, To the Free Citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, No. rv,
{BOSTON) AM. HERALD, Oct.-Dec. 1787, reprinted in 4 THE COl\fPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 98, at 33-34 (4.3.21-22) (expressing fears of federal searches and contrasting the
Massachusetts protection against general warrants). See also the address of the Maryland
anti-Federalists, discussed supra note 164.
Calls for a constitutional protection broader than a prohibition of general warrants were
infrequent. But see Old Whig, No. 5, {PHIL.) lNDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov. 1, 1787, excerpted in
COGAN, supra note 122, at 240 (6.2.4.5) (calling for a protection of persons, houses, and pa
pers "from seizure and search upon general suspicion or general warrants").
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authority. Rather, they were concerned specifically with the threat
posed by general warrants, especially in the context of revenue
searches of houses.

3.

The Post-Framing Understanding of the Constitutional
Search and Seizure Provisions

Previous commentaries have tended to jump from the framing of
the Fourth Amendment to the 1886 Boyd decision,167 which is widely
viewed as the Supreme Court's first substantial construction of the
Fourth (and Fifth) Amendment.168 However, a variety of aspects of
early nineteenth-century legal pronouncements (or silences) cast light
on the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment - and reveal that
the original meaning differed from modern constructions.
To begin with, the First Congress did not address the warrantless
arrest authority of federal officers. The 1789 Judiciary Act, enacted
contemporaneously with Congressional approval of the Fourth
Amendment, created authority for magistrates to issue arrest warrants
for federal offenses.169 It also created federal marshals and gave them
the duty of executing writs and warrants issuing from federal courts but was silent as to their authority to make warrantless arrests.170 In
1792, Congress conferred on marshals authority equivalent to that of a
state sheriff to call out a posse comitatus of citizens (that is, the local
militia) to suppress riots or insurrections.171 However, Congress never

167. Boyd declared that a federal statute that authorized court orders requiring the pro
duction of invoices in customs disputes was unconstitutional as a violation of both the Fifth
Amendment's self-incrimination clause and the Fourth Amendment. On the way to that
ruling it articulated the basis for what became known as the "mere evidence doctrine." It
also anticipated the modern exclusionary rule by ordering that the information obtained
from the unconstitutionally seized invoice could not be used in any further proceeding. I
discuss Boyd and criticize its historical clainls regarding the Fourth Amendment infra notes
511-515 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., LANDYNSKI, supra note 38, at 49; LASSON,.supra note 16, at 106-07 (cov
ering the period from the franiing to Boyd in a page and a half). Cuddihy's account essen
tially stopped with the franiing; so did Levy's.
169. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (providing authority for any judge
or justice of the peace to order arrest of violators of federal law "agreeably to the usual
mode of process").
170. See id. § 27, 1 Stat. at 87 (creating the office of federal marshal and charging that
officer with the duty of executing writs and warrants issued by federal judges). The mar
shal's duty to execute writs and warrants has been continuously in effect with only minor
changes in phrasing; it now appears in 28 U.S.C. § 566(c) (1994). The likely explanation for
the First Congress's failure to enact legislative warrantless arrest authority is that the general
understanding in 1789 was that any officer possessed the same common-law arrest authority
as that inherently possessed by any person - but no more. See infra note 218.
171. A 1792 statute titled "An Act to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the
laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions" conferred additional author
ity on the federal marshal:
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explicitly authorized marshals to make warrantless arrests until
1935.172 Thus, it does not appear that early Congresses were much
concerned with warrantless arrests by federal officers.

That the marshals of the several districts, and their deputies, shall have the same powers in
executing the laws of the United States, as sheriffs and their deputies, in the several states,
have by law, in executing the laws of the respective states.
Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 18, § 9, 1 Stat. 265. This provision was reenacted several times: Act
of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, § 9, 1 Stat. 424, 425 (act with similar title); Act of July 29, 1861, ch.
25, § 7, 12 Stat. 281, 282 (act with similar title); Rev. Stat. § 788 (1874); and Judicial Code of
1948, ch. 646, § 549, 62 Stat. 910, 912. This provision is currently 28 U.S.C. § 564 (1994).
Judicial opinions and commentaries have asserted that the 1792 provision was intended
to confer broad warrantless arrest authority on federal marshals and thus demonstrates the
early Congress's approval of wide use of warrantless arrest authority. See, e.g., United States
v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418, 420 n.2 (1976); Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at
764. However, the title of the statute - referring to the calling out of the militia to suppress
insurrections - indicates that Congress had in mind the sheriff's common-law "power of the
county" to call out the posse comitatus to suppress riots or civil disorders. See, e.g., 1
BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 343; Note, Baltimore City's Liability for Riot Damage: The
Mayor as Conservator ofthe Peace, 33 MD. L. REV. 73, 76-79, 84-91 (1973) (discussing sher
iff's authority to call out posse comitatus to suppress riots). The federal legislation may have
been prompted by the agitation against the 1791 federal excise on liquor that ultimately
erupted in the 1794 Whiskey Rebellion.
Unfortunately, there is no record of any debate in the Senate regarding this Act. The
record of the debate on this statute in the House of Representatives is limited but neverthe
less supports the interpretation offered. The bill was treated as part of the "Militia Bill" and
the debate was mostly about what sort of federal authority should exist to call out a state
militia to respond to an insurrection. See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 557, 574-80 (Gales & Seaton,
1849) (page numbers cited are to the edition with the running head "History of Congress,''
see infra note 475). However, the record indicates that there was some discussion of the po
tential for popular resistance to the excise and of marshals' authority to call out the posse
comitatus. Representative Clark referred to "call[ing] forth the military in case of any oppo
sition to the excise law." 3 ANNALS OF CONG., supra, at 575. Representative Mercer ob
served that "the marshals of the several states have a power to call forth the posse comitta
tus; and additional marshals should be appointed, and only in the last extremity they may
call forth the military power." Id. (Because states did not use the office of "marshal,'' the
reference to "the marshals of the several states" must be to the federal marshals serving in
the various states.) In contrast, the record does not disclose any discussion of marshals' war
rantless arrest authority as such.
172. In 1935, Congress added to the authority of federal marshals the power to "make
arrests without warrant" for any federal offenses "committed in their presence" or "in cases
where such felony has in fact been or is being committed and they have reasonable grounds
to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing it." Act of June 15,
1935, ch. 259, § 2, 49 Stat. 377, 378. The language of this provision did not authorize arrests
on probable cause of felony, but only when there was an actual felony.

In 1948, Congress expanded the marshal's warrantless arrest authority by providing for
warrantless arrests based on "reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed or is committing" a federal felony. At that time, Congress also moved this
provision from the duties of judicial officers to the criminal title of the federal code. See Act
of June 25, 1948, ch. 203, § 3053, 62 Stat. 817 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3053 (1994)) (providing
authority for warrantless arrests based on "reasonable grounds"). In 1988, Congress rein
serted a similar (and apparently redundant) statement of warrantless arrest authority in the
judiciary provisions regarding the authority of the marshal. See Pub. L. No. 100-690, §
7608(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4514 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 566(d) (1994)).

December 1999]

The Original Fourth Amendment

613

Early nineteenth-century judicial interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment and of the state search and seizure provisions also pro
vide important evidence as to how the Framers understood these texts.
(At the least, they are better guides to the original understanding than
are judicial interpretations offered a century or more after the fram
ing.) Post-framing interpretations indicate that judges understood the
provisions banning "unreasonable searches and seizures" as bans
against too-loose warrants, but not as standards for warrantless intru
sions.
Federal courts rarely addressed the Fourth Amendment during the
nineteenth century. That in itself is strong evidence that the amend
ment was not understood to be a comprehensive regulation of
searches and arrests in that period - federal officers certainly made
arrests and searches.173 Moreover, the early federal cases which did
mention the Fourth Amendment almost always addressed warrant
authority in some respect, and often involved a challenge to legislation
that allowed a novel use of warrants.174 For example, even the 1886

173. This is not to say that search issues could be raised as readily then as now; for ex
ample, federal appellate review of criminal convictions was very limited until the late nine
teenth century. See LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 24445 (1939).
174. For Supreme Court decisions that referred to the Fourth Amendment, see: Ex
parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 447, 450-51 (1806), in which the Marshall Court ordered the
release of a man in a habeas corpus proceeding who had been iniprisoned by the justices of
the peace of the District of Columbia for being "an evil doer and disturber of the peace"
(the Court quoted the warrant clause of the sixth Article to the Constitution (the Fourth
Amendment) while reminding the justices of the peace that a warrant of commitment to
prison could be issued only upon a conviction for a recognized crime); Ex parte Bollman and
Swartwout, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 110 (1807), in which the Marshall Court in a habeas corpus
proceeding, during which counsel for a petitioner recited the Fourth Amendment and em
phasized the warrant clause, ruled that an arrest warrant issued to commit two men to trial
for treason was invalid because it lacked an adequate showing of probable cause as to the
offense (In an earlier proceeding of the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia in the lat
ter case, Chief Judge Cranch had opined that the issuance of an arrest warrant against the
men was inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment (denoted "sixth article of the amend
ments"). See United States v. Bollman, 24 F. Cas. 1189, 1190, 1192-93 (C.C.D.C. 1807) (No.
14,622)); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 76 (1855), in which the Justices turned
away a challenge brought by Maryland oystermen against a Maryland state statute that
authorized search warrants for the regulation of oystering on the grounds that the Fourth
Amendment "restrains the issue of warrants only under the law of the United States, and has
no application to state process"; Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59
U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855), in which the Court rejected a challenge to a "warrant" used for
execution of a civil judgment because the Fourth Amendment did not apply to writs or proc
ess issued in a private civil action, but only to warrants issued in causes to which the United
States is a party; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877), in which the Court, while dis
cussing statutory postal authority, noted in dicta that letters and packages in the mail could
not be opened without a search warrant; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); and West
v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1894), in which the Court held that an arrest warrant that was
mistakenly made out in a name other than that of the intended person contravened constitu
tional standards.
Reported decisions by lower federal courts rarely referred to the Fourth Amendment.
One did manifest an understanding that the provision addressed warrant standards. See In
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Boyd

decision, which involved a challenge to the constitutionality of
statutory authority by which the government had obtained an invoice
in a customs dispute, implicitly dealt with search warrant authority.175
Conversely, although federal courts discussed the validity of warrant
less arrests on a number of occasions, they rarely mentioned the
Fourth Amendment when they did so - and the few arrest cases that
did mention the Fourth Amendment were of the exception-that
proves-the-rule variety.176
State constitutional pronouncements and judicial decisions re
garding search and seizure also focused on warrant authority, rather
than treating reasonableness as a standard for warrantless intrusions.
When Ohio adopted a declaration of rights in 1802, it changed "unrea
sonable searches and seizures" to "unwarrantable searches and sei
zures" - hardly a change the drafters would have made if reasonable
ness had been the accepted constitutional standard for assessing
warrantless intrusions.177

re Meador, 16 F.

Cas. 1294, 1298 (D.C.N.D. Ga. 1869) (No. 9375) (discussing the history of
the Fourth Amendment and asserting that the Fourth Amendment is a "provisionO in re
gard to search warrants" and that it applies only to criminal proceedings because search war
rants were never recognized at co=on law for use in civil proceedings).
175. The statute at issue in Boyd provided for a court order to compel production of
invoices in customs disputes. That statute replaced an earlier Civil War-era statute that had
provided for use of search warrants to obtain such documents. See 116 U.S. at 620-21. By
ruling that the statutory authority for the court-ordered production of an invoice was an un
constitutional "seizure," Boyd effectively precluded reauthorization of search warrants to
obtain such documents. Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 {1925) {observing
that Boyd's ruling prohibited "unreasonable search even where made upon a search war
rant"). Boyd is discussed in more detail infra notes 511-515 and accompanying text.
176. The Supreme Court discussed the standards for a federal warrantless arrest in some
detail without mentioning the Fourth Amendment in its 1900 decision Bad Elk v. United
States, 177 U.S. 529 {1900). Several lower federal court opinions also assessed warrantless
arrests made by federal officers without mentioning the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., In re
Engle, 8 F. Cas. 716 (C.C.D. Md. 1877) (No. 4488); Ex parte Geissler, 4 F. 188 {C.C.N.D. Ill.
1880); In re Deputy Marshals, 22 F. 153 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1884).
The exception-that-proves-the-rule cases include: Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840,
849 {C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 7416) {discussing the Fourth Amendment only in connection
with a judge's oral order to arrest, but not when assessing a constable's warrantless actions;
discussed infra note 184); and United States v. Tureaud, 20 F. 621, 622-23 {C.C.E.D. La. 1884)
(condemning a barebones misdemeanor charge as failing the Fourth Amendment's probable
cause standard, but applying the Fourth Amendment by declaring that all misdemeanor
prosecutions necessarily involved the use of "warrants" in the form of sworn complaints). A
more ambiguous treatment appears in Ex parte Morrill, 35 F. 261, 266-67 (C.C.D. Or. 1888)
(stating that the Fourth Amendment was never understood to prohibit an officer from
making warrantless arrest for offense committed in his presence, and an officer's observa
tions are analogous to sworn-to allegation of probable cause).
177. See Omo CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 5, reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS
OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 547, 554 {William F. Swindler ed., 1973) (hereinafter
SWINDLER].
That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions from all
unwarrantable searches and seizures; and that general warrants, whereby an officer may be
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State court interpretations of state search and seizure provisions
banning "unreasonable searches and seizures" also focused on warrant
authority. Some state court decisions assessed the constitutionality of
statutes that authorized new uses of search warrants.178 The state
courts, however, rarely addressed the constitutional provisions when
they assessed the lawfulness of warrantless arrests. The few state
court opinions regarding warrantless arrests to address constitutional
provisions banning "unreasonable searches and seizures" concluded
that such provisions were not intended to apply to warrantless ar
rests.179
The 1814 Pennsylvania case Wakely v. Hart was probably the most
widely cited early American case on the law of arrest.180 Wakely sued
a high constable of Philadelphia for false imprisonment, alleging that
the officer had violated the state constitutional prohibition against
"unreasonable searches and seizures" simply because he had arrested
Wakely without a warrant.181
Unsurprisingly, the Pennsylvania

commanded to search suspected places, without probable evidence of a fact committed, or to
seize any person or persons not named, whose offences are not particularly described, and
without oath or affirmation, are dangerous to liberty, and shall, not be granted.
"Unwarrantable" meant "[n]ot defensible; not to be justified; not allowed." See
SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755) (unpaginated)
[hereinafter JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY]. Note that "unwarrantable" is nearly a synonym for
the Cokean meaning of "unreasonable,'' discussed infra notes 391-397 and accompanying
text. See also infra note 417 and accompanying text.

Id.

178. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841) (upholding the con
stitutionality of a state statute authorizing search warrants for unlawful lottery materials as
complying with the state search and seizure provision); Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 1
(1854) (holding that a statutory provision authorizing search warrants for liquor did not sat
isfy the requirements of the state search and seizure provision). For a more detailed discus
sion of Dana, see discussion infra note 318.
179. In addition to the state arrest cases discussed in the text, there is another set of
exception-that-proves-the-rule cases. During the late nineteenth century, several state
courts invoked the constitutional search and seizure provisions in striking down state stat
utes that purported to authorize warrantless arrests for misdemeanors based on probable
cause, even though, at common law, an arrest for a misdemeanor could have been justified
only by an arrest warrant if the arresting person had not actually witnessed the commission
of the offense. (This common-law rule is discussed infra notes 216, 220-222 and accompa
nying text.) Some state courts reasoned that statutes authorizing officers to make misde
meanor arrests were the functional equivalent of "general warrants" for misdemeanor ar
rests, and ruled the statutes unconstitutional. See, e.g., In re Kellam, 55 Kan. 700, 41 P. 960,
961 (1895) (statute permitting arrests for unwitnessed misdemeanor is "in effect, a revival of
the odious general warrants").
180. 6 Binn. 315 (Pa. 1814).
181. Although Pennsylvania had not used "unreasonable" in its 1776 state constitutional
search and seizure provision, see discussion infra notes 353-366 and accompanying text, it
later added the term in 1790 when the provision was amended to read:
Sect. VIII. That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions,
from umeasonable searches and seizures: And that no warrant to search any place, or to
seize any person or things, shall issue, without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.
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Supreme Court rejected Wakely's strained argument.182 However, the
Pennsylvania judges did not conclude that the warrantless arrest con
formed to a constitutional reasonableness standard. Rather, Chief Jus
tice Tilghman wrote that the state search and seizure provision had
nothing to do with warrantless arrests:

The whole [search and seizure provision] was nothing more than an af
firmance of the common law, for general warrants have been decided to
be illegal; but as the practice of issuing them had been ancient, the
abuses great, and the decisions against them only of modem date, the agi
tation occasioned by the discussion of this important question had
scarcely subsided, and it was thought prudent to enter a solemn veto
against this powerful engine of despotism.183
Thus, Wakely construed the provision banning "unreasonable searches
and seizures" as simply prohibiting any authorization of general war
rants.184
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court gave a similar descrip
tion of its state provision (the provision in which "unreasonable
searches and seizures" had been introduced) in its 1850 decision

Rohan v. Sawin:
It has been sometimes contended, that [a warrantless arrest] was a viola
tion of the great fundamental principles of our national and state consti-

PA. CONST. of 1790, art IX, § 8, reprinted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 235 (6.1.3.6.b).
182. Wakely's argument was strained because common law allowed for warrantless ar
rests for felony "on suspicion" if there had been "felony in fact" (The common-law "on
suspicion" standard is discussed infra notes 226-228 and accompanying text.) I speculate
that Wakely's claint was prompted by an out-of-context reading of a statement the
Pennsylvania court had earlier made in Conner v. Commonwealth, 3 Binn. 38, 44 (1810), to
the effect that "a man . . . should not be arrested, unless [on the basis of a sworn complaint]."
Because the only issue in Conner was whetlter a constable was obligated to execute a war
rant that lacked a sworn allegation of cause, that statement was undoubtedly meant to relate
to arrests that were made by warrant. However, if taken out of context, the statement may
have appeared to make warrantless arrests impermissible.
183. 6 Binn. at318 (emphasis in original).
184. The treatment of the Pennsylvania provision in Wakely was followed in Johnson v.
(No. 7416). The plaintiff, a slave owner who
was hit and injured in an attempt to recapture a fugitive slave, brought a successful trespass
action in federal court against Tompkins (a justice of the peace) and otlters (including a con
stable) who had resisted his efforts. In the course of a lengtlty opinion, Judge Bald\vin de
scribed the law of warrantless arrest, citing Wakely ("6 Binn. 318, 319") without any refer
ence to either the Pennsylvania search and seizure provision or tlte Fourtlt Amendment. See
id. at 844-45. However, when Judge Baldwin later addressed an oral arrest order that had
been given, during the events at issue, by a state judge named M'Neil, he quoted botlt tlte
1790 Pennsylvania provision and the Fourtlt Amendment and declared that the oral arrest
order by a state judge was "in direct violation of botlt constitutions" and "void" because it
was "utterly wanting every requiste prescribed." Id. at 849. Thus, he concluded tltat tlte oral
judicial order to arrest could not justify any act by the defendants. The specific application
of constitutional provisions in tltis case also reflects a view tltat the constitutional search and
seizure provisions reached judicial acts, but not the conduct of constables acting \vitltout
warrant

Tompkins, 13 I'. Cas. 840 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833)

December 1999]

The Original Fourth Amendment

617

tutions, forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures and arrests, ex
cept by warrant founded upon a complaint made under oath. Those pro
visions doubtless had another and different purpose, being in restraint of
general warrants to make searches, and requiring warrants to issue only
upon a complaint made under oath. They do not conflict with the
authority of constables or other peace-officers, or private persons under
proper limitations, to arrest without warrant those who have committed
felonies.185
Thus, both Wakely and Rohan construed the ban against "unreason
able searches and seizures" to be aimed at searches and seizures made
under general warrants rather than warrantless arrests.186 (Unfortu
nately, some recent discussions of these cases may have conveyed the
misimpression that they applied constitutional search and seizure pro
visions to warrantless arrests.187)
In addition, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had earlier
discussed the meaning of "unreasonable searches and seizures" in its

185. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 281, 284-85 (1850) (emphasis added). Defendant constable had
made a warrantless arrest of plaintiff for theft, but no charge was prosecuted. Plaintiff brought a
trespass action for false arrest The trial judge gave the unusual instruction that "reasonable and
probable ground to suspect" theft was not a justification for a warrantless arrest unless there was
a danger the suspected person would flee. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The
Massachusetts Supreme Court reversed, and declared that "[p]eace officers without warrant may
arrest suspected felons." Id. at 284. Although this ruling dropped the framing-era "felony in
fact" requirement for a warrantless arrest, Justice Dewey's opinion did not acknowledge the
change. See infra note 244. In the course ofjustifying conferral of broad arrest authority on offi
cers, Dewey asserted that constitutional search and seizure provisions did not limit warrantless
arrest authority, as quoted in the text
186. See also Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N.H. 53, 59-60 (1817). The New Hampshire Supreme
Court upheld a warrantless arrest under a state statute malting Sabbath-brealdng an offense.
The court concluded that the statutory authorization for a warrantless arrest did not violate
the state "law of the land" provision. The court also briefly noted, with regard to the state
search and seizure provision (which was identical to the Massachusetts provision, see infra
note 380}, that a warrantless arrest on "open and manifest guilt" was "no more unreason
able" than an arrest by valid warrant, and that the search and seizure provision "does not
seem intended to restrain the legislature from authorizing arrests without warrant, but to
guard against abuse of warrants issued by magistrates." Id. The latter part of that statement
reflects the usual understanding that the constitutional provisions only regulated warrant
authority. The earlier statement that a warrantless arrest was not "more unreasonable" than
an arrest under a valid warrant may appear to be an early treatment of "unreasonable
searches and seizures" as a relativistic standard, but can also be understood simply as saying
that a warrantless arrest on "strong evidence" was no more inlterently illegal than an arrest
under a valid warrant would have been - that is, that a warrantless arrest on strong evi
dence was perfectly lawful.
187. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 561, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing
Wakely shortly after referring to "unreasonable" in the Fourtlt Amendment without men
tioning that Wakely stated that the constitutional ban against "unreasonable searches and
seizures" did not apply to warrantless arrests); see also Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra
note 58, at 763 (describing Wakely, Rohan, and Mayo, see preceding note, as "briskly dis
missing" a warrant requirement for arrests, without mentioning that those courts treated
warrantless arrests as falling outside of the constitutional protection against "unreasonable
searches and seizures").
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v. Farwell.188 An officer had arrested Banks pur
suant to a warrant and then, after Banks confessed to a theft, went to
Banks's shop and entered without a warrant to retrieve property
Banks had just admitted was there. The court concluded that neither
the Fourth Amendment nor the Massachusetts provision prohibited
the intrusion because "[w]hat is meant by 'unreasonable searches and
seizures,' is clearly explained by the subsequent words in both consti
tutions."189 Of course, the "subsequent words" only set out standards
for valid warrants.
These judicial statements that search and seizure provisions against
"unreasonable searches and seizures" did not apply to warrantless in
trusions were consistent with early constitutional commentaries. St.
George Tucker, William Rawle, and Justice Joseph Story each de
scribed the Fourth Amendment and state search and seizure provi
sions exclusively in terms of the warrant standards that banned the use
of general warrants. None discussed standards for warrantless intru
sions in that context, and none identified a reasonableness standard
distinct from the standards for a valid warrant.190 As late as 1868,
Thomas Cooley used "Unreasonable Searches and Seizures" as the
heading for his discussion of the Fourth Amendment, but discussed
only warrant standards, not warrantless intrusions, under that head
ing.191
1838 decision Banks

188. 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 156 (1838); see also infra note 284.
189.

Banks, 38 Mass. at 159.

190. St. George Tucker described the Fourth Amendment as affording a test "for trying
the legality of any warrant." ST. GEORGE TuCKER, ANNOTATIONS TO BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES app. at 301 (1803). He included annotations to the Fourth Amendment
and the Virginia search and seizure provision at Blackstone's condemnation of general war
rants, see id. at 291 n.4 (annotating the Blackstone passage discussed supra note 78), and at
Blackstone's statement that imprisonment under an unspecific warrant was "unreasonable,"
see id. at 137 n.22 (annotating the Blackstone passage discussed infra note 418). However,
he did not mention either provision in connection with Blackstone's discussion of the stan
dard for a warrantless arrest.
Sintilarly, William Rawle discussed the Fourth Amendment as pertaining only to war
rant authority. See WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 127 (Philip Nicklin Law Bookstore 2d ed. 1829).
Justice Joseph Story treated the Fourth Amendment sintilarly, writing that it was "little
more than the affirmance of a great constitutional doctrine of the common law" and that its
inclusion in the Bill of Rights reflected the controversies "upon the subject of general war
rants almost upon the eve of the American revolution." He did not discuss standards for
warrantless intrusions but only the ban against general warrants - hence, it is clear that the
"great constitutional doctrine" he referred to was the illegality of general warrants. See 3
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES § 1895, 748 (1st ed. 1833).
191. See COOLEY, supra note 92, at 299-308. Cooley still stressed the protection of the
house as the focus of the Amendment - the second sentence in his commentary on the
Fourth Amendment invoked the doctrine that a man's house is his castle. See id. at 299-300.
He then discussed the condemnation of general warrants in the Wilkesite cases and in the
American colonial opposition to general writs of assistance, and commented tltat, although
those matters were in the past, "it has not been deemed unwise to repeat in the State consti-
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In sum, the historical record does not support the common as
sumptions that the Framers must have intended the Fourth Amend
ment to be a comprehensive regulation of search and arrest authority
and to articulate a standard for warrantless intrusions. An authentic
historical account of the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment
must account for both the focused nature of the complaints that ap
peared prior to the framing and the focused character of the post
framing judicial interpretations of the search and seizure provisions.
v.

WHY IT MADE SENSE FOR THE FRAMERS TO Focus ON

PROHIBITING LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL OF GENERAL WARRANTS

The preceding Parts have argued that existing accounts of the
original meaning of the Fourth Amendment rest on misinterpretations
of the historical evidence. This Part begins the task of piecing to
gether an authentic account of the original meaning. Specifically, it
offers two somewhat overlapping explanations for the Framers' focus
on banning general warrants. It first draws on common-law doctrine
regarding arrest and search authority to show that the Framers under
stood warrant authority as the most relevant and potent mode of ar
rest and search authority, especially when intrusions of houses were
involved; thus, the Framers perceived that control of warrant authority
would control the officer. It next argues that common-law doctrine
did not include the notion that an officer's misconduct might constitutions, as well as in the national, the principles already settled in the common law upon this
vital point in civil liberty." Id. at301-03. In the remainder of his discussion, he described the
requisites for valid issuance and execution of "criminal process" and "search-warrants" and
discussed constitutional limits on legislative power to authorize novel uses of search war
rants. Id. at 303-07. In particular, he opined that legislative power to authorize "process"
for entering houses to search books and papers "can properly be exercised only in extreme
cases." Id. at 306. In the context of that discussion of legislative authorization of warrants,
he also asserted that "it would generally be safe for the legislature to regard all those
searches and seizures 'unreasonable' which have hitherto been unknown to the law, and on
that account abstain from authorizing them." Id. at 307. The implicit premise underlying
Cooley's discussion of warrant authority is that the use of warrants should be carefully
regulated because warrants could provide authority for intrusions, including even searches of
houses, that would not otherwise exist. Thus, he concluded by noting that except for in
stances in which search warrants may be legal, "the law favors the complete and undisturbed
dominion of every man in his own premises, and uealously] protects him in it . . . ." Id. at
308.
Cooley also addressed the meaning of "unreasonable searches and seizures" as a Justice
of the Michigan Supreme Court in Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 200, 208 (1874), a challenge
to the constitutionality of a state statute authorizing a "warrant" to levy against the property
of a delinquent tax collector for undelivered tax receipts. The Michigan search and seizure
provision declared that "[t]he person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall
be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures" and forbade issuance of too-loose war
rants. MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. VI, § 26. Upholding the statute, Cooley observed that the
"main purpose [of the constitutional provision] was to make sacred the privacy of the citi
zen's dwelling and person against everything but process issued upon a showing of legal
cause for invading it." 30 Mich. at 208 (emphasis added).
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tute a government illegality; thus, the Framers would not have per
ceived any basis for addressing the conduct of warrantless officers in a
constitutional text.

A.

Why the Framers Were Concerned Only with Prohibiting
General Warrants

Framing-era arrest and search authority was both more complex
and more restrictive than modem commentaries have suggested. In
particular, the common law did not provide officers with discretionary
search and seizure authority. Although use of warrants was not "re
quired" in quite the same way as it is today, the warrant was far more
salient in common-law authority than it is in modem doctrine. Indeed,
the historical sources show that the Framers worded the search and
seizure provisions as they did to counter the possibility that legislators
might authorize use of general warrants for customs searches of
houses, and thereby open a unique breach in the common law's prohi
bition of discretionary house searches.
1.

The Salient Characteristics ofFraming-Era Criminal Law
Enforcement Authority

Proactive criminal law enforcement had not yet developed by the
framing of the Bill of Rights; in fact, even post-crime investigation by
officers was minimal.192 Criminal law was still conceived largely in
terms of disputes between man and man. Although the law recog
nized a number of complainantless crimes (such as public drunken
ness and violation of Sabbath laws), they appear not to have been
viewed as seriously as modem complaintless crimes such as drug of
fenses. In addition, the institutions of criminal justice were still rudi
mentary. There were no police departments in the colonies or early
states. In fact, there were no professional law enforcement officers.
The peace officer, most commonly a constable,193 was usually a low
status "freeman" pressed into a tour of duty for a year.194 He was not
192. See, for example, the following description of criminal justice in Boston:
Through the eighteenth century the use of legal force was ordinarily a direct response to the
demands of private citizens for help. The victim of robbery or assault called a watchman, if
available, and afterward applied to a justice for a warrant and a constable to make or aid in
the arrest. The business of detection was largely a private matter, with initiative encouraged
through a system of rewards and fines paid to informers. Neither state nor town made any
provision for the identification or pursuit of the unknown offender, except through the coro·
ner's inquest.
ROGER LANE, POLICING THE CITY: BOSTON 1822-1885, at 7 (1967).

193. Although there were some local variations, the sheriff and his deputies were pri·
marily concerned with the service and execution of writs regarding civil litigation and made
arrests primarily in connection with bringing defendants in civil litigation before the courts.
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paid a salary; rather, he was a part-time officer who received small
fees for performing various services, probably while attempting to
maintain his usual occupation. Although constables in some cities
might have been loosely organized under a "high constable," and
might have been augmented by a nightwatch, peace officers were not
numerous; the usual pattern was one constable for each parish, ward,
or similar local jurisdiction. Thus, the constable often depended on
the assistance of bystanders to execute an arrest- in fact, the consta
ble's authority to command the assistance of others may have been the
most distinctive attribute of his office.195
Constables were expected to preserve order by keeping an eye on
taverns, controlling drunks, apprehending vagrants, and responding to
"affrays" (fights) and other disturbances1% - but they were not oth-

The sheriff also had the "power of the county" to quell riots and civil disturbances, but he
and his deputies were otherwise uninvolved in criminal law enforcement. See liENING, supra
note 25, at 153 (stating that arrest warrants were most commonly issued to constables rather
than to sheriffs). Hening was a compiler of Virginia statutes. His justice of the peace manual is
especially useful as a source on the content of American law at the date of the framing of the
Fourth Amendment, especially because it is one of the few such publications that sometimes
commented on actual practices as well as doctrines.
194.

Cf. DOUGLAS GREENBERG, CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN TiiE COLONY OF

NEW YORK,

1691-1776, at 156-58 (1974) (describing the nightwatch and constables in New
York City). Greenberg notes that "there appears to have been great difficulty in keeping a
sufficient number of constables in office," that "[m]en of questionable integrity and scruples
were sometimes the only people willing to serve" as constables, and that "there can be no
doubt that the first link in the chain of criminal justice in colonial New York - the exercise
of police powers by constables and sheriffs - was a very weak one indeed." Id. at 163, 165,
167; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PuNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
27-30, 67-68 (1993).
195. See 1 HALE, supra note 75, at 588. Blackstone's successor in the Vinerian chair of
law at Oxford commented that:

The right of quelling an affray or apprehending a felon upon view every other man partakes
with the constable, but the constable as a public person has what others have not, the right of
requiring any of the king's subjects to assist him in executing the king's laws; and he that re
fuses to obey him becomes liable to fine and imprisonment.

ROBERT CHAMBERS, A COURSE OF LECTURES ON TiiE ENGLISH LAW: 1767-1773, at 245
(Thomas M. Curley ed., 1986). Note, however, that Chambers's lectures were not published
at the time of the framing. See id. at xi; see also HENING, supra note 25, at 20, 37 (stating that a
private person is bound to assist an officer if asked and risks punishment if he refuses); id. at 39
(stating that a private person could not command assistance to arrest); WILLIAM E. NELSON,
AMERICANIZATION OF TiiE COMMON LAW 34 (1975) ("In [the Anglo-American] tradition,
government did not have vast bureaucratic armies of officials to enforce its laws, but instead
relied on its subjects to aid the few officials who did exist in their task of law enforcement.").
Nelson also notes that this meant that community sentiment could blunt law enforcement
efforts. See id. at 34-35.
1

196. The constable had a variety of order maintenance roles. For example, he policed
taverns. In England, statutes that created misdemeanor offences (for example, vagrancy)
sometimes also provided authority for constables to arrest on view of a violation. A number
of colonies and states also enacted a variety of misdemeanor-level offenses for which only
constables, but not private persons, could make arrests. In addition to vagrancy laws, Sab
bath violation offenses were often enforceable only by constables or sinillar officers. See,
e.g., Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N.H. 53, 59-60 (1817) (concerning the New Hampshire statute pro-
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erwise expected to investigate crime.197 Instead, the mobilization of
criminal justice depended almost entirely on private initiation of
criminal prosecutions. Except for homicides, which might be inquired
into by a coroner's inquest or grand jury, the initiation of arrests and
searches commenced when a crime victim either raised the "hue and
cry" or made a sworn complaint. How and how often (if at all) the
hue and cry was used in late eighteenth-century America is not well
understood, but it appears to have been reserved primarily as a re
sponse to "fresh" crimes, especially robbery and escapes.198
viding authority for "selectmen" and "tythingmen" (local officers) to arrest persons traveling
on Sunday that was the basis for the arrest); see also discussion supra note 186. Hale and
Blackstone based much of their descriptions of the power of constables on these statutes.
See 2 HALE, supra note 75, at 88-89; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 344-45. Some Ameri
can states adopted similar statutes. See THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 568-69 (Robert G.
McCloskey ed., 1967) (reprinting the 1790-91 law lectures given by Wilson, one of the
American Framers). Note, however, that Hening remarked in 1794 that there had been "few
instances" in Vrrginia where a constable had attempted to exercise "the same latitude of power
as exercised in England." HENING, supra note 25, at 20.

See also Bradley, supra note 161, at 1041-45 n 64 (setting forth examples of such stat
utes). A few early American statutes describe the duties and authority of constables. See
THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 13 (1929, reprinting the 1648 edition); THE
FIRST LAWS OF THE STAIB OF CONNECTICUT 23-24 (1984, reprinting the 1784 edition); see
also BRADLEY CHAPIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN COLONIAL AMERICA: 1606-1660, at 96-97
{1983).
.

197. A number of common-law statements reflect an expectation that warrantless ar
rests would be resorted to primarily when an offense was observed and there was pursuit of
fresh crime. For example, Hening's 1794 discussion observed that arrests may "frequently" be
made without warrant as well as by warrant, but then mentioned only instances in which the
commission of a crime was directly observed - by any person who viewed the commission of a
felony, dangerous wounding, or breach of the peace, and by watchmen who crune across "night
walkers." He then concluded "[s]o much concerning an arrest without a warrant," and moved on
to arrest by warrant. HENING, supra note 25, at 37-38 (emphasis in original). Similarly, the
Pennsylvania court emphasized "pursued" when it remarked in 1814 that, "[t]he felon who is
seen to commit murder or robbery, must be arrested on the spot or suffered to escape. So
although not seen, yet if known to have committed a felony, and pursued with or without
warrant, he may be arrested by any person." Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 315, 318-19 (Pa. 1814)
(emphasis in original); cf. Grano, supra note 38, at 639 ("The common law, which was preoc
cupied with the danger of escape, contemplated that [a warrantless] arrest would be made
shortly after the felony occurred.").
198. The hue and cry emerged during an early period in which a village or hundred
could be "amerced" (fined) if a felony occurred within it and the felon was not caught. For
descriptions of the legal authority for arrests on hue and cry, see 2 HALE, supra note 75, at
104; 2 HAWKINS, supra note 76, at 75-77; and 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 290-91.
Blackstone described an arrest under a hue and cry as carrying equivalent protections as an
arrest under warrant, but noted that a person who "wantonly or maliciously" raised a cry
would be guilty of disturbing the peace. Id. at 291; see also 3 BACON, supra note 149, at 6265.
Early American statutes provided that constables could "put forth Pursuits or Hue-and
cries after Murderers, Peacebreakers, Thieves, Robbers, Burglarians and other Capital Of
fenders where no Magistrate or Justice of the Peace is near at hand." FIRST LAWS OF THE
STAIB OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 196, at 23-24. A similar provision appears in the 1648
Massachusetts statute. See THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETI'S, supra note 196,
at13.
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Because only a commissioned judicial officer possessed authority
to administer an oath and act on the basis of another person's suspi
cion, crime victims had to make complaints to a local justice of the
peace, the lowest ranking official possessing a judicial commission.
The constable, who had no judicial commission, could neither adminis
ter an oath nor receive a complaint. Thus, the justice of the peace
served as the gatekeeper who decided whether to activate the criminal
justice apparatus for making arrests and searches.199
Unlike the constable, the justice of the peace was a man of wealth
and high status in the local community. He did not personally make
arrests or searches; rather, he directed his constable (who was re
garded as an officer of the judicial branch200) to perform those tasks.
A judicial warrant (sometimes referred to by the more generic terms
"mandate," "precept," "writ," or "process"201) was central to law enThe traditional hue and cry appears to have fallen into disuse in late eighteenth-century
America. In his 1794 manual, Helling stated that the hue and cry was "seldom used" in Vrrginia.
See HENING, supra note 25, at 247. He also concluded his discussion of hue and cry arrest
authority by noting that the "safest" way to use it was to procure a hue and cry warrant from a
magistrate. Id. at 251. To the extent that the hue and cry persisted in framing-era America, it
may have been used primarily to convey information about wanted felons to adjoining coun
ties, thus avoiding the cumbersome procedure of "backing" warrants (i.e., having an arrest
warrant issued in another county endorsed by a justice of the peace of the local county be
fore it could be executed). Thus, the hue and cry may have been transformed into the nine
teenth-century "wanted" poster.
199. See, e.g., CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 12, at 109, 117 (reprinting essay by
Saunders Welch, former high constable of Middlesex, England) (noting "that the suspicion
of one man cannot properly be transferred to another without the circumstance of an oath,
which the constable has no power to administer"); 1 ROBERT BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE
PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER 393 (15th ed. 1785) (noting that a constable "cannot take any
man's oath . . . because he is not a judge of record").
200. James Wilson, one of the Framers and an early law teacher, described the consta
ble, in his law lectures of 1790-91, as the lowest officer of the "judicial department," not of
the executive branch. See 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WIISON, supra note 196, at 568-69; see
also HENING, supra note 25, at 142 ("[T]he constable is the proper officer to a justice of the
peace, and bound to execute his warrants.").
201. Warrants were a specific form of the larger category of written judicial orders. For
example, 2 GILES JACOB, THE LAW-DICTIONARY: EXPLAINING THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND
PRESENT STATE, OF THE ENGLISH LAW (T.E. Tomlins ed., London, Andrew Strahan 1797)
[hereinafter JACOB'S LAW DICTIONARY] (pages unnumbered), defined "WARRANT'' as
"[a] precept under hand and seal of some Officer, to take up any offender, to be dealt with
according to due course of Law." One of the definitions the source gives for "PRECEPT'' is
"a command in writing, by a Justice of the Peace, or other officer, for bringing a person or
records before him." 2 id. "MANDATE" is similarly defined as "[a] commandment judicial
of the King or his Justices to have any thing done for dispatch of justice." 2 id. (These defi
nitions remained unchanged in the first American edition of Jacob's Law Dictionary pub
lished in 1811. See JACOB'S LAW-DICTIONARY (T.E. Tomlins ed., 1st American ed.,
Philadelphia, P. Byrne 1811).) The use of the terms "process" or "writ" to refer broadly to
written orders issued by a judicial officer was a looser usage, but was quite common in com
mon-law writings. Hence, the appearance of any of these terms in common-law writings on
search and arrest should be understood as a reference to warrant authority. See, e.g., An Act
for apprehending and securing for Trial Persons charged with having committed Crimes in
some States; and to authorize the Officers of Justice of the other States to continue the Exe
cution of their Precepts within this State, when Necessary (Mass. 1782), reprinted in THE
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forcement authority because it was usually the only means for a justice
of the peace to give binding instructions to the constable as well as to
indemnify the constable against trespass claims.202

2.

"Justification" for Arrests and Searches at Common Law

A few words are in order regarding "legal authority." Official
authority can be thought of either in normative terms as positive
statements of what an officer is entitled to do, or in more prudential
terms as descriptive statements of the potential adverse consequences
if an officer oversteps his bounds. Because we cannot recover the ac
tual attitudes and behaviors of framing-era peace officers, assessing
the latter provides the more useful means of understanding past
criminal law enforcement authority.
Today, the exclusionary rule articulates the legal consequence that
may follow an "illegal" arrest or search. Although there was no exclu
sionary rule in the late eighteenth century, "unlawful" arrests or
searches still carried potential adverse consequences. At common law,
a search or arrest was presumed an unlawful trespass unless "justi
fied. "203 Thus, law enforcement authority as such consisted simply of

FlRST LAWS OF 1HE

COMMONWEALTII OF MASSACHUSETTS 131-32 (John D. Cushing ed.,
1981) ("Precepts" in the title refers to provisions in the act dealing with "writs, warrants, or
other process."); the quotation from Bacon's Abridgment set out infra note 209 (referring to
a "Warrant" as a "Writ").

202. See, e.g., 2 HA.LE, supra note 75, at 86 ("[I]f the felony or other breach of the peace
be done in [the justice's] absence, then he must issue his warrant in writing under his seal to
apprehend the malefactor."). The only exception to the requirement that a justice's com
mand to a peace officer be in a written warrant was that a justice could orally ("parol")
command an officer to make an arrest if the justice was at the scene and witnessed the com
mission of the offense. See id; see also 2 HAWKINS, supra note 76, at 83; HENING, supra note
25, at 21. Massachusetts and Connecticut both adopted statutory provisions requiring that
any warrant be in writing. See the statutes regarding constables cited supra note 196. A
constable who refused to execute a lawful warrant was subject to prosecution. See Conner v.
Commonwealth 3 Binn. 38, 44 (Pa. 1810).
203. Lord Camden stressed the rigid requirement of positive legal authority to justify
intrusions by officers - the mirror image of the complaint against discretionary authority in the short report of Entick:
In

the case of Wilkes, a member of the Commons House, all bis books and papers were
seized and taken away; we were told by one of these messengers that he was obliged by his
oath to sweep away all papers whatsoever; if this was law it would be found in our books, but
no such law ever existed in this country; our law holds the property of every man so sacred,
that no man can set bis foot upon bis neighbour's close without his leave; if he does he is a
trespasser, though he does no damage at all; if he will tread upon bis neighbor's ground, he
must justify it by law.

Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 275, 291, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (C.P. 1765) (case report pub
lished in 1770, see supra note 25).
Blackstone also stressed the requirement of positive legal justification "either by com
mon law or act of parliament," in his discussion offalse imprisonment:
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those justifications for arrests or searches recognized by the common
law treatises and cases.
"Unlawful" (unjustified) arrests or searches exposed the officer to
lawful resistance by bystanders or the target of his intrusion. Unlike
modem statutes, the common law did not make it an offense to resist
an officer who attempted to make an unjustified arrest or search.
Thus, there was a relatively robust understanding of a citizen's right to
resist an officer who exceeded his authority.204
Furthermore, the victim of an unlawful arrest or search could sue
the offending officer for trespass damages. The common law recog
nized no broad doctrine of official immunity.205 There is a dearth of
Every confinement of the person is an imprisonment, whether it be in a common prison, or
in a private house, or in the stocks, or even by forcibly detaining one in the public streets.
Unlawful, or false, imprisonment consists in such confinement or detention without suffi
cient authority: which authority may arise either from some process from the courts of jus
tice; or from some warrant from a legal officer having power to commit, under his hand and
seal, and expressing the cause of such commitment; or from some other special cause war
ranted, for the necessity of the thing, either by common law, or act of parliament; such as the
arresting of a felon by a private person without warrant, the impressing of mariners for the
public service, or the apprehending of waggoners for misbehavior in the public highways.
3

BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 127 (citations to Coke and to a statute omitted).

204. Use of force necessary to prevent an officer from making an unlawful arrest was
not a crime unless the officer was killed or seriously injured. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Kennard, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 133, 134, 135-36 (1829); Commonwealth v. Crotty, 92 Mass (10
Allen) 403 (1865) (reversing a conviction for assaulting and battering a deputy sheriff, de
scribed as a "ministerial officer," who had attempted to arrest pursuant to an unparticular
ized illegal "John Doe" warrant because the officer was a "trespasser" who stood "on the
same footing" as a person doing the same act who was not an officer). Forcible resistance to
constables was not uncommon. See GREENBERG, supra note 194, at 158-62.
However, some common-law authorities gave a more restrictive description of the right
to resist an unlawful arrest. See, e.g., HENING, supra note 25, at 42-43 (stating that the target
of an arrest might lawfully resist an attempted arrest by a private person because "an inno
cent person is not bound to take notice of a private persons suspicions," but that a person
should submit to an arrest by a "commonly known" officer or pursuant to a warrant).
Killing a constable who attempted an unlawful arrest was an offense at common law, but
it was manslaughter, not murder. See, e.g., 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note
20, at 102 n.75 (quoting LAW OF ARREsTS 71-72, § 9, that it was "[n]ot Murder to slay an
officer executing bad Warrant" (stating the holding of Rex v. Cook, Cro. Car. 537, 79 Eng.
Rep. 1063 (K.B. 1640))). This was still the law at the end of the nineteenth century. See,
e.g., Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 534 (1900).
The right to resist forcibly unlawful arrests has effectively been revoked by modem ar
rest statutes, which limit resistance to police officers making arrests to self-defense against
excessive force. See generally Paul G. Chevigny, The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest, 78
YALE LJ. 1128 (1969).
205. Judicially defined official immunity has only recently been extended to ordinary
law enforcement officers. During the framing era, there were some English statutes that
provided various protections for magistrates and peace officers against trespass liability.
See, for example, the statute protecting officers who executed a warrant that was at issue in
the Wtlkesite cases, 24 Geo. II, ch. 44, discussed supra note 111. Except for customs statutes,
however, English statutes protecting officers did not apply in the American colonies. The
American states began to adopt such statutes in the early nineteenth century. See NELSON,
supra note 195, at 92-93 (describing statutes protecting officers that were enacted in the early
nineteenth century).
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information, however, as to how often victims actually brought tres
pass suits as remedies for unlawful arrests or searches.206 (The com
mon-law sources also referred to the potential for criminal prosecution
of officers for unlawful intrusions; however, instances of criminal
prosecution would likely have been as rare then as they are today.207)
The most salient feature of common-law authority for present pur
poses is that a valid (specific) arrest or search warrant provided the of
ficer with the clearest and strongest source of justification for an intru
sion. The constable executing a valid warrant acted as the agent of the
justice of the peace and, indirectly, of the sovereign political power.
He was not to be trifled with. As long as he acted "ministerially" that is, within the directions of the warrant208 - it was an offense to
206. Famous trespass cases such as the Wtlkesite cases demonstrate that some trespass
actions were based on unlawful searches or arrests, but they shed little light on the frequency
of such cases in the civil trial courts. Likewise, the few early American reported appellate
decisions, see supra note 115, do not provide a basis for assessing the incidence of trespass
claims in the trial courts. A comment by Chief Justice Wilmot in an English case suggests
that there may have been a fair number of such cases in the trial courts. See Bruce v.
Rawlins, 3 Wils. 63, 95 Eng. Rep. 934 {K.B. 1770) (commenting that he could not conceive
what customs officers meant by searching a house unlawfully because "this matter has been
so often tried in Westminster Hall").
A caveat is in order on this point - there were numerous actions brought against sher
iffs and their deputies for misfeasance or nonfeasance as well as malfeasance in the execu
tion of writs in civil cases, often by the plaintiff creditors in civil actions, sometimes by debt
ors who were wrongfully arrested or whose goods were wrongfully seized. Indeed, the Chief
Justice of Massachusetts remarked that such claims against officers "are among the most
common actions in our courts." Commonwealth v. Kennard, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 133, 135
(1829). Although the trespass actions relating to misconduct by officers in civil matters
sometimes reflected similar issues and standards to those arising from criminal arrests or
searches, the two sets of cases should be distinguished when one attempts to assess the fre
quency with which successful trespass actions were brought. For example, civil cases in
which plaintiff-creditors complained that an officer allowed a debtor to escape are quite un
like cases alleging wrongful searches or arrests. In addition, it seems that the parties to civil
actions would have been more likely to have sufficient funds to pursue such actions, and ju
ries may have responded differently to trespass actions involving civil rather than criminal
matters. Thus, it is likely that successful trespass actions against officers regarding civil mat
ters would have been more frequent than such actions involving criminal matters. However,
some commentaries regarding the frequency of trespass actions against officers have mixed
the two categories of cases. See, e.g., 3 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1535-39.
207. Alexander Hamilton implied that criminal sanctions would keep officers in check
when he asserted that trial by jury in criminal cases would provide security against abuses by
federal revenue officers. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83 {1788) {Alexander Hamilton).
208. The term "ministerial" was commonly used to describe the character of the peace
officer's authority. For example, Hawkins referred to "a Constable, or other such like minis
terial Officer." 2 HAWKINS, supra note 76, at 82. JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY, supra note 177,
gave three potentially relevant definitions of "Ministerial," including: "Attendant; acting at
command"; "Acting under superior authority"; and "Pertaining to • . . persons in subordinate
authority." See also South v. State of Maryland, Use of Pottle, 59 U.S. {18 How.) 396, 402
(1855) (describing the "ministerial" aspects of the office of sheriff as a duty "to execute all
processes issuing from the courts of justice"). Constables, sheriffs, and related officers were
routinely described as "ministerial" officers well into the nineteenth century. See generally
WILLIAM L. MURFREE SR., A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SHERIFFS AND OTIIER
MINISTERIAL OFFICERS {1884).
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resist him, or even to refuse to assist him. Likewise, because he acted
as the justice's agent, he was "indemnified" against trespass liability.209
In contrast, an officer found it much harder to justify his actions when
he attempted an arrest or search without a warrant.210 Indeed, com
mon-law sources often described warrantless arrests or searches as
acts that an officer undertook "at his own risk" or "at his peril."211

3.

The Meager Authority ofthe Warrantless Officer

In the late eighteenth century, searches were still of limited utility
to criminal law enforcement. The principal possessory offense was
possession of stolen property. In the absence of forensic science, items
other than stolen property would usually have been of limited eviden
tiary value.212 Thus, as I describe below, the common law recognized a
search warrant for stolen goods, and also recognized the lawfulness of
taking weapons or stolen property from the "possession" of an arres
tee as an "incident" of a lawful arrest made with or without a warrant.
However, those appear to have been the only forms of search author
ity recognized in framing-era common law.213
The limited character of common-law authority for warrantless ar
rests is apparent if one contrasts the framing-era rules to the ex officio
authority of a modern police officer. Today, a police officer's felony
arrest is generally considered legal if she had "probable cause" to be
lieve the arrestee might be involved in crime. Likewise, an arrest

209. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 288 (commenting that a constable was in
demnified so long as he executed a warrant "ministerially"). However, the officer was not
allowed any leeway for mistakes in the execution of a warrant; for example, if he arrested
the wrong person under an arrest warrant, the arrest was unjustified. See, e.g. 5 BACON, su
pra note 149, at 170 ("34. . . . if A. tell an Officer, who has a Warrant to arrest B. that his
Name is B. and thereupon the Officer arrest A. this is a false Imprisonment; for that the Of
ficer is at his Peril to take Care, that he do not arrest any other Person than him against
whom the Writ issued.").
210. The lawfulness of the use of force to make an arrest was also clearest when the ar
rest was by warrant. See, e.g., HENING, supra note 25, at 42.
211. See, e.g., Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 315, 317-18 (Pa. 1814).
212. Discussions of evidence in common-law sources usually dealt with sworn testimony
by witnesses and certain types of formal documents, but not with physical items. See, for
example, the discussion of "Evidence" in 1 JACOB'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 201;
HENING, supra note 25, at 175-88.
213. See, e.g., CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 12, at 109, 117 (reprinting essay by
Saunders Welch, former high constable of Middlesex, England, advising constables that "a
thorough search of the [arrested] felon is of the utmost consequence to your own safety,
and . . . by this means he will be deprived of instruments of mischief, and evidence may
probably be found on him sufficient to convict him"). However, the doctrine of search inci
dent to arrest is not uniformly accorded importance in the framing-era materials; for example,
there is no mention of that doctrine in HENING, supra note 25.
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based on probable cause will justify a search incident to arrest. That
simple picture, however, is a recent development.214
In the late nineteenth century, statutory provisions and judicial
opinions usually identified four or five different (though somewhat
overlapping) justifications for warrantless arrests by officers. For ex
ample, the 1887 South Dakota arrest statute, which the Supreme
Court discussed in the 1900 decision Bad Elk v. United States, set out
five possible justifications for a warrantless arrest by an officer, and
the Court characterized them as codifying the "common law":

(1) For a public offence committed or attempted in [the officer's] pres
ence. [This was often referred to as an arrest "on view."]

(2) When the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in

[the officer's] presence. [This was sometimes referred to as the actual
guilt justification.]

(3) When a felony has in fact been committed and [the officer] has rea
sonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.
[This was often referred to as an arrest "on suspicion."]

(4) On a charge made [by another person] upon reasonable cause of the
commission of a felony by the party arrested. [This was sometimes called
an arrest "on charge."]

[(5) The officer] may also . . . arrest any person whom he has reasonable
cause for believing to have committed a felony, and is justified in making
the arrest, though it afterward appear that the felony had not been com
mitted. [This is the modem "probable cause" standard.]215
The listing is a virtual fossil record of the gradual expansion of arrest
authority. As I discuss below, the "on charge" justification (the fourth
in the list) was added in the early nineteenth century to allow the offi
cer more leeway to assist a citizen who was making a felony arrest, and
the "probable cause" justification (the fifth in the list) then evolved
from the "on charge" justification and eventually displaced the earlier
justifications for warrantless felony arrests by officers. However, only
the first three justifications for warrantless arrests were recognized in

214. After reconstructing the post-framing expansion of the peace officer's warrantless
arrest authority, as described in the text and notes that follow, I discovered that Professor
Jerome Hall had previously described the expansion of the officer's warrantless arrest
authority in English law in even more detail. See Jerome Hall, Legal and Social Aspects of
A"est Without a Wa"ant, 49 HARV. L. REV. 566 (1936). Unfortunately, Hall's account has
rarely been cited (never by the Supreme Court). One reason may be that its title does not
convey that it is a historical account.
215. 177 U.S. 529, 535-36 n.1 (1900). The five arrest standards are from THE COMPILED
LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF DAKOTA (E.W. Caldwell & Charles H. Price eds., 1887). The
first four justifications appear in § 7148; the fifth justification (the probable cause justifica
tion, which the South Dakota statute limited to arrests at night) was set out in § 7150.
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American law as of 1789 (and they were not augmented by any broad
authority to temporarily detain persons short of arrest216).

a.

The Three Framing-Era Justifications for Warrantless Arrest.

One notable feature of the three framing-era justifications for war
rantless arrests is that they were equally available to peace officers and
private persons; thus, they also defined the justifications for what we
now call a "citizen's arrest."217 In fact, the leading treatise by Serjeant
William Hawkins first described the arrest authority possessed by "any
person" and then opened the discussion of an officer's warrantless ar
rest authority by saying that "[a]s to the justifying of . . . arrests by the
Constable's own authority; it seems difficult to find any Case, wherein
a Constable is impowered to arrest a Man for a Felony committed or
attempted, in which a private Person might not as well be justified in
doing it . . . . "218 Put another way, the idea that a peace officer pos-

216. Framing-era common law did not recognize any broad power of peace officers to
detain short of arrest. See supra note 203. There were, however, three specific circum
stances in which officers could temporarily detain persons. First, some common-law sources
indicate that an officer could detain a person to prevent an incipient "affray" (for example,
when he observed an argument becoming violent). See, e.g., 2 'DIE WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON, supra note 196, at 468 (discussing the authority of a "conservator of the peace" - a
term sometintes used to describe peace officers generally). Second, an officer could detain a
person who had inflicted a grave wound to determine whether the victint would live or die
because, although homicide was a felony and thus subject to warrantless arrest, an attack
short of homicide was usually only a misdemeanor, and thus limited to arrests on view. See
infra note 220. Third, common-law sources recite that constables and nightwatchmen were
empowered to detain any "nightwalkers" for examination by a justice of the peace the next
morning - an authority that reflected the special fear of nighttinte crime. See 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 289; see also 'DIE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF
MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 196, at 13 (Massachusetts statute regarding constables); 'DIE
FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 196, at 23-24 (Connecticut stat
ute). It appears that there were so few legitintate reasons to be out and about at night that
nightwalking was viewed almost as an offense in its own right. Except for these specific
situations, however, the common-law sources did not recognize any broad authority for offi
cers to detain "suspicious" persons; thus, there is no historical precedent for the general
authority of police officers to detain persons based on "reasonable suspicion" as authorized
'
by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
217. For example, the justifications for arrest by a private person in the South Dakota
statutes match the first three justifications for arrests by an officer. (Compare the three sub
sections of § 7154 to the first three subsections of § 7148 quoted
in Bad Elk, 177 U.S. at 536
.
tlJ
218. 2 HAWKINS, supra note 76, at 80-81. This statement was unchanged as late as 1788.
See 2 LEACH'S HAWKINS, supra note 76, at 130. The 1814 Pennsylvania decision in Wakely
discussed the warrantless arrest authority of the high constable of Philadelphia in terms of
the justifications available to any person, not in terms of any distinctive authority derived
from the constable's office. See Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 315, 318 (Pa. 1814); see also Hall,
supra note 214, at 567-70 (discussing the equivalent warrantless arrest authority possessed by
private persons and officers in late eighteenth-century common law).
Acceptance of the equivalence between an officer's warrantless arrest authority and the
warrantless arrest authority inherently possessed by any person probably explains why the
First Congress did not confer any warrantless arrest authority on federal marshals in the
1789 Judiciary Act, see supra note 170; there was no need explicitly to confer that level of
warrantless arrest authority on a marshal.
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sessed a distinctive level of ex officio arrest authority had not yet
emerged.
The narrowness of the three framing-era justifications for warrant
less arrests becomes apparent when one works through them. The
"on view" justification (the first in the list) was the only justification
for a warrantless misdemeanor arrest. Common law did not provide
any justification for making a warrantless misdemeanor arrest after
the-fact; in that case, only a judicial arrest warrant could justify the ar
rest.219 This limitation was significant because many serious crimes
(that are now felonies) were misdemeanors at common law.220
The restriction against making warrantless misdemeanor arrests
after-the-fact meant that even a person guilty of a completed misde
meanor could lawfully resist a constable's attempt to make a warrant
less arrest for that offense.221 Likewise, even a convicted misdemean
ant could bring a trespass action against an officer who had arrested
him after-the-fact without a valid arrest warrant.222

219. See, e.g., HENING, supra note 25, at 21 ("[A] constable hath no power to arrest a
man for an affray done out of his own view, without a warrant from a justice, unless a felony
were done or likely to be done.").
220. For example, all attempt crimes were only misdemeanors at common law, as were
assaults, batteries, woundings, and even kidnappings. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at
216. The treatment of what we now call "aggravated assault" or "assault with a deadly
weapon" as a misdemeanor at common law created a procedural difficulty when a person
was found holding a knife over a stabbing victim who was not yet dead. Homicide was a fel
ony and thus subject to a warrantless arrest; but if the victim did not die, there was only a
misdemeanor, so an arrest had to be by warrant {unless the arresting person had actually
observed the stabbing). The common-law sources permitted a sort of conditional warrant
less arrest of the attacker until it became clear whether the victim would live or die. See, e.g.,
Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N.H. 53, 56 (1817) {"If one man dangerously wound another, any person
may arrest him, that he be safely kept, till it be known whether the person shall die or not.");
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 289.
221.

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Crotty, 92 Mass. {10 Allen) 403, 405 {1865).

222 Wilkes v. Halifax demonstrates the point. Wiikes's 1769 trespass verdict against
Lord Halifax for issuing the general warrant under which Wilkes had been arrested in 1763
was obtained while Wilkes was in prison serving consecutive misdemeanor sentences for
publication of a seditious libel and for publication of an obscene poem. The complex events
that preceded the verdict in Wilkes v. Halifax were as follows. In late 1763, Wilkes won a
verdict in Wilkes v. Wood, a trespass action against Halifax's subordinate who had directed
the Messengers who arrested Wilkes, searched his house, and seized his papers under the
general warrant See supra notes 21-25. Wood was unusual because Wilkes managed to
bring that trespass action to trial before there had been a trial on the misdemeanor charges
he faced for seditious libel for publishing The North Briton, No. 45 {the publication named in
the general warrant). Shortly after he won the trespass verdict against Wood, Wilkes went
(or fled) to France. In 1764, during his absence, Wilkes was tried and convicted of publish
ing a seditious libel for The North Briton, No. 45, as well as of publishing an obscene poem.
When he returned to England in 1768, his convictions were affirmed by the Court of King's
Bench and the House of Lords, he was denied the seat in the House of Commons to which
he was elected, and he began serving 10 months for publishing The North Briton, No. 45, and
an additional 14 months for publishing the obscene poem. See Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527,
2574, 98 Eng. Rep. 327, 353-54 (K.B. 1770) (reporting proceedings in the criminal case in the
Court of King's Bench from the filing of charges and trial in 1764, through the sentencing in
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Because it was more important to apprehend felons than misde
meanants, the common law provided somewhat broader justifications
for felony arrests. Thus, an officer could justify a felony arrest if the
arrestee was actually guilty of the felony for which the arrest was
made - that is, if the arrestee was subsequently convicted of the fel
ony.223 The actual guilt justification depended entirely on the subse1768, to his release from custody in 1770); see also Wilkes v. The King, Wilm. 322, 340, 97
Eng. Rep. 123, 130 (H.L. 1768) (affirming the sentencing in 1768). A useful summary of the
sequence of the civil and criminal proceedings involving Wilkes appears in NOBBE, supra
note 21, at 225-65.
There is no case report of Wilkes v. Halifax. However, a brief account of the judge's in
structions to the jury in an "Addenda" to the Wilkesite cases, 19 Howell St. Tr. 1381, 1408-15
(some pages misnumbered) (reprinting a magazine account of the trial), indicates that the
trial was little more than an exercise in assessing damages: the judge instructed the jury that
"this proceeding [i.e., the arrest and search pursuant to the general warrant] . . . was certainly
illegal; you must therefore find a verdict for [Wilkes)." Id. at 1415. Thus, Halifax confirms
that even a convicted misdemeanant could bring a trespass action for an arrest not meeting
the "on view" justification. (Both Wilkes's 1768 sentencing proceeding as well as his suc
cessful trespass suit against Halifax were covered by the American colonial press. See 3
Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1632-33 (identifying 1770 colonial press reports about the trial
and verdict in Halifax).)
There is a puzzling statement in the case report of the 1763 trial in Wood that may seem
inconsistent. During that trial, Chief Justice Pratt instructed the jury that "[i]f upon the
whole, they should esteem Mr. Wilkes to be the author and publisher [of The North Briton,
No. 45), [then Wood's) justification would be fully proved." Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1, 18, 19
Howell St Tr. 1153, 1166, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498 (C.P. 1763). Pratt's statement may appear
to be an application of the "actual guilt" justification for an arrest, discussed infra note 223
and accompanying text (Professor Stuntz has read it that way. See Stuntz, supra note 57, at
400 n.33.) The actual guiltjustification did not apply to a misdemeanor arrest, however, and
seditious libel was a misdemeanor. Moreover, the presentation of the legal arguments in
Lofft's case report of Wood was grossly incomplete - the legal arguments made by the So
licitor General on Wood's behalf are virtually omitted. All one learns is that Wood "main
tained a plea of not guilty" (that is, he contested his role as a factual matter), and he "sec
ondly, relied on the special justification." Wood, Lofft at 8, 98 Eng. Rep. at 493.
The reports of the other Wtlkesite cases reveal that "the special justification" would
have been the protection of "the statute of24 G[eorge] 2, c. 44." See, e.g., Leach v. Money, 3
Burr. 1742, 1742, 1745, 19 Howell St Tr. 1001, 1003, 1006, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1075, 1077
(K.B. 1765). That statute gave protection to an officer who acted "in obedience to" a war
rant 3 Burr. at 1767, 19 Howell St. Tr. at 1026, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1088. In Leach the King's
Bench ruled that the Messengers could not raise the statute as a defense because the general
warrant directed the arrest of the author, publisher, or printer of No. 45, but Leach did not
fit any of those descriptions. See supra note 111. It seems likely that Wood also raised this
statutory defense, and that Pratt's reference to whether "[Wood's] justification would be
fully proved" meant that if the jury found that Wilkes was the author of No. 45, then Wood's
conduct would be within the terms of the warrant and the "special justification" provided by
24 Geo. 2, c. 44. Interestingly, because none of the juries ever found the "special justifica
tion" applicable, the English courts never reached the question of whether conduct in obedi
ence to an illegal general warrant fell within the statutory protection.
223. See, e.g., 2 HAWKINS, supra note 76, at 77 ("And where a man arrests another, who
is actually guilty of the Crime for which he was arrested, it seems, That he needs not in justi
fying it, set forth any special Cause of his Suspicion, but may say, in general, that the Party
feloniously did such a Fact, for which he arrested him."). The felony conviction would bar
trespass liability for the arrest and would also justify any force used to accomplish the arrest
Likewise, a conviction meant that any forcible resistance by the arrestee, or by anyone at
tempting to rescue the arrestee, would be uulawful and constitute an offense.
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quent conviction of the arrestee224 - it did not matter what information
the arresting person had about the crime at the time of the arrest.225
The practical limitation was that the actual guilt justification involved
a gamble - the officer had to predict whether a felony conviction
would result (and the outcome of a trial obviously could tum on fac
tors other than the testimony provided by the arresting person).
Because the actual guilt justification was so uncertain, it appears
likely that the "on suspicion" standard, the third in the list, would have
been the operative common-law justification for a warrantless felony
arrest. Although the "on suspicion" justification was less demanding
than actual guilt, it was more demanding than the label might suggest.
An officer could meet it only upon proof that "felony in fact" had ac
tually been committed by someone and that there was "probable
cause of suspicion" to think the arrestee was that person. The "prob
able cause of suspicion" prong does not appear to have been particu
larly stringent; it departed from the notion of certain truth by allowing
suspicion as to who committed the offense to be merely "probable."
Moreover, it seems likely that an officer could have met this prong by
testifying as to unswom information reported by other persons.226
The requirement that the officer prove a felony had been commit
ted by someone "in fact," however, was met only if the officer proved
that the felony for which the arrest was made had actually (not just
probably) been committed (and proof that a misdemeanor had been
committed would not suffice).227 (The principal difference between

224. The common-law actual guilt justification appears to have been a holdover of the
religious epistemology of certain truth that prevailed during the Middle Ages; notions of
"probable" truth and ex ante assessments of legality emerged later, but still had not been
fully absorbed by the late eighteenth century. See generally BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT AND PROBABLE CAUSE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE (1991).
225. Cf. Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at 767 ("[If the constable] merely
played a hunch and proved right - if the suspect was a felon, or the goods were stolen or
contraband - this ex post success apparently was a complete defense."). Amar's statement
is true as to felony arrests, but not as to searches for stolen goods or contraband. See infra
notes 278-285.
226. Hawkins asserted that "sufficient causes of suspicion" could be based on "[t]he
common Fame of the Country" provided such fame was based on probable ground, as well
as on a variety of observations suggesting guilt. 2 HAWKINS, supra note 76, at 76; see also
HENING, supra note 25, at 35. Professor Alschuler has noted that this prong may trace back
as far as Bracton's writing in the mid-thirteenth century. See Albert W. Alshuler, Bright
Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 253 (1984). Alschuler also
noted that the prerevolutionary legal literature indicated that "so long as an offense had
been committed, the common opinion of the public that a particular person had committed
it would justify his arrest." Id. at 254.
227. The framing-era sources make it clear that a warrantless felony arrest could not be
justified unless there was proof of felony-in-fact. See, for example, James Wilson's state
ment in his law lectures of 1790-91:
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the "on suspicion" justification and the modem "probable cause"
standard is that the latter can be satisfied by showing a probability that
a felony had been committed, but the former could not.228) Thus, the
constable had to be sure of his facts about the felony before he at
tempted a warrantless arrest.
In addition, the framing-era officer could not avoid justifying the
arrest by claiming to act at another person's request. The person who
initiated an arrest had to be able to justify it,229 and anyone who as-

It is a general rule, that, at any time, and in any place, every private person is justified in ar
resting a traitor or a felon [this is the ex post guilt-in-fact justification]; and, if a treason or
felony has been committed, he is justified in arresting even an innocent person, upon his rea
sonable suspicion that by such person it has been committed.
2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 196, at 685 (emphasis added); see also
CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 12, at 109, 116-17 (reprinting essay by Saunders
Welch, a former English high constable in Middlesex, England) (advising constables that it is
"absolutely necessary" to justify an arrest that a felony has been really committed; that a
mistake on that point is "fatal"); 2 HALE, supra note 75, at 92 (stating that for justification of
a felony arrest made "on suspicion," "there must be a felony in fact and the constable must
be ascertained of that, and aver it in his plea and it is issuable" (emphasis in original));
HENING, supra note 25, at 36 ("But generally, no . . . cause of suspicion . . . will justify an arrest,
where in truth no such crime hath been committed; unless it be in the case of hue and cry.").
A crime "in fact" was still a requirement for an arrest in early nineteenth-century
American law. See Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 315, 318 (Pa. 1814) ("And even when there is
only probable cause of suspicion, a private person may without warrant at his peril make an
arrest. I say at his peril, for nothing short of proving the felony will justify the arrest."); 2
DANE, supra note 151, at 224, ch. 217, art. 2. (volume 2 published 1823) ("But 'without a fact
suspicion is no cause of arrest'; that is, there must be a felony or offence, in fact, committed,
and suspicion is only to the person."); see also Hall, supra note 214, at 567-70.

228. For example, assume that a modern police officer has discovered that a person is in
possession of a white powder, and the officer has substantial reason from the context to
think that the powder may well be heroin. Today, that would be enough for "probable
cause" to arrest for possession of heroin, and that arrest would be valid, even if subsequent
testing showed that the white powder was not a drug at all. However, under the framing-era
"on suspicion" standard, the arrest would be unlawful because, if there were no heroin, there
would be no felony-in-fact.
229. For example, Hawkins wrote:
As to . . . [b]y whom the [arrested] Person must be suspected, upon such an Arrest for Suspi
cion; it seems to be agreed, That the Law hath so tender a Regard to the Liberty and Repu
tation of every Person, that no Causes of Suspicion whatsoever, let the Number and Prob
ability of them be never so great, will justify the Arrest of an innocent Man, by one who is
not himself induced by them to suspect him to be guilty . . . .

2 HAWKINS, supra note 76, at 76, sec. 15. Hawkins then went on to state that the same rules
applied to warrantless arrests by an officer. See id. at 80-81, sec. 7. Likewise, Hawkins wrote
that the rule that "no one can justify an Arrest upon a Suspicion of Felony, unless he himself
suspect the Party" applied except in the case of an officer executing an arrest warrant. Id. at
82, sec. 11; see also 5 BACON, supra note 149, at 171 ("50. But if A. arrest B. without an ex
press Warrant, because C. has just Cause to suspect that B. has committed a Felony, A. is
guilty of a false Imprisonment; for the Power of arresting without an express Warrant is con
fined to the Party suspecting.").
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sisted in making an arrest, including an officer, was justified only if the
initiating person could do so.230

b. The Expansion of the Officer's Warrantless Arrest Authority
After the Framing. One indication that framing-era law actually in
hibited officers from making warrantless arrests is that later - when
crime and urban disorder emerged as concerns during the nineteenth
century - courts and legislatures substantially relaxed the justifica
tions for warrantless arrests by officers. The expansion of the officer's
ex officio authority, which opened the way for the development of
modem policing, was largely imported from developments in English
law.
The initial expansion of the peace officer's warrantless arrest
authority occurred in the 1780 King's Bench decision, Samuel v.
Payne.231 Indeed, the change made is evident in the difference be
tween Lord Mansfield's charge to the jury at the trial and the subse
quent granting of a new trial by the Court of King's Bench.
Hall, a private person, suspected that Samuel had stolen some
laces, and procured a warrant to search for stolen goods (but not to
arrest). Payne, a constable, assisted in executing the search. Although
no stolen laces were found, Hall accused Samuel of theft, and Payne
assisted Hall in arresting Samuel. After a magistrate released Samuel,
Samuel sued both Hall and Constable Payne for trespass. At the trial,
Mansfield instructed the jury that a constable could not justify a war
rantless arrest on the basis of an unswom charge by another person;
thereupon the jury found both Hall and constable Payne liable for
trespass.232
When Constable Payne moved for a new trial in the Court of
King's Bench, the judges, including Mansfield, recognized a "charge"
of felony as a justification for a warrantless arrest by an officer, even if

230. The risk an officer took if he made a felony arrest on the basis of information pro
vided by another was illustrated by the initial trial verdict in the English case Samuel v.
Payne, 1 Doug. 359, 360, 99 Eng. Rep. 230, 231 {K.B. 1780). See also CONDUCTOR
GENERALIS, supra note 12, at 109, 116-17 (reprinting essay by Saunders Welch, a former
English high constable in Middlesex, England) {advising constables that if they arrest on the
report of a felony by another person, based on the other person's own knowledge, they
should require the other person.to attend the arrest; and that "in all cases of [arrest on] sus
picion, not from your own knowledge [that is, not 'on view'], the safest way is to refer the
parties to a justice of the peace, and act on his warrant").
There were two exceptions. A constable did not incur risk simply by receiving custody
of a person already arrested by someone else; a private person who made an arrest was sup
posed to turn the arrestee over to a constable for presentation to a justice of the peace. In
that instance, the constable did not arrest but simply provided safekeeping following the ar
rest made by the other person. The other exception was that the constable could - like
anyone else - arrest without personal liability under the hue and cry. See supra note 198.
231. 1 Doug. 359, 99 Eng. Rep. 230 {K.B. 1780).
232. See Samuel, 1 Doug. at 359-60, 99 Eng. Rep. at 230-31.
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there was no felony in fact. They described the earlier rule as "incon
venient."233 However, they did not relax the rule that a private person
could not justify an arrest unless there was an actual felony.234 The dis
tinction drawn in Samuel between the warrantless arrest authority of a
peace officer and that of a private person was the seed from which the
discretionary arrest authority of the modem police officer devel
oped.235
Although Samuel was decided in 1780, it could not have influenced
the framing of the American search and seizure provisions; the case
report was not published until 1782,236 after the "right to be secure"
against "unreasonable searches and seizures" had already been intro
duced in the 1780 Massachusetts provision. It is possible that some of
the federal Framers may have heard of Samuel by 1789, but if so they
would have understood it to be a novel English ruling.237 In fact,
American courts appear to have been slow to adopt Samuel's innova
tion. The 1814 Pennsylvania decision in Wakely does not even hint of
233. 1 Doug. at 359-60, 99 Eng. Rep. at 230-31. Five years later, Mansfield summed up
the post-Samuel law of warrantless felony arrest as follows: "When a felony has been com
mitted, any person may arrest on reasonable suspicion. When no felony has been commit
ted, an officer may arrest on a charge." Cooper v. Boot, 4 Douglas 339, 342, 99 Eng. Rep.
911, 913 (K.B. 1785). Note, however, that this statement was not available to the Framers.
See supra note 19.
234. Despite its novelty, Samuel preserved trespass accountability by confining the justi
fication to the officer, while still holding the person who made the unproven charge of felony
(or any other private person who assisted) accountable for damages for false arrest. See 1
Doug. at 360, 99 Eng. Rep. at 231 {"He that makes the charge should alone be answer
able."). On retrial, constable Payne was found not liable, but Hall, the accuser, was again
found liable for trespass. See 1 Doug. at 360 n.8, 99 Eng. Rep. at 231 n.8.
235. As Professor Hall previously observed: "We are able to trace definitely in the cases
the origin of the rule which augmented [the officer's warrantless arrest authority]. Samuel v.
Payne is the pivot upon which the legal cycle turns." Hall, supra note 214, at 570 (citation
omitted).
236. See 1 LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 299, entry 44 (1 Douglas published
1782).
237. The descriptions of Samuel that were available by 1789 explicitly portrayed the
King's Bench ruling as novel. The initial report of Samuel in Douglas's Reports described it
as "the first determination of the point." 1 Doug. at 360 n.7, 99 Eng. Rep. at 231 n.7. A note
on Samuel in Leach's 1787 edition of Hawkins's widely used treatise also made it clear that
the ruling was novel. See LEACH'S HAWKINS, supra note 76, 120 n.(a) (describing Samuel as
"the first determination of the point" that a constable could arrest "on charge" even in the
absence of an actual felony). Likewise, descriptions of Samuel in justice of the peace manu
als also demonstrated its novelty. For example, a discussion in a 1785 edition of Bum's
manual described both the initial imposition of liability on the constable at the trial presided
over by Mansfield and the new rule adopted by the Court of King's Bench. See 1 BURN, su
pra note 199, at 102-03 (noting the different rules applied by Mansfield at trial and by the
King's Bench on motion for new trial). Descriptions of Samuel during the 1790s still noted
the novelty of the ruling. The difference between the trial and appellate rulings was still
recognized in a 1793 edition of Burn. See ROBERT BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND
PARISH OFFICER *403 (London, 1793) {title page reciting published in London in 1793 and
sold in shops in America). For a virtually identical description of the two proceedings in
Samuel, see also HENING, supra note 25, at 36-37 .
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the "on charge" standard or of the idea that an officer might possess
distinctive ex officio (as opposed to personal) warrantless arrest
authority.238 The 1829 New York decision Holley v. Mix appears to
have been the earliest American case to adopt the "on charge" justifi
cation.239 However, during the remainder of the nineteenth century
virtually all American jurisdictions adopted the "on charge" justifica
tion for arrests by officers.240
The "probable cause" justification for warrantless arrests was also
an English import. In 1827 the judges of the King's Bench used
Samuel as a springboard for a further expansion of ex officio arrest
authority in Beckwith v. Philby, which permitted an officer (but not a
private person) to justify a warrantless arrest if he could show "rea
sonable ground to suspect that a felony ha[d] been committed," even
if none had been241 - that is, on probable cause.242 American lawyers
and judges likely became familiar with the Beckwith probable cause
standard by the early 1830s. Even so, it appears that the first American
reported decisions to endorse the probable cause standard for warrant
less arrests by officers were the 1844 Pennsylvania decision Russell v.

238. Wakely still analyzed the arrest authority of a high constable of Philadelphia in
terms of the inherent arrest authority possessed by any person rather than in terms of ex of·
ficio arrest authority, see supra note 218; it also still emphasized the traditional requirement
of felony-in-fact for a warrantless arrest, see supra note Z27.
239. 3 Wend. 350, 353 (N.Y. 1829) (citing Samuel). The slowness of tlle American adop
tion of Samuel is also evident in the fact that Nathaniel Dane still described it as an innova·
tive case in 1824: "(i]f this case be law, it settles the long agitated point, and proves a peace
officer may arrest on reasonable suspicion of felony without warrant, though no felony has
been committed." 3 DANE, supra note 151, at 72, ch. 75, art 6, § 4 (volume published 1824).
240. See, for example, the inclusion of the "on charge" justification in the
Dakota arrest statute quoted supra text accompanying note 215.

1887 South

241. 6 B. & C. 635, 638-39, 108 Eng. Rep. 585, 586 (1827). Philby, a high constable, had
been told that Beckwith was acting suspiciously and suspected, from various circumstances, that
Beckwith had stolen a horse. Philby arrested Beckwith on that basis. However, no horse had
been stolen. Beckwith sued for trespass, but Lord Tenterden, CJ., ruled that an officer could
arrest upon reasonable ground to suspect a felony. A similar ruling was announced in Davis v.
Russell, 5 Bing. 354, 130 Eng. Rep. 1098 (C.C. 1829).
The timing of the Beckwith decision is notable because it came just two years prior to the
creation of the London Metropolitan Police in 1829. The expansion of a peace officer's dis
cretionary arrest authority in Beckwith may well have been a crucial step in making a police
force feasible.

242 Samuel destabilized the law regarding warrantless arrests by officers, and a number
of English decisions issued after Samuel contained language that anticipated the even
broader reasonable (or probable) ground to suspect commission of a felony standard an
nounced in Beckwith. See Hall, supra note 214, at 571-75. Nevertheless, Beckwith appears
to be the first case that actually upheld the lawfulness of an officer's warrantless arrest in
circumstances in which no felony had been committed. See id. at 575 (assessing that
Beckwith was the first case "closely representing the ultimate doctrine" that an officer can
arrest on reasonable (that is, probable) grounds to suspect a felony has been committed).
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Shuster-43 and the 1850

Massachusetts decision Rohan v. Sawin.244 Dur
ing the remainder of the century, a majority of American jurisdictions
adopted the probable-cause-to-suspect-felony standard.245 Unlike the
"on charge" standard, however, the probable cause standard sparked
some controversy, and it was not uniformly adopted.246 Nevertheless, by
the early twentieth century the probable cause standard had become the
predominant American standard for warrantless felony arrests by offi
cers.247

243. 8 Watts & Serg. 308, 309 (Pa. 1844). Defendants Russell and Downer (apparently
constables, though the report does not say so explicitly) had arrested Shuster, on the ground
that Shuster's trunk, which he permitted to be examined, contained burglar's tools and thus
showed that he "was addicted to burglary." Id. at 308. When no charges were brought,
Shuster sued for trespass. At trial, the defendants were not permitted to admit evidence re
garding Shuster's trunk, and the verdict was for Shuster. The Supreme Court reversed and
ruled that the evidence regarding the trunk should have been permitted because the issue
was "probable cause." Id. at 310. Chief Justice Gibson recited that "[a] constable may jus
tify an arrest for reasonable cause of suspicion alone; and in this respect he stands on more
favourable ground than a private person, who must show, in addition to such cause, that a
felony was actually committed." Id. at 309. Gibson cited no authorities. However, counsel
for the defendant officers cited Wakely ("6 Binn. 316"), Samuel ("Doug!. 359"), and
Beckwith ("6 Barn. & Cres. 635"). Id. Nothing in the opinion acknowledges the departure
from the explicit requirement of felony-in-fact in the Pennsylvania court's earlier ruling in
Wakely (discussed supra note 227).
244. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 281, 284 (1850) (reciting that "[p]eace-officers may arrest sus
pected felons," citing Samuel and Beckwith, and incorrectly asserting that the 1814
Pennsylvania ruling in Wakely "is to the same effect"). The facts in Rohan are described
supra note 185.
245. In some instances state legislatures endorsed the reasonable cause standard for
warrantless felony arrests by officers. In other cases, state courts read that standard into
statutes that did not include it See, e.g., State v. Hum Quock, 300 P. 220, 221 (Mont 1931)
(upholding an arrest by a prosecutor's special investigator as being justified by probable
cause, even though the state arrest statute provided equal authority to officers and private
persons and still required observation of the offense, actual guilt of a felony, or reasonable
cause "when a felony has in fact been committed").

246. For example, a North Carolina judge dissented from an 1856 decision adopting
those cases "go very far in the justification of officers, who
apprehend suspected persons without warrants . . . farther than is compatible with that per
sonal liberty, of which English jurists are so fond of boasting." Brockway v. Crawford, 48
N.C. (3 Jones) 433, 439-40 (1856) (Battle, J., dissenting). The less-than-uniform adoption of
the probable cause standard is also evident in legislative arrest standards. The 1887 South
Dakota statute discussed in Bad Elk allowed the probable cause justification to be used only
for arrests made at night See supra note 215. Indeed, Congress still employed the felony-in
fact standard, not the probable cause of felony standard, when it initially addressed the war
rantless arrest authority of federal marshals in 1935. See supra note 172. Likewise, a New
York decision rejected probable cause of felony as a justification for a warrantless arrest by
an officer as late as 1939. See Morgan v. New York Cent. R. Co., 9 N.Y.S. 2d 339, 341 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1939) (interpreting state statute to permit felony arrest by officer without warrant
only when a felony has in fact been committed). The Tennessee arrest statute has never
been amended to recognize the probable cause standard; it ends with the "on charge" justifi
cation. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-103 (1997) (grounds for arrest by officer without war
rant).

Samuel and Beckwith because

247. The notion that probable cause was uniformly accepted as the American standard
for warrantless felony arrests may stem from Chief Justice Taft's assertion to that effect in
his 1925 opinion in Carroll. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) ("The
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The purely ex ante probable cause justification for warrantless fel
ony arrests was a more radical enlargement of the officer's arrest
authority than was the "on charge" justification. By replacing the fel
ony "in fact" requirement with a probable felony, while at the same
time not requiring any explicit charge of a felony, Beckwith provided
the officer with a substantial degree of discretion to judge the appro
priateness of an arrest. As a result, an officer enjoyed a much broader
latitude for erroneously arresting innocent persons or for making war
rantless arrests of persons who were actually guilty only of a misde
meanor.248
The expansion of the ex officio arrest authority of state officers
(which also affected federal officers249) constituted a revolution in
criminal justice authority and resulted in warrantless felony arrests
displacing the previous reliance on arrest warrants. Additionally, the
expansion of ex officio felony arrest authority expanded the opportu
nities for officers to make warrantless searches incident to arrest,
making that power far more significant than it had been at the fram
ing.zso
The adoption of the probable cause justification also undercut the
adverse consequences that had previously policed the limits on war
rantless arrest and search authority. Beckwith undercut the threat of
trespass liability by allowing the officer to rely on unswom informa
tion provided to him by other persons even when no one else actually
made a felony "charge." Thus, no particular person took on the re
sponsibility for being the complainant for the arrest: the officer was
not accountable for actually "charging" the commission of a crime.
Thus, the probable cause standard blurred accountability for a mis
taken arrest and severely undercut the viability of the trespass remedy

usual rule is that a police officer may arrest without warrant one believed by the officer upon
reasonable cause to have been guilty of a felony . . . .") . Taft also cited Rohan as reflecting
"the co=on law." Id. at 157.

248. A large proportion of "felony arrests" made today are disposed of without any fel
ony complaint being filed. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 133, at 643 n.172.
249. Because the federal marshal statute in effect during the nineteenth century linked
the authority of federal officers to that of a state sheriff in the state in which the federal mar
shal served, these changes in state law were probably understood to automatically expand
the arrest authority of many federal officers without any federal legislation or federal court
decisions. See supra note 171.
250. Reported decisions regarding the allowable scope of searches incident to arrest first
became evident in court records during the late nineteenth century. Taylor reported that he
found only three cases raising issues as to the lawfulness of searches incident to arrest "prior
to 1920" and cited state cases from 1866, 1887, and 1897. See TAYLOR, supra note 49, at 188
n.77. Taylor interpreted that fact to mean that courts were beginning to question the
authority for warrantless searches made incident to arrest at that time. See id. at 45. It
seems more likely that the issue appeared in reported cases at that time because officers
were increasingly testing the limits of their expanded authority to make warrantless arrests
and warrantless searches incident to them.
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as a means of regulating warrantless arrests. In addition, because an
innocent person could not readily appraise whether an officer who at
tempted an arrest was justified by "probable cause," the right to resist
unlawful arrests became unworkable and gradually collapsed.251
In sum, the recognition of probable cause alone as a justification
for a warrantless arrest marked a drastic departure from the common
law regime familiar to the Framers. The enlarged ex officio authority
of the officer, coupled with the organizational might of the new police
departments, fundamentally changed arrest and search doctrine and
practice. The modem police officer and aggressive policing had be
come realities by the end of the nineteenth century; the warrant
ceased to be the usual mode of arrest, and the "ministerial" label dis
appeared from the literature on law enforcement officers.
Unfortunately, modem Supreme Court opinions and commentar
ies have obscured the post-framing expansion of the officer's ex officio
authority by incorrectly asserting that probable cause was the
American "common-law" standard for arrest at the time of the fram
ing.252 Indeed, that error is responsible for much of the confusion at-

251. The common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest or search was fairly robust
{though not without ambiguity) at the time of the framing. See supra note 204. However,
that right was undercut when the officer was given greater leeway for error; a person who
was the target of an attempted arrest could usually apprise whether he was guilty of a crime,
but he could not readily assess whether the officer had information that made it reasonable
to suspect he might be guilty of a crime. Thus, the shift to probable cause made it riskier to
resist arrest. Moreover, the appearance of police departments, the presence of multiple offi
cers, and eventually of armed officers also made resistance less feasible. It is difficult to pin
point exactly when the right to resist unlawful arrest collapsed - but it clearly did.
252. The virtual erasure of memory of the historical "felony in fact" requirement and
the substitution of a mythical long-standing or even "ancient" probable cause standard pres
ents a case study in how legal institutions reconstruct historical doctrine to legitimate current
rulings. Although the King's Bench ruling in Samuel clearly changed the trial court ruling,
the judges who later decided Beckwith simply cited Samuel without noting that it was novel
in itself and without noting that their announcement of the probable cause of felony stan
dard actually went well beyond the innovation made in Samuel. Nineteenth-century English
commentaries subsequently reinforced the false notion that the new probable cause standard
was long-standing. See, e.g., 1 JAMES FITZ.JAMES STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF ENGLAND 193 {1883) (attributing the reasonable cause standard to Hale, but not
giving any page citation for that claim). But see Hall, supra note 214, at 567 (criticizing Ste
phen).
The false notion of a historical probable cause standard was implanted in American law
by the judicial opinions that imported the Samuel and Beckwith innovations. Neither Holly,
Russell, nor Rohan acknowledged that they were adopting a change from earlier American
law. Thereafter, these cases - which departed from the framing-era standards - were cited
as if they articulated historical common-law standards. This presentation was facilitated by
the dual meanings of "common law" - sometimes referring to the content of the law inher
ited from England in 1776, but sometimes referring simply to judge-made law. In the 1900
Bad Elk decision, Justice Peckham described the 1887 South Dakota statute that included
the "on charge" and "probable cause" justifications as a codification of "common law." Bad
Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 535-36 {1900).

A widely cited 1924 article, Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest Without A Warrant, 22 MICH. L.
REV. 541 (1924), further reinforced the notion that the common law of arrest had not
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tending Fourth Amendment history. We cannot appreciate the Fram
ers' understanding of the problem of search and seizure unless we re
move the probable cause justification for arrests and related post
framing developments from the picture. The Framers understood that
justifications for warrantless arrests and accompanying searches were
quite limited. Thus, they did not perceive the peace officer as pos
sessing any significant ex officio discretionary arrest or search author
ity.
Likewise, the Framers did not share the modem expectation that
police officers will tend to be overzealous in "the often competitive
changed greatly; Wilgus commingled sources ranging from Coke and Hale to early twenti
eth-century American decisions and presented the whole as though there was an analytically
coherent treatment of "common law" arrest authority. (Wilgus did not omit the cases that
made important historical changes, but he did not say they changed the law; for example, he
wrote as though Beckwith "settled" an uncertainty - a treatment that did not adequately
recognize the earlier stability of the felony-in-fact requirement See, e.g., id. at 689.) In the
1925 Carroll decision, Chief Justice Taft (who could have read Wilgus) cited Rohan for a
seemingly historical assertion (in the context of discussing the original meaning of the
Fourth Amendment) that "at common law" a warrantless arrest could be made "on a reli
able report of a felony," 267 U.S. at 157, 161, and also asserted that "[t)he usual rule is that a
police officer may arrest without warrant one believed by the officer upon reasonable cause
to have been guilty of a felony" - but did not mention the felony-in-fact requirement, id. at
156.
Recent decisions have reinforced the myth of a long-standing probable cause standard.
In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975), Justice Powell blurred together historical and
modem citations and erroneously implied that the "probable cause" standard for warrant
less arrests was in keeping with "the common-law antecedents" of the Fourth Amendment.
A year later, Justice White asserted in Watron v. United States, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976) the leading contemporary decision regarding warrantless arrest authority - that the "an
cient common law rule" permitted an officer to make a warrantless arrest "if there was rea
sonable ground for making the arrest." As authority for that claim, he cited Hale and
Blackstone (statements which, if examined, clearly stated the felony-in-fact requirement)
and then Samuel, Beckwith, and Rohan - as though the sources endorsed a consistent stan
dard. See id. at 418-19. White concluded that "[t)he balance struck by the common law in
generally authorizing felony arrests on probable cause, but without a warrant, has survived
substantially intact" Id. at 421.
Decisions since Watron have reiterated the claim that probable cause was the framing
era standard for warrantless arrests. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 607, 609
(1980) (White, J., dissenting) (citing Samuel and Rohan as reflecting the standard for war
rantless arrests in framing-era common law); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 584 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Watron and Rohan in stating "[u]nder our precedents (as at
common law), a person may be arrested . . . on the basis of probable cause, without an arrest
warrant").
Likewise, modem commentary has almost uniformly succumbed to the myth of a histori
cal probable cause arrest standard. Lasson did not discuss the historical standard for war
rantless arrests; however, Landynski asserted that at common law "[a] felon could be appre
hended on probable cause alone," but gave no authority for that statement. LANDYNSKI,
supra note 38, at 45; see also Amar, Boston, supra note 19, at 61, 70 (describing Samuel and
Beckwith as though they reflect framing-era common law and the Framers' expectations);
Jack K. Weber, The Birth ofProbable Cause, 11 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 155, (1982) (treating
the probable cause of suspicion prong of the "on suspicion" standard as though it were the
same as the modem probable cause standard, without addressing the historical felony-in-fact
requirement).
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enterprise of ferreting out crime."253 The aggressive police officer is an
outgrowth of an occupational subculture created by the development
of police departments and full-time, career police officers.254 The ama
teur constable of the framing-era would not have had any similar no
tion of "real police work"; rather, he had little motive to act "at his
own risk." The principal historical complaint regarding constables was
not their overzealousness so much as their inaction.255
The bottom line is that the Framers perceived warrant authority as
the salient mode of arrest and search authority. As James Wilson put
it when opening his 1790-91 lecture on arrest authority, "A warrant is
the first step usually takeri. for [the apprehension of a criminal]."256 In
that institutional context, the Framers perceived no reason to fear the
253. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
254. The classic description of the occupational subculture of modem policing is

JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN A DEMOCRATIC
S OCIETY (1966).
The historical development of the police department is well documented.

See, e.g.,

DAVID R. JOHNSON, POLICING THE URBAN UNDERWORLD: 'filE IMPACT OF CRIME ON
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN POLICE, 1800-1887 (1979); LANE, supra note 192;
WILBUR R. MlLLER, COPS AND BOOBIES: POLICE AUTHORITY IN NEW YORK AND
LONDON, 1830-1870 (1973); ERIC MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA, 1860-1920
(1981); JAMES F. RICHARDSON, 'filE NEW YORK POLICE: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1901
(1970); ALLEN STEINBERG, 'filE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
PHILADELPHIA, 1800-1880 (1989); see also Steiker, Second Thoughts, supra note 63, at 83239.
255. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 194, at 68. The common-law sources sometimes
provided forms for indictments for refusing to serve as constable. See, e.g., 1 BURN, supra
note 199, at 391-92, 397-98.
256. 2 'filE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 196, at 684; see also 1 BURN, supra
note 199, at 390 (stating that constables are chosen by justices of the peace because their of
fice consists largely of executing the justices' precepts); 5 BACON, supra note 149, at 171, §§
46-49 ("It is in the general true, that an Arrest for a criminal Cause, without an express War
rant, is a false Imprisonment. . . . And wherever an express Warrant is necessary to author
ise an Arrest for a criminal Cause, an Arrest without an express Warrant can never be justi
fied under one granted after the Arrest. . . . But in some Cases an Arrest may be made for a
criminal Cause without an express Warrant. If a Felony have been committed, and A. have
just Cause to suspect it was committed by B. A. may arrest B. without an express Warrant.").
Modem historians have also emphasized the importance of warrant authority. See, e.g.,
CHAPIN, supra note 196, at 31, 96-97 ("The larger part of [the constables'] duty consisted of
executing the orders of the justices of the peace."); GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 57,
at 337-38 (warrants usually used for arrest in colonial New York); NELSON, supra note 195,
at 17 (stating, somewhat overbroadly, "[a] fundamental rule was that an arrest, a search, or a
seizure of goods following a search was an actionable wrong unless made pursuant to a law
ful warrant"); ARTHUR P. Scarr, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VmGINIA 52-53 (1930)
(stating that warrants were usually used for arrest in colonial Virginia).
There is also indirect evidence of the expectation that arrest warrants were the usual ba
sis for arrest; when arrest powers were discussed during the ratification debates of 1187-88 it
was in the context of arrest warrants. See, for example, the remarks of Holmes in the Mas
sachusetts convention, quoted infra note 302, and the remarks of Patrick Henry in the Vir
ginia convention discussed supra note 162. It is also significant that the First Congress did
not create any ex officio arrest authority when it created the office of federal marshal shortly
after adopting the Fourth Amendment. See supra note 170.
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"ministerial" officer - especially when house searches were in
volved.257

4.

The Heightened Importance ofWarrant Authority for Intrusions
into Houses

Although modern courts apply the Fourth Amendment to all pri
vately owned property (except open fields), contemporary cases still
acknowledge that the house was meant to receive special protection.258
Even so, the rhetoric of modern doctrine falls short of recognizing the
unique status accorded the house at common law. The domicile was a
sacrosanct interest in late eighteenth-century common law, as evi
denced by the doctrine that "a man's house is his castle."259
The castle doctrine announced the householder's entitlement to be
left alone in his house - what John Adams called "that strong Protec
tion, that sweet Security, that delightful Tranquillity which the Laws
have thus secured to [an Englishman] in his own House . . "260 Thus,
.

.

257. Unfortunately, historical records cannot be used to quantify how often warrants
were used during the framing era because executed warrants were not filed, but retained by
the constables who executed them. See HENING, supra note 25, at 44. Thus, issued warrants
have not been preserved even in surviving court records. Contemporary empirical research
ers still report severe difficulties working with records of search warrants, because they are
usually not filed with case files. See RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE WARRANT
PROCESS 2, 8 {1985).
258. The most quoted passage to this effect is in United States v. United States Dist.
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 {1972) ("[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which
the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed . . . .")
.

259. The most famous statement of this doctrine is a 1763 speech by William Pitt. See
LASSON, supra note 16, at 49-50. However, the doctrine was recognized a century and half
earlier by Coke in Semayne's Case, 5 Coke Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1604)
("[T]he house of every one is to him as his castle . . . ."), and traces back at least to the early
sixteenth century. See LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING, supra note 45, at 222, 441 n.2; 1
Cuddihy, supra note 20, at xciv-xcvii.
The importance attached to the house is evident in numerous ways. For example, being
a "freeholder" - that is, owning a house - was the general standard for membership in the
English political community. Similarly, the Third Amendment to the Federal Constitution,
which was based directly on a provision in the English Bill of Rights, and reflects a pre
revolutionary grievance as well, forbade quartering soldiers in "a house." U.S. CONST.
amend. ill.
The common-law felony of burglary also demonstrated the unique status of the house.
a general rule, attempt offenses (conduct committed "with intent" to inflict a harm) were
only misdemeanors at common Jaw; however, breaking into a house at night with intent to
commit a felony was a felony. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 223-26 (stating the cas
tle doctrine and noting that outbuildings within the curtilage are within the meaning of a
house but not a "distant barn, warehouse, or the like").
As

However, there was a limitation: a householder could not give sanctuary to a person
who was not a resident of the household and was pursued by officers who had grounds to
arrest him. See, e.g., HENING, supra note 25, at 41.
260. Adams described the status of the house:
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except for extraordinary circumstances, an officer could not justify
"breaking" (that is, opening261) the outer door of a house unless he
acted pursuant to a judicial warrant. Adams's cryptic notes of Otis's
1761 argument bear witness to this understanding:

This [general writ of assistance] is against the fundamental Principles of
Law. The Priviledge of House. A Man, who is quiet, is as secure in his
House, as a Prince in his Castle, not with standing all his Debts, and civil
Processes of any kind. - But
For flagrant Crimes, and in Cases of great public Necessity, the
Priviledge may be [encroached]. For Felonies an officer may break upon
Prossess, and oath - i.e. by a Special Warrant to search such an House,
sworn to be suspected, and good Grounds of suspicion appearing.262
Otis's claim that a house was immune to entry except upon a "spe
cial warrant" echoed earlier common-law statements. Coke had as
serted a broad right to forcibly defend one's house,263 and had de
scribed arrest warrants largely in terms of the authority they provided
officers to enter a house to make a felony arrest.264 Although Hale

An Englishmans dwelling House is his Castle. The Law has erected a Fortification round it
- and as every Man is Party to the Law, i.e. the Law is a Covenant of every Member of so
ciety with every other Member, therefore every Member of Society has entered into a sol
emn Covenant with every other that he shall enjoy in his own dwelling House as compleat a
security, safety and Peace and Tranquility as if it was surrounded with Walls of Brass, with
Ramparts and Palisadoes and defended with a Garrison and Artillery. . . .
Every English[man] values himself exceedingly, he takes a Pride and he glories justly in that
strong Protection, that sweet Security, that delightfull Tranquillity which the Laws have thus
secured to him in his own House, especially in the Night. Now to deprive a Man of this Pro
tection, this quiet and Security in the dead of Night, when himself and Family confiding in it
are asleep, is treat[ing] him not like an Englishman not like a Freeman but like a Slave . . . .
1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 20, at 137 (quoting Adams's notes of his ar
gument in the 1774 case King v. Stewart).
261. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 226 (discussing burglary, Blackstone wrote
that "lifting up the latch" of an outer door would constitute "breaking" a house).
262. 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 20, at 125-26. (Note that, because
"Prossess" was a generic term for writs and warrants, the statement that "an officer may
break [a house] upon Prossesses" reflects an understanding that a valid warrant was usually
needed to justify breaking a house.) Otis also referred to the need to "get a special [i.e., spe
cific] Warrant . . . to infringe the Priviledge of House," complained that the general writ was
a "Commission to break Houses," and specifically noted an instance in which "Justice
Walley searched House" under a writ. 2 id. at 126-29; see also 2 id. at 142-43 (discussing the
portion of Adarns's abstract of Otis's argument dealing with "the freedom of one's house,"
described as "one of the most essential branches of English liberty").
263. Semayne's Case, 5 Coke Rep. at 9lb, 77 Eng. Rep. at 195 (stating that, although a
homicide committed in self-defense or by accident was still a felony, a killing in defense of
one's house was not).
264. See 4 COKE, supra note 74, at 176-77. Coke had earlier made a statement that "the
K[ing]'s officer" could break into a house to arrest for felony or suspicion of felony in his
ruling in Semayne's Case, 5 Coke Rep. at 92a-92b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 196-97 (K.B. 1604). This
is sometimes read as though Coke meant that an officer had broad authority to break into a
house to make a felony arrest See, e.g., LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING, supra note 45, at 223.
However, the only justification for a warrantless breaking recognized in that case report is
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later gave a somewhat more expansive interpretation of an officer's
authority to break into a house to make a warrantless arrest for felony,
he generally cautioned that the felon must actually be present in the
house265 and advised that "to avoid question in these cases, it is best to
obtain the warrant of a justice, if the time and necessity will permit. "266
Hawkins adopted a more restrictive view in his chapter on "Where
Doors may be broken open in Order to make an Arrest." He noted
that an officer could break into a house to execute an arrest warrant
from a justice of the peace,267 but recognized only two situations in
which an officer could do so without a warrant: if he perceived that
violence was then occurring inside the house,268 or if he was in pursuit
of a person who either had just been witnessed committing an affray
or was actually guilty of a felony. However, Hawkins asserted that an
officer could not break into a house to make an arrest on suspicion of
for an arrest made upon "hue and cry" where the criminal "retreats into the house" and is
"pursue(d]." Semayne's Case, 5 Coke Rep. at 91b-92a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 196. The seemingly
broad statement regarding the authority of the King's officer actually referred to the execu
tion of a "writ" - that is, a warrant:
[Y]et forasmuch as the K[ing] is a party, the writ of itself is non omittas propt' aliquam liber·
tat'
for felony or suspicion of felony, the K(ing]'s officer may break the house to apprend
the felon, and that for two reasons: 1. For the commonwealth, for it is for the common·
wealth to apprehend felons. 2. In every felony the King has interest, and where the King has
interest the writ is non omittas propter aliquam libertatem; and so the liberty or privilege of
the house doth not hold against the King.
• • . .

5 Coke Rep. at 92 a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 196-97 (emphasis added). ("(N]on omittas propter ali
quam libertatem" directed the officer not to omit to execute the writ because of any "lib
erty" - that is, any special district or jurisdiction. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 917,
1056, 1220 (6th ed. 1990).) Thus, the only justification for a warrantless breaking of a house
Coke recognized was on fresh pursuit under the hue and cry.

The crucial distinction drawn in Semayne's Case was that a house could never be forcibly
entered, even on the basis of a writ or other process, in a civil matter to which the King was
not a party, but could be forcibly entered to execute judicial process (writs or warrants) in a
matter in which the King was a party. See, e.g., HENING, supra note 25, at 41.
265. Hale twice discussed breaking doors to arrest. In his first volume, he discussed
breaking doors to execute an arrest warrant at 1 HALE, supra note 75, at 582-83; he dis
cussed breaking doors for warrantless arrests at 1 id. at 588-89. Note that his statements re
garding breaking to make a warrantless arrest are usually qualified by something like "and
the offender is in the house." Hale also discussed arrest authority in his second volume
where he stated that a private person could not justify breaking a house to arrest on suspi·
cion, but only to arrest on actual guilt, see 2 id. at 82; that an officer could justify breaking a
house for a warrantless arrest on suspicion "if the supposed offender fly and take house,'' 2
id. at 92; that a constable can break into a house to suppress an affray "whereby there is
likely to be manslaughter or bloodshed committed" or to suppress disorder, 2 id. at 95; that
an arrest by hue and cry will justify the breaking of doors only if the person sought is pres
ent, 2 id. at 103; and that an arrest warrant will justify the breaking of doors, 2 id. at 116-17.
266. 1 id. at 589.
267. 2 HAWKINS, supra note 76,
at 138-39.

at 86-87; see also 2 LEACH'S HAWKINS, supra note 76,

268. See 2 LEACH'S HAWKINS, supra note 76, at 139, § 8 (stating one limitation as
"[w]here an affray is made in a house in the view or hearing of a constable").
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felony.269 Other eighteenth-century authorities maintained that, while
an arrest warrant for a felony could justify breaking a house, an arrest
warrant for a misdemeanor would not suffice.270
The warrant was even more critical for justifying searches of
houses than for entering the house to make an arrest. Common-law
authorities recognized a search warrant for stolen goods,271 which was
also a justification for forcibly entering a house if necessary.272 The

269. Hawkins recognized two situations in which a warrantless breaking of a house was
permitted in a pursuit. "Sect. 8. [The breaking of doors of a house may be justified w]here
those who have made an Affray in [the arresting person's] Presence fly to a House, and are
immediately pursued by him, and he is not suffered to enter . . . to apprehend the Affray
ers • • . ." 2 HAWKINS, supra note 76, at 87; see also 2 LEACH'S HAWKINS, supra note 76, at
139.
Sect. 7.[The breaking of doors of a house m�y be justified w]here one known to have com
mitted a Treason or Felony, or to have given another a dangerous Wound, is pursued either
with or without a Warrant, by a Constable or private Person: But where one lies under a
probable Suspicion only, and is not indicted, it seems the better Opinion at this Day, That no
one can justify the breaking open Doors in Order to apprehend him . • • .
2 HAWKINS, supra note 76, at 86-87; 2 LEACH'S HAWKINS, supra note 76, at 139. Hawkins's
reference to a "known" felon is to one actually guilty, rather than only suspected of being
guilty. Note that Hawkins's view that even an officer could not break into a house to arrest
on suspicion without a warrant was contrary to Hale's earlier view. See supra note 265. This
difference was noted in a number of framing-era sources. See, e.g., 1 BURN, supra note 199,
at 106-07.
270. See John Adams, Minutes of the Referee's Hearing, reprinted in 1 LEGAL PAPERS
OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 20, at 87, 99 n.59 (quoting 1 JOSEPH SHAW, THE PRACTICAL
JUSTICE OF PEACE 85 {6th ed. 1756)) (" '[A] Justice of Peace his Warrant will not justify a
Constable in breaking into a House to apprehend any Person for a less Crime than Felony or
Misprision of Felony.' ").
271. The common-law search warrant for stolen goods seems to have been created as a
response to the special protection of the house recognized in Semayne's Case, 5 Coke Rep.
91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1604), see discussion supra note 264, which held that a house
could not be broken to serve a civil writ unless the King was a party to the suit. The search
warrant for stolen goods provided a means for recovering property while avoiding that limit
because the allegation that goods had been stolen gave the King an interest in the proceed
ing. Lord Camden described search warrants for stolen goods as having "crept into the law
by imperceptible practice" in the longer report of Entick v. Carrington, 11 St. Tr. 313, 321
(Francis Hargrave's 4th ed.), 19 Howell St. Tr. 1029, 1067 (C.P 1765) {first published 1781,
see supra note 25). This passage was paraphrased in 2 LEACH'S HAWKINS, supra note 76, at
135 n.6 (1788 edition).
272. The strong protection afforded the house is evident in the fact that Hale was ap
parently uncertain whether a search warrant for stolen goods could justify breaking the door
of a house, or merely allowed entry through an already open door. In Hale's first discussion,
he wrote that "[t]here can be no breaking open of doors to make the search, but [the search
ers] must enter per ostia aperta [by an open outer door] or upon voluntary opening of the
door by the house-keeper or his servants," 2 HALE, supra note 75, at 114, and also that
"[u]pon a warrant to search for stolen goods the doors cannot be broken open," id. at 116.
In his second discussion of the execution of a warrant to search for stolen goods, however,
Hale states that
[i]f the door be shut, and upon demand it be refused to be opened by them within, if the sto
len goods be in the house, the officer may break open the door, and neither the officer nor
the [complainant] are punishable for it, but may justify it upon the general issue . . . so that in
eventu it is justifiable by both . . . .
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common-law sources, however, did not identify any positive justifica
tion for a warrantless search of a house - a silence that meant there
was no such justification.273 Indeed, the absence of common-law justifi
cations for warrantless house searches, or of common-law authority for
search warrants other than for stolen property, explains why Parliament
had to enact statutory search authority for customs officers.274 As the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated in 1816, "every one is
presumed to know that the dwelling house of another cannot be law
fully forced, unless for purposes especially provided for by law."275
Modern commentators have sometimes understated the strong
protection afforded the house against warrantless intrusions. For ex
ample, Professor Taylor claimed that the common law permitted a
warrantless search of a house for evidence or stolen goods as an "inci
dent" of a lawful arrest made in the house - but did not support that
historical claim.276 Although that issue apparently arose infrequently,
(emphasis added). Note that the breaking of the door pursuant to a legal search
warrant was justifiable only if the stolen goods were actually found in the house - othenvise
it was a trespass. See also the discussion of the liability of the complainant for an unsuccess
ful search pursuant to a warrant infra notes 293-294.

Id. at 151

273. As noted above, common-law sources tended to define lawful authority positively
and to catalog the forms of authority that existed; as a general matter, the absence of an af·
firmative statement of authority was understood to mean there was no authority. See, for
example, Lord Camden's statement in Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 275, 291, 95 Eng. Rep.
807, 817 (C.P. 1765) ("[I]f this is law, it would be found in our books . . . •"). For the full
quotation, see supra note 203.
Professor Amar has implied that warrantless searches of houses were permitted because
scholars have yet to identify framing-era statements that warrants were required for all
searches. See, e.g., Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at 763. That argument is a
strawman. Not all interests were as protected as houses; thus, specific warrants were not
needed to justify ship searches. See supra notes 149-159 and accompanying text. Moreover,
Amar posed the question backwards - a framing-era lawyer would have assumed there was
no justification for a search of a house unless such authority was positively recognized. The
important fact is the absence of statements approving of warrantless house searches. See
also supra notes 93, 203; infra note 543.

274. Parliament conferred customs revenues on Charles II at the Restoration in 1660;
shortly thereafter, Parliament created a customs search warrant. See An Act to Prevent
Frauds, 12 Car. 2, ch. 19 (1660) (Eng.). That legislation was prompted by a situation in
which a merchant had barred the door to his house to block officers attempting to search for
uncustomed goods; the officers did not make the search because they dared not break into
the house on their own ex officio authority. See Frese, Article, supra note 18, at 321-22.
Smith described the same incident but failed to mention the important fact that the door
barred was to the merchant's house. See SMITII, supra note 20, at 41. In 1662, when customs
collections were "farmed" to commissioned collectors, the customs search warrant was re
placed by the writ of assistance. See infra note 306.
275. Sanford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. (1 Tyng) 286, 289 (1816). The statement was made in
the context of a ruling recognizing the trespass liability of revenue officers who searched a house
without a valid warrant.
276. Taylor offered only three pieces of historical evidence on that point, and none of
them lends any support to his claim. He first quoted a description of the early law of arrests
as "rude." TAYLOR, supra note 49, at 28 (quoting 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC
WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE TIIE nME OF EDWARD I
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the framing-era statements that do address the point take the opposite
view.277
Similarly, Professor Amar has asserted the existence of a broad "ex
post success justification" for searching for and discovering stolen
goods or contraband - but has not identified any supporting author
ity.278 Actually, the record indicates the opposite - that the success of

582-83 (2d ed. 1903)). That, however, was a description of the English law of arrest circa the
thirteenth century. See 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra, at 579. Second, Taylor cited a sin
gle mid-seventeenth-century pamphlet on the constable for the proposition that a constable
could make a warrantless search of a house incident to making an arrest there. TAYLOR,
supra note 49, at 28-29 (quoting WILLIAM SHEPPARD, THE OFFICES OF THE CONSTABLES,
CHuRCH-WARDENS, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR, SUPRAVISORS OF THE HIGH-WAYES,
TREASURERS OF THE COUNTY STOCK; AND SOME OTHER LESSER COUNTRY OFFICERS,
PLAINLY AND LIVELY SET FORTH ch. 8, § 2, no. 4 (London, c. 1650)). The pamphlet was of
dubious authority, however; at a number of points it appears to be more an assertion of what
the law should be than a description of what the courts had declared the law was. Moreover,
it predated the full development of the liberty of the house that attended the Restoration of
1660 and the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Taylor's third citation was a "see also" cite to a
1754 work, but it does not contain any statement on the subject. See TAYLOR, supra note 49,
at 183 n.27 (citing SAUNDERS WELCH, OBSERVATIONS ON THE OFFICE OF CONSTABLE 12,
14 (1754)). On the basis of that scanty, parachronistic evidence, Taylor asserted that
searches of houses incident to arrest "had the full approval of bench and bar, in the time of
George III . . . ." TAYLOR, supra note 49, at 29.
Notwithstanding Taylor's minimal documentation, a number of commentators have un
critically accepted his assertion on this point. See, e.g., Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra
note 58, at 764; Stuntz, supra note 57, at 401 n.35.
277. Cuddihy has summarized the common-law literature on this point: "[t]he legal
authors of 1761-1776 agreed that houses could be broken into to consummate the arrest pro
cess," but "they did not also say that houses could be searched during that process." 2
Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1183. Cuddihy also reports a memorandum Charles Pratt (the
judge in the Wilkesite cases) sent to William Pitt in 1763, just prior to the Wilkes trials,
which stated that, even though the law allowed an officer to break into a house to arrest "in
Felony & the flagrant Cases," the arresting officer could "apprehend nothing but the Per
son." Id. at 989, 1184 n.3 (quoting memorandum from Pratt to Pitt).
The most likely reason that little was said in the common-law sources about the scope of
searches incident to arrest is that such searches were conducted primarily in connection with
arrests made in fresh pursuit. Except in that setting, officers would not usually have made
arrests for theft until after the property was discovered with a search warrant for stolen
goods; without the recovered property, it would usually have been difficult to justify the ar
rest. See supra note 227 (discussing the requirement of "felony in fact" for a warrantless ar
rests "on suspicion"); see also discussion supra notes 231-235 and accompanying text (noting
that the victim-complainant in Samuel obtained a search warrant for stolen goods, but not an
arrest warrant); supra note 115 (discussing Taylor's own observation that trespass cases in
volving searches for stolen property arose from warrant searches).
278. In addition to correctly noting that there was an "ex post success defense" to tres
pass for felony arrests, Amar asserted that discovery and seizure of "stolen goods" or "con
traband" would also be self-justifying, citing as authority a statement by Justice Story in
Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 310 (1818). See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra
note 58, at 767 n.30; quotation of Amar's statement supra note 225. (Stuntz has uncritically
repeated Amar's assertion on this point. See Stuntz, supra note 57, at 400 n.32.) However,
Gelston involved an in rem seizure of a ship based on information that it was about to violate
the 1794 Neutrality Act; it did not involve any search, let alone a warrantless entry and
search of a house. Hence, Gelston does not provide authority for justifying a search of a
house; it merely illustrates that ships did not enjoy the same protection as houses.
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a search was not sufficient justification for a violation of a house.279
The importance of a valid warrant for justifying a house search is ex
emplified by the 1813 New York decision Bell v. Clapp, in which a
search warrant was the only justification offered for the lawfulness of a
successful search.280 Likewise, in the 1816 trespass case Sanford v.
Nichols, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court faced a situation in
which customs officers had made a successful search of a house for un
customed goods, but had acted under a too-loose and therefore illegal
search warrant.281 The court noted that the plaintiff was entitled to a
trespass verdict against customs officers, thereby showing that a suc
cessful search did not justify the violation of a house (however, the
court suggested that damages might be small because only forfeit
goods were actually taken).282 Similar implications are apparent in
both the 1814 New York decision Sailly v. Smith2133 and the 1838 Mas-

279. An English judge described a verdict of trespass against revenue officers who had
found uncustomed goods during a search of a house under a writ of assistance but who had
failed to comply with the terms of the writ, because they had searched without bringing the
local constable with them, as called for in the writ. Thus, the successful seizure of uncus
tomed goods was not enough to justify the house search; the justification for the house
search depended on compliance with the writ of assistance. See the statement by Justice
Gould in Bruce v. Rawlins, 3 Wils. 61, 62, 95 Eng. Rep. 934, 935 (C.P. 1770). (Although
Bruce is conventionally cited to the third volume of Wilson's Reports, it was initially pub
lished in 1775 in the third "part" which comprised the second volume of the first edition. In
later editions, the volume numbers were changed when the three parts were published as
three volumes. See the discussion of publication dates of Wilson's Reports, supra note 25.)
280. 10 Johns. Cas. 263 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813). Officers had searched a house and found
and removed barrels of stolen flour under the authority of a search warrant for stolen prop
erty; the owner of the premises sued for trespass, but the court held that the warrant pro
vided justification for the search. The significant point, for present purposes, is that the offi
cers do not seem to have attempted to justify the successful search other than by the
warrant. Why would the arguments have been entirely about the validity of the search war
rant if the success of the search could constitute a justification?
Although barrels of stolen flour were recovered, there is no mention of any criminal
prosecution. A search warrant for stolen property did not rest on an allegation that the theft
was committed by anyone in particular, only that that there had been a theft and that there
was probable cause as to where the property was located. The warrant commanded the con
stable to bring anyone who was found to have control of the premises to the justice of the
peace for examination if the allegedly stolen property was found during the search. It does
not appear, however, that a successful search for stolen property necessarily led to a criminal
prosecution. At least when there was no subsequent prosecution, the search warrant for
stolen property was the only justification for a search of a house.
281. 13 Mass. (1 Tyng) 256, 289-90 (1816).
282. The defendant officers had won at a trial, in which the too-loose search warrant
had been admitted into evidence as their justification. On appeal, the court ruled that the
warrant should not have been admitted, and ordered a retrial. In that context, the court
noted that the plaintiff might wish to consider whether a retrial would be worthwhile be
cause, since only forfeit goods had actually been seized, damages might not be large (appar
ently there was no damage to the house itself). The court's comment on the amount of dam
ages shows that the defendant officers could not justify the house search simply by showing
that forfeit items had been found. See generally id.
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sachusetts decision Banks v. Farwell.284 Thus, the common law appar
ently provided no justification for a search of a house beyond the
ministerial execution of a valid search warrant.285
The absence of justifications for house searches other than a valid
search warrant explains why prerevolutionary controversies over
search authority consistently focused on whether general warrants
could constitute a legal justification for a house search. It also ex
plains why no one seems to have claimed that customs officers (or
King's Messengers) could conduct lawful warrantless searches of
houses.
Thus, there is a historical explanation for the silence of the Fourth
Amendment (and of the state provisions) as to whether or when a war
rant is to be used. The Framers of the Fourth Amendment understood
that the common law already specified that many sorts of arrests or
searches could only be justified by a valid warrant - especially when
"houses, papers, and effects" were involved. Because they took the im
portance of warrant authority for granted, they perceived the task for the

283. 11 Johns Cas. 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814). The decision upheld a state customs offi
cer's warrantless search and seizure of a commercial sled that was located in a shed open to
the public. The seizure was made under a state "trading with the enemy" statute enacted
during the War of 1812. The court's opinion noted that the statute also purported to
authorize warrantless searches of dwelling-houses, and commented that authority for a war
rantless search of a house would be "an extensive and highly important authority . . . if it
does exist," and that the "more correct course" for searching a house would be for the offi
cer to obtain a search warrant. Id. at 502-03. This opinion has to be read in light of the fact
that New York had not adopted any constitutional search and seizure provision; thus, the
judges could not invoke a constitutional provision to invalidate the statute. In that light, the
reluctance they expressed regarding warrantless house searches reflected a strong sense that
the statute conflicted with the common-law protection usually accorded the house. The dis
cussion also refutes any notion that warrantless house searches were permissible in the ab
sence of specific statutory authority.
284. 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 156 (1838). Farwell had sworn out a complaint and arrest war
rant for Banks for theft of a pump-nose. A constable arrested Banks pursuant to the war
rant, and during a justice of the peace's examination Banks said that the pump-nose was in
his shop. Over Banks's objections, the justice told the constable and Farwell to get it. To do
so, they broke into Banks's shop and seized the pump-nose. Banks subsequently sued
Farwell and the constable for trespass. The trial judge instructed thejury that the facts did
not constitute a justification for the breaking and search of the shop, and the jury returned a
verdict for Banks. On the officer's appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Court reversed the
trespass verdict. Although the result in the case weakened the need for a search warrant
(and is best understood as reflecting the nineteenth-century expansion of the officer's ex of
ficio authority), the court based its ruling on the premise that the retrieval of the stolen item
from the shop had not constituted a "search." In that regard, the judges recited that "[h]ad
[the constable and the complainant] attempted to break into the plaintiff's house or shop for
the purpose of searching for stolen property, they would have gone aside from their author
ity and would have acted at their peril." Id. at 159. Thus, the court seems to have upheld the
warrantless entry on the narrow ground that because the arrestee had confessed the location
of the pump-nose, its location was known with certainty - not because a successful search
was self-justifying.

285. See also GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note
NELSON, supra note 195, at 34, quoted supra note 195.

57,

at

428,

quoted

supra

note

57;
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constitutional text solely as banning the legalization of general warrants
- and the warrant standards of sworn-to probable cause and particular
ity sufficed to accomplish that.
Justices Jackson and Frankfurter, as well as a number of commen
tators, were therefore correct when they asserted that the Framers of
the Fourth Amendment must have believed they could control intru
sions by peace officers simply by controlling the issuance of war
rants.286 The Justices provided no supporting evidence for their con
clusion, however, because they likely did not fully grasp (or were
constrained from reporting) how much modem search and seizure
doctrine had diverged from the common-law rules that had shaped the
Framers' expectations.

5.

The Framers' Acceptance of Specific Warrants

The common-law sources also shed considerable light on why the
Framers objected only to general warrants, but not to specific war
rants. At common law, specific warrants provided several layers of
protection against arbitrary searches. First, and perhaps foremost, the
specific warrant gave a particularized command to the officer, thereby
circumscribing the officer's exercise of his own judgment as to whom
to arrest, what place to search, or what items to seize. The specific
warrant controlled the officer.
The second layer of protection derived from the common law's dis
tribution of accountability for searches made under warrant. In the
modem warrant process, an officer can recite hearsay information
from an unidentified informant to establish probable cause for a war
rant287 (or, as a practical matter, can even invent such information or
286. Justice Jackson correctly perceived the Framers' sense of the centrality of warrant
authority. After quoting the Fourth Amendment, he wrote "[h]ere endeth the command of
the forefathers, apparently because they believed that by thus controlling search warrants
they had controlled searches." Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 196 (1946) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Frankfurter put it this way:
When the Fourth Amendment outlawed "unreasonable searches" and then went on to de
fine the very restricted authority that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate could
give, the framers said with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is "unreason
able" unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute necessity.

United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

See also Kamisar, supra note 38, at 571-79 (discussing "why the Framers probably be
lieved that by controlling search warrants they had controlled searches"); Wasserstrom &
Seidman, supra note 9, at 83 ("[A]t the time the amendment was adopted, it was assumed
that the common law would effectively protect the citizenry from warrantless searches and
seizures, and therefore the framers primarily feared search[es] and seizures under war
rants.").
287. The Supreme Court still expressed skepticism regarding the use of hearsay infor
mation to establish probable cause for a search warrant as late as Grau v. United States, 287
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informants with minimal likelihood of discovery288) . In framing-era
law, however, only a person who had personal knowledge of an of
fense could swear out a complaint and warrant; thus, there were no
"confidential" informants, only named complainants.289 An officer
could act as the complainant only by swearing to his own information
and suspicion.
In addition, a complainant had to make strong allegations: for an
arrest warrant, he had to swear to knowledge of a crime in fact and
that he possessed probable cause of suspicion regarding the perpetra-

U.S. 124, 128 (1932) ("A search warrant may issue only upon evidence which would be com
petent in the trial of the offense before a jury."). However, the restrictive use of hearsay to
establish probable cause for warrants was in tension with the permissive allowance of the use
of hearsay information to provide probable cause for warrantless arrests, as permitted in
Beckwith and its progeny. The Supreme Court resolved that tension by rejecting the general
proposition that probable cause for a warrantless arrest must be based on evidence that
would be admissible at trial in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311-12 & n.4 (1959)
(disapproving the standard stated in Grau and asserting that allowance of hearsay evidence
to establish probable cause is consistent with the treatment of probable cause in Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172-74 (1949)). The Court also ruled that an affidavit for a
search warrant is not to be deemed invalid because "it sets out not the affiant's observations
but those of another" because it would be "incongruous" to apply different standards for
probable cause for warrantless arrests and search warrants. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 269, 270 (1960). The Supreme Court's allowance of hearsay to show probable cause was
anticipated in earlier lower federal court and state court rulings. However, the earlier cases
that permitted probable cause for an arrest or search to be based on hearsay information
from an informant tended to require that the informant be identified, notwithstanding the
general "informant's privilege" recognized in the law of evidence. See 8 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 769 n. 9 (John T. McNaughton rev.
1961) (citing cases). However, the Supreme Court also effectively rejected a rule of disclo
sure of the identity of an informant who provided the information constituting probable
cause for an arrest or search warrant in 1960 in Jones, 362 U.S. at 272 (although defendant
objected that warrant affidavit did not name informants, the Court ruled that informants
need not be produced before commissioner authorized to issue search warrant).
The Court subsequently directly rejected a claim that a defendant was entitled to know,
for purposes of challenging the validity of an arrest and search, the identity of the person
who allegedly provided the information that constituted probable cause. See McCray v.
Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). Although McCray involved a warrantless arrest, it has been
understood - in light of the Court's earlier statement in Jones that it would be "incongru
ous" if the standard for probable cause for a warrant were higher than for a warrantless in
trusion - to also mean that the identity of an informant need not be disclosed in a warrant
application based on hearsay information, or in subsequent suppression proceedings.
288. See, e.g., Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Ex
clusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 102-07 (1992). The
Burger Court made it virtually impossible for defendants to attack perjurious allegations in
warrant affidavits. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) (requiring defendant
to make a prima facie showing that police deliberately or recklessly made a false allegation
regarding information provided by informant). The affidavit in Franks was aberrant insofar
as it named the supposed informants; however, when the informants are not identified, as is
the typical practice, there is no possible way for a defendant to challenge the veracity of the
claims police officers swear to in affidavits.
289. See, e.g., 2 HALE, supra note 75, at 150 (stating that a search warrant for stolen
property is not to be granted without oath of a felony (that is, a theft) committed and "that
the party complaining hath probable cause to suspect" that the stolen property is in a par
ticular place).
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tor's identity;290 for a search warrant for stolen goods, he had to swear
that goods were stolen in fact and that he possessed probable cause of
suspicion as to the location of the stolen property.291 (Note that the
Fourth Amendment probable cause standard for warrants, which does
not require an allegation of an offense "in fact," is actually less de
manding than the common-law standards for criminal warrants.292)
Swearing out a search warrant was a serious undertaking because
the complainant was accountable for the outcome of the search; if it
did not produce the stolen property or contraband as alleged, the
complainant was liable for trespass.293 Moreover, an officer who initi
ated a revenue search was as accountable as a private complainant. An
officer was indemnified for executing a valid search warrant because that
was a "ministerial" act he was duty-bound to perform, but swearing out a
warrant was a personal act. Thus, an officer who initiated an unsuc
cessful revenue search of a house by swearing out a search warrant for
untaxed goods was likewise liable for trespass if the search proved
fruitless.294 (Customs officers did, however, sometimes enjoy a degree

290. Hale wrote: "it is fit in all cases of warrants for arresting for felony, much more for
suspicion of felony, [for the justice of the peace] to examine upon oath the party requiring
the warrant, as well whether a felony were done, as also the causes of his suspicion • • • •" 2
HALE, supra note 75, at 110. See also the passage from Blackstone quoted infra note 297.
The elements for an arrest were still stated the same way in early nineteenth-century works.
See, e.g., 7 DANE, supra note 151, at 244, 248.
291. See citation to Hale supra note 289. Lord Camden described the elements for a
search warrant the same way: "thejustice and the informer must proceed with great caution;
there must be an oath that the party has had his goods stolen, and a strong reason to believe
they are concealed in such a place . . . ." Entick v. Carrington, 2 \Vtls. 275, 291-92, 95 Eng.
Rep. 807, 818 (C.P. 1765) (version published 1770, see supra note 25). The same description
of the elements needed for a search warrant still appeared in post-framing American works.
See, e.g., 7 DANE, supra note 151, at 244-45 & n.*; HENING, supra note 25, at 413-15.
292 See infra notes 445-447 and accompanying text.
293. See, e.g., 2 HALE supra note 75, at 151

(stating that an officer executing a warrant
,
was not liable for a fruitless search of a house "but it seems the party that made the sugges
tion [to search] is punishable in such case, for as to him the breaking of the door is in eventu
lawful or unlawful, viz. lawful if the goods are there; unlawful, if not there"). Lord Camden
also asserted that the complainant was liable for a fruitless search for stolen goods: "if the
goods are not found there [as the complainant swore], he is a trespasser; the officer in that
case is a witness." Entick, 2 Wils. at 291-92, 95 Eng. Rep. at 818; see also 2 Wils. at 283, 95
Eng. Rep. at 812 (case report published in 1770, see supra note 25). In addition, the original
statutory authority for a customs search warrant explicitly provided for liability of the com
plainant for a fruitless search under such a warrant. See 12 Car. 2, ch. 19 (1660) (Eng.) ("[I]f
the Information whereupon any House shall come to be searched shall prove to be false, that
then and in such case the party injured shall recover his full damages and costs against the
Informer by Action of Trespasse to be therefore brought against such Informer.").

In American law, the rule of complainant liability for a fruitless search made pursuant to
a warrant persisted into the nineteenth century. See, e.g., DANIEL DAVIS, A PRACTICAL
TREATISE UPON THE AUTHORITY AND DUTY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 75-76 (1824);
HENING, supra note 25, at 40, 414, 415.
294. At common law, the general rule, that the person who initiated a fruitless search
by procuring a search warrant was liable for trespass, applied to officers who initiated
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of statutory protection for wrongful seizures when they seized goods
that had initially appeared to be untaxed but later were ruled not for
feit.295) Although the complainant's trespass liability has disappeared
from modem doctrine, it was an important feature of framing-era law.

searches. For example, an officer who made a fruitless search under a writ of assistance was
liable for trespass if he initiated the search on the basis of his own suspicion; however, he
was not liable for trespass if he acted on the basis of information provided by another per
son. See Bruce v. Rawlins, 3 Wtls. 61, 95 Eng. Rep. 934 (C.P. 1770) (imposing trespass li
ability on a customs officer for a fruitless search under a writ of assistance initiated on the
basis of the officer's own suspicion rather than on information provided by another person).
Framing-era American lawyers were probably familiar with Bruce, because the case reports
conventionally cited to the third volume of Wilson's Reports were published in the second
volume of the first edition in 1775. See supra notes 25, 279. (However, it is unclear how the
potential liability of an officer who searched under a writ of assistance was understood by
Massachusetts lawyers at the time of the 1761 Writs of Assistance Case. See SMITH, supra
note 20, at 511-15.)
Similarly, at common law, an officer who acted as complainant and procured a revenue
search warrant was liable for trespass if the search proved fruitless. See Bostock v. Saunders,
3 Wils. 434, 95 Eng. Rep. 1141 (K.B. 1773) (distinguishing between the protection afforded
an officer who only executed a fruitless search under a lawful search warrant and the liability
of an officer who also initiated a fruitless search by acting as complainant and obtaining an
excise search warrant); also reponed as 2 Black. W. 912, 96 Eng. Rep. 539 (first published
1781, see 1 LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 239, entry 11). Framing-era American
lawyers were probably familiar with Bostock because it was published in 1775 in the same
volume of Wilson's Reports as Bruce.

Bostock was reversed in English law when Lord Mansfield and the other judges of the
Court of King's Bench ruled in 1785 that an officer should not be liable for a fruitless search
conducted under an excise search warrant even if he had procured the warrant (though ac
knowledging that this treatment contrasted with the well established liability of an officer
who initiated a fruitless search under a writ of assistance on the basis of his own suspicion).
Cooper v. Booth, 3 Esp. 138, 170 Eng. Rep. 564 (K.B. 1785), also reponed as Cooper v. Boot,
4 Doug. 339, 99 Eng. Rep. 911. However, it is highly unlikely that framing-era American
la\vyers were familiar with this change in English law because the case report by Espinasse
was published no earlier than 1801 while that by Douglas was not published until 1831. See
supra note 19.
Indeed, Nathaniel Dane treated Bostock as the American doctrine in his 1824 commen
tary (without mentioning Cooper) and suggested that, under Bostock, a federal customs offi
cer who procured a search warrant under the 1789 Collections Act should be liable if the
revenue search made pursuant to it was unsuccessful. See 7 DANE, supra note 151, at 244-46
(volume published 1824). The 1789 Collections Act anticipated suits against officers in con
nection with searches and seizures but did not state any standards as to when liability would
be incurred regarding search warrants. See 1789 Collections Act, Act of July 21, 1789, ch. 5,
§ 27, 1 Stat 29, 43-44.
295. English statutes in effect during the late colonial period provided that customs offi
cers were immune against trespass suits if they seized goods or ships that were subsequently
ruled not forfeit or "acquitted" provided that the judge who heard the forfeiture proceeding
determined that the officer had acted with "probable cause" when he made the seizure. See,
e.g., The Sugar Act, 4 Geo. 3, ch. 15, § 46 (1764) (Eng.). American legislators also provided
customs officers with a comparable protection in the event a ship or goods seized by customs
officers was ruled not forfeit. The 1789 Collections Act enacted by the First Congress pro
vided that the court that decided a revenue seizure was invalid could issue a certificate that
would bar any legal action against the customs officer who made the seizure, provided the
court found "there was a reasonable cause of seizure." See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 36, 1
Stat. 29, 4748.
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Indeed, the complainant's oath may have been important, in part, be
cause it clarified who was ultimately accountable for the search.
A magistrate's assessment of the adequacy of a complaint added a
third layer of protection to the specific warrant process. Unlike a con
stable, a magistrate (usually the justice of the peace) was expected to
be a man of stature and sound judgment.296 In addition to assuring
that a complaint alleged, under oath, an offense "in fact," the magis
trate was expected to assess the grounds for probable cause of suspi
cion respecting the person to be arrested or the place to be searched.297
In sum, the specific warrant provided substantial protections against
arbitrary intrusions.

296. In colonihl America, the office of justice of the peace was reserved for "men of
means and standing." David F. Forte, Marbury's Travail: Federalist Politics and William
Marbury's Appointment as Justice of the Peace, 45 CATI!. U. L. REV. 349, 354 {1996). Forte
notes that in Maryland, "appointment as justice of the peace was an essential emblem of a
man's membership in the political and financial elite." Id. at 351.
297.

See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 287 (emphasis in original):

[I]t is fitting [for the magistrate who hears a warrant application] to examine upon oath the
party requiring a warrant [i.e., the complainant], as well to ascertain that there is a felony or
other crime actually committed, without which no warrant should be granted; as also to
prove the cause and probability of suspecting the party, against whom the warrant is prayed.

This statement comports with other descriptions of the magistrate's role. See, e.g., 1 HALE,
supra note 75, at 582; 2 id. at 110-11 (stating that a justice of the peace is "a competent judge
of those circumstances that may induce the granting of a warrant" and "[t]he party that de
mands it ought to be examined upon his oath touching the whole matter, whereupon the
warrant is demanded, and that examination put into writing"); 2 HAWKINS, supra note 76, at
84-85 (advising that "a Justice of Peace cannot well be too tender in [issuing arrest warrants
prior to indictment], and seems to be punishable not only at the Suit of the King, but also of
the Party grieved; if he grant any such Warrant groundlessly and maliciously, without such
probable Cause, as might induce a candid and impartial Man to suspect the Party to be
guilty"); 2 LEACH'S HAWKINS, supra note 76, at 135 (repeating previous passage). See also
Mansfield's statement in Leach quoted supra note 77 (recognizing that it is for a magistrate
to assess cause for arrest), and Camden's statement from Entick (case report published in
1770) quoted supra note 291 (reflecting need for magistrate to exercise care in granting war
rant). This view of the magistrate's role also appears in early American sources. See, e.g., 7
DANE, supra note 151, at 243 (volume published 1824).
Some co=entaries have asserted that magistrates did not, indeed could not, assess the
grounds for a warrant. Levy has written, without offering any documentation, that magis
trates "made no independent determination" whether there was a basis for a warrant.
LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING, supra note 45, at 224-25. His statement is presumably based on
Cuddihy's similar statements. See, e.g., 2 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 687 (stating that a mag
istrate had no discretion as to the issuance of a warrant under certain Massachusetts laws
circa 1756-64) (This was also relied upon by Maclin, Complexity, supra note 44, at 944 n.112.)
I do not think these claims reflect the general understanding of the magistrate's role in the
warrant process at the time of the framing.
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The Illegality of General Warrants

Although there had been a long period in which general warrants
had been allowed at common law,298 common-law treatises clearly dis
approved of such warrants as a doctrinal matter (even if such warrants
had not been entirely eliminated in practice) by the mid-eighteenth cen
tury - and any lingering doubt was removed by the Wilkesite cases in
the 1760s.299 Courts and commentators condemned general warrants
298. See MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE 462-64, 469 (1690 ed.) (first pub
lished in London, 1618 with seventeen subsequent editions to 1742, see 1 LEGAL
BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 227, entry 24), discussed in 1 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at
95-96.
299. When exactly the condemnation of general warrants occurred is a contested sub
ject. I think American lawyers understood general warrants to be condemned as a matter of
doctrine by the late 1760s. That is not to say that some ignorant justices of the peace did not
continue to issue general warrants for arrests or searches of houses after that date (there are
still some ignorant magistrates who do so); however, the cumulative effect of the condemna
tions of general warrants by Hale, see supra note 75, and Hawkins, see supra note 76 and ac
companying text, the press reports of the Wilkesite cases, see supra note 137, the politiciza
tion of the complaint against the general warrant during the Townshend Act controversies,
see supra note 26, and Blackstone's 1769 condemnation of general warrants, see supra note
78, would have dispelled any lingering approval of general warrants for arrests of person or
searches of houses.

In contrast, Cuddihy has argued that the general warrant was common in colonial prac
tice and was still widely used and approved of in some states until the mid-1780s - virtually
the eve of the Fourth Amendment's adoption. (Cuddihy's argument on this point is set out
primarily in his Chapter 23, 3 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1231-1358; it has also been summa
rized in Cloud, supra note 42, at 1725-31, and Maclin, Complexity, supra note 44, at 939-50.
See also LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING, supra note 45, at 240, 242; Cuddihy & Hardy, supra
note 40, at 398.) However, Cuddihy is not entirely consistent in his own treatment of the
subject. Compare 2 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1229 (stating that the specific warrant tri
umphed over the general warrant by 1776), with 3 id. at 1277 (stating that general warrants
were still common in the states in the 1780s).
Cuddihy offered four sorts of evidence to support his claim that Americans did not fully
reject the general warrant until the eve of the framing of the Fourth Amendment; however, I
do not think that they support his conclusion. First, he argued that some state governments
used general warrants during the Revolution to authorize searches to apprehend deserters or
escaped enemy soldiers, to seize weapons, supplies, or the papers and possessions of Tories,
to enforce bans against trading with the enemy, or to discover hoarding of vital supplies. See
3 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1256-76. In addition, he noted that a form of general warrant
was used in 1777 to round up and detain prominent Quakers in Philadelphia, who were
feared to be loyalists, shortly before the British army occupied that city. See 3 id. at 1267-70,
1283-84, 1297-98, 1313-16. (This episode was also discussed in LASSON, supra note 16, at 7678.)
However, at least some of the "general warrants" to arrest persons that Cuddihy refers
to were of the innocent variety discussed supra note 12 - warrants to arrest particular per
sons that were designated "general" only in the sense that they were returnable before any
magistrate in the county. Moreover, the use of general warrants during the military emer
gency of the Revolutionary War - which amounted to a civil war - is not valid evidence of
the Framers' view of the legality of such warrants in normal times. There is considerable
evidence that the Framers concluded that legal rights could be suspended in the face of mili
tary emergency. For example, Cuddihy notes that Hemy Laurens observed in 1777 that the
mass arrest of Quakers, while absolutely necessary in the circumstances, would be "danger-
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ous" in peacetime. 3 id. at 1297-98; cf., Blackstone's statement regarding "first principles,"
quoted infra note 568; LASSON, supra note 16, at 77-78. Likewise, the Framers' outlook is
evident in the provision of the Constitution that provides for the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus "when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it,"
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, and also in the Third Amendment which qualifies the protection of
the house by permitting the billeting of troops "in time of war." Moreover, Cuddihy also
reports that even during the revolutionary war "[o]n land • . . general warrants of all descrip
tions were far less common than specific search warrants and warrants to apprehend par
ticular persons." 3 id. at 1261-62. Thus, even during the period of military action, the Foun
ders usually used specific warrants.
The second sort of evidence Cuddihy pointed to as showing the persistence of general
warrants consisted of search warrant provisions in a number of early state statutes, especially
state impost (customs) statutes. Cuddihy asserted that many of these statutes provided for
"general warrants." Specifically, he asserted that "general warrants" were provided for in
the 1781 Virginia impost statute, see 3 id. at 1284; in the 1784 New York impost statute, see 3
id. at 1325-26; in the 1783 Maryland impost statute, see 3 id. at 1332-33; in the 1786 Georgia
impost statute, see 3 id. at 1332 n.195; in the 1784 North Carolina impost statute, see 3 id. at
1333; and in the 1783 South Carolina impost statute, see 3 id. at 1334-35. He also asserted
that the 1780 Pennsylvania impost statute permitted warrantless searches of houses as well
as ships, but required the officer to obtain a writ of assistance to justify forcible entry if entry
was resisted. See 3 id. at 1284.

I do not read these statutes the way Cuddihy did. Some of his statements are plainly er
roneous. For example, his initial statements about the 1780 Pennsylvania statute are incon
sistent with a later passage in which he correctly noted that that statute actually contained a
provision that required use of a specific warrant for a search of a house. See 3 id. at 1314-15.
(I discuss this statute infra note 370 and accompanying text.) In addition, Cuddihy never
explained the basis for his conclusion that the other state impost statutes provided for gen
eral warrants except for noting, at the beginning of that discussion, that the 1781 Virginia
statute employed "general warrants" that "allowed searching 'any house.' " Because similar
"any house" language appeared in the other state customs acts cited by Cuddihy (except for
the Pennsylvania statute), I presume that this language is what led Cuddihy to describe the
statutes as providing for "general warrants."
However, I think Cuddihy miscomprehended the point of the "any house" language.
That phrase appeared in the following search warrant provision of the Virginia statute (and
in comparable provisions in the other statutes cited):
[I]t shall be lawful to and for all and every [customs] Collector and Collectors . . . , by war
rant under the hand of a Justice of the Peace (which warrant shall not be granted but upon
an information made to him upon oath, and accompanied with a Constable) to break open,
in the day time, any house, warehouse, or storehouse, to search for, seize, and carry away
any [uncustomed goods].
An Act for ascertaining certain Taxes and Duties, and for establishing a permanent Reve
nue, Va. Acts, ch. 90, §§ 10-11 {1782), reprinted in VIRGINIA: THE STATUTES AT LARGE 501
(William Waller Hening ed., 1822). Cuddihy apparently read the statute as permitting issu
ance of a warrant that recited authority to search "any house." I think that is a misreading:
the reference to "information made to him upon oath" indicated that the warrant had to be
based on specific information. In that context, the "any house" language only indicated that
there was no limitation on the kind of building that the specific warrant could be issued for
- that it could be issued for a dwelling house just as validly as for a warehouse or store
house. This is evident if one examines the style of the provision. Note the reference to "all
and every Collector and Collectors" at the outset of the provision; that language indicated
that the authority to obtain a warrant was not limited to a particular collector, but was
shared by all collectors. Note, too, the clearly plural meaning of "all and every" collectors
and the contrasting singular implication of "any" building - not "all and every' buildings in this context. And note that the statute used the singular "any house," not the plural "any
houses." Although the statute could have been more precisely drafted (for example, by
saying "any particular house"), Cuddihy's reading reflects a hypercritical attitude toward the
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precisely because they lacked each of the protections afforded by spe
cific warrants: a complainant's swearing out of specific allegations, the
complainant's accountability for fruitless searches, a judge's assess
ment of the grounds for the warrant, and - perhaps most importantly
- clear directions to the officer as to whom to arrest or where to
search.300 The general warrant was reviled as a source of arbitrary
power.

7.

Why the Framers Feared Legislative Approval of
General Warrants for Customs Searches

One question remains: why did the Framers bother to adopt con
stitutional bans against general warrants in light of the apparent con
sensus that the general warrant was illegal at common law? Their mo
tivation may have been partly symbolic - they responded to
Parliament's earlier insult to their right to be secure by declaring that
the government should never ignore that right again. But they may
also have felt a genuine concern that Congress might endanger the
right in the future.
They had little reason to fear that judges might approve of general
warrants on their own initiative - the highly visible rulings in the

Framers' draftsmanship rather than an effort to recover the meaning they expected their
language would convey. See also infra note 349. {The Virginia, Maryland, and North
Carolina impost statutes are also discussed infra note 374.)
The third sort of evidence Cuddihy pointed to as showing the persistence of general war
rants consisted of the fact that forms for "hue and cry" warrants continued to be set out in
several American practice manuals published between 1776 and 1788, and that those war
rant forms commanded that "diligent search" be made for known felons. There were also
some proclamations issued by governors of a similar import. See 3 id. at 1279-82. These
"warrants," however, were derived from the common-law institution of the "hue and cry"
and were issued only for pursuit of fresh crime or escape, sometimes by constables when no
justice of the peace was available, and without the usual requirements of a sworn complaint.
It is unlikely the Framers would have perceived hue and cry warrants as being in the same
category as judicially issued arrest or search warrants. Moreover, it is not clear whether hue
and cry was much used by the framing era. {See the discussion of hue and cry arrests, supra
note 198.)
Finally, Cuddihy pointed to the use of slave patrol statutes in several Southern states
(mostly carried over from the colonial period). See 3 id. at 1280-82, 1327, 1340-41. Those
statutes certainly demonstrate the inherent incompatibility between the institution of slavery
and enforceable legal rights (it is no coincidence that Georgia and South Carolina, which
had slave patrol statutes, did not adopt declarations of rights). However, those statutes do
not shed much light on the Framers' general understanding of the common-law status of a
freeman's house.

In sum, I do not think the evidence supports Cuddihy's claim that Americans did not
generally perceive general warrants as inherently illegal until the eve of the framing of the
Fourth Amendment. Rather, the illegality of general warrants was well settled prior to the
first round of state search and seizure provisions adopted in 1776 and 1777.
300. See the condemnations of the discretionary character of general warrant authority
discussed supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
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Wilkesite cases had removed any possibility of upholding general war
rants at common law. Thus, legislation posed the only plausible threat
that general warrants might be made legal in the future.
The
Wilkesite cases, which declared general warrants illegal under com
mon law, explicitly left open that possibility;301 indeed, Parliament had
reauthorized the general writ of assistance in the Townshend Act of
1767, after the Wilkesite cases. Thus, the Framers' constitutional con
cern was preventing the legislature from authorizing use of general
warrants.302
Of course, the Framers would not have anticipated that future leg
islators might seek to authorize general warrants in a campaign against
crime. Indeed, crime was apparently not perceived as a pressing social
problem in late eighteenth-century America. Nor were the Framers
likely worried that a future legislature might be tempted to authorize
general warrants to identify and persecute political opponents (as the

301. See Lord Camden's 1765 remarks in Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 275, 292, 95 Eng.
Rep. 807, 818 (C.P. 1765) (version first published 1770, see supra note 25) (stating that "if the
Legislature be of that opinion they will make (warrants to search for papers] lawful"). Cam
den seems to have earlier made a contrary assertion, however, during the 1763 trial in Wilkes
v. Wood, Lofft 1, 3, 19 Howell St. Tr. 1153, 1155, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 490 (C.P. 1763) (first
published in 1776, see supra note 25) ("No legal authority, in the present case, to justify the
action. No precedents, no legal determinations, not an Act of Parliament itself, is sufficient
to warrant any proceeding contrary to the spirit of the constitution.").
302. When the American Framers described the reason for declarations of rights, they
typically stated that the declarations were meant to curb legislative power. For example,
during the 1788 Virginia ratifying convention, George Mason described the Virginia declara
tion, which he had primarily authored, as declaring rights "to be paramount to the power of
the legislature." 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 84, at 444. The same is true of statements
regarding the need for a federal Bill of Rights.
For example, during the 1788
Massachusetts ratification convention, Abraham Holmes said the following about the need
for a protection against general arrest warrants:
The framers of our state constitutions took particular care to prevent the General Court [the
Massachusetts state legislature] from authorizing the judicial authority to issue a[n arrest]
warrant against a man for a crime, unless his being guilty of the crime was supported by oath
or affirmation, prior to the warrant being granted; why it should be esteemed so much more
safe to intrust Congress with the power of enacting laws, which it was deemed unsafe to in
trust our state legislature with, I am unable to conceive.

Abraham Holmes, Statement at the Massachusetts State Convention (Jan. 30, 1788), quoted
in COGAN, supra note 122, at 284, 285-86 (7.2.2.1.a). Madison also presented his proposals
for rights amendments as a check on Congress. See infra notes 435-439 and accompanying
text.
The focus on legislation explains historical silences that would otherwise be inexplicable.
Hening's 1794 justice manual discussed the standards for warrants and the illegality of gen
eral warrants (briefly mentioning the Wilkesite cases), yet never mentioned the ban against
general warrants in the Virginia Declaration of Rights. See HENING, supra note 25, at 41316, 459-64. Likewise, he presented the provisions of the federal customs and excise statutes
relating to search warrants, but never mentioned the Fourth Amendment. See id. app. II, at
4, 30. These silences would be inexplicable if he had understood constitutional search and
search provisions to apply to the day-to-day operation of criminal justice. However, his
omission of the constitutional provisions from a justice of the peace manual would make
sense if the provisions were understood primarily as checks on legislative authority.
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Tory government in England had persecuted Wilkes and his support
ers). Instead, they were most likely concerned about general warrants
because of their experience with the use, or at least threatened use, of
general warrants for customs searches of houses.303
Customs was a peculiar arena in several ways. First, customs en
forcement was more aggressive than law enforcement generally. Cus
toms officers had a unique motive for initiating searches and seizures
that constables and other peace officers did not share: customs offi
cers were entitled to keep a significant portion of the value of any un
customed goods they seized.304 Second, legislatures had a particular
reason to allow unusually aggressive enforcement in customs collec
tions: customs ("imposts") were to be a primary source of revenues,
initially for the new state governments, and then for the new national
government. Thus, flagging revenue collections might prompt a legis
lature to approve general warrants.305
In addition, because customs search law was understood to be the
product of statutes,306 common law was less effective as a restraint on
customs collections than on criminal law enforcement. Hence, cus
toms law was peculiarly susceptible to novel standards and modes of
procedure. Parliament had crafted the writ of assistance to facilitate a

303. Cf. Kamisar, supra note 38, at 571 (arguing that the Framers were preoccupied with
general warrants and "seem to have had tax collectors and customs officials more in mind
than the police"). See also discussion of Madison's concern with customs searches infra
notes 443-450 and accompanying text.
304. In colonial America, a customs position was denoted an "office of profit." It was
called that because the value of ships or goods seized and condemned as forfeit under cus
toms statutes was divided into three moieties: one-third went to the crown, one-third to the
provincial governor, and one-third to the customs official who made the seizure. See SMITH,
supra note 20, at 13. This same approach was continued by the First Congress in the 1789
Collections Act. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, § 38 {providing that the value of
ships or goods seized and ruled forfeit under the act should be divided into two "moieties,"
one-half going to the United States and the other half to be divided among the various cus
toms officials {and informers) responsible for the seizure).
305. See, e.g., Essay by a Farmer (I), supra note 98, at 14 (referring to the threat of reve
nue searches of houses under general warrants and noting that "general warrants have been
used" only in "those cases which may strongly interest the passions of government").
306. Parliament provided that the crown would have revenue from customs collections
at the Restoration in 1660. In that same year, Parliament enacted statutory authority for a
customs search warrant. See An Act to Prevent Frauds, 12 Car. 2, ch. 19 {1660) (Eng.). (For
a discussion of the incident that motivated that measure, see supra note 274.) In 1662, when
customs collections were "farmed" to commissioned collectors, Parliament created a writ of
assistance to facilitate customs searches. See An Act to Prevent Frauds, 14 Car. 2, ch. 11, § 5
{1662) (Eng.). By another statute adopted in 1696, the provisions for customs collections in
England were extended to the North American colonies. See An Act for Preventing Frauds,
7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 22, § 6 (Eng.). The 1696 act was the only authority for use of the customs
writ of assistance in the American colonies until the writ was reauthorized in the Townshend
Act of 1767, 7 Geo. III, ch. 46, § 10 (Eng.). See discussion supra note 26. For a fuller treat
ment of the English statutory provisions regarding customs searches, see SMITH, supra note
20, at 41-50, and Frese, Article, supra note 18. Customs search authority was also defined by
statute in the American states. See infra notes 370-374 and accompanying text.
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customs collector's ability to initiate searches and seizures, giving him
greater room to exercise initiative than an ordinary peace officer en
joyed.
Thus, the Framers likely perceived the threat to the right to be se
cure in house and person in very specific terms - they feared the pos
sibility that future legislatures might authorize use of general warrants
for revenue searches of houses. As a result, they wrote constitutional
search and seizure provisions to address what they perceived to be the
singular threat to the right to be secure in person and house - they
wrote them to bar legislative authorization of general warrants.307

B.

Why the Framers Did Not Perceive Misconduct by Officers as a
Form of Government Action

There is a second reason that the Framers addressed only warrant
standards - they did not equate an officer's misconduct with govern
ment illegality; rather they perceived only personal misconduct when
an officer exceeded his official authority. Hence, misconduct by an
ordinary officer could not constitute an "unconstitutional" govern
ment act. This is a large topic, and I will only sketch the argument
here.308
In the late eighteenth century, constitutions were understood to
address acts of sovereign power. In that vein, the Framers understood
that a statute, which always carried the imprimatur of sovereign gov
ernmental authority, could be "unconstitutional."309 They also under
stood that a general warrant could be "illegal" and "unconstitutional"
because a judicially issued warrant always carried the imprimatur of
sovereign governmental authority, even if the warrant was ultimately
found invalid.310 Thus, the Framers realized that a constitutional pro-

307. This is hardly the first commentary to recognize that the Framers' concern was
aimed at general warrants. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 38, at 397-98; Grano, supra note
38, at 617; Kamisar, supra note 38, at 571; Wasserstrom, Two Clauses, supra note 9, at 1393.
However, because those previous commentaries continued to assume that the first clause
created a broad reasonableness standard for warrantless intrusions, they did not recognize
that the constitutional texts were focused solely on banning general warrants.
308. I still misunderstood the status of the warrantless officer when I gave my 1995 tes
timony. At that time, I thought that the warrantless officer was always viewed as being a
private actor. See Davies's Testimony, supra note 3, at 127. In fact, only unlawful conduct by
an officer was perceived as merely personal.
309. See discussion of Coke's opinion in Dr. Bonham's Case, infra notes 391-399 and
accompanying text; see also discussion of the Framers' views of judicial review of statutes
infra notes 440-441.
310. For example, colonial press accounts of the Wilkesite cases condemned the general
warrant as "unconstitutional, illegal, and absolutely void." See press accounts supra note 22.
See also infra note 313.
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vision was an appropriate means of prohibiting future legislative
authorization of general warrants.
The Framers' understanding of the conduct of the ordinary officer,
however, was more complex, almost paradoxical. An ordinary offi
cer's act remained official as long as it fell within the lawful authority
of his office. Thus, the officer exercised sovereign power when he
executed a legal warrant, and he also exercised official authority de
riving from his own office when acting without a warrant but within
the lawful bounds of that office (limited as it was). However (and this
is the twist), an officer's conduct ceased to be official if he exceeded his
lawful authority; then he committed only an "unlawful" personal
wrong for which he was subject to forcible resistance and trespass li
ability just as if he held no office at all.311 Although an officer's mis
conduct was sometimes labeled misconduct "under color of' law,
authority, or office, that meant only that there had been a pretense of of
ficial action, not that it was a form of government illegality.312 Miscon-

311. Because writers rarely explicitly disavow notions they do not conceive of, this is a
point on which silences of the dog-that-did-not-bark-in-the-night variety provide salient evi
dence. The framing-era sources simply do not treat wrongful intrusions by warrantless offi
cers as "unconstitutional" in the way they treat general warrants.
However, the understanding that an officer's misconduct was not viewed as official ac
tion is reflected in a number of framing-era statements. For example, during the 1765 argu
ments in Leach, the plaintiff's attorney described the Messengers who had executed the ille
gal general warrant as having acted "of their own wrong." Money v. Leach, 3 Burr. 1741,
1745, 19 Howell St Tr. 1001, 1006, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1077 (K.B. 1765). Similarly, Chief
Justice Marshall wrote the following, quoting Blackstone:
After stating that personal injury from the king to a subject is presumed to be impossible,
Blackstone, vol. 3, p. 255, says, "but injuries to the rights of property can scarcely be commit
ted by the crown without the intervention of its officers; for whom, tp.e law, in matters of
right, entertains no respect or delicacy; but furnishes various methods of detecting the errors
and misconduct of those agents, by whom the king has been deceived and induced to do a
temporary injustice."
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165 (1803). This notion that misconduct by an
officer amounts to "deception" of the King (who can do no wrong) contrasts with the usual
rule of respondeat superior applicable to master and servant. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 27, at 417-20.

312. The understanding that unlawful acts by an ordinary officer were not official per
sisted well into the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840, 854
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 7416) (employing the traditional distinction between actions by an
official "merely under the colour or pretense of his office, and not by virtue of it," and ad
dressing constitutional search and seizure provisions only when discussing the validity of a
statejudge's orders, but not when discussing a state constable's conduct (see discussion supra
note 184)); Commonwealth v. Crotty, 92 Mass (10 Allen) 403 (1865) (holding that officer
attempting an unlawful arrest is as susceptible to lawful resistance as any private person at
tempting the same act); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908) (state attorney general
attempting to enforce invalid state statute is "stripped of his official or representative char
acter"); Merrick v. Lewis, 22 Penn. Dist. Rep. 55, 56 (1913) (ruling that a jailer who com
pelled an inmate to attend religious service did not violate the inmate's state constitutional
right to freedom of conscience because the constitutional provision was "directed to legisla
tive action or its results [and] does not apply to compulsion exercised by one person over
another, except so far as that compulsion may claim to be authorized by law").
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duct by an officer was usually denoted a wrong, a trespass, or "unlawful"
- the language of private wrongdoing which indicated that the officer
was personally liable for it - but it was rarely labeled "illegal."313
This narrow understanding of misconduct by officers was becom
ing unstable by the time of the framing. For example, English legisla
tion had afforded officers some protection from trespass liability for
errors made in connection with their office,314 and the First Congress
extended comparable protections to federal revenue officers.315

Woodrow Wilson summed up the historical understanding of officer misconduct as fol
lows in 1908 (about the time when this understanding was collapsing): "The theory of our
law . . . is that an officer is an officer only as long as he acts within his powers; that when he
transcends his authority he ceases to be an officer and is only a private individual, subject to
be sued and punished for his offense."
WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (1908), quoted in LANDYNSKI, supra note 38, at
184.
313. Although valid warrants were often denoted "lawful," see, e.g., 3 BLACKSTONE,
("a lawful warrant"), general warrants
were almost uniformly condemned as "illegal." See, for example, Chief Justice Pratt's
speech from Leach, quoted supra note 22 ("This [general] warrant is • • • illegal."); 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 288 (general warrant "illegal and void" (for fuller quotation
of passage, see supra note 78)); Frisbie v. Butler, Kirby 213, 214, 215 (Conn. 1787) (asserting
search warrant was general and thus was "illegal and void" and "clearly illegal"); Ex Parte
Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448, 453 (1806) (unspecific warrant of commitment "was illegal");
and 1 NOAH WEBSTER, FIRST EDmON OF AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1828, reprinted in facsimile 1967) (pages unnumbered) [hereinafter
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY] (entry for "WARRANT") ("A general warrant to seize sus
pected persons, is illegal."). But see infra note 417 and accompanying text (quoting Serjeant
Glynn's reference to an "unreasonable or unlawful warrant").

supra note 27, at 127 ("a lawful warrant"); 4 id. at 288

In contrast, invalid warrantless intrusions were usually denoted "unlawful." See, e.g., 3
BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 127 (referring to "[t]he unlawfulness of a detention" and to
"[u]nlawful, or false, imprisonment").
For an exception, see Ex Parte Bollman &
Swartwout, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 111 (1807) (argument of counsel referring to an invalid
warrantless arrest under military authority as an "illegal seizure").
My impression is that this specific difference may reflect a broader pattern of framing
era usage in which "unlawful" was used to refer to private wrongdoing while "illegal" tended
to be reserved as a label for official or institutional wrongdoing and often was linked to
"void." I do not mean to suggest that there was a clear difference in the definitions of the
terms; there was not. Rather, I suggest there was a perceptible difference in usages. Cf. 7
THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 652 (2d ed. 1989) (pre-1800 usages of "illegal," "ille
gality," and "illegally" refer to elections, acts of Princes of England, official judgments, and a
warrant obtained without oath); 14 id. at 98 (pre-1800 usages of "unlawful," "unlawfully,"
and "unlawfulness" tend to refer to personal wrongdoing).
314. Eighteenth-century English statutes had begun to provide officers and magistrates
with a degree of protection from trespass actions for unjustified acts committed in connec
tion with their office. For example, magistrates who issued warrants and officers who made
arrests in obedience to warrants were generally protected against trespass liability by statute.
See discussion of the protections afforded by 24 Geo. 2, ch. 44, supra note 111. (Some states
began to adopt similar protections in the early nineteenth century. See supra note 205.)
English statutes also permitted courts that ruled that seized goods were not forfeit under
revenue statutes to issue certificates of probable cause which protected the revenue officer
who made the invalid seizure from trespass liability. See supra note 295.
315. The 1789 Collections Act enacted immediately before the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment provided that federal courts could protect federal revenue officers against tres-
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Even so, there is no reason to think the Framers perceived an or
dinary officer's misconduct to be a form of governmental action.
Thus, they had neither a motive nor a basis for addressing the conduct
of ordinary officers in constitutional provisions.
The absence of a concept that officer misconduct was attributable
to the government is also evident in the fact that the Framers did not
address any "remedies" for officers' violations when they wrote the
Fourth Amendment (or the other provisions in the Bill of Rights). In
deed, the narrow view of officer misconduct as only personal miscon
duct explains why the Framers never considered an exclusionary prin
ciple. The exclusionary rule is premised on the notion that an
unconstitutional government act is void - but exclusion has never
been seriously proposed as a consequence of private wrongdoing.316
Because the only constitutional violation the Framers could have an
ticipated would have taken the form of a statute purporting to
authorize general warrants, the primary "remedy" would have been
for the judiciary to refuse to issue warrants under the void statute.317
pass suits by issuing certificates of reasonable cause in cases in which seized ships or goods
were ruled not forfeit. See discussion supra note 295; Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 27, 1 Stat.
29, 43-44.

In addition, Congress later provided for removal of suits against federal revenue officers
from state to federal court as a response to New England opposition to shipping restrictions
imposed during the War of 1812. See Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 195, 198. That
statute was extended briefly, see Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 94, §§ 6, 8, 3 Stat. 231, 233-34, 235;
Act of April 27, 1816, ch. 110, § 3, 3 Stat. 315, but went out of effect in 1822, see Act of
March 3, 1817, ch. 109, §§ 2, 6, 3 Stat. 396, 397. The relevant provision read as follows:
That if any suit or prosecution be commenced in any state court, against any collector, naval
officer, surveyor, inspector, or any other officer, civil or military . . . , for any thing done, or
omitted to be done, as an officer of the customs, or for anything done by virtue of this act or
under color thereof, [the defendant may remove to federal court].
Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. at 198-99. The reference to conduct "as an officer of
the customs" may appear to reach unlawful acts committed in connection with customs en
forcement, and there was a clear attempt to extend the removal power to some wrongful
conduct in the language "anything done . . . under color [of this act]."
A subsequent removal provision was included in the "Force Bill" of 1833 as a response
to South Carolina's espousal of the nullification doctrine. See Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, §
3, 4 Stat. 632, 633. That act defined removal as applying to
any officer of the United States, or other person, for or on account of any act done under the
revenue laws of the United States, or under colour thereof, or for or on account of any right,
authority, or title, set up or claimed by such officer, or other person under any such law of
the United States.

Id.

Note that this statute tied removability closely to conduct that was at least colorably
within statutory autliority, ratlier tlian to any broad notion of conduct in connection wiili an
office.

The broad term "under color of his office" was not used in any federal removal statutes
until 1866. See Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 67, 14 Stat. 98, 171.
316. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 {1921) (hqlding that items or information
obtained by private wrongs are not subject to exclusion under the Fourtll Amendment).
317. For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 440-442 and accompanying text.
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The historical appearance of the argument for exclusion supports
this analysis; the exclusionary principle was first articulated in
nineteenth-century cases that challenged the constitutionality of stat
utes that authorized court orders for searches and seizures. Exclusion
was first proposed as a constitutional remedy for illegally seized evi
dence in the 1841 case Commonwealth v. Dana, which involved a
challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute that authorized
courts to issue search warrants to seize lottery tickets.318 Likewise, ex
clusion was first employed as a remedy for a violation of the Fourth
Amendment in the 1886 Supreme Court decision in Boyd v. United
States, which ruled unconstitutional a statute that authorized courts to
issue orders to compel production of invoices in customs disputes.319
In contrast, the argument for exclusion was not raised in cases that
simply alleged unlawful searches by officers,320 because personal

318. The constitutional argument for exclusion was first made (unsuccessfully) in Com
That case involved a challenge to the con
stitutionality of a state statute that authorized a novel use of a search warrant to obtain evi
dence of a lottery violation. Of course, the statute clearly involved a government action; that
is why the argument for exclusion as a necessary consequence of an unconstitutional and
therefore void government act could be made in that context. The court initially upheld the
statute, but then added dicta to the effect that the means by which evidence was acquired
could not be challenged during a criminal trial. See id. at 337.

monwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. {2 Met.) 329 {1841).

The fact that the argument for exclusion was first made in Dana is confirmed by the ap
pearance of the discussion of that issue in Greenleafs Evidence Treatise. Amar has noted
that "as late as 1883" that treatise recited Dana's dicta prohibiting litigation during a crinti
nal trial of the means by which evidence was obtained. See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra
note 58, at 787 n.108 (citing 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON nm LAw OF EVIDENCE
§ 254a {14th ed. 1883)). The more significant fact is that there is no mention of that topic in
the 1842 first edition - § 254a was inserted into the 1844 second edition on the basis of
Dana. Compare 1 GREENLEAF, supra, §§ 254-255 {1st ed. 1842) {lacking § 254a), with 1 id.
at 302 {2d ed. 1844) (inserting § 254a).

Dana and Greenleaf cited two English cases as earlier authority for this point: Legatt v.
Tollervey, 14 East 302, 104 Eng. Rep. 617 {K.B. 1811), and Jordan v. Lewis, 14 East 306 n.a,
104 Eng. Rep. 618 {K.B. 1740). However, neither of the English cases were germane to an
alleged violation of a constitutional standard; they each involved an attempt by a defendant
officer to prevent a plaintiff-victim in a false prosecution case from admitting unofficially
obtained court records as evidence of the false prosecution - the reverse of the setting in
volved in the constitutional argument for exclusion.
319. 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886). In Boyd, the first Supreme Court case to recognize exclu
sion under the Fourth Amendment, the Court ruled that the statute that authorized a court
order to compel production of an invoice in a customs proceeding was unconstitutional and
the order to produce therefore "void." On that basis, the Court ruled that admission into
evidence of the invoice obtained under the order was "erroneous." For a more complete
discussion of Boyd, see infra notes 512-515.
320. There is a widespread misperception that Justice Story addressed and rejected ex
clusion under the Fourth Amendment in dicta in his 1822 circuit court opinion in United
States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832 {C.C.D. Mass.). See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3,
at 17 (statement of William Gangi); BRADFORD P. WILSON, ENFORCING nm FOURTH
AMENDMENT 45-47 (1986); Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at 786-87. The facts
are otherwise.
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wrongdoing, even by a person holding an office, could not violate a
constitutional standard or right.321 For the same reason, the Framers

To begin with, La Jeune Eugenie arose when an American naval ship captured a French
ship for violating international law by preparing to engage in slave-trading off the West coast
of Africa. (The reference to "United States" in the case caption is somewhat misleading; the
value of the seized ship was to go entirely to the captain and crew of the naval ship, not to
the government.) In a trial conducted under admiralty prize court procedure, Story decided
the seizure was valid under the law of nations. There is no mention of the Fourth Amend
ment anywhere in his opinion or in the record of the case (available through the National
Archives).
The only argunient touching on any notion of exclusion was made by the French ship
owners, who claimed, under admiralty law, that there could be no right to seize if there was
no "right of search" (an admiralty term referring to a warship's authority to search ships en
tering its national waters or during wartinle, neither of which was involved). After rejecting
that claim as incorrect under English admiralty cases, Story added, in dictum, that incrimi
nating items might be used as evidence "in the ordinary administration of municipal law"
even if the items had been obtained from a suspect during a dubious arrest. La Jeune
Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. at 843-44.
Story did not refer to a government arrest, however - in fact, he did not even place any
officer in the hypothetical arrest and search scenario. Moreover, it is not likely he would
have prefaced his dictum as pertaining to "the ordinary administration of municipal law" if
he had a constitutional issue in mind. (Indeed, Story viewed the Fourth Amendment as only
addressing warrant standards. See supra note 190.) All Story's dictum stands for is the unex
ceptional proposition that exclusion is not appropriate when evidence has been obtained
through an unlawful private arrest and search - a view which has never been seriously
challenged. See supra note 316. La Jeune Eugenie did not address exclusion based on a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Amar has also claimed that exclusion was rejected in King v. Warickshall, 1 Leach 263,
264-65, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (1783), which permitted the admission of testimony regarding
recovery of stolen property even when the property was located through an improperly "in
duced" confession that was itself inadmissible. See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note
58, at 789 n.123. (Amar has also claimed that Warickshall sheds light on the intended
meaning of the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. See Akhil
Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination
Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 916-17 (1995) (describing Warickshall as "apparently the
leading English case on [the admissibility of confessions and fruits of confessions] when the
U.S. Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791"). The short answer is that Warickshall has nothing
to do with the Fourth Amendment because it is highly unlikely the Framers were familiar
with it; although the doctrines regarding induced confessions and recovered property that were
discussed in Warickshall were briefly noted in the 1787 edition of Hawkins's treatise, see
LEACH'S HAWKINS, supra note 76, at 604 n. 2, the case report itself was not published until
1789. See 1 LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 303, entry 78 (1 Leach published
1789). In addition, Warickshall dealt with the discovery of evidence through a confession
induced by threats or promises made by "the prosecutor" - in all likelihood by the private
person whose property was allegedly stolen. It does not appear that Warickshall addressed
any misconduct during an official judicial examination of the defendant. For example,
Hening's 1794 discussion of the inadmissibility of an induced confession describes it as applying
to "the case of a private confession" - presumably in distinction to a judicially received confes
sion. HENING, supra note 25, at 138 (emphasis added). Private misconduct could not have
been understood to implicate a constitutional right.

321. The necessity of characterizing an officer's wrongful search as government miscon
duct as a predicate for a constitutional remedy of exclusion is reflected in the fact that some
of the state courts that declined to adopt a state exclusionary rule during the early twentieth
century based that refusal on their insistence that the wayward officer had acted only per
sonally, not as the government. See, e.g., Hall v. Commonwealth, 121 S.E. 154, 155 (Va.
1924) (holding that exclusion was not required because "[a] police officer, when acting with-

666

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:547

would not have believed that the government could be liable for a
"constitutional tort" committed by an officer - a term that would
have been a virtual oxymoron in 1789.322
The modern notion that officer misconduct constitutes government
illegality traces its origin to the development, during the late nine
teenth and early twentieth centuries, of "state action" doctrine under
the Fourteenth Amendment. In that context, courts came to view
misconduct by officers acting "under color or' law as a form of gov
ernment misconduct.323 That development, however, which came

out a warrant, or under a void warrant, acts without authority or color of authority from the
state, and ceases to be its agent and he alone is responsible for his illegal acts").
322. The notion of a "constitutional tort" developed only after the Supreme Court be
gan to treat unlawful misconduct by an officer as a governmental deprivation of rights. The
Supreme Court first recognized the possibility of a constitutional tort action against a federal
officer in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), and subsequently endorsed such an action in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents ofFederal Bureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Both of those cases employed the modem notion of officer conduct "under color of office"
as a form of government misconduct. See infra note 323. The flaw in Professor Amar's
claim that the Fourth Amendment "sounds . . . in constitutional tort law," Amar, Fourth
Amendment, supra note 58, at 758, is that there was no such doctrine until the twentieth cen

tury.
323. The redefinition of "under color of law" from a term for a pretense of official ac
tion to one connoting a form of government illegality is a complex story. The highlights are
as follows. When the Reconstruction Congress undertook to protect former slaves from
abuse in the Southern states, it encountered a constitutional difficulty - there was no con
sensus, even after the Civil War, that the federal government should have plenary power
over the conduct of individuals. However, a legislative majority sought to prevent Southern
states from enforcing discriminatory state laws, such as the notorious "Black Codes." In sec
tion one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Congress first recited that all citizens were to enjoy
equal benefit of the laws, "any [state] law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the
contrary notwithstanding." Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. In section two, it cre
ated criminal liability for "any person who, under color of any [state] law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom" deprived any inhabitant of the equal benefit of the laws. Id. § 2.
Thus, as written, the statutory language appears to have been aimed at prohibiting state offi
cers from enforcing discriminatory state legislation. The statute did not use the potentially
broader term "under color of office," even though the term "under color of his office" had
appeared in an 1866 removal act, see supra note 315.
The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868, prohibited deprivations of rights by a
"State." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (1868). The Congress then reenacted the substance of
the 1866 Act in the Enforcement Act of 1870, see Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16-18, 16
Stat. 140, 144, and added a civil remedy for discrimination committed "under color or• state
law in the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, see Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. These
provisions again addressed conduct "under color of any [state] law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom." The 1871 statute added the word "usage" after "custom" in the list
ing of forms of state law. The important point for present purposes is that these statutes did
not attempt to treat all forms of misconduct by officers in connection with their office as
"state" conduct. Rather, they treated only those sorts of discriminatory misconduct by offi
cers that were within the tenns ofa discriminatory state statute or some other form ofpositive
state law as government misconduct. See also Eric H. Zagrans, "Under Color of' What Law:
A Reconstructed Model ofSection 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REV. 499, 540-60 (1985) (arguing
that discrimination "under color of' state law was understood during Congressional debates
to refer to conduct within the terms of a discriminatory state statute). But see infra note 324.
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more than a century after the framing, constituted nothing less than a
revolutionary expansion of the bounds of government action and the
reach of constitutional standards.324 The modem reading of the Bill of
Rights as a comprehensive regulation of the conduct of government
officers is possible only because of the Court's expansive redefinition
of officer misconduct as a form of government action. Officer mis
conduct was not viewed as government illegality at the time of the
framing.325
The Supreme Court later incrementally expanded the boundary of "state action" (that is,
state government misconduct) by enlarging the understanding of "under color of [state] law."
The justices initially upheld federal civil rights prosecutions against state officials who dis
criminated in the exercise of authority created by state statutes that were nondiscriminatory
on their face. See, e.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879) (upholding indictment of state
judge for engaging in racial discrimination in the seating of a jury). Subsequently, during the
period of economic "substantive due process," the justices began to treat even conduct by
state officials that was allegedly contrary to state law as conduct "under color of' state law
and "state action" for purposes of applying the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Home
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 287 (1913) (holding that action by city
utility regulators that allegedly violated state law constitutes "state action" and is subject to
Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). Under that formulation, any misconduct
by an officer that was connected to the exercise of an office came to constitute government
misconduct.
The Supreme Court then transferred this broadened understanding of government ille
gality to misconduct by federal officers. It was in the 1914 decision in Weeks, a year after
Home Telephone & Telegraph, that the Court first extended the Fourth Amendment to a
federal marshal's unlawful warrantless search of a house by deeming that his "unlawful"
misconduct was "under color of' office and thus a government violation of the Constitution.
See Weeks v. United States 232 U.S. 383 (1914); discussion infra notes 519-523 and accom
panying text.
324. Professor Steven L. Winter has argued that conduct "under color of law" always
constituted a third category between private and official conduct which referred specifically
to the unlawful but nevertheless official actions of public officers, and that the Reconstruc
tion Congress understood the term this way when it enacted the federal civil rights acts. See
Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under Color of' Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323 (1992).
I do not think Wmter's analytic notion that conduct "under color of law" was a "third
category" addresses the crucial question, which is whether officer misconduct was under
stood to be a form of government conduct or illegality. I agree that early efforts to protect
officers from trespass liability (for example, in the federal removal statutes discussed supra
note 315) show that the traditional notion that officer misconduct was purely private was
becoming unstable. However, in framing-era doctrine, misconduct by an ordinary law en
forcement officer was not understood to carry any consequence for the government, or to be
capable of qualifying as a constitutional violation.

Likewise, although Winter's critique of Zagrans's analysis of the legislative history of the
federal civil rights acts, see Zagrans, supra note 323, may suffice to show that the under
standing of "under color of' law was contested and in transition, I do not think that it shows
any consensus that "under color of' state law extended to any abuse committed in connec
tion with a state office, regardless of explicit state statutory authority. The significant point,
for present purposes, is that the idea of attributing misconduct by an officer to the govern
ment that made him an officer was still a relatively novel notion in the latter half of the nine
teenth century.
325. My argument on this point is historical, not normative. The modem understanding
that misconduct by an officer in connection with an office is a form of government illegality
makes eminent sense given the expansive discretionary authority that modern officers now
exercise. That, however, is not the sort of officer the Framers anticipated.
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Summary: The Framers' Concern with Banning Legislative
Approval of General Warrants

In sum, the Framers did not harbor diffuse concerns about search
and seizure. They did not fear warrantless intrusions because they per
ceived the officer's ex officio authority to be meager. Moreover, they did
not have a conceptual basis for addressing misconduct by ordinary of
ficers in a constitutional text. They also did not fear, but preferred use
of, specific warrants because the warrant process carried significant pro
tections. Thus, they thought the important issue, and the only poten
tial threat to the right to be secure, was whether general warrants
could be authorized by legislation. Hence, they were content to ban
legislative approval of too-loose warrants.
VI. THE ACTUAL FRAMING-ERA MEANING OF "UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES "

Of course, there is still an important question to answer
if the
Framers meant only to constitutionalize the standards for valid war
rants, why did they include the language of the first clause of the
Fourth Amendment? Where did "unreasonable" in "unreasonable
searches and seizures" come from, and how was it understood? In this
Part, I trace the appearance of "unreasonable searches and seizures"
in the textual evolution of the state search and seizure provisions. In
the next Part, I trace the framing of the Fourth Amendment itself.
-

A.

How the Framers Approached Declarations ofRights

Eleven of the initial thirteen states (thirteen of the initial fifteen
counting Vermont and Franklin, the protostate of Tennessee) adopted
state constitutions prior to the adoption of the federal Constitution; of
those, seven (nine counting Vermont and Franklin) adopted declara
tions of rights. Several of the states not adopting declarations in
cluded some provisions regarding rights within the constitutional texts
themselves.326 Although the grievance over Parliament's authorization
326. In chronological order, the states and proto-states that adopted declarations of
rights as well as constitutions were Virginia, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North
Carolina (all in 1776), Vermont (which adopted a constitution and declaration of rights in
1777 but was not admitted to the Union until 1791), Massachusetts (in 1780), New Hamp
shire (in 1783), and Franklin (the proto-state of Tennessee, Franklin adopted a constitution
and declaration of rights in 1784, but Tennessee was not admitted to the Union until 1796).
New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Georgia adopted state constitutions without
adopting declarations of rights, but did protect some rights within the body of the constitu
tional statements. Connecticut adopted a brief constitutional statement requiring the gov
ernment to comply with the laws, and continuing its charter government (in 1776). Rhode
Island did not adopt any constitutional statement but continued its charter government.
(The state declarations of rights and constitutions, as well as the statehood statutes for
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of the general writ had yielded to more severe complaints after 1774,3'ZT
each of the state declarations of rights included a search and seizure
provision that banned general warrants (though none of the states that
omitted a declaration adopted such a ban). The state search and sei
zure provisions provide important evidence regarding the original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, because virtually all of the lan
guage of the Fourth Amendment found its genesis in the earlier state
texts.
The state declarations typically included two different sets of
statements.328 One articulated the political rights of the community
and reflected the political theory of social contract evident in the
Declaration of Independence. The other articulated individual rights,
and included a number of procedural and substantive provisions re
lating to criminal justice, broadly defined. Although few records of
the deliberations that preceded the framing of the state declarations
have survived (beyond the declarations themselves), it is apparent that
the state framers did not undertake to draft comprehensive catalogs of
individual rights.
For one thing, the framers would not have thought it feasible to
capture all of the rights of citizens in a single document. For another,

Vermont and Tennessee, may be located in SWINDLER, supra note 177. Earlier collections
include THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909), and
an earlier edition of the same work edited by Benjamin P. Poore, THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS (Benjamin Perley Poore ed., 2d ed. 1878). Note, however, that the Thorpe
and Poore collections omitted the Delaware declaration of rights.)
327. It has been noted that the Declaration of Independence does not specifically men
tion the general writ as one of the colonial grievances, though it does refer to harassment by
tax collectors. Part of the explanation is that the general writ ceased to be a major issue af
ter the colonial courts refused to issue them. See supra note 26. The other part of the expla
nation is that the declaration was aimed at George III, not at Parliament. See, e.g., Edwin S.
Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background ofAmerican Constitutional Law (pt.2), 42 HARV. L.
REV. 365, 402 (1928) (noting that the Declaration of Independence was "addressed not to
Parliament but to the king"). The general writ grievance was against Parliament's
reauthorization of the writ in the Townshend Act rather than against the crown as such. In
contrast, the king had issued the commissions of the tax collectors, so their appointment was
a grievance against the crown.
328. For commentary on the state declarations, see, for example, WILLI PAUL ADAMS,
CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE
CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA (1980); THE BILL OF RlGHI'S AND THE
STATES: THE COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES
(Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kaminski eds., 1992); MARK W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN
AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY:
STATE CONSTITUTION MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY
AMERICA 35-59 (1997); DONALD S. Lurz, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL:
WHIG POLITICAL THEORY IN THE EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1980); G. ALAN TARR,
UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 75-81 (1998); and Jeremy Elkins, Declarations of
Rights, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 243 (1996). A table that identifies the provisions in
some of the state declarations that anticipated provisions of the federal Bill of Rights (but
that does not report other provisions in the state declarations that were not included in the
federal Bill of Rights) appears in EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHI'S AND WHAT
IT MEANS TODAy app. at 160-65 (1957).
THE FIRST
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they would not have thought it necessary to do so because rights were
already captured by another source - the common law.329 Indeed, the
ideological justification for the American Revolution consisted largely
of complaints that Parliament's enactments had encroached upon the
"immemorial" common-law rights, privileges, and immunities that
colonists claimed as English "freemen."330 Given that background, the
state framers did not approach the task of articulating individual rights
as an exercise in abstract theorizing. They were not engaged in de
ducing rights, but in declaring and thus preserving rights already em
bedded in the larger structure of common law.331
The degree to which the common law shaped the state framers'
approach is evident in the widespread adoption of provisions guaran
teeing that government would not act against citizens except according
to "the law of the land" - a provision that was adopted in some form
by nearly all of the initial state constitutions, including those that
329. The political rights identified in the declarations were clearly based on social con
tract notions of natural law. However, the specific protections of individual rights were
drawn from common law, which was thought to create a structure of legal rights consistent
with the demands of natural law. As Professor Wood observed:
[W]hat is truly extraordinary about the Revolution is that few Americans ever felt the need
to repudiate their English heritage for the sake of nature or of what ought to be. In their
minds natural law and English history were allied. Whatever the universality with which
they clothed their rights, those rights remained the common-law rights embedded in the
English past, justified not simply by their having existed from time immemorial but by their
being as well "the acknowledged rights of human nature."

GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF TIIE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 10 (1969)
(quoting a speech by John Dickinson).
330. Professor John Phillip Reid has noted that Americans did not establish new consti
tutional rights; instead, they drew upon "old law, the not yet quite passe law of Magna Carta,
the Petition of Right, and the English Bill of Rights."
JOHN PHILLIP REID,
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF TIIE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTIIORITY TO
LEGISLATE 6 (1991). See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF
TIIE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); REID, supra note 19, at 190-202; WOOD, supra note
329.
331. For example, Richard Henry Lee summed up the contents of the rights that had
been omitted from the federal Constitution as "[a] reservation in favor of the Press, Rights
of Conscience, Trial by Jury in Criminal cases, or Common Law securities." Letter from
Richard Henry Lee to Samuel Adams (October 27, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE LETI'ERS OF
RICHARD HENRY LEE 456, 457 (James Curtis Ballagh ed., 1914) (emphasis added).
Modem arguments over the content of the provisions of the Bill of Rights tend to ad
dress those rights as though they are freestanding. Thus, liberals tend to assert that the pro
visions should be understood expansively as sweeping generalities written in vague language,
while conservatives tend to assert that the content of a right should be strictly limited to the
actual language of the provision. I think both of these treatments are historically inaccurate
because neither takes account of the larger structure of common-law rights that the Framers
understood to exist beneath and around the enumerated rights. Similarly, although I would
agree with Professor Amar that some of the provisions of the Bill of Rights should be under
stood to carry implications for one another, the provisions of the Bill of Rights and of the
Constitution should not be regarded as the exclusive or even predominant source of such
implications. The historical Bill of Rights cannot be understood except in the context of the
common law.
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lacked a declaration of rights as such. Such provisions echoed the
most famous chapter in Magna Carta, that which declared that no man
could be taken or punished by the sovereign except according to "the
law of the land"332 (or, in later iterations, except according to "due
process of law"333).
Sir Edward Coke's writings shaped the framers' understanding of
the "law of the land" chapter. Coke was not only a central figure in
the Whig tradition of English liberty,334 he was also the author of the
works which the framers read to learn law.335 The important point, for
present purposes, is that Coke had presented the common-law rules of
criminal procedure, including arrest authority and warrants, as being
subsumed under the law of the land chapter of Magna Carta.336
Moreover, Coke had insisted that the sovereign was obligated to com-

332.

In the original 1215 version of Magna Carta, this chapter read:

No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised of his freehold or outlawed or exiled
or in any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him; except by lawful judgment of his
peers or by the law of the land. . . .

J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 460-61 (2d ed. 1992) (translated from the Latin). (Although the
chapters of the original text were unnumbered, this chapter is conventionally numbered 39
in modem discussions of the original text).
Magna Carta was reconfirmed on several later occasions. Sir Edward Coke discussed
the 9 H. III (1225) version in which this chapter was numbered 29 and read:
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freehold, or liberties, or free
customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon
him, nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. We
will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right.

SIR EDWARD COKE, SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 45
(1817 edition, reprinted 1986 by Professional Books Ltd.) (originally published 1642, see 1
LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 546, entry 4). Because the American Framers
learned law largely from Coke, they also knew the provision as chapter 29. See, e.g.,
Paxton's Case, Mass. (Quincy) 51, 56 n.22 (1761) (quoting James Otis referring to this chap
ter as "29"); Mass. (Quincy) app. l at 483-85 (1762) (editor's collection of quotes) (same).
333. The phrase "due process of law" was substituted for "law of the land" in a 1354
statutory iteration of Magna Carta. See AE. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND
COMMENTARY 15 (1964) ("The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is
talking about 'law of the land' when it says that no person shall be deprived of 'life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.' ").
334. For an introduction to Coke's place in Anglo-American law, see NORMAN F.
CANTOR, IMAGINING THE LAW:
COMMON LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 301-22 (1997).
335. Although Coke wrote in the early seventeenth century, his Institutes and Reports
were still the primary sources from which the American framers learned law. See, e.g., A.E.
DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEADE:
MAGNA CARTA AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 117-25 (1968).
336. See 2 COKE, supra note 332, at 45-56 (discussing the law of arrests under chapter 29
of Magna Carta).
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ply with criminal procedure rules that constituted the law of the
land.331
Thus, the phrase "law of the land" connoted that the basic features
of common-law criminal procedure were essentially fixed.338 Likewise,
the fact that the framers of some state constitutions were content to
simply adopt the law of the land protection, rather than a catalog of

337. The Petition of Right of 1628, which Coke authored, condemned the king's orders
for arrests without cause as a violation of the law of the land clause of Magna Carta and of
the fundamental principles of common-law procedure. See COGAN, supra note 122, at 355
(10.1.4.2); see also infra note 397. This is the basis for the common-law rule that the king
could not order an arrest except by procuring a judicial arrest warrant. See 2 COKE, supra
note 332, at 186; 1 JACOB'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 201 (explanation of the term "ar
rest").
338. For an example of this understanding of "fixed" law, see FATHER OF CANDOR, su
pra note 23, at 64, 90. The celebratory view of the common law as a permanent and per
fected law of the land is also evident in statements by American legal writers. For example:
Common law is the perfection of reason, arising from the nature of God, of man, and of
things, and from their relations, dependencies, and connections: It is universal and extends
to all men, and to all combinations of men, in every possible situation; and embraces all
cases and questions that can possibly arise; it is in itself perfect, clear and certain; it is immu
table, and cannot be changed or altered, without altering the nature and relation of things; it
is superior to all other laws and regulations, by it they are corrected and controlled; all posi
tive laws are to be construed by it, and wherein they are opposed to it, they are void. It is
inunemorial, no memory runneth to the contrary of it; it is coexistent with the nature of man,
and commensurate with his being; it is most energetic and coercive; for every one who vio
lates its maxims and precepts are sure of feeling the weight of its sanctions.
Jesse Root, Introduction to 1 Root i, ix (Conn. 1798). (Root was a judge of the superior
court and a compiler of Connecticut decisions.) (Professor David Langum brought this
quote to my attention.)
Of course, the great unsettled point was the degree to which legislation could alter long
settled procedural law. On the one hand, there is no doubt that the American Framers
viewed the legislature as the preeminent branch of government, and no doubt that they
thought legislation could alter procedure to some degree. Indeed, they probably regarded
some statutes, such as the English Habeas Corpus Act, as being so settled that they had be
come part of the law of the land. On the other hand, the American Revolution was a rejec
tion of the British notion of parliamentary sovereignty insofar as Americans asserted the
existence of fundamental legal rights that could not be altered even by Parliament; thus, the
guarantee of "the law of the land" or of "due process of law" carried substance beyond mere
compliance with whatever legislative standard was then in effect.
My sense is that the Framers did not think it necessary to define the boundary of what
aspects of common-law procedure could or could not be changed by legislation in any defi
nite way. They had no reason to think that a government would be likely to ignore the en
tire body of common-law procedure. (Recall that the dispute over general writs of assis
tance had been argued within the shared understanding that houses could not be searched
without some form of warrant authority.) Likewise, they had no experience with broad codi
fication of criminal procedure; in their experience, legislation regulated commerce and trade,
set taxes, defined new crimes, and created public and commercial institutions - thus, they
could not have anticipated the broad shift from common-law procedure to legislation that
occurred in the nineteenth century. Instead, they simply expected that common-law proce
dure would persist. The phrase "due process of law" now seems imprecise because we have
lost the common-law tradition the Framers took for granted, and because we address con
texts and issues that the common law never anticipated.
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more specific rights, reveals their understanding of its breadth.339 The
state framers understood the "law of the land" protection to encom
pass the more specific procedural requirements eventually included in
American declarations of rights, including the ban against general
warrants.340
That the framers sometimes articulated more specific procedural
protections likely reflects their desire to repudiate particular past vio
lations of the law of the land and thus preclude any repetition of those
deviations. Indeed, the historical models of declarations of rights
available to the state framers took the form of statements of griev
ances.341 Thus, the specific provisions in the state declarations tend to
address either specific grievances from English constitutional history
or colonial grievances from the controversies that preceded the
American Revolution. They thus reinforced what Madison would call
"those essential rights, which have been thought to be in danger."342
The bans against general warrants were spun out from the broader
"law of the land" protection because Parliament had purported to

339. Cf Letters from the Federal Farmer (XVI), supra note 128, at 328 (2.8.200) (stating
that the law of the land provision "may be said to comprehend the whole end of political
society"). (The Letters may have been authored by Richard Henry Lee. See supra note
121.)
340. For example, Chief Justice Pratt (Lord Camden) had referred to the general war
rant as a violation of Magna Carta in Huckle. See supra note 79. Father of Candor had pro
posed a parliamentary resolution recognizing that general warrants were "contrary to Magna
Carta." See FATHER OF CANDOR, supra note 23, at 105. Likewise, William Henry Drayton
had referred to the general writ as "trench[ing] too severely and unnecessarily on the safety
of the subject, secured by Magna Carta." Drayton, supra note 83, at 21. All of these refer
ences to Magna Carta would have been understood to be to the "law of the land" chapter.
The Supreme Court adopted a narrow understanding of "due process of law" in Hurtado
that the Due Process Clause of the Four
teenth Amendment did not include the other rights specifically enumerated in the Bill of
Rights (in particular, the right not to be prosecuted except upon indictment by a grand jury).
Justice Matthews argued that the specific articulation of a right to grand jury indictment in
the Fifth Amendment would be redundant if it were also included in the protection of the
Due Process Qause of that Amendment. See id. at 534-35. However, that construction did
not give adequate attention to the way "law of the land" and "due process of law" were un
derstood in the framing era. Moreover, although constitutional provisions should not be
inconsistent, there is no reason they should not overlap. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion
in Hurtado was much closer to the Framers' broad understanding of the content of the due
process of law protection. See id. at 539-46.
v.

California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), when it ruled

341. Magna Carta had set out the Crown's assurances to the barons that their grievances
against the Crown would not be repeated. See SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 1-22 (Richard
L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959). The Petition of Right of 1628 identified certain acts
of the Crown as "illegal" and forbade their repetition. See id. at 62-75. The English Bill of
Rights of 1689 listed the abuses of James II to assure they would not be repeated. See id. at
222. In short, the enumerated rights were identified by the experience of prior government
abuses. See also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 123-25 (describing these constitutional
statements).
342 See infra note 435.
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authorize use of general warrants in derogation of the common-law
liberty of the house.343
B.

The Textual Evolution ofSearch and Seizure Provisions

As noted above, the phrase "unreasonable searches and seizures"
first appeared in the 1780 Massachusetts search and seizure provision,
the seventh of the nine state and proto-state provisions.344 Why and
how it appeared there are crucial to an authentic understanding of the
original Fourth Amendment.

1.

The Straightforward State Bans Against General Warrants

The story of the state declarations began when George Mason
authored the first draft of the Virginia declaration of rights in the late
spring of 1776, prior to the Declaration of Independence. Mason
omitted a prohibition against general warrants because he did not
think it sufficiently fundamental for a declaration of rights.345 Other
members of the legislative committee that reviewed Mason's draft dis
agreed, however, and inserted a search and seizure provision.346 After
making further changes, the legislature adopted the following:

X. That general warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be

commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact com
mitted, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offence is
not particularly described and supported by evidence, are grievous and
oppressive, and ought not to be granted.347

343. Cf. Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 316 (Pa. 1814) {describing the origin of the
Pennsylvania search and seizure provision); see also supra note 183 and accompanying text
(quoting Wakely).
344. See supra note 326.
345. See HELEN HILL MILLER, GEORGE MASON: GENTLEMAN REVOLUTIONARY 148
{1975).
346.

The committee of the legislature proposed the following provision:

12.

That warrants unsupported by evidence, whereby any officer or messenger may be
commanded or required to search suspected places, or to seize any person or persons, his or
their property, not particularly described, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be
granted.

1 THE pAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 284

(Robert A Rutland ed., 1970). The legislature
modified this draft further and adopted the provision quoted in the text infra.

347. VA. CONST. of 1776, art. X {Deel. of Rights), quoted in COGAN, supra note 122, at
235 (6.1.3.8). The state provisions and the various drafts and proposals for a federal provi
sion are quoted in numerous works; to simplify the citations, I have referred, whenever pos
sible, to Cogan's reference work. The citations in Cogan will lead the reader to earlier
sources. Note, however, that Cogan presents the state provisions broken up according to
each of the ten amendments in the federal Bill of Rights. For sources containing the full
state declarations of rights, see supra note 326.
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Like the earlier committee draft, the final version focused on ban
ning general warrants; nothing in its language could be viewed as ad
dressing warrantless intrusions or creating a broad reasonableness
standard.348 The Virginia drafters clearly banned general warrants.349
However, they did not attempt to spell out when warrants were to be
used, because the common-law justifications for arrest and search were
not controversial. Rather, because the drafters took it as a given that a
warrant provided the most potent form of arrest authority, and virtually
the only authority for searching a house or papers, they were content to
simply ban the use of too-loose warrants by commanding that such war
rants "ought not be granted."350 Maryland, Delaware, and North

348. The legislature added the term "general warrants" and then made the standards for
warrants more precise by banning search warrants for "suspected places without evidence of
a fact committed." "[F]act committed" meant that a search warrant had to be based on spe
cific information that an offense actually had been committed (a "fact"), and thus was more
rigorous than the committee's language which simply prohibited warrants "unsupported by
evidence." See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 301 (noting that the date and town
ship "in which the fact was committed" must be named in an indictment). The legislature
dropped the explicit prohibition against warrants that did not particularly describe the prop
erty to be seized, but that was probably thought redundant in view of the "fact committed"
requirement (for example, if the "fact" was smuggling, then the property to be seized was
any uncustomed goods).
Similarly, the legislature banned arrest warrants that did not name the person to be ar
rested, did not particularly describe the offense he had committed, and were not "supported
by evidence." The requirement in arrest warrants that the offense be particularly described
and supported by evidence would seem to accomplish the same point as the "fact commit
ted" language used for search warrants.
349. Unfortunately, modem readers sometimes approach historical texts with more hu
bris than sensitivity; as a result, they sometimes fail to perceive how much the language of
those texts actually conveyed. For example, Levy has described the 1776 Virginia provision
as exhibiting "egregious deficiencies" because it lacked a requirement of an oath, contained
only a "stunted" probable cause standard, merely labeled general warrants as "grievous"
rather than "illegal," and only advised that general warrants "ought" not be issued rather
than commanded that they shall not be issued. LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING, supra note 45,
at 236-37; see also 3 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1233-55.
These criticisms are invalid. Use of the term "evidence" in the provision would have
implied a complaint under oath because statements not under oath could not be "evidence";
the requirement of "evidence of a fact committed" - that is, of a sworn complaint of a crime
committed in fact - is actually a stronger standard than probable cause, see infra notes 445447 and accompanying text; omission of the term "illegal" in a constitutional provision con
demning too·loose warrants hardly alters its significance; and "ought" was as imperative as
"shall," see infra note 350.
350. I think that the provisions in the state declarations that used "ought" were under
stood to limit the legislative power. However, a number of commentators have asserted that
the rather consistent use of "ought" rather than "shall" in the state declarations of rights
made the declarations merely prescriptive or hortatory rather than legally binding on state
legislatures. For example, Levy has asserted that Madison's later use of "shall" in his pro
posals for federal rights amendments made them more imperative than the statements in the
earlier state declarations that had used "ought." See, e.g., LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING, su
pra note 45, at 243. A number of other commentators have repeated that assertion. See,
e.g., TARR, supra note 328, at 76; 3 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1472. In particular, LUTZ,
supra note 328, at 65-68, has noted that the state framers usually used "shall" in the body of
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Carolina soon adopted similar provisions that also simply stated the
standards for valid warrants. (The protostate of Franklin did likewise

in 1784.351)
state constitutions, but usually used "ought" in the state declarations of rights; he concluded
that the difference shows that the declarations were understood to be not legally binding.
I think the asserted difference is illusory and the different usages were only stylistic,
rather than substantive. Many of the statements in the body of the constitutions were de
scriptive of processes, and, in that context, "shall" fit better than "ought." Conversely,
"ought" was probably thought to convey a more solemn, traditional tone, befitting a state
ment of fundamental rights. (For example, the English Bill of Rights had used "ought"
rather than "shall." See SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 341, at 245, 246-47 (for
example: "10. That excessive bail ought not to be required . . .").)

In addition, several uses of "ought" in the state constitutions are inconsistent with the
notion that "ought" was not imperative. For example, the Delaware constitution ended by
stating that "No article of the declaration of rights . . . nor the first, second, • . • twenty-ninth
articles of this constitution, ought ever to be violated on any pretence whatever . . . . " DBL.
CONST. of 1776, art. 30. The inclusion of the words "ever" and "any pretense whatsoever"
remove any doubt that the prohibition against future amendment was meant to be "legally
binding" - however, it uses "ought" rather than "shall." Similar provisions, also using
"ought," appeared in several of the other early state constitutions.
Moreover, framing-era usages do not bear out the notion that "shall" was more impera
tive than "ought." Instead the historical dictionary definitions indicate that "ought" was un
derstood to be imperative. JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY, supra note 177 (pages unnumbered),
defined "Ought" as "[t]o be obliged by duty" and also defined "Oblige" as "[t]o bind; to im
pose obligation; to compel something" - thus it treated "ought" as binding or compelling,
which sounds rather imperative. Noah Webster still gave essentially the same definition of
"ought" when he published his American dictionary in 1828.
See 1 WEBSTER'S
DICTIONARY, supra note 313 (defining "Ought" as "[t]o be held or bound in duty or moral
obligation").
The dictionaries gave alternative definitions for "shall." Johnson commented that
"Shall" was "originally I owe, or I ought," but that it subsequently "became a sign of the fu
ture tense"; he then gave alternative definitions in which "shall" was defined as command, as
permission, and as a description of what will happen in the future. See JOHNSON'S
DICTIONARY, supra note 177 (emphasis in original). Webster commented regarding "Shall"
that "it coincides in signification nearly with ought, it is a duty, it is necessary; • . . [t]he literal
sense is to hold or be held, hence to owe, and hence the sense of guilt, a being held, bound or
liable to justice and punishment." WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 313 (emphasis in
original). Like Johnson, Webster emphasized the alternative meanings that "Shall" could
carry.
It is important to recognize substantive distinctions in the framers' language, but it is
equally important not to impose distinctions that the framers did not intend. The evidence
does not support the assertion that the framers understood "ought" to be less binding or im
perative than "shall."
351. North Carolina copied the final Virginia provision in 1776. See N.C. CONST. of
1776, art. XI (Deel. of Rights), quoted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 234-35 (6.1.3.5).
Maryland adopted a similar provision in 1776:
That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to seize any
person or property, are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search sus
pected places, or to apprehend suspected persons without naming or describing the place, or
the person in special, are illegal, and ought not to be granted.

MD. CONST. of 1776, § 23 (Deel. of Rights), quoted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 234
(6.1.3.2). Delaware adopted a provision nearly identical to Maryland's in 1776. See DEL.
CONST. of 1776, § 17 (Deel. of Rights), quoted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 234 (6.1.3.1).
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Pennsylvania's Addition of an Introductory Right Statement

Shortly after the Declaration of Independence was signed,
Pennsylvania became the second state formally to adopt a declaration
of rights. The Pennsylvania framers borrowed heavily from the com
mittee draft of the Virginia declaration, then being circulated within
the Continental Congress meeting in Philadelphia.352 Pennsylvania
adopted the following search and seizure provision:

That the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers,
and possessions free from search or seizure; and therefore warrants
without oaths or affirmations first made, affording a sufficient foundation
for them, and whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded or
required to search suspected places, or to seize any person or persons, his
or their property, not particularly described, are contrary to that right,
and ought not to be granted.353
The language banning general warrants (everything after "therefore")
was clearly based on the Virginia committee draft. Like the Virginia
draft, the Pennsylvania provision did not use the term "general war
rant" (as the final Virginia text did) but instead prohibited unparticu
larized warrants for "suspected places" or an undescribed person the hallmarks of general warrants.354 It appears that the initial draft
for this provision consisted only of the ban against too-loose warrants
(like the provisions being drafted in the neighboring states of
Maryland and Delaware at roughly the same time). However, at some
point in the drafting process, possibly quite late, the Pennsylvania
framers innovated by inserting the statement declaring the "right" at
issue ahead of the ban against general warrants.355 (I refer to clauses
of the type preceding "and therefore" in the Pennsylvania text as an

The proto-state of Franklin, which became Tennessee, copied the 1776 Virginia search
and seizure provision when it adopted a declaration of rights in 1784. See 9 SWINDLER, su
pra note 177, at 125, 128.
352. See 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 98, at 171 (showing the Virginia
committee draft of declaration of rights was carried to the Second Continental Congress and
printed in a Philadelphia paper).

PA. CONST. of 1776, art. X (Deel. of Rights), quoted in COGAN, supra note 122, at
(6.3.1.6.a).
354. The Pennsylvania text spelled out the cause standard in the Virginia committee
draft ("unsupported by evidence") in somewhat more detail, but otherwise tracked the lan
guage of the Virginia committee draft, the text of which is quoted supra note 346.
353.

235

355. Benjamin Franklin presided over the adoption of the Pennsylvania constitution and
declaration. A copy of a printed draft of the declaration with his editing appears in 22 THE
PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 528, 532 (William B. Willcox ed., 1982). It shows that the
printer had erroneously added the statement of a right against search and seizure to the end
of section 9, the "law of the land" provision, rather than at the beginning of section 10, the
search and seizure provision. See 22 id. The misplacement of the right statement suggests
the possibility that it had been inserted into an earlier draft or even that the printer received
it separately from the rest of the text and was left to guess (wrongly) where to insert it.
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"introductory right statement" in order to reserve the "first clause"
label for the opening clause of the Fourth Amendment itself.)
As shown below, the Pennsylvania introductory right statement
would serve as the prototype for similar language in the 1780
Massachusetts provision, and that provision, in tum, would provide
the model for the language of the first clause of the Fourth Amend
ment. The Pennsylvania introductory right statement, however, does
not contain the term "unreasonable." In fact, it is oddly drafted: a
"right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, and possessions free
from search or seizure" sounds absolute.356 Yet the provision clearly
was not intended to create a complete ban against searches and sei
zures of the listed interests because it used "therefore" to connect the
introductory right statement to the warrant standards, thus showing
that the statement of the right was meant to serve as the premise for
the constitutionalization of the warrant standards.357 Why did the
Pennsylvania framers add this introductory right statement?
Prior commentators have assumed the statement was added to
broaden the protection to regulate warrantless intrusions and have
even "imputed" a broad reasonableness standard for warrantless in
trusions to its language.358 However, they have not identified a colo
nial grievance broader than customs searches of houses under general
warrants.359 Likewise, they have not explained why the framers would
have thought an unlawful warrantless arrest or search by an officer
could carry any constitutional implications.360 (An unjustified arrest
ordered by a governor might have carried constitutional implications;
however, that specific abuse would have been understood to violate
the "law of the land" provision that was also included in the
Pennsylvania declaration, as well as other state declarations. Hence,
even that concern would not have led the drafters to expand the
search and seizure provision beyond banning general warrants.361)
356. The absolutist tone was corrected when Pennsylvania added "unreasonable" in a
1790 amendment. See supra note 181.
357. Cf. LASSON, supra note 16, at 81 n.11; Kamisar, supra note 38, at 573.
358.

See supra note 119 and accompanying text.

359.

See supra notes 136-142 and accompanying text.

360.

See supra notes 313-314 and accompanying text.

361. The Pennsylvania law of the land clause read "nor can any man be justly deprived
of his liberty except by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers." PA. CONST. of
1776, ch. 1, § 9, reprinted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 353-54 (10.1.3.8.a). This was a virtual
copy of the 1776 Virginia law of the land clause. See id. at 355 (10.1.3.12). The 1776
Maryland provision included a bit more of the language of Magna Carta by stating that no
man could be "taken" except according to the law of the land. See id. at 350 (10.1.3.2.b).
The 1780 Massachusetts provision was even more explicit by prohibiting the government
from "arrest[ing)" any person except according to the law of the land. See id. at 350
(10.1.3.3.c) (emphasis added). Compare these to the language of the chapter of Magna
Carta quoted supra note 332.
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Prior commentators have also overlooked a noteworthy textual
feature - neither the Pennsylvania provision nor any of the other
state search and seizure provisions used the term "arrests"; rather,
they each referred to "seizures" of persons. The terms "arrest" or
"apprehension" were widely used in the framing-era common-law lit
erature when referring to warrantless arrests; the most likely explana
tion for the use of "seizure" in the constitutional provisions is that it
had been used in the Wilkes general warrant.362
That the Pennsylvania introductory right statement was not meant
to address warrantless intrusions brings us back to the question: why
did the Pennsylvania framers add the introductory right statement?
One explanation is that the statement provided a rhetorical justifica
tion for including the ban against general warrants in the declaration.
Prefacing the warrant standards with an invocation of a "right" of "the
people"363 served to show that the warrant standards were not mere
Attacks on the illegality of government-ordered arrests were historically connected to
the law of the land provision because Coke had explicitly claimed in the Petition of Right
that the King had violated the law of the land chapter of Magna Carta when he had ordered
arrests without cause. See supra note 337. The Framers' understanding of the connection
between the law of the land and arrest authority is also evident in the 1817 New Hampshire
decision in Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N.H. 53 (1817), in which the court assessed the constitutional
ity of an arrest statute primarily in terms of the state due process provision rather than the
search and seizure provision. See supra note 186.
362. The Wilkes general warrant commanded the Messengers to identify the culprits
responsible for the publication of The North Briton, No. 45, "and them or any of them hav
ing been found, to apprehend and seize, together with their papers, and to bring in safe cus
tody . . . ." Money v. Leach, 3 Burr. 1742, 1743, 19 Howell St. Tr. 1001, 1004, 97 Eng. Rep.
1075, 1076 (K.B. 1765) (emphasis added). This warrant was reprinted in colonial newspa
pers. See 2 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1105-10; 3 id. at 1631-33. It also appeared in FATIIER
OF CANDOR, supra note 23, at 38.
Other linguistic evidence also suggests that "seizure" of a person often connoted an ar
rest under warrant. Johnson's Dictionary defined "seize" as "To take forcible possession of
by law." JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY, supra note 177. The first definition it offered for the
verb "arrest," and the only one that used any form of "seize," was "[t]o seize by a mandate
from a court or officer of justice." Id. The term "mandate" indicates either a writ or a war
rant. See supra note 201. Likewise, "officer of justice" refers to a justice of the peace or
judge, because only they could issue a "mandate." See also the definition of "justice" in
JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY, supra note 177. However, there are some instances in which
"seize" was used in framing-era sources in the context of warrantless arrests. See, e.g., 1
CHAMBERS, supra note 195, at 245 (stating that if an offense is committed in the constable's
view, he "may by virtue of his office seize the offender'').
Thus, it appears that the historical relation of seizure and arrest was different from the
current usage. Today, "seizure" is treated as a broader category that includes temporary
detentions as well as arrests. At the time of the framing, "arrest" was at least as broad a
term and included both warrantless arrests and "seizures" (warrant arrests). Of course, the
current broad usage of "seizure" dates back only to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the first
case to apply the Fourth Amendment to a detention less than an arrest.
363. It may initially seem odd that a right regarding search and seizure would be
phrased as a right of "the people," because that connotes a collective right. This phrasing
may simply reflect the rhetorical bent of the Pennsylvania framers, who were fond of de
scribing constitutional rights in terms of "the people." Nine of the sixteen provisions in the
Pennsylvania declaration of rights refer to a right or authority of "the People." See PA.
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legal niceties but were sufficiently fundamental to merit inclusion in a
declaration of rights.364 Indeed, the reference to persons, houses, pa
pers, and possessions served to link the warrant standards to interests
that were paramount under the common law.365 The rhetorical expla
nation is especially compelling because the Pennsylvania framers were
quite fond of prefacing constitutional rules with statements of rights.366
The persons-houses-papers-possessions formula also suggests an
other possible explanation for the introductory right statement: the
Pennsylvania framers may have added it to define the scope of the ban
against use of general search authority.367 As noted above, the colo
nists had aimed the legal grievance against general writs specifically at
customs searches of houses, not at searches of ships or warehouses.

CONST. of 1776 {Deel. of Rights), reprinted in 8 SWINDLER, supra note 177, at 277-79. This
may reflect the fact that the Pennsylvania constitution was the most radically democratic of
the initial state constitutions.
See generally J. PAUL SELSAM, THE PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTI1UTION OF 1776: A STUDY IN REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY (1971). Moreover,
this usage was not unprecedented; Blackstone had described the right of personal security as
one of "the rights of the people of England." 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 125. In ad
dition, the collective tone of "the people" is appropriate to a provision banning general war
rants because such warrants, if allowed, would imperil the security of the entire community.
Amar has asserted a different explanation of "the people" - that the use of the term
shows that the Framers were primarily concerned with preventing the use of search and ar
rest authority to suppress free speech, and that the Fourth Amendment really reflects First
Amendment concerns. See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS BOOK, supra note 58, at 65-68; Amar,
Bill ofRights, supra note 58, at 1175-77; see also Stuntz, supra note 57, at 403. That interpre
tation is strained at the least; Amar has not identified any historical evidence for it beyond a
general assertion that the Wilkesite cases, which involved political dissidents, were the real
catalyst for the Fourth Amendment. See supra note 60. The inclusion of "papers" in the
Pennsylvania introductory right statement no doubt does reflect the memory of the Wilke
site cases. However, the predominant concern during the colonial grievances and during the
ratification debates of 1787-88 was the use of general warrants or writs for customs searches
of houses. See supra notes 136-142 and accompanying text. Commentators should certainly
be sensitive to the possibility that there are interrelationships between rights provisions but they should not pretend relationships which are not supported by evidence.
364. Note that there had been some disagreement on this point in Virginia. See supra
notes 345-349 and accompanying text. The Pennsylvania drafters could easily have learned
of that disagreement because Virginia delegates were then in Philadelphia for the Continen
tal Congress.
365. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 125 (discussing the "three principal or
primary articles [of the rights of the people of England]; the right of personal security, the
right of personal liberty; and the right of private property").
366. The Pennsylvania framers inserted a statement of a right that "therefore" required
a constitutional rule in five of the fifteen provisions in their declaration of rights: IV, VIII, X
(the search and seizure provision), XII, and XIV. See PA. CoNST. of 1776, reprinted in 8
SWINDLER, supra note 177, at 277, 278-79.
367. As a drafting matter, if one wanted to add a definition of the scope of the ban
against general search warrants to the already complex language stating the standards for
valid warrants, the easiest way would be to add it in an introductory statement.
The text itself is not entirely clear on this point. For example, it still condemns warrants
to search "suspected places," which sounds broader than houses. As described above, how
ever, that language simply repeated a phrase that commonly appeared in general warrants.
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Likewise, the Wilkesite cases had been primarily concerned with
searches of, and seizures of papers from, houses, as well as arrests un
der general warrants. Thus, the persons-houses-papers-possessions
formula captured the interests involved in both the colonial grievance
and the Wilkesite cases.368 Conversely, the listing would also have
served to indicate that the provision did not bar general search
authority of warehouses. A motive for limiting the ban against gen
eral search authority is also evident; the Pennsylvania framers would
have anticipated that customs, enforced by searches, would be the
primary source of revenue for the new state government. Indeed, be
cause Philadelphia was the busiest port in America at that time,
Pennsylvania would have had an unusually strong interest in efficient
customs enforcement.369
The strongest evidence that the introductory right statement was
meant to delimit the provision's scope is found in the Pennsylvania
legislature's subsequent treatments of search authority. In 1780, it en
acted a state customs statute that required customs officers to obtain a
specific warrant to search a "dwelling house," but permitted them to
make warrantless searches of other premises, and even to obtain a writ
of assistance if they met with a lack of cooperation.370

368. It is noteworthy that, beginning with the 1776 Pennsylvania provision, "papers"
were consistently included in all of the various scope formulas employed in introductory
right statements. See the 1780 Massachusetts provision, quoted infra text accompanying
note 379; the 1788 Vrrginia ratification convention proposal, quoted infra note 429;
Madison's proposal, quoted infra text accompanying note 432; the various anti-Federalist
proposals discussed infra notes 453-459. That treatment attests to the importance that the
Framers attached to papers. However, it is also significant that none of the various search
and seizure provisions ever indicated that searches and seizures of "papers" were subject to
any distinct limitations beyond the standards for valid warrants - a treatment which tends
to undercut the historical case for the "mere evidence" doctrine. See infra note 513.
369. The importance of customs collections varied among the states because of the pat
tern of foreign commerce. Ships from foreign ports tended to enter, and pay customs, at
Philadelphia or Boston, or perhaps Charleston. Trade to the other American ports tended
to be by smaller coastal vessels that distributed goods from the larger ports. This coastal
trade, however, was not subject to further customs collections. Thus, customs was far more
important as a source of revenue to Pennsylvania or Massachusetts than to Virginia. This
pattern was a source of regional conflict when the Framers debated the early federal customs
and excise laws. For example, during the contentious debate over the 1791 Excise Act,
Madison disputed another representative's claim that the Southern States did not pay their
proportion of the impost by noting that "the trade of the Southern States was carried on by
the Eastern and Northern States" - that is, they indirectly paid their share of customs in the
prices of the merchandise they purchased tlrrough the coastal trade. See 3 ANNALS OF
CONG. 1861 (1834) (citing version with running head "History of Congress," see infra note
475).
370. Section 10 of the Pennsylvania customs act of 1780 gave the customs officers
authority to conduct warrantless searches of ships and all other premises "where he shall
have reason to suspect" uncustomed goods are concealed; in instances where entry was re
fused or resisted, the officer was authorized to obtain a writ of assistance from the supreme
court or two justices of the peace. See Act of Dec. 21, 1780, ch. 190, § 10 (placing an impost
on goods, wares, and merchandise imported into the state), reprinted in nm FmsT LAws OF
TiiE COMMONWEALTii OF PENNSYLVANIA 422, 424-25 (John D. Cushing ed., 1984). Section
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Moreover, Pennsylvania's distinction between searches of houses
and other premises appears to be part of a broader pattern.
Massachusetts, which also had a major port in Boston and which
adopted a search and seizure provision also containing the persons
houses-papers-possessions formula,371 enacted a customs act in 1783
that required specific search warrants to search houses but allowed
somewhat broader customs search authority for other premises.372 In
contrast, Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina - none of which
had ports comparable to Philadelphia or Boston and none of which
had included any listing of protected interests in their search and sei
zure provisions373 - each adopted customs statutes that required spe
cific search warrants for any search of premises on land.374 (There are
also indications that the scope of the ban against general search

11, however, added the proviso that "no search of any dwelling shall be made in manner
aforesaid, until due cause of suspicion hath been shewn to the satisfaction of a fiudge or jus
tice of the peace], as in the case of stolen goods." Id. at 425. The reference to "the case of
stolen goods" refers to the common-law specific search warrant for stolen goods.
371.

See infra text accompanying note 379.

372. In 1783, Massachusetts adopted revenue search provisions similar to that adopted
by Pennsylvania; a specific search warrant was required to search a house, but ships and
commercial premises could be searched on a more routine basis. One statute, Excise Act of
March 10, 1783 "An Act in Addition to an Act passed the Eighth Day of November [1782],
laying an Excise on certain Articles therein mentioned," required a specific search warrant
for a search of a "Dwelling-House," but provided that customs officials could search ships or
commercial premises without a warrant provided they had sworn information in writing con
stituting "just cause to suspect" that uncustomed goods were hidden on the premises. These
provisions were essentially reenacted in Excise Act of July 10, 1783, "An Act laying Dutes of
Impost and Excise on certain Goods, Wares and Merchandize therein described, and for re
pealing the several Laws heretofore made for that Purpose."
373.

See supra text accompanying notes 347, 351.

374. Virginia adopted a state customs statute that required a specific warrant for any
search of a premises on land {but still allowed warrantless searches of ships). See An Act for
ascertaining certain Taxes and Duties, and for establishing a permanent Revenue, Va. Acts,
ch. 40, §§ 10-11 {1782), reprinted in VIRGINIA: THE STATUTES AT LARGE 501 {William
Waller Hening ed., 1822). Chapter 10 provided that the state collectors "shall have full
power and authority to go and enter on board any ship or other vessel, and [to seize any arti
cles liable to a duty]." Id. ch. 10. Chapter 11 provided:
That it shall be lawful to and for all and every collector . . . by warrant under the hand of a
justice of peace (which warrant shall not be granted but upon an information made to him
upon oath, and accompanied with a constable) to break open, in the day time, any house,
warehouse or storehouse, to search for, seize and carry away [any customed goods].
ch. 11. The Maryland customs act treated search authority the same way. See An Act to
impose duties on certain enumerated articles imported into and exported out of this state,
and on all other goods, wares and merchandise, imported into this state . • . , ch. 84, §§ 6 & 7
(1784), reprinted in FIRSTLAWS OF TIIB STATE OF MAR YLAND {John D. Cushing ed., 1981)
(unpaginated). The North carolina customs statute also provided the same search authority
as that of Virginia. See An act for laying certain duties therein mentioned on all foreign
merchandize imported into this State, in aid of the public finances, and directing the mode of
collecting the same, [ch. 4], §§ 5, 7 {1784).

Id.
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authority was still controversial during the framing of the Fourth
Amendment, as I describe below.375)
In addition, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a 1785 statute that
repealed various earlier statutes that had permitted revenue officers
"to break open dwelling houses" without specific warrants. The re
peal was enacted because those earlier statutes were "in direct viola
tion of the [search and seizure provision of the state] Bill of Rights."
Like the 1780 customs act, the 1785 statute required the use of specific
warrants only to break open dwelling houses; it did not mention other
premises.376 Thus, the listing of interests in the Pennsylvania introduc
tory right statement was understood to define the scope of the consti
tutional ban against general search authority.377
Whatever the actual motive(s) behind the adoption of the
Pennsylvania introductory right statement, there is neither need nor
grounds to "impute" a broad reasonableness standard for warrantless
intrusions. Like the other state provisions adopted in 1776, the Penn
sylvania provision focused precisely on the right not to have one's per
son or house subjected to general warrant authority. That was also
true of the 1777 Vermont provision, which copied Pennsylvania's.378
Combining Pennsylvania and Vermont with the four states that adopted
provisions that set out only warrant standards without any form of intro
ductory right statement (Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and North

375. Disagreement regarding the scope of the ban against general warrants appears to
have persisted until the framing of the Fourth Amendment, and may have led to the adop
tion of "effects" as a final compromise term in the scope formula. See infra notes 465-472
and accompanying text.
376. See Act of Apr. 5, 1785, ch. 208 (An Act to repeal and alter such parts of the Excise
Laws and other Tax Laws of this Commonwealth as empower the Collectors of these taxes
to break open dwelling houses, in order to make seizures . . . ) , reprinted in 2 LAws OF TIIB
COMMONWEALTII OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1781-1790, at 306 (Alexander James Dallas ed.,
1793). The statute does not specifically identify the earlier provisions; however, it appears
that when the state of Pennsylvania was initially formed in 1776, the state legislature had
continued a variety of the existing colonial statutes on such topics. It seems likely that some
of those earlier colonial statutes contained the provisions referred to.
377. Although Cuddihy passed over the possible significance of the persons-houses
papers-possessions language in the Pennsylvania provision, he described one event that may
appear inconsistent with the interpretation I have given. Specifically, he asserted that the
Pennsylvania court in 1780 "struck down general warrants to search ships." 3 Cuddihy, su
pra note 20, at 1507 (citing Letter from McKean to Reed (July 10, 1780), reprinted in 8
PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES 403-04 (Series 1 1853)). If that were all that were involved, it
would call my interpretation into question. However, the rejected general warrant, which
had been requested by the French consul, was not simply to search all ships, but to search
ships for the purpose of seizing "any person" suspected of being a deserter from French
ships. In short, the request was for a general arrest warrant, which is probably why the
Pennsylvania judges said the illegality of such a warrant "would have been pretty clear" un
der the common law even if Pennsylvania had not adopted a constitutional provision.
378. See VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 1
235 (6.1.3.7).

(Right XI),

reprinted in COGAN, supra note 122, at
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Carolina), none of the initial six state provisions addressed warrantless
intrusions, and none created any reasonableness standard.
3.

The Introduction of "Unreasonable" in the 1780
Massachusetts Provision

Massachusetts was the first state to add "unreasonable" before
"searches and seizures" when it adopted its search and seizure provi
sion in 1780:
Art. XIV. Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable
searches and seizures of his person, his house, his papers, and all his pos
sessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause

or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or affirma
tion; and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in
suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize
their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the per
son or objects of search, arrest, or seizure: And no warrant ought to be
issued, but in cases, and with the formalities, prescribed by the laws.379

This provision (which was copied by New Hampshire in 1783380) is the
longest and most systematic of the state search and seizure protec
tions; it is also the most detailed provision in the Massachusetts decla
ration. Unlike the Pennsylvania provision, it makes three statements
rather than two. It begins with an introductory right statement; it then
"therefore" forbids the use of general warrants (like the Pennsylvania
provision, it does not use that term but rather forbids unparticularized
warrants to search "suspected places" or arrest "suspected persons");
finally, it commands that "and no warrant ought to be issued but in
cases . . . prescribed by the laws." This third statement, which had not
appeared in any prior provision, almost certainly reflects the basic
principle articulated in Lord Camden's 1765 ruling in Entick v.
Carrington (one of the Wilkesite cases): that no magistrate had
authority to issue a search by warrant except for purposes authorized
by common law or statute.381 The addition of the third statement
probably explains why the introductory right statement was made a
separate sentence; otherwise, the provision would have become a very
lengthy run-on sentence.
379. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XIV, reprinted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 234
(6.1.3.3) (emphasis added).
380. See N.H. CONST. of 1783, pt. 1,
234 (6.1.3.4).

art. XIX, reprinted in COGAN, supra note

122, at

381. 2 Wils. 275, 291, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 {C.P. 1765) {This is the shorter report of

Entick published in 1770. See supra note 25.) Lord Camden had stated that warrants could

be issued only for purposes recognized in the "law books" (i.e., common law or statute) in
Entick. Id.; see also quotation supra note 203. Maclin has offered a different explanation for
the third statement, that it reflected the earlier Massachusetts legislation prohibiting certain
types of general warrants. See Maclin, Complexity, supra note 44, at 968.
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A crucial fact about the Massachusetts provision, which Lassan was
unaware of when he wrote the first history of the Fourth Amendment
in 1937, is now well established. John Adams personally drafted the
provision along with rest of the 1780 Massachusetts constitution and
declaration of rights.382 Adams used the Pennsylvania provision as a
starting point,383 borrowing "search[es] and seizure[s]" and the
persons-houses-papers-possessions formula from the Pennsylvania in
troductory right statement.384 He made two changes in that statement,
however. First, he called the right at issue the "right to be secure," a
label that anchored the ban against general warrants in the larger set
of common-law protections of person and house.385 Adams's second,
more important change was the addition of "unreasonable" before
searches and seizures. Previous commentators did not examine why
Adams added that term because they assumed that the
Massachusetts provision simply made explicit the broad "reasonable
ness" standard they had already "imputed" to the Pennsylvania intro
ductory right statement.386 However, his motives can be discerned.
The immediate reason Adams added "unreasonable" is patent; it
cured the defective drafting of the Pennsylvania introductory right
statement. The Pennsylvania language - a right to "hold [one's per382 See 8 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 228-71 (Gregg L. Lint et al. eds., 1989). The final
text was virtually unchanged from Adams's draft except for altering Adams's "man" to
"subject." See id. at 240. Adams's involvement in drafting the Massachusetts constitution
and declaration of rights was still unsettled as late as the 1950s. See, e.g., ROBERT ALLEN
RUILAND, THE BIRTil OF TilE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791, at 68-70 (1955). Some recent
commentary has still not noted Adams's authorship. See, e.g., Amar, Boston, supra note 19,
at 66 (stating that the 1780 Massachusetts search and seizure provision was written by "a
convention"). Other commentators have recognized Adams's authorship, and even the sig
nificance of Adams's connection to James Otis. See, e.g., LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING, supra
note 45, at 238; Maclin, Complexity, supra note 44, at 968; 3 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 124748, 1296-97. Even these commentators have not made the connection, however, between
Otis's use of "against reason" and Adams's "unreasonable."
383. This is apparent from the texts.
382, at 231, 263 n.24.

See also 8 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note

384. It is not surprising that Adams included an introductory right statement. For one
thing, he would have appreciated the rhetorical invocation of a "right" because he was in
clined to state the premises for constitutional provisions. See RONALD M. PETERS, THE
MAsSACHUSETI'S CONSTITUTION OF 1780: A SOCIAL COMPACT 14 (1974). For another, he
would have approved of the persons-houses-papers-possessions formula because he was well
versed in the special protection afforded the house at common law. See supra note 260.
385. The label "right to be secure" was not innovative. In the common-law tradition,
the notion of a right to "security" was as closely connected to the status of a "freeman" as
the right to "liberty"; it was often linked to the house. For example, Otis had also asserted
that the general writ made householders "less secure." See Otis's 1762 Article, supra note 20,
at 562.
386. Just as there is no basis for imputing a broad "reasonableness" standard into the
Pennsylvania provision, there is also no basis for assuming that Adams meant to employ
"unreasonable" as a global standard for all government searches or arrests. Adams had al
ready included another provision that prohibited government "arrest[s]" except according to
the "law of the land." See supra note 361.
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son and house] free from search and seizure" - was susceptible to the
misunderstanding that it barred any arrest or any search of a house,
even by an officer with a valid specific warrant.387 A careful drafter,
which Adams undoubtedly was, would have perceived the need to
qualify the right by adding some descriptive adjective before "searches
and seizures." The crucial question is why Adams chose "unreason
able" for the adjective, and how he and others of his generation would
have understood the meaning of that term.
C.

What "Unreasonable" Meant, and Why John Adams Chose It

A word rarely carries only a single meaning. Thus, the precise
meaning a word was meant to carry in a text can be identified only by
examining the customary usage of a term in the specific context ad
dressed by the text.388 Moreover, because usages can shift over time,
the meaning a word carried in a historical text can be evaluated only
by considering the usage of the term in the specific historical context.389
In current Fourth Amendment doctrine, "unreasonable" is used as
a relativistic term connoting inappropriateness in the circumstances.
Although the relativistic usage of "reasonableness" does appear in
framing-era discourse, and even in framing-era legal discourse,390 it
was not the only meaning the term carried. The modern relativistic
meaning of "reasonableness" is pragmatic, but late eighteenth-century

387.

See supra note 356 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in
Statutory Cases, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 235 (criticizing acontextual interpretation of statutes
388.

based on the "ordinary" meaning of words).
389. The famous example is that in 1675, Charles II described St. Paul's Cathedral as
"awful" and "artificial" - by which he meant "awe-inspiring" and "artistic." See Thomas
Gibbs Gee, Original Intent: "With Friends Like These . • . , " 88 MICH. L. REV. 1335, 1337
{1990) {book review); see also JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY, supra note 177 {definitions of "aw
ful" and "artificial").
390. "Unreasonable" was sometimes used in framing-era legal sources to denote an ex
cessive quantity, as in a complaint regarding an act taking "an unreasonable time." See, for
example, the discussion of Leach supra text accompanying note 110. Similarly, HENING,
supra note 25, at 421-22, observed that Virginia sheriffs were not to take "unreasonable dis
tresses" for unpaid taxes - i.e., they were not to seize an amount of property that substan
tially exceeded the value of the tax owed. Likewise, "reasonable cause to suspect" was often
used as a synonym for the "probable cause to suspect" prong of the "on suspicion" arrest
standard. See, e.g., HENING, supra note 25, at 251. Even so, "reasonable" - and especially
"unreasonable" - were not used as frequently in framing-era writing as they are today.
My impression is that Blackstone used "reasonable" and even "unreasonable" far more
frequently than any of the preceding common-law treatises on criminal law and procedure.
Blackstone often wrote of the "reason" for a rule, and described the effects of a rule as "rea
sonable." However, he seems to have been more restrained in using "unreasonable" in dis
cussing criminal procedure. There, he used "unreasonable" to condemn violations of basic
rules such as use of an unspecific warrant of commitment to prison, see infra note 418, or ex
post facto laws, see 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 46.
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legal discourse was usually of a more formal character. In the latter
context, "reasonable" usually connoted logic or consistency, and "un
reasonable" connoted illogic or inconsistency in the form of a viola
tion of a rule or principle.391 Moreover, "unreasonable" had become
an extremely potent pejorative in constitutional discourse because
"unreasonable" - in the form of "against reason" - had been used in
famous episodes in English constitutional history to denounce viola
tions of fundamental legal principle.

1.

Coke's Use of "Against Reason" as a Label for Unconstitutionality

Coke had championed the idea that the basic principles of the
common law constituted the fundamental and immemorial law of the
land. Like other early common-law writers, he described the common
law as an embodiment of "natural equity."392 He also insisted that
common law had a constitutional status, asserting that common-law
principles sometimes restrained otherwise sovereign political power.
In particular, he declared that common-law principles could limit the
power of Parliament in his 1610 opinion in Dr. Bonham's Case.393
There, Coke ruled that a statute that permitted the college of phy
sicians to impose fines for unlawful practice of medicine was "void"
because it violated the common-law principle that no man could sit in
judgment of a case in which he had a direct interest. In the course of
that ruling, Coke insisted that "the Common Law will controul Acts of
Parliament" and then condemned the statute as being "against Com
mon Right and Reason"
a phrase of art denoting unconstitutional
ity.394
-

391. This formal usage of "unreasonable" is evident in JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY, supra
note 177 (the principal dictionary available during the framing era) (pages unnumbered). It
offered three definitions of "unreasonable": "exorbitant"; "[n]ot agreeable to reason"; and
"[g]reater than is fit; immoderate." Three definitions were given for "Exorbitant": "[g]oing
out of the prescribed track" (the literal translation of the Latin root); "deviating from the
course appointed or the rule established"; and "[a]nomalous; not comprehended in a settled
rule or method." Thus, both "unreasonable" and "exorbitant" could connote a violation of a
settled rule.
392. Common-law writers were too sophisticated to claim that common law was solely
the product of natural law; rather, they argued that the common law was a refined and per
fected system of rationalized custom that was consistent with natural law. See generally
GLENN BURGESS, THE POLmCS OF THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION 19-78 (1992).
393. 8 Coke Rep. 113b, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P. 1610).
394. Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Coke Rep. at 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652 (emphasis added).
This phrase appears in the following passage:
And it appears in our Books, that in many Cases, the Common·Law will controul Acts of
Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: For when an Act of Parliament
is against Common Right and Reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the
Common Law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void . . . .

Id.

The stylized character of "against common right and reason" is evident in the fact that
Coke repeated it two more times in the lines immediately following the passage.
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To understand what Coke meant by "against . . . reason," one must
understand that "reason" carried several different meanings in
seventeenth-century common-law discourse.
"Natural reason" re
ferred to logic. However, Coke and other legal writers insisted that
the common law had its own "artificial reason,"395 and sometimes used
"reason" in legal contexts as a label for the basic principles of the
common law.396 Thus, "the reason" of the common law became a label
for principles such as, for example, the maxim that no man could be a
judge in his own cause. To say that a statute was "against reason" was
to say that it violated basic principles of legality.397
There is a debate among modem scholars as to what Coke actually meant regarding the
power of judicial review in Dr. Bonham's Case - especially whether he meant that courts
could negate legislation or only that courts could construe legislation to avoid palpably ab
surd implications. See JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY:
COKE, HOBBES, AND TIIE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, 48-62 (1992).
What matters for present purposes, however, is that American Whigs understood Coke to
endorse some degree of judicial review of statutes by recourse to common-law principles.
395. [F]or reason is the life of the law, nay the common law itselfe is nothing else but rea
son; which is to be understood of an artificial! perfection of reason, gotten by long study, ob
servation, and experience, and not of every man's naturall reason; for, Nemo nascitur artifex.
This legal! reason est summa ratio. And therefore if all the reason that is dispersed into so
many several! heads, were united into one, yet could he not make such a law as the law in
England is; because by many successions of ages it hath beene fined and refined by an infi.
nite number of grave and learned men, and by long experience growne to such a perfection,
for the government of this realme . . . : no man out of his own private reason ought to be
wiser than the law, which is the perfection of reason.
SIR EDWARD COKE, 1 THE INSTITUTES OF TIIE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR A COMMENTARY
UPON LTITLETON 97b (19th ed. 1832) (commonly called Coke on Littleton) [hereinafter
COKE ON LITTLETON] (originally published 1628, see 1 LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note
19, at 449, entry 7). Coke also based his famous rebuke of James l's claim to be entitled to
judge legal cases himself on the King's ignorance of the "artificial reason" of the common
law. See Prohibitions de! Roy, 12 Coke Rep. 63, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342 (1610). Blackstone also
reiterated Coke's discussion:
Customs must be reasonable; or rather, taken negatively, they must not be unreasonable.
Which is not always, as Sir Edward Coke says, to be understood of every unlearned man's
reason, but of artificial and legal reason, warranted by authority of law.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 77 (citations to Coke omitted).
396. For example, Coke wrote "that the surest construction of a statute is by the rule
and reason of the common law." COKE ON LITTLETON, supra note 395, at 272b.
397. Dr. Bonham's Case was not the only occasion on which Coke used "against reason"
to denote unconstitutionality. Although James I removed Coke from the bench for "errors"
in his reports, possibly including his dictum in Dr. Bonham's Case (the statute voided in that
case rested on a royal charter), the elderly Coke returned to the political fray as a member of
the House of Commons in 1628 and participated in the parliamentary debates that culmi
nated in the Petition of Right. See supra note 337. Controversy had arisen when Charles I
had levied a tax in the form of a "loan" on landholders and merchants without Parliament's
approval. Whigs viewed it as an illegal tax. Subsequently, the King's ministers ordered the
arrest of persons who refused to pay it. The courts upheld the arrests. See Darnell's Case
(also called The Five Knights Case), 3 Howell St. Tr. 1 (1627) (never reprinted in the English
Reporter).
During the subsequent debate in the House of Commons, Coke denounced the illegality
of the royal order for arrest that lacked a statement of cause (virtually a general, nonjudicial
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Coke's "against reason" dictum was well known and often re
peated by political and legal writers in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. For example, John Locke invoked the principle that it
would be "unreasonable" for any man to be judge in his own case (an
obvious reference to Coke's "against reason" in Dr. Bonham's Case)
as one of his basic arguments for a social contract of government.398
Likewise, Blackstone discussed Coke's dictum early in the first volume
of his Commentaries, and, like Locke, he converted Coke's "against
reason" to "unreasonable."399
Coke's dictum in Dr. Bonham's Case also became the model for
the initial constitutional argument that American Whigs made against
Parliament's imposition of taxes on the colonies - that such taxes
violated the colonists' rights under common law.400 James Otis antici
pated that use of "against reason" when he argued that the statutory
authority for general writs of assistance was unconstitutional.401

2.

Otis's Claim that the Statute Creating the General Writ of
Assistance Was "Against Reason"

Coke's "against reason" dictum was the fulcrum for James Otis's

1761 argument during the Writs of Assistance Case. Of course, Otis
denounced the general writ of assistance as a violation of American

warrant) by declaring that "[i]t is against reason to send a man to prison and not show the
cause." S1EPHEN D. WHITE, SIR EDWARD COKE AND "THE GRIEVANCES OF THE
COMMONWEALTH," 1621-1628, at 231, 240 {1979) (citing 2 Commons Debates, 1628, at 10014 (Robert C. Johnson et al. eds., 1977)). (Blackstone later paraphrased Coke's statement
on that occasion. See infra note 418.) For a fuller treatment of Coke's use of "reason" and
"against reason," see STONER, supra note 394 (especially pp. 13-26).

398. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CrvIL GOVERNMENT §§ 12, 13 (Peter
Laslett ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1988) (stating "[t]hat it is unreasonable for Men to be Judges
in their own Cases, that Self-love will make Men partial to themselves and their Friends"),
quoted in STONER, supra note 394, at 139. Thomas Hobbes also discussed the principle that
"no man can be Judge in his own cause." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 23, 292 (C.B.
McPherson ed., Penguin Books 1984), quoted in STONER, supra note 394, at 110.
399. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 91.
400. The American cry of "no taxation without representation" was not a novel political
claim, or a "natural law" claim, but constituted a legal claim based on American colonists'
perception of their common-law right against being taxed without "consent," that is, without
the approval of their legislature. See supra note 397. Thus, one of the resolutions adopted
by the Stamp Act Congress of 1766 (to which James Otis was a delegate) resonated with
Coke's "against reason" dictum by declaring that "it is unreasonable, and inconsistent with
the principles and Spirit of the British Constitution, for the People of Great Britain, to Grant
to his Majesty, the property of the Colonists."
C.A. WESLAGER, THE STAMP ACT
CONGRESS: WITH AN EXACT COPY OF THE COMPLE1E JOURNAL 201 {1976).

401. This is not a novel observation. See, e.g., I JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at
89-95 (1971); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 3-6 (1993).
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liberties. But the crucial point is that he leveled a constitutional attack
against the legislation authorizing the writ.402
Otis opened by developing and emphasizing the high level of pro
tection the common law afforded the house under the "castle" doc
trine.403 He then established that the common-law authorities had al
ready condemned general warrants as illegal.404 From those premises,
he concluded that any statute that authorized use of a general writ
would be so contrary to the principles of common law as to be "void."
John Adams not only heard Otis's argument, but took notes and
subsequently wrote up an "abstract" of it.405 His notes of Otis's argu
ment on this point are as follows:

As to Acts of Parliament. An Act against the Constitution is void: an
Act against natural Equity is void: and if an Act of Parliament should be

made, in the very Words of this Petition, it would be void. The executive
Courts must pass such Acts into disuse. 8 Rep. 118. from Viner. Reason
of the Common Law to control an Act of Parliament.406

Previous commentators have recognized that Adams's notation to
"8 Rep 118" is a citation to Coke's opinion in Dr. Bonham's Case and
that "Viner" refers to Charles Viner's discussion of Coke's dictum;407
but they have not called attention to the fact that "8 [Coke] Rep 118"
cites the page on which Coke stated that an act of Parliament is "void"
if it is "against common right and reason,"408 perhaps because the
phrase "against . . . reason" does not actually appear in Adams's notes.
Although Adams recorded only the page citation, Otis, who spoke for
four or five hours, would have read Coke's language.409 Moreover,

402. The customs writ of assistance was entirely a creation of statutory law.

See supra

note 306.
403.

See supra text accompanying note 262.

404. Adams's notes show that Otis cited Hawkins's condemnation of general warrants.

See

2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 20, at 140; discussion supra note 76.
Smith has asserted that Otis relied on Hale's condemnation of general warrants, but his
claim appears to be entirely speculative. See SMITH, supra note 20, at 334-36.
405. See 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 20, at 123-34 (Adams's notes),
134-44 (Adams's "Abstract").

406. 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS,
courts" were the law courts.

supra

note 20, at 127-28.

The "executive

407. See CHARLEs VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY (23 vol
umes, 1741-53). It appears that Otis referred to the extract from Dr. Bonham's Case in 19
VINER, supra, at 512-13. See 2 LEGAL pAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 20, at 128 n.73.
408. Lasson and Cuddihy both recognized that Otis invoked Dr. Bonham's Case but did
not note the connection between Coke's "against reason" and Adams's "unreasonable." See
LASSON, supra note 16, at 59; see also 2 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 783-84. Smith quoted the
"common right and reason" passage from Dr. Bonham's Case, but passed over it, probably
because he was not particularly interested in discussing the Fourth Amendment itself. See
SMITH, supra note 20, at 358-64.
409.

See SMITH, supra note 20, at 257-61 (estimating Otis spoke for four or five hours).
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Otis's invocation of Coke's "against reason" is evident in Adams's no
tation that Otis asserted "[the r]eason of the Common Law [is] to con
trol an Act of Parliament."410 That Adams recorded only the page ci
tation may indicate (beyond the limitations of recording with a quill
pen) that he was already familiar with Coke's "against reason" dictum.
"Against reason" also appears in the "abstract" of Otis's argument
that Adams wrote shortly after the argument (possibly with Otis's as
sistance). The abstract, which was probably intended for a wider lay
audience, alters the order of Otis's argument from Adams's notes.
There is no quotation of Coke's "against common right and reason" at
the point where Adams describes Otis's argument that the statute was
"void."411 However, Adams's abstract describes Otis asserting, at a
slightly earlier point, that "Reason and the constitution are both
against this writ."412
It is unlikely that Adams forgot Otis's claim.413 In fact, there is di
rect evidence of Adams's familiarity with Coke's "against reason." In

1765, Adams argued, as co-counsel with Otis, that the Stamp Act was
unconstitutional. He declared it to be "against Reason."414
3.

Other Common-law Authorities' Use of "Unreasonable" to
Condemn General Warrants

The scholarly Adams undoubtedly also would have been exposed
to Coke's dictum through other common-law sources that had con
demned general warrants as "unreasonable." Although Hale had not
used the term "unreasonable" when he condemned general warrants,
he had written that a general warrant was illegal because it allowed

410. 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 20, at 128 (emphasis added). Dur
ing the second hearing, Otis also quoted Coke to the effect that " [t]he surest construction of
a statute is by the rule and reason of the common law." Paxton's Case, Mass. (Quincy) 51,
56 n.21 (1761).
411.

See 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 20, at 144.

412 Id. at 143. When Otis wrote a 1762 newspaper column that repeated his legal ar
guments for a lay audience, he referred to searches under writs of assistance as "unreason
able." See Otis's 1762 Article, supra note 20, at 562, 563 (describing an officer's assertion of
authority to search a house under a writ of assistance as "his unreasonable . . . demands").
413. Otis had been Adams's mentor, and Adams often recalled Otis's role in the forma
tive period of the American revolution. Contemporaneously with the Declaration of Inde
pendence in 1776, Adams described "the argument concerning the writs of assistance" as the
beginning of the struggle with Britain, see LASSON, supra note 16, at 61, and he gave much
the same account at the end of his career, see id. at 59, 60 n.39. Writers who dismiss the eld
erly Adams's statements about Otis overlook the statement he made in 1776. See, e.g.,
Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at 772.
414. "Notes on the Opening of the Courts," reprinted in 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS,
supra note 382, at 150, 151 ("Acts of Parliament that are against Reason, or impossible to be
performed shall be judged void. 8 Rep. 118. 128. 129. . . ."). Note that Adams omitted
Coke's "common right" and simply wrote that the statute was "against reason."
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the executing officer to act as judge in his own case415 - the same
principle Coke had earlier invoked in Dr. Bonham's Case. Thereafter,
it was a short step for other writers to condemn general warrants as
"against reason" or "unreasonable."
A 1742 treatise on the law of arrest used in colonial Boston
(probably by Otis and Adams) condemned "the Unreasonableness,
and the seeming Unwarrantableness of [general warrants]."416 In addi
tion, during the 1765 argument in Entick, Serjeant John Glynn, the
well-known London lawyer who represented Entick (and who had
previously represented John Wilkes and his supporters), belittled a
warrant authorizing a search of papers as an "unreasonable or unlaw
ful warrant."417 Similarly, when Blackstone discussed the inherent rights
of Englishmen in 1765, he invoked Coke's earlier assertion that an im
prisonment under an unspecific warrant would be "against reason" and converted "against reason" to "unreasonable."418
Thus, the powerful "unreasonable" had already emerged as the
pejorative of choice for condemning the inherent illegality of general
warrants well before Adams penned the 1780 Massachusetts provision.
It is worth noting, however, that framing-era common-law sources did
not apply "unreasonable" to mere "unlawful" intrusions by warrant
less officers - it was too grand a pejorative for mere personal tres
passes committed by ordinary officers.419

415.

See supra note 75 and accompanying text.

416. 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 20, at 102 n.74 (quoting THE LAW
OF ARREsTS § 8, at 173-74 {London 1742)) {"And yet there is a Precedent of such general
Warrant in Dalton's Justice, notwithstanding the Unreasonableness, and seeming Unwar
rantableness of such practice."). Adams apparently referred to this passage in his legal notes
for a 1765 case. See 1 id. at 102 n.74.
417. Glynn's labeling the papers search warrant "unreasonable" as well as his statement
that office practices that are "unreasonable, contrary to common right, or purely against
law" are "void," appeared in 2 Wils. at 283, 95 Eng. Rep. at 812 {the shorter version of
Entick published in 1770, see supra note 25). Glynn's reference to a warrant as "unlawful,"
rather than "illegal," is unusual; I speculate he may have used "unlawful," the language of
personal misconduct, to underscore the complete lack of legal authority for the Secretary of
State to issue any such warrant. Glynn was well known to the Framers because of his repre
sentation of Wilkes. For example, Georgia included "Glynn" along with "Wilkes" and
"Camden" among the names it adopted for counties.
418. After stating that a warrant of commitment to prison must "express the causes of
the commitment," Blackstone cited Coke for the principle "that it is unreasonable to send a
prisoner, and not to signify withal the crimes alleged against him." 1 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 27, at 133 (emphasis added). The reference to Coke appears to be to Coke's argument
during the debate over the Petition of Right. See supra note 397. This statement by
Blackstone appears in a discussion of the inherent rights of Englishmen at common law in
the first volume of his Commentaries - a part that would have been widely read.
419.

See supra note 313.
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Thus, John Adams likely had a ready-made qualifier for "searches
and seizures" when he wrote the Massachusetts provision.420 Because
"unreasonable" was a pejorative synonym for gross illegality or un
constitutionality, "unreasonable searches and seizures" simply meant
searches and seizures that were inherently illegal at common law.421
As a result, the Framers would have understood "unreasonable
searches and seizures" as the pejorative label for searches or arrests
made under that most illegal pretense of authority - general war
rants.422

VII. THE

ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The historical record of the framing of the Fourth Amendment
shows that it was essentially a replay of the framing of the state provi
sions. The anti-Federalists who called for a federal search and seizure
protection focused on the threat that general warrants might be used for
federal revenue searches of houses. Madison proposed a federal provi
sion which only forbade general warrants and which he consistently de
scribed as a ban on general warrants. Although Madison's text was al420. There are several reasons why it would not have suited Adams to simply write that
there was a right not to have one's person, house, papers or possessions violated by a general
warrant. For one thing, the term "general warrant" was not a precise term of art. See supra
note 12. For another, that formulation lacked rhetorical punch; use of the term "unreason
able" connoted that the ban against general warrants was of a fundamental character.
"illegal" is another term that may seem to have fit Adams's need; why did he not simply
write that there was a right against "illegal" searches and seizures of persons, houses, papers,
and possessions? I think the problem with that formulation was that it did not adequately
address the issue of legislation. A statute could usually prescribe what was legal (as Adams's
third statement implicitly recognized). The main point of the constif.utional provision ban
ning general warrants was to prohibit the legislature from enacting a statute that would
make loose warrants legal. Thus, simply articulating a right against "illegal" searches and
seizures would not have accomplished anything.
421. The label "unreasonable searches and seizures" also captured the second sort of in
herently illegal warrant - one issued for a purpose not authorized by positive law and thus
violative of the third statement in Adams's text. See Adam's inclusion of the Entick princi
ple in the final statement of the Massachusetts provision discussed supra text accompanying
note 381.
422. There is no reason to doubt that the other Framers understood "unreasonable
searches and seizures" the same way Adams did. See, for example, discussion of the resolu
tion of the Stamp Act Congress supra note 400. In 1774, Roger Sherman stated in the Con
tinental Congress that " '[t]he Colonies adopt the common Law, not as the common Law,
but as the highest Reason.' " WOOD, supra note 329, at 9 (quoting Roger Sherman). In
1784, Alexander Hamilton cited Coke's opinion in Dr. Bonham's Case as authority when he
argued that a New York statute was unconstitutional and void. See Alexander Hamilton,
Brief No. 4 from Rutgers v. Waddington (undated), reprinted in I LAW PRACTICE OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 282, 357 (Julius Goebel, Jr. ed., 1964) (stating that "[a] statute
against law and reason especially if a private statute is void,'' and citing "8 [Coke Rep.] 118 a
& b" ). In 1789, a South Carolina court ruled that "[i]t is clear, that statutes passed against
the plain and obvious principles of common right, and common reason, are absolutely null
and void, as far as they are calculated to operate against those principles.'' Ham v. M'Claws,
1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 38, 40 (1789).
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tered to the final two-clause format during debate in the House of Rep
resentatives, the historical record is devoid of any indication that the
change was meant to create a standard for warrantless intrusions by fed
eral officers; rather, it simply gave a more imperative tone to Madison's
proposal. Like the state framers, the federal Framers believed that a ban
against general warrants would suffice to protect the security of person
and house.
A.

Anti-Federalist Proposals for a Federal Protection Against
General Warrants

Any lingering question as to the illegality of general warrants had
disappeared by the time of the ratification debates in 1787-88.423 In
fact, the various state legislatures had earlier banned the use of gen
eral warrants by national customs officers during a failed attempt to
create a national customs revenue during the mid-1780s.424 The only
unsettled question at that time was whether the ban against general
warrants also applied to premises other than houses.
When anti-Federalists made the absence of a federal Bill of Rights
the centerpiece of their opposition to ratification of the Constitution
(at least without amendments), they expressed concern over the lack
of a protection against general warrants.425 Thus, those among the
anti-Federalists calling for a federal bill of rights usually included a
ban against general warrants among the needed protections. Inter
estingly, however, the anti-Federalist pamphleteers did not usually

423. The acceptance of the illegality of general warrants is demonstrated by the earliest
reported state search and seizure decision, Frisbie v. Butler, 1 Kirby 213 {Conn. 1785) (rec
ognizing that a warrant to search an entire village for a stolen pig was invalid). The fact that
this decision was by a Connecticut court - a state that had not adopted a search and seizure
provision as such - demonstrates the acceptance of the illegality of general warrants at
common law. Kirby's reports were the first set of state court reports published in any
American state.
424. These statutes are cited and discussed in 3 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1347-51. I
disagree with Cuddihy's suggestion, however, that some of these statutes permitted general
search warrants; rather, they consistently required specific warrants for house searches. See
supra note 299.
425. See supra notes 98, 164, 166.
Chief Justice Rehnquist has written that "[t]he Framers originally decided not to include
a provision like the Fourth Amendment, because they believed the National Government
lacked power to conduct searches and seizures." United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259, 266 {1990} (citing WARREN, supra note 16, at 508-09). I do not find any compara
ble statement in Warren. In any event, the statement is historically incorrect. Although
Federalists made a general argument that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary in view of the
limited powers of the proposed government, it was widely assumed that customs would be
the chief revenue source for the new national government and that federal customs collec
tors would be empowered to make searches and seizures to enforce it; that is evident in the
provisions for search authority for federal officers in the state statutes discussed in the pre
ceding note.
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adopt John Adam.s's reference to "unreasonable searches and sei
zures." In fact, the anti-Federalist factions in the Pennsylvania and
Maryland ratification conventions (the first two state conventions that
witnessed substantial opposition to ratification) both proposed federal
search and seizure provisions that simply banned general warrants
without including any statement of the "right" at issue.
The
Pennsylvania anti-Federalists actually dropped the introductory right
statement that had been included in their own state provision.426
Use of the phrase "unreasonable searches and seizures" as part of
an introductory right statement likely became popular among the anti
Federalists because it was used in the Letters of a Federal Farmer
the most influential of the anti-Federalist pamphlets. The author of
the Letters most likely used John Adam.s's Massachusetts text as a
template for his proposed federal protection against what he called
"unreasonable searches and seizures," or, alternatively, "hasty and un
reasonable search warrants."427 The influence of the Letters, or of
Richard Henry Lee (who may have been their author),428 probably ac
counts for the inclusion of an introductory right statement regarding
"unreasonable searches and seizures" in the influential proposal for a
federal ban against general warrants that was adopted by the Virginia
-

426. The Pennsylvania anti-Federalists proposed:
5. That warrants unsupported by evidence, whereby any officer or messenger may be com
manded or required to search suspected places, or to seize any person or persons, his or their
property, not particularly described, are grievous and oppressive, and shall not be granted ei
ther by the magistrates of the federal government or others.
COGAN, supra note 122, at 233 (6.1.2.5). Note that this is basically the 1776 Pennsylvania
provision, see quotation supra text accompanying note 353, with the deletion of the introduc
tory right statement and the addition of the final reference to federal magistrates. Because
the anti-Federalists tended to take libertarian positions, I speculate that the Pennsylvania
anti-Federalists dropped the right statement to enlarge the protection beyond the limited
scope of the ban implied by the persons-houses-papers-possessions formula of the state pro
vision. See supra note 370 and accompanying text.

The Maryland anti-Federalists advanced a similar proposal for a straightforward ban
against too-loose warrants:
8. That all warrants without oath, or affirmation of a person conscientiously scrupulous of
taking an oath, to search suspected places, or seize any person or his property, are grievous
and oppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend any
person suspected, without naming or describing the place or person in special, are danger
ous, and ought not to be granted
COGAN, supra note 122, at 232 (6.1.2.1). This proposal, however, tracked the 1776 Maryland
provision, which also had not included an introductory right statement. See supra note 351;
see also supra note 164.

427. See description of the calls for a federal protection in the fourth, sixth, and six
teenth letters discussed supra notes 122, 127, 128 and accompanying text.
428. See Richard Henry Lee's call for a federal protection discussed supra note 120 and
accompanying text; authorship of the Letters discussed supra note 121.
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ratification convention (and that was also subsequently adopted by the
ratification conventions in New York and North Carolina).429
B.

Madison's Proposal for a Federal Ban Against
"General Warrants"

James Madison took up the task of drafting a proposal for federal
rights amendments. He had the experience for it, having served on
the committee that had drafted the Virginia declaration of rights and
constitution in 1776,4:,o and on the committee of the Virginia ratifica
tion convention that had proposed federal rights amendments in
1788.431
Madison did not, however, simply reiterate the search and seizure
proposal advanced by the Virginia ratification convention. Instead, he
borrowed from a number of previous provisions to fashion a novel
proposal. Rather than adopting the usual two-clause format of an in
troductory right statement that "therefore" required the banning of

429.

The Virginia ratification convention proposed:

Fourteenth, That every freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and
siezures of his person, his papers and his property; all warrants, therefore, to search sus·
pected places, or sieze any freeman, his papers or property, without information upon Oath
(or affirmation of a person religiously scrupulous of taking an oath) of legal and sufficient
cause, are grievous and oppressive; and all general Warrants to search suspected places, or
to apprehend any suspected person, without specially naming or describing the place or per
son, are dangerous and ought not to be granted.
COGAN, supra note 122, at 233

(6.1.2.6).

Lasson asserted that the language of the Virginia ratification convention resolution "was
broader than the analogous clause in the [1776] Virginia Bill of Rights which had only con
cerned itself with general warrants" and that this language "added the principle of security
from unreasonable search and seizure." LASSON, supra note 16, at 95-96. That assertion,
however, rests on the unsupported assumption that "unreasonable" was intended to be a
standard distinct from the standards for valid warrants.
George Wythe moved this proposal in the Virginia convention on beha.lf of a bipartisan
committee that included James Madison. See Proposed Amendments Agreed upon by the
Anti-federal Committee of Richmond and Dispatched to New York, June 11, 1788, reprinted
in 3 PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, supra note 346, at 1071. The introductory right statement
tracks that found in the sixteenth of the Letters from the Federal Fanner and the 1780
Massachusetts provision. See supra note 128; text accompanying note 379. The language
banning too-loose warrants appears to be a slightly expanded version of the Maryland anti
Federalist proposal. See supra note 426.
For the New York version of the proposal, see COGAN, supra note 122, at 233 (6.1.2.3);
for the North Carolina version, see id. (6.1.2.4). Samuel Adams also made a motion that
called for a federal protection against "unreasonable searches and seizures" during the
Massachusetts convention, which was withdrawn during political maneuvering. See supra
note 123 and accompanying text

430. See 1 nm PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 98, at 170-71. This suggests
that Madison participated in the decision to add a ban against general warrants to Mason's
initial draft of the Virginia declaration. See supra note 346.
431. See supra note 429.

The Original Fourth Amendment

December 1999]

697

general warrants, Madison collapsed the substance of the two state
ments into a single-clause provision:
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their
papers, and their other property from all unreasonable searches and sei
zures, shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the
places to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized.432

Several features of Madison's proposal are noteworthy.
1.

Madison's Single-Clause Format

Madison's use of a single-clause format is significant. Madison's
motive for collapsing the right statement and the warrant standards
into a single clause was likely stylistic - he appears to have disliked
the "therefore" constructions that were common in earlier declara
tions of rights and proposals for a federal declaration.433 As a result,

432. James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789) [hereinaf
ter Speech of James Madison], in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 98, at 197,
201; see also COGAN, supra note 122, at 223 (6.1.1.1.a-c). Madison's proposal obviously in
cluded borrowings from the language of the Pennsylvania provision (for example, "the peo
ple," see supra note 363), and from the Massachusetts provision and Virginia ratification
convention resolutions ("right to be secured" and "unreasonable searches and seizures," see
supra text accompanying notes 379, 429). Madison also followed the Virginia convention's
preference for defining the scope of the protection more broadly to reach persons, houses,
papers, and "other property" rather than "possessions," as discussed in the text infra.
433. Previous commentaries have not ventured any explanation for Madison's adoption
of a single-clause provision. I think the significant clue is that Madison did not use a single
"therefore" format in any of the federal rights amendments he proposed. See Speech of
James Madison, supra note 432, at 200-02. The complete absence of that format suggests a
stylistic aversion, because it had been used in all of the prior state search and seizure provi
sions, and proposals for a federal search and seizure protection that included an introductory
right statement. Likewise, it had been frequently used in provisions dealing with other rights
in the state declarations of rights and in proposals for a federal bill of rights.
Madison's proclivity to adopt different language to articulate rights previously identified
in the various state declarations or state ratification convention proposals is also evident in
his treatment of the common-law protection against compelled self-accusation. Madison
proposed "No person . . . shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." See Speech of
James Madison, supra note 432, at 201; see also COGAN, supra note 122, at 315 (9.1.1.1.a).
However, the initial provision adopted by Virginia in 1776 had stated that no man "can be
compelled to give evidence against himself." VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS of 1776, § VIII, re
printed in COGAN, supra note 122, at 330 (9.13.8). Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
North Carolina, and Vermont had repeated that formulation. See COGAN, supra note 122,
at 328-30 {9.13.6.a, 9.13.1, 9.13.2, 9.135, 9.1.3.7). In keeping with John Adams's more de
tailed drafting style, the 1780 Massachusetts declaration had adopted a somewhat fuller
statement that "No subject shall . . . be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against him
self." MASS. CONST. of 1780, part I, art. XII, reprinted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 328
(9.133.b.). New Hampshire had also adopted that formulation. See COGAN, supra note
122, at 329 (9.1.3.4). The Virginia, New York, and North Carolina ratification conventions
all had proposed that no person should "be compelled to give evidence against himself." See
COGAN, supra note 122, at 326-28 (9.1.2.1-9.1.2.5).
Some prior commentators have asserted that these minor language variations are signifi
cant, and that Madison's "compelled to be a witness" formulation was narrower than earlier
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formulations. See, e.g., Amar & Lettow, supra note 320, at 919 & n.274. However, the his
torical record shows that was not the case.
The record of the House debate over the language that became the Fifth Amendment
provides direct evidence that Madison's "compelled to be a witness against himself' was un
derstood to be synonymous with the earlier usage of "compelled to give evidence against
himself." Representative Lawrance voiced the only objection to Madison's proposal when
he complained that Madison's language was a "general declaration" that was too broad un
less it was explicitly limited to criminal cases. See discussion infra note 450. The record
states that Lawrance "alluded to that part where a person shall not be compelled to give evi
dence against himself." See COGAN, supra note 122, at 330 (9.2.1.2.a) (recording House de
bate, August 17, 1789) (emphasis added). Thus, Madison's "be a witness" language was un
derstood to be interchangeable with the earlier "give evidence" language during the House
debate.
Moreover, had Madison's language been perceived as narrower than earlier constitu
tional statements, zealous advocates of a strong bill of rights undoubtedly would have criti
cized it during that debate. {Elbridge Gerry did criticize several of Madison's other propos
als, including his search and seizure proposal, for being too weakly stated. See infra notes
482, 493-497 and accompanying text). However, the Committee of Eleven accepted
Madison's language without alteration, see COGAN, supra note 122, at 316 (9.1.1.2), and
there is no indication anyone criticized Madison's language as being too narrow during the
House debate.
Indeed, the precise phrasing of the protection against self-accusation was inconsequen
tial in any event. When the Framers drafted bills of rights, they undertook to preserve ex
isting doctrines, not formulate new ones. They usually did not attempt to define the rights in
detail; rather, they simply invoked the then-shared understanding of well-settled common
law rights. See supra notes 329-331 and accompanying text. {The state search and seizure
provisions and the Fourth Amendment were unusually detailed because the legal requisites
of search and arrest warrants had been the subject of controversy only a decade or two prior
to the framings.)
The most significant feature of the common-law statements of the right against com
pelled self-accusation was the breadth with which they were stated.
For example,
Blackstone, in the 1765 first volume of his commentaries, gave two examples of "established
rules and maxims" of the common law - one was that "no 'man shall be bound to accuse
himself.' " 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 68. In his 1769 fourth volume he stated that
"at the common law, nemo tenebatur prodere seipsum [no one is bound to betray himself];
and his fault was not to be wrung out of himself, but rather to be discovered by other means
and other men." 4 id. at 293 {bracketed translation of the Latin from Black's Law Diction
ary); see also infra note 574. Likewise, Chief Justice Pratt (Lord Camden) stated in his jury
instructions during the 1763 trial in Wood that one reason the seizure of papers under a gen
eral warrant was illegal, see supra note 21, was that "nothing can be more unjust in itself,
than that proof of a man's guilt shall be extracted from his own bosom.'' Wilkes v. Wood,
Lofft 1, 3, 19 Howell St. Tr. 1153, 1155, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 490 {C.P. 1763) (case report pub
lished in 1776, see supra note 25); see also cases discussed infra note 511.
The most significant innovation in Madison's presentation of the right against com
pelled self-accusation was not his wording but rather where he placed it in the Bill of Rights.
Whereas some earlier state provisions or state ratification proposals might have appeared to
have bundled the right with trial rights, Madison did not include it in the provision he pro
posed for rights "[i]n all criminal prosecutions" (namely, the language that became the Sixth
Amendment). Rather, he set it out in an earlier provision in combination with the ban
against double jeopardy, the broad "due process of law" protection, and a "takings" clause.
See Speech of James Madison, supra note 432, at 201. That placement makes it clear that he
understood the right to apply to any aspect or stage of a criminal matter. See also infra note
450. Although the Committee of Eleven and the House did move some provisions around in
framing the final Bill of Rights {for example, the grand jury provision), there is no indication
anyone objected to Madison's placement of the right against being "compelled to be a wit-
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his text defined the violation of the "right" to be secure solely in terms
of "warrants issued without probable cause [or particularity]." Thus,
as previous commentators have almost uniformly conceded, Madison's
text only banned general warrants but did not reach warrantless intru
sions.434
Because Madison's text reached only warrant authority, he must
have used "unreasonable" to describe only those searches and seizures
made under general warrants. In fact, Madison referred to this provi
sion as a protection from "general warrants" at least once (possibly
twice) in his speech introducing proposed rights amendments in the
House of Representatives, as well as in three letters.435 There is no re-

ness." Thus, the language and placement of the right in the Fifth Amendment invoked the
full breadth of the common-law right.
Another example of Madison's innovative drafting was his use of the term "due process of
law" instead of "law of the land" in the what became the Fifth Amendment The preceding state
constitutions and declarations ofrights had almost uniformly used "law of the land," see CoGAN,
supra note 122, at 349-53 {10.13.1.b - 10.13.12), as had most of the state ratification convention
proposals for federal rights amendments, see id. at 348-49 (10.122-10.1.2.4). The only prior use
of "due process of law" had appeared in the 17'0/ New York statutory bill of rights and the New
York ratification convention proposal for federal amendments. See id. at 353 (10.13.6.c), 348
(10.1.2.1). Nevertheless, Madison chose the less used formulation. See supra notes 332-333 and
accompanying text
434. See, e.g., LANDYNSKI, supra note 38, at 41-42; LASSON, supra note 16, at 100;
supra note 49, at 42-43; Amsterdam, supra note 38, at 468 n.465; Kamisar, supra
note 38, at 573-74. This also appears to be Amar's understanding; he asserted that "in early
drafts of the federal Fourth, it is the loose warrant, not the warrantless intrusion, that is ex
plicitly labeled 'unreasonable.' " See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at 775. Levy
also has viewed Madison's text as being narrower than the final text, but for peculiar rea
sons. See infra note 474.

TAYLOR,

Cuddihy, however, asserted that "Madison's original proposal . . . embraced the full
breadth of the final version [of the Fourth Amendment] simply by acknowledging the multi
ple categories of unreasonable searches and seizures against which rights existed." 3
Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1410; see also id. at 1476-77 (suggesting that Madison only altered
the "phraseology" of the earlier proposals). It appears that Cuddihy concluded that Madi
son was addressing "multiple categories of unreasonable searches and seizures" because
Madison used the plural "rights" when he referred to "the rights of the people." {No his
torical source ever referred to "multiple categories of unreasonable searches and seizures"
- that is only the conceptual framework that Cuddihy himself employed.) Madison's use of
the plural "rights" may have simply reflected his use of the collective terms "the people" and
"their" persons, houses, papers, and property.
435. Madison referred to his proposed protection as a prohibition against Congress ap
proving "general warrants" in his June 8, 1789, speech to the House on rights amendments.
Speech of James Madison, supra note 432, at 205; see also COGAN, supra note 122, at 53, 55
{l.2.1.1.a) (excerpting from Madison's statement). {One observer of Madison's speech also
described his search and seizure proposal as "exemption from general warrants." Letter
from Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight (June 11, 1789), reprinted in COGAN, supra note 122,
at 242 (6.25.2).) Madison's notes for his speech to the House show he also planned to refer
to "GI. Warrants" a second time during the speech in a passage describing several desirable
rights not included in the English Declaration of Rights. James Madison, Notes for Speech
in Congress (June 8, 1789) [hereinafter Madison's Notes], reprinted in 12 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 98, at 193. No such reference, however, appears in the corre
sponding part of the report of his speech.
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cord, however, of his expressing concern about warrantless intrusions
nor even of his referring generically to the provision as a protection
against "unreasonable searches and seizures."436

2.

Madison's Focus on Banning Legislative Approval of
General Warrants

Madison also proposed that most of the rights amendments, in
cluding the ban against general warrants, be added to Article I's limi
tations on Congressional power rather than be stated in a supplemen
tal bill of rights.437 The proposed placement strongly suggests that
Madison conceived his proposal as a deprivation of Congress's power
to authorize use of general warrants438 - not as a constraint on the
The three letters were: Letter from James Madison to George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789), re
printed in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 98, at 404, 405 (endorsing "provi

sions for all essential rights, particularly the rights of Conscience in the fullest latitude, the
freedom of the press, trials by jury, security against general warrants &c."); and Letter from
James Madison to Thomas Mann Randolph (Jan. 13, 1789), reprinted in 11 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 98, at 415, 416 (endorsing "the clearest, and strongest provi
sion . . . for all those essential rights, which have been thought in danger, such as the rights of
conscience, the freedom of the press, trials by jury, exemption from general warrants, &c.");
Letter from James Madison to a Resident of Spotsylvania County (Jan. 27, 1789), reprinted
in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 98, at 428 (endorsing "specific provi
sion[s] made on the subject of the Rights of Conscience, The Freedom of the Press, Trials by
Jury, Exemption from General Warrants, &c."). These three letters are identified in 3
Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1405 n.79.
436. Madison's arguments regarding the need for a federal search and seizure provision
have sometimes been misstated as though he had expressed a fear about customs searches
being made without warrant. Writing in 1928, Charles Warren asserted, in an apparent ref
erence to Madison's speech to the House regarding the need for rights amendments, that
Madison feared that customs officers would make searches "without warrants." See
WARREN, supra note 16, at 508-09. Warren's statement is an example of prochronistic histo
riography; he treated the dominant issue of search law at the time he wrote {after Weeks and
Carroll) as though it were the historical issue - even though Madison had not expressed any
doubt that revenue searches would employ some sort of warrant. See the text of Madison's
statement, quoted infra note 438.
437. Madison proposed putting the provisions that became the first, second, third, fifth
(except the grand jury clause), eighth, fourth, sixth (except the trial by local jury clause) and
ninth amendments "in article 1st, section 9, between clauses 3 and 4." See Speech of James
Madison, supra note 432, at 201-02. He proposed putting the local jury trial clause, the
grand jury clause, and the provision that became the seventh amendment Gury trials in civil
cases) in "article 3d, section 2 . . . ." Id. at 202; see also Edward Hartnett, A 'Uniform and
Entire' Constitution; Or, What ifMadison Had Won?, 15 CONST. COMMENTARY 251 {1998).
438. Madison's reason for inserting most of the rights amendments into the limits on
Congressional power in Article I is evident in the explanation that he gave during his speech
to the House:

In our government it is [necessary to guard against abuse by] the legislative, for it is the most
powerful [branch], and most likely to be abused, because it is under the least controul;
hence, so far as a declaration of rights can tend to prevent the exercise of undue power, it
cannot be doubted but such declaration is proper.
Speech of James Madison, supra note 432, at 204. He also referred to the need to check the
legislature indirectly when he stated that "the prescriptions in favor of liberty ought to be
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conduct of ordinary officers. Likewise, when Madison introduced his
proposals for rights amendments in the House, he specifically men
tioned the need to include a provision banning "general warrants" to
make clear that the Necessary and Proper Clause did not empower
Congress to authorize general warrants for revenue collections
(though he did not limit the threat posed by general warrants to that
setting).439
Madison's treatment of the search and seizure provision as a limit
on legislative power also explains why he omitted any statement of a
remedy for a violation of the right to be secure. To begin with, an ex
plicit constitutional prohibition would inhibit Congress from author
izing general warrants. In addition, although the Framers may have
held a variety of views regarding the appropriate scope of judicial re
view, the evidence suggests that they would have expected, at a mini
mum, that courts would decline to enforce legislation that conflicted
with the essential rights announced in the Constitution.440 Indeed, belevelled against . . . the body of the people, operating by the majority against the minority."
These concerns are consistent with Madison's previously expressed concern that the leg
islative branch would tend to "draw O all power into its impetuous vortex."
THE
FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison).

Id.

439. Madison said the following:
It is true that the powers of the general government are circumscribed, they are directed to
particular objects; but even if government keeps with those limits, it has certain discretionary
powers with respect to the means, which may admit of abuse to a certain extent, in the same
manner as the powers of the state governments under their constitutions may to an indefi
nite extent . . . . Now, may not laws be considered necessary and proper by Congress, for it is
them who are to judge of the necessity and propriety to accomplish those special purposes
which they may have in contemplation, which laws in themselves are neither necessary or
proper; as well as improper laws could be enacted by the state legislatures, for fulfilling the
more extended objects of those governments. I will state an instance which I think in point,
and proves that this might be the case. The general government has a right to pass all laws
which shall be necessary to collect its revenue; the means for enforcing the collection are
within the direction of the legislature: may not general warrants be considered necessary for
this purpose, as well as for some purposes which it was supposed at the framing of their con
stitutions the state governments had in view. If there was reason for restraining the state
governments from exercising this power, there is like reason for restraining the federal gov
ernment.
Speech of James Madison, supra note 432, at 205-06; see also COGAN, supra note 122, at 55
(1.2.1.1.a) (excerpting Madison's speech). Madison may have borrowed this point from
Patrick Henry's expression of concern, during the Virginia ratification convention, that the
"necessary and proper clause" would permit general warrants. See Patrick Henry, State
ments Before the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 14, 1788), reprinted in 3 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 84, at 439, 442, 448. Elbridge Gerry had also singled out the Necessary
and Proper Clause as a power that "rendered insecure" the rights of citizens. See GEORGE
ATIIAN BILLIAS, ELBRIDGE GERRY, FOUNDING FATHER AND REPUBLICAN STATESMAN
199 (1976).
440. Although there may not have been a clear consensus as to the appropriate scope
for judicial review among the Framers, there is little doubt that they at least intended that
the federal courts would exercise review over the constitutionality of legislation that im
pinged on tradition judicial functions and subject matter. For example, during the Constitu
tional Convention of 1787, Madison expressed doubts "whether it was not going too far to
extend the jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases arising Under the Constitution, &

702

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:547

cause general warrants would have to be issued by a judge, the judici
ary could enforce the ban against general warrants simply by refusing
to act - the remedy Otis had sought in 1761 and that the colonial
courts had provided when they refused to issue "illegal" general writs
under the Townshend Act.441 Additionally, even if Congress were to
pass such a statute and a wayward judge were to issue a general war
rant, another court could still treat the warrant as a nullity in a subse
quent trespass action or prosecution for resisting execution of the war
rant.442 Given these layers of protection against the use of general
warrants, it should not be surprising that neither Madison nor the
other Framers made any explicit provision for a "remedy."

whether it ought not to be limited to cases of a Judiciary Nature." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Ferrand ed., 1911, reprinted 1966) [hereinafter
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION]. His notes show that the response to his query
was that it was "generally supposed that the jurisdiction given was constructively limited to
cases of a Judiciary nature." Id. The significant point, for present purposes, is that legisla
tion dealing with the issuance of warrants, or with other aspects of crinlinal procedure,
would have been understood to be "of a Judiciary nature."
Madison's expectation that there would be judicial review regarding legislation affecting
procedural rights is also evident in his speech to the House on June 8, 1789, when he argued:
[If provisions regarding rights] are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals
of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they
will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or ex
ecutive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipu
lated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights.

Speech of James Madison, supra note 432, at

206-07.

There are a variety of other endorsements of the principle of judicial review in the rec
ords of the Constitutional Convention, the debates over ratification, and the state ratifying
conventions.
The best known endorsement was by Alexander Hamilton in nm
FEDERALIST No. 78. See also Eldridge Gerry, Statements Before the Federal Convention
(July 21, 1787), reprinted in 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra, at 97-98;
Patrick Henry, Statement Before the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 12, 1788), re
printed in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 84, at 313, 325; Patrick Henry, Statement Before
the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 15, 1788), reprinted in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, su
pra note 84, at 460, 462; John Marshall, Statement Before the Virginia Ratification Conven
tion (June 20, 1788), reprinted in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 84, at 551, 553-54.

441. Otis called on the Massachusetts Court to "pass into disuse" the statute that pur
ported to authorize issuance of general warrants. See supra text accompanying note 406.
Likewise, the colonial courts had generally refused to issue general writs despite the statu
tory authority provided by the Townshend Act. See supra note 26.
Unfortunately, works on the historical origins of American judicial review have some
times focused on judicial review of Congressional powers granted in Article I, without ade
quately addressing the implications of the adoption of the Bill of Rights as a limit on con
gressional power. See, e.g., LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING, supra note 45, at 89-123 (1988);
J.M. SOSIN, THE ARISTOCRACY OF THE LONG ROBE: THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

IN AMERICA (1989).
442 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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Madison's Use of "Probable Cause"

Madison's draft also adopted "probable cause" as the standard of
cause for a valid warrant, a standard that had not been used in any of
the previous state provisions or anti-Federalist_ proposals. Instead,
Madison (who had expertise in customs legislation443) may have bor
rowed "probable cause" from a 1786 Pennsylvania statute allowing for
a national customs collection.444
Significantly, "probable cause" alone was not the common-law
standard for criminal warrants; as described above, common law re
quired that arrest or search warrants had to be based on an allegation
of an offense or theft "in fact" as well as "probable cause of suspicion"
as to a particular person to be arrested or place to be searched.445 An
English excise statute, however, had authorized revenue officers to ob
tain search warrants on probable cause standing- alone, without any
allegation of a "fact" of a violation446 ---.:. a lower threshold of cause
than that required for criminal warrants.447 Madison's adoption of a
443. Madison had authored a Virginia customs statute in 1787; hence, it is likely that he
was familiar with the various state customs statutes as well as the state statutes enacted in
the unsuccessful attempt to authorize a national impost. See James Madison, Bill concerning
the Collection of Duties (Jan. 8, 1787), reprinted in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, su
pra note 98, at 232-42.
444. The Pennsylvania statute required a sworn-to showing of "probable cause" as a
condition for the granting of a search warrant for a house to a national customs collector.
Act of April 8, 1786, ch. 30, § 3. So far as I can determine, this statute is the only American
source, predating Madison's draft, that used "probable cause," standing alone, as a standard
for a warrant. The Pennsylvania statute may have borrowed the probable cause standard
from the English excise or customs statutes discussed infra note 446.
445. The allegations of an offense "in fact" required for a complaint to support a crimi
nal arrest or search warrant are discussed supra notes 290-292 and accompanying text.
446. English revenue statutes used the "probable cause" standard in two ways. One
was as a protection for the officer in a case in which seized goods or ships were acquitted in
forfeiture proceedings; in that circumstance, the court that adjudged the seized goods not
forfeit could nevertheless protect the officer from a trespass action by certifying that the of
ficer had possessed "probable cause" for the seizure. English cilstoms statutes that applied
in the American colonies offered this protection. See supra note 295.
English revenue statutes also had employed probable cause as grounds for the issuance
of an excise search warrant. See, e.g., 10 Geo. 1, ch. 10, § 13 (English excise statute that was
never in effect in the American colonies, but that the Framers probably became familiar
with when they began to formulate revenue statutes in the 1780s). Lord Mansfield suggested
the reason for allowing revenue warrants to be issued on the lower threshold of probable
cause: namely, that a revenue search warrant should be more available to a revenue officer
than a search warrant for stolen goods should be to a private complainant, because the for
mer was "for the benefit of the public, and it is for their benefit that the parties may proceed
safely on reasonable grounds." See Cooper v. Boot, 4 Doug. 339, 349, 99 Eng. Rep. 911, 916
(K.B. 1785). The implication seems to be that the search for stolen property was only a pri
vate benefit to the victim. Note, however, that the Framers were unfamiliar with Cooper
because it was not published as of 1789. See supra note 19.
447. Prior commentators have either understated or misunderstood this point. Lasson
noted that Hale had written that the examination of a complainant seeking an arrest warrant
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probable cause standard for warrants, without any reference to an al
legation of an offense "in fact," seems geared specifically to customs
searches and indicates the federal Framers' specific concern with
regulating revenue searches448 (which may explain why "probable
cause" met a mixed reception among subsequent state drafters).449 Al
though Madison's formulation assured that the wording of the federal

should included "whether a crime had actually been committed and the reasons for his sus
picions." LASSON, supra note 16, at 35 (citing 2 HALE, supra note 75, at 110). However,
when Lasson described the requirements for a search wa"ant for stolen property, he de
scribed Hale as stating that such a search warrant could be issued "after a showing, upon
oath, of the suspicion and the 'probable cause' thereof, to the satisfaction of the magistrate."
LASSON, supra note 16, at 35-36 (citing 2 HALE, supra note 75, at 150). Actually, Hale had
stated that search warrants "are not to be granted without oath made before the justice ofa
felony committed, and that the party complaining hath probable cause to suspect [the stolen
goods] are in such a house or place, and do shew his reasons of such suspicion." 2 HALE,
supra note 75, at 149-50 (emphasis added). Thus, because Lasson's treatment of search war
rants understated Hale's insistence on an allegation of felony-in-fact, it allowed readers to
erroneously believe that common law permitted a search warrant to be issued on "probable
cause" alone.
Subsequent commentators have written as though the cause standard for a warrant had
evolved from weaker statements up to the probable cause threshold. See, e.g., LEVY,
ORIGINAL MEANING, supra note 45; Cuddihy, supra note 20. Actually, the evolution was
the reverse.
448. Madison's concern with customs searches was evident in his speech to the house.

See supra note 439 and accompanying text.
449. "Probable cause" met with a mbi:ed reception after the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment. In 1790, when Pennsylvania revised its search and seizure provision, it
adopted "probable cause" as the cause standard for warrants rather than the "supported by
evidence" standard in the 1776 Pennsylvania provision. Compare the 1790 provision, supra
note 181, with the 1776 provision, supra text accompanying note 353. Pennsylvania had ear
lier adopted "probable cause" as the standard for national customs search warrants. See Sil·
pra note 444. In 1792, Kentucky adopted a provision based on the 1790 Pennsylvania provi
sion and also used "probable cause." See KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, reprinted in 4
SWINDLER, supra note 177, at 142, 150. Indiana followed suit in 1816. See IND. CONST. of
1816, art. I, § 8, reprinted in 3 SWINDLER, supra note 177, at 364, 365. Mississippi did like
wise in 1817. See MISS. CONST. of 1817, art I, § 9, reprinted in, 5 SWINDLER, supra note 177,
at 347, 348.
When Tennessee adopted a declaration of rights in 1796, however, it appears to have
borrowed only the introductory right statement language from the 1790 Pennsylvania revi
sion but then condemned "general warrants" not based on "evidence of a fact committed."
See TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 7, reprinted in 9 SWINDLER, supra note 177, at 141, 148.
The "evidence of a fact committed" standard was probably borrowed, via North Carolina,
from the Virginia provision. See supra text accompanying notes 347, 351. Tennessee may
have used that language because it had been previously used in the 1784 declaration of rights
by the proto-state of Franklin. See supra note 351. In 1802, Ohio apparently copied the 1796
Tennessee provision but tried to blend it with the federal probable cause standard by calling
for "probable evidence of the fact committed" {which appears to be an oxymoron). See
Omo CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 5, reprinted in 7 SWINDLER, supra note 177, at 547, 554
(quoted supra note 177). Illinois, however, reverted to the earlier "evidence of a fact com
mitted" standard without "probable" in 1818. See 3 ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 7, re
printed in 3 SWINDLER, supra note 177, at 237, 244. Virginia and North Carolina still retain
their "evidence of a fact committed" standard. See supra text accompanying note 347 and
note 351.
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ban against general warrants would not impede customs collections,450
there is no evidence to suggest that he actually intended to reduce the
450. Concern for the efficient collection of customs affected another aspect of the
House deliberations over the proposed Bill of Rights; specifically, the historical record indi
cates that "in any criminal case" was added to the Fifth Amendment's language protecting
the right against self-incrimination to make it clear that that provision did not extend to civil
customs collection matters. Representative John Lawrance moved to add that language be
cause otherwise "this clause contained a general declaration, in some degree contrary to laws
passed . . . ." John Lawrance [sometimes spelled Laurence], Statement Before First Con
gress (Aug. 17, 1789), reprinted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 330 (9.2.1.2.a). The 1789 Col
lections Act, enacted July 31, 1789, was one of the few "laws passed" prior to the House de
bate over the Bill of Rights in August 1789, and it contained a variety of provisions requiring
oaths and production of invoices. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 13, 1 Stat 29, 39-40. Sig
nificantly, Lawrance was the principal author of the Collections Act. See 3 Cuddihy, supra
note 20, at 1487-88.
Lawrance's insertion of "in any criminal case" was not a novel limit on the right against
compelled self-accusation - at common law the right applied to criminal matters, but not to
civil matters. See, e.g., Roe v. Harvey, 4 Burr. 2484, 2489, 98 Eng. Rep. 302, 305 (K.B. 1769)
("Lord Mansfield observed that in civil causes, the Court will force parties to produce evi
dence which may prove against themselves; or leave the refusal to do it (after proper notice)
as a strong presumption, to the jury . . . . But in a criminal or penal cause, the defendant is
never forced to produce evidence; though he should hold it in his hands, in Court."). (Bur
rows' case report of Roe was published 1776. See 1 LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 19,
294, entry 20 ("Vol 4, 1776").)
The need to explicitly define the scope of the right against compelled self-accusation in
the federal Bill of Rights arose because Madison had not followed the earlier practice of
bundling that right only with other rights that also pertained to criminal matters. For exam
ple, the 1776 Virginia declaration had combined the right against compelled self-accusation
with other rights pertinent to "capital or criminal prosecutions." See VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS
of 1776, § VIII, reprinted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 330 (9.1.3.8). The same was true of
the Virginia ratification convention proposal. See COGAN, supra note 122, at 328 (9.1.2.5).
However, Madison also had included the civil "takings" provision in the same provision as
the right against compelled self-accusation, and that injected some ambiguity into the scope
of the latter. See Speech of James Madison, supra note 432, at 201; see also COGAN, supra
note 122, at 315 (9.1.1.1.a).
Unfortunately, the rather straightforward explanation why the Framers inserted "in any
criminal case" has been lost sight of. The reason is probably Justice Bradley's erroneous
claim in the 1886 Boyd decision that the Fifth Amendment right was intended to prohibit
compelled production of invoices for imported goods in civil customs forfeiture proceedings
(which Boyd was) because "though [such proceedings] may be civil in form, [they] are in
their nature criminal." See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-34 (1886). The most
significant feature of Bradley's claim is that he did not discuss the actual legislative history of
the addition of "in any criminal case." Instead, he directed attention to a provision of the
Judiciary Act that permitted federal courts to require production of books or writings in civil
suits according to the ordinary rules of proceeding in chancery, and asserted that a cardinal
rule of chancery was that production was never to be compelled if it would result in forfei
ture. See id. at 630-32. Thus, he justified prohibiting compelled production of invoices not
withstanding that the Framers intended to permit compelled production in customs matters.
Modem commentary on the Fifth Amendment has uncritically followed Bradley's ex
planation. See LEONARD w. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGIIT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 424-27 (1968). So far as I can determine, no commentary
has previously noted the rather obvious connections between "in any criminal case," the
preservation of settled customs enforcement procedures, and the common-law boundary on
the privilege.
Indeed, Professor Amar has recently given "in any criminal case" in the Fifth Amend
ment a novel twist by asserting that the phrase should be understood to mean that the pro-
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common-law cause standards for criminal warrants451 (though that is
what subsequently occurred).

4.

Madison's Substitution of "Other Property" for "Possessions"

A final noteworthy aspect of Madison's proposal is his use of
"other property" as the final term in the listing of interests protected
by the right to be secure. As noted above, the only controversial as
pect of the ban against general warrants was the scope of the protec
tion. The states apparently held different views as to whether the pro
tections associated with specific warrants should apply to searches of
all premises on land or only to houses.452 Thus, the appropriate scope
for the protection was still unsettled during the ratification debates.
tection only prohibits compelling a defendant to give testimony during his own criminal trial,
but allows compelling him to make incriminating statements or produce incriminating evi
dence prior to his trial or in connection with prosecution or trial of another person. See
Amar & Lettow, supra note 320, 898-901. Amar's argument is grounded on the assertion
that "in a criminal case" can mean only during a person's own criminal trial. See, e.g., id. at
858-59 ("[T]he [defendant's] compelled words will never be introduced over the defendant's
objection in a criminal trial [so] the defendant will never be an involuntary 'witness' against
hinlself 'in' a 'criminal case'." (emphasis in original)); id. at 900 ("Unless these words [from a
defendant's compelled pretrial statements] are introduced at trial, a suspect is not a 'witness'
against hinlself 'in' a criminal 'case.' " (emphasis in original)); id. at 909-910 ("Textually, the
Fifth Amendment speaks to witnessing within the criminal case, not beyond. Therefore, the
key question is what 'witnessing' is excludable 'in' a 'criminal case' - that is, at trial.'' (em
phasis in original)).
The significant feature of Amar's and Lettow's assertion, for present purposes, is that
they offered no evidence that "case" was understood to mean only the defendant's own trial
at the time of the framing. That clearly was not the historical understanding. For example,
Chief Justice Pratt ruled during Wilkes v. Wood that a potential witness against Wilkes could
not be required to answer questions regarding "any matter which may tend to accuse him
self." Lofft 1, 13, 19 How. St. Tr. 1154, 1162, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 495 (C.P. 1763). (The case
report was published 1776. See supra note 25.) Oddly, although Amar treated the civil tres
pass ruling in Wood as central to the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, see supra note 60,
he does not mention it in his discussion of the breadth of the right against self-accusation.
See also supra note 433.
451. Early interpretations of the probable cause standard seem to have varied depend
ing on the context. The Supreme Court gave a rather rigorous interpretation of "probable
cause" in the context of assessing an arrest warrant for treason in Ex parte Bollman and
Swartwout, 8 U.S. (7 Cranch) 75 (1807). In that case, the Court ruled that the absence of an
allegation that there had been an actual taking up of arms against the United States defeated
probable cause for an arrest warrant for treason. In contrast, the Court later gave a looser
interpretation of "probable cause" in the context of assessing the validity of a revenue sei
zure made under the 1799 Collections Act:
[T]he term "probable cause," according to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence
which would justify condemnation; and, in all cases of seizure, has a fixed and well known
meaning. It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion. In this,
its legal sens�, the Court must understand the term to have been used by Congress.

Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813) (construing Act of March 2, 1799,
ch. 22, § 71, 1 Stat. 627, 678). Note that the "in all cases of seizure" language leaves open the
possibility that the term could carry a different meaning in the criminal context.
452

See supra notes 370-377 and accompanying text.
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The lack of consensus regarding the scope of the protection is sug
gested by the variation in the listing of protected interests in anti
Federalist proposals. Richard Henry Lee's initial proposal for a fed
eral search and seizure protection approximated the Pennsylvania and
Massachusetts state provisions by recognizing a right regarding per
sons, houses, papers - but substituted "property" for "possessions."453
The most complete and polished proposal for a federal protection that
appeared in the sixteenth of the Letters from the Federal Farmer used
the persons, houses, papers, and possessions formula.454 However,
other anti-Federalists seem to have endorsed a broader scope of pro
tection.
As noted above, the anti-Federalist factions in the Pennsylvania
and Maryland ratification conventions followed the earlier Virginia
state provision by omitting any right statement, and thus any listing of
protected rights - an omission that implied a broad ban against gen
eral search authority.455 Other anti-Federalists endorsed a listing of
protected interests but did so in a way that seemed to reach a search of
any privately owned premises; specifically, they omitted any specific
mention of "houses." For example, the initial discussion of a federal
search protection in the Letters called for a protection against
"searching and seizing men's papers, property, and persons."456 The
proposals for a federal search protection adopted in the Virginia, New
York, and North Carolina ratification conventions also referred to the
right of a freeman regarding "his person, his papers and his property"
- without mentioning the house.457 Similarly, another of the Letters
referred to a right regarding a citizen's "person, papers, or effects,"458
and Samuel Adam's motion during the Massachusetts convention used
"persons, papers, or possessions."459 The absence of any reference to
"houses" in these formulations of a federal protection is remarkable
given the prominence attached to violations of the house in the com
plaints about general warrants. For that reason, I speculate that the
term "houses" was omitted in order to extend the protection to all pri
vately owned property regardless of the premises on which it was lo
cated.
On a related point, it is also noteworthy that the anti-Federalist
proposals tended to substitute the broader-sounding terms "property"
453. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Randolph (postscript), supra note 120,
at 117.
454. See Letters from the Federal Farmer (XVI), supra note 128, at 328.
455. See supra note 426 and accompanying text.
456. See Lettersfrom the Federal Farmer (IV), supra note 127.
457. See supra note 429.
458. See Letters from the Federal Fanner (VI), supra note 122.
459. See supra note 123.
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or "effects," for "possessions." "Possessions" connoted items of tan
gible personal property that might be seized.460 The term "effects"
may have carried a broader connotation insofar as it was commonly
used to denote commercial goods.461 (At the time of the framing, "ef
fects" was most commonly used in bankruptcy law,462 though it may have
460. One commentator has argued that "possessions" could have been understood to
include real property at the tinte of the framing. See Neil C. McCabe, State Constitutions and

the "Open Fields" Doctrine: A Historical-Definitional Analysis of the Scope of Protection
Against Warrantless Searches of "Possessions, " 13 VT. L. REV. 179 {1988). McCabe did show
that "possessions" sometintes referred to land in framing-era usage. Id. at 193-210. How

ever, he does not show that it was ever used that way in the context of complaints about
searches and seizures. As described above, the American search controversies were about
the threatened seizure of goods from houses. Moreover, McCabe did not offer any explana
tion for the substitution of "effects" for "possessions" in the Fourth Amendment {discussed
in the text infra), and offered no evidence that "effects" was used to refer to land. To the
contrary, the evidence is clear that "effects" referred to moveable goods. See infra note 461.
Thus, it is implausible that the term "possessions" in search and seizure provisions was un
derstood to apply the right to be secure to land.
461. "Effects" does not seem to have been defined in framing-era legal dictionaries, but
it was defined in general purpose dictionaries. A 1730 dictionary defined "effects" as "the
goods of a merchant, tradesman, &c." DICTIONARIUM BRITANNICUM (Nathan Bailey ed.,
1730, reprinted 1969). JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY, supra note 177 (published in 1755), defined
the plural of "effect" simply as "Goods; moveables."

In addition, some framing-era usages of "effects" clearly used the term to refer only to
moveable property. For example, during the debates over boycotting British imports in
1769, the imports were usually referred to as "goods," "wares," "manufactures," "merchan
dizes," or "commodities," but were occasionally referred to as "effects." See THE LETI'ERS
OF FREEMAN, ETC: EsSAYS ON THE NONIMPORTATION MOVEMENT IN S OUTH CAROLINA
105, 107 (William Henry Drayton ed., 1771; reprinted, Robert M. Weir ed., 1977). Similarly,
in 1775 the Continental Congress complained that British authorities in Boston "detained
the greatest part of the inhabitants of the town, and compelled the few who were permitted
to retire, to leave their most valuable effects behind" - a complaint that would not make
sense unless it meant that the departing inhabitants were not permitted to take everything of
a moveable nature with them. See A DECLARATION BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED
COLONIES OF NORTH-AMERICA, Now MET IN CONGRESS AT PHILADELPHIA, SETIING
FORTH THE CAUSES AND NECESSITY OF THEm TAKING UP ARMS {July 6, 1775), quoted in
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 295, 298 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1959).
Similarly, a 1782 wartime Pennsylvania statute authorized seizures of "Goods, Wares, and
Merchandize" or "Goods and Property" imported from Britain; one provision excepted "all
Goods and Effects" which were the property of any of the States, and another referred to
"the Goods or Effects seized" under authority of the act. See An Act for the more effectual
Suppression of all Intercourse and Commerce with the Enemies of the United States of
America, ch. 31, § 3 ("all Goods and Effects"), § 13 {"the Goods and Effects seized") {1782).
The same understanding is still evident in the 1828 first edition of WEBSTER'S
DICTIONARY, supra note 313 (pages unnumbered) {defining "EFFECT" as "[i]n the plural,
effects are goods; moveables; personal estate. The people escaped from the town with their
effects") (emphasis in original).
462. Bankruptcy appears to be the only area of framing-era law where the term "ef
fects" was frequently used. References to the bankrupt's "estate and effects" were common
in framing-era bankruptcy law because the principal English bankruptcy statute applied to
the bankrupt's "goods, wares, merchandizes, money, estate and effects." An Act to prevent
the committing of Frauds by Bankrupts, 5 Geo. 2, ch 30, § 1 {1732) (Eng.). As a result, the
term "estate and effects" was often used as an inclusive formula for everything the bankrupt
had that was of value. See, e.g., 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at ch. 31. The term "effects"
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later acquired broader usage and connotations during the nineteenth
century.463) However, "effects" appears to have been similar to "posses
sions" insofar as it also connoted goods or items that might be seized,
rather than premises.
In contrast, the term "property" was potentially broader than "pos
sessions" or "effects" insofar as it could have included real property as
well as personal items or commercial goods; thus, "property" could have
been understood to denote premises such as houses, shops, or ware
houses that might be searched, as well as items or goods that might be
seized. As a result, the statement of a right to be secure in one's "prop
erty" (without mentioning "houses" specifically) may have been in
tended to serve as a rhetorical endorsement of the importance of the
protection against general warrants that did not limit the scope of the
premises that enjoyed the protection.
Madison proposed that the right be stated as a protection of "their
persons, their houses, their papers, and their other property." Thus,
he specifically included "houses" but coupled it with the broader term
"other property" rather than the narrower term "possessions" - a
formulation that only Lee had previously proposed. It is possible that
Madison sought to broaden the scope of the protection by using
"property" rather than "possessions." (Madison's reference to "the
place to be searched" may also appear to anticipate that the provision
- often coupled with "estate" - also appears in the 1785 Pennsylvania bankruptcy Act, An
Act for the Regulation of Bankruptcy, ch. 230, (1785), and in the 1800 federal bankruptcy
Act, Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat 19.
The use of "effects" in bankruptcy law probably reflects the fact that, during the framing
era, bankruptcy still applied only to "merchants." See Thomas Plank, The Constitutional
Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REV. 487, 507-09 (1996). A bankrupt merchant's re
maining wealth might well be largely in the form of unsold goods (though all of his interests,
including land, were subject to bankruptcy). In that context, it made sense that bankruptcy
law would often refer to the combination of a bankrupt's "effects" (goods and personal
items, see the previous note) and "estate" (a term that referred broadly to interests in land
or other property). Thus, "estate and effects" of the bankrupt served as an inclusive formula
for anything of value that the bankrupt owned or was owed. The early bankruptcy acts,
however, used a plethora of terms to denote anything of value that commissioners of bank
ruptcy could claim and sell for the benefit of the bankrupt's creditors, and it does not appear
that there was any particular effort to differentiate among the various terms for forms of
property or interests in those statutes.
463. Lord Mansfield gave an expansive construction to the phrase "real and personal
effects" in the context of interpreting a will in the 1775 English decision Hogan v. Jackson, 1
Cowp. 299, 98 Eng. Rep. 1096, 1099 (K.B. 1775). The case report of that decision, however,
was not published until 1783, see 1 LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 298, entry 36;
hence, it seems unlikely that Mansfield's interpretation influenced the American Framers.
One of the attorneys in Hogan had argued that the word "effects" was properly applicable
only to "personal estate," and that "[a]ll the dictionaries explain it by the words 'goods and
moveables.' " 1 Cowp. at 302, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1098. Lord Mansfield chose to interpret "ef
fects" to be "synonimous to worldly substance . . . whatever can be turned to value" so that
"real and personal effects" would mean "all a man's property.'' 1 Cowp. at 304, 98 Eng. Rep.
at 1099. Mansfield's treatment may have led to a broader understanding of "effects" during
the nineteenth century - at least or especially when it was linked to the term "real."
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would protect premises other than houses, but it may simply be a car
ryover from the disapproval of the earlier language of general war
rants directing search of "suspected places."464) Alternatively, he may
have cobbled together an ambiguous listing in the hope of avoiding or
downplaying conflict on that point.
C.

The Committee ofEleven's Review ofMadison's Proposal

The "Committee of Eleven" of the House of Representatives ini
tially reviewed Madison's proposals for rights amendments, and made
significant changes to a number of the proposals; however, they did
little to the language of his search and seizure proposal.465 In fact, the
Committee made only one deliberate change of any potential signifi
cance - it altered Madison's listing of protected interests from per
sons, houses, papers, and "other property" to persons, houses, papers,
and "effects."
1.

The Committee's Substitution of "Effects"

Because there are no records of the Committee's deliberations,
one can only speculate as to why the committee substituted "effects"
for Madison's "property." It seems unlikely (though not impossible)
that the Committee made the substitution only as a matter of stylistic
preference. The Committee certainly did not have any general aversion
to the term "property," as it had already twice accepted Madison's use of
the term in what later became the Fifth Amendment.466 Moreover, be
cause it seems likely that the Committee would have perceived the listing
of protected interests as a controversial subject, it is unlikely that the
committee would have made any casual stylistic changes in that regard.
Because "effects" was usually understood to designate moveable goods
or property (but not real property or premises), the most likely explana-

464. See supra text accompanying notes 351-378.
465. The committee reported the provision as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, shall not be
violated by warrants issuing, without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and
not particularly describing the places to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.

HOUSE COMMITIEE OF ELEVEN REPORT
122, at 223-24 (6.1.1.2).

(July 28,

1789),

reprinted in

COGAN,

supra note

For the appointment of the Committee, see 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-91: HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOURNAL 117 (Linda Grant
DePauw ed., 1977). Madison and Egbert Benson were members, but Elbridge Gerry was
not.
466. See James Madison, Proposal in the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), re
printed in COGAN, supra note 122, at 337 (10.1.1.1.a-c); HOUSE COMMITTEE OF ELEVEN
REPORT (July 28, 1789), reprinted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 338 (10.1.1.2).
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tion for the substitution is that the Committee intended to narrow the
scope of interests protected by Madison's proposal.467
Thus, the Committee's formulation implied that "houses" were the
only type of premises protected by the right to be secure, although "ef
fects" denoted that any type of items or goods that might be located
within a house, including commercial goods, were also protected. A
plausible motive for adopting a narrower expression regarding the scope
of protection is patent: customs collections would be the primary source
of revenue for the new government, and the Committee may have been
reluctant to adopt an inflexible constitutional protection that would limit
legislative authority to provide for searches of commercial premises468 especially given that the popular concern regarding searches focused on
violations of houses.469
At first blush, this interpretation may appear to be inconsistent
with the statutory protection of commercial premises enacted by the
First Congress. For example, the provisions regarding customs search
authority included in the 1789 Collections Act (adopted virtually con
temporaneously with the Fourth Amendment's language) did require
specific warrants for searches of all buildings, rather than just
houses.470 However, Congress's decision to require use of specific

467. The Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he Framers would have understood the
term 'effects' to be limited to personal, rather than real, property" in Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 177 n.7 (1984) (opinion of the Court by Powell, J.). Note, however, that the
citations to Blackstone in the discussion in Oliver are mere decorations rather than historical
evidence on this point; they refer to Blackstone's discussion of personal property, but he did
not use the term "effects" in that discussion.
In contrast, Amar has asserted that the Framers intended for "effects" to be a catchall
including all buildings and even ships. See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS BOOK, supra note 58, at
67 (asserting that "other buildings" than houses were "subsumed within the catchall word
effects"); Amar, Boston, supra note 19, at 68-69 (criticizing my suggestion that the Fourth
Amendment did not reach ships or commercial premises as "Davies's gambit"); Amar,
Terry, supra note 58, at 1104-05, 1108-09 (criticizing my argument that ships were not "ef
fects" and asserting that "property," "effects," and "possessions" each constituted "broad
residual language" meant "to sweep in all important stuff, not to keep out ships, etc." (em
phasis in original)). Amar, however, has not offered any historical evidence to support these
assertions.
468.

See supra note 369 and accompanying text.

469. One sort of evidence suggests the absence of any popular demand for protection of
commercial premises: the state search and seizure provisions that were revised or adopted after
the Fourth Amendment was adopted all explicitly referred to "houses" and often used the more
traditional, but narrower-sounding "possessions" rather than "effects." Pennsylvania retained
"possessions" rather than change to "effects" when it revised its search and seizure provision
in 1790. See supra note 181. Thereafter "possessions" was used by Kentucky (1792), Ten
nessee (1796), Ohio (1802), Mississippi (1817), Illinois (1818), Maine (1819), and Alabama
(1819). The term "effects" was not used in a state provision until Indiana used it (1816), and
Missouri followed suit (1820). See the respective state declarations of rights in SWINDLER,
supra note 177.
470. The First Congress adopted customs search authority provisions in the 1789 Collec
tions Act only a few weeks before the House debate on the Bill of Rights. Act of July 31,
1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29. Section 24 initially empowered customs officers to make warrantless
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search warrants for commercial premises as a matter of policy does
not show that Congress understood that the constitutional right to be
secure required that treatment.
Moreover, in later statutes Congress sometimes provided for war
rantless search authority of commercial premises, but not dwellings.
The excise search provisions adopted in 1791 and following years gen
erally required specific warrants for searches of houses or other
buildings, but provided revenue officers with warrantless search
authority for buildings or rooms that had been registered as distilleries
or liquor storerooms as part of the liquor licensing process. The ex
ception suggests that Congress understood that it had leeway to confer
general search authority on revenue officers regarding commercial
premises - though not for places actually used as dwellings.471 (In

searches of ships when they had "reason to suspect" customs fraud. Id. at 43. {However, the
Framers would not have thought ships came within protection of the common law "right to
be secure" protected in the Fourth Amendment. See supra notes 143-151 and accompanying
text.) Section 24 also provided:
if [the officer] shall have cause to suspect a concealment [of uncustomed goods], in any par
ticular dwelling-house, store, building, or other place, [he] shall, upon application on oath or
affirmation to any justice of the peace, be entitled to a warrant to enter such house, store, or
other place (in the day time only) and there to search for such goods . . .
1 Stat at 43. Because this authority for issuance of a search warrant was the only form of
authority for a search of a house or other building that was created by the statute, this sec
tion effectively required use of a particularized warrant for any search of a building.
Unfortunately, this section has been misconstrued in various ways in prior commentary.
Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at 766, asserted that the statute "authorized, but
did not require" use of warrants to search houses and building. That interpretation, how
ever, ignores the absence of any other grant of legal authority by which a federal officer
could justify a search of a house. See supra notes 92, 240. It also flies in the face of the ex
plicit grant of warrantless search authority only as to ship searches at the beginning of the
same section, as described above. See Maclin, Complexity, supra note 44, at 952.
LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING, supra note 45, at 245, asserted that this section prevented
the magistrate from assessing whether there was probable cause for the search before issuing
a warrant However, that reading placed too much weight on "entitled to a warrant" and too
little on the earlier "if' in "if [the officer] shall have cause . . . ."
The confusion over the meaning of the search provisions in the 1789 Collections Act no
doubt flows in part from a serious gap in the historical record. Although the House debates
over the duties and tonnage aspects of the act were reported by Lloyd in volumes one and
two of the Congressional Register, see CONG. REGISTER, infra note 475, the entries for the
dates on which the procedural aspects of customs collections would have been debated con
sist only of brief notations that the House resolved itself into a committee of the whole and
continued debate on the collections bill. See 2 id. at 54-56 (reporting proceedings on July 23, 6-11, 1789). Thus, there is no record of the content of the House debate on the subjects
that would have most directly illuminated the Framers' views of the relative protections to
be afforded houses, commercial buildings, and ships. Likewise, this gap probably also at
least partly explains the failure of prior Fourth Amendment commentaries to recognize how
focused the federal Framers were on customs searches when they framed the Fourth
Amendment.
471. Congress modeled the 1791 federal excise on distilled spirits on earlier English ex
cise collection schemes. Distillers were required to register and designate any buildings or
rooms in houses that were used for distilling or for storing liquor and those premises were
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made subject to discretionary inspection by excise officers at any time during daytime. See
Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, §§ 25, 26, 29, 1 Stat 199, 205-07. However, the Act provided for
specific search warrants for searches of any premises other than registered distilleries or
storerooms:

It shall be lawful for any [federal judge or justice of the peace], upon reasonable cause of
suspicion, to be made out to the satisfaction of such judge or justice, by the oath or affirma
tion of any person or persons, by special warrant or warrants . . . to authorize any of the offi
cers of inspection, by day, in the presence of a constable or other officer of the peace, to en
ter into all and every such place or places in which any of the said spirits shall be suspected
to be [concealed].

Id. §

32, 1 Stat. at 207. This authority for issuance of "special warrant[s]" effectively re
quired use of specific search warrants because it was the only form of search authority for
non-registered premises provided for. Thus, an excise search of a house could be justified
only by a specific warrant.
The exposure of registered rooms to discretionary (general) search authority would ap
pear to mean either that the constitutional "right to be secure" in the Fourth Amendment
did not prohibit legislative approval of general search authority as to co=ercial premises,
or that the registration was understood to constitute a waiver of the usual protection. Of
course, from the standpoint of modem doctrine, it may seem that the exception for regis
tered buildings or rooms could be explained as a form of waiver of the usual right to security
as a condition for being permitted to engage in distilling. I have not found any framing-era
discussions that actually discussed a waiver, however.
Unfortunately, there is no record of any debate in the Senate regarding the 1791 Excise
Act, and the record of the debate in the House of Representatives regarding the procedural
aspects of the Act is quite limited. Even so, the House record indicates that the representa
tives were especially opposed to authorizing excise officers to make discretionary searches of
houses but were not necessarily opposed to allowing discretionary search authority regard
ing co=ercial premises. Opponents of the excise asserted it would provoke public resis
tance because it would make houses vulnerable to searches. For example, Representative
Jackson asserted that Americans would "not subject themselves to a host of excise officers,
who would be warranted by law to penetrate into the inmost recesses of houses." 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FlRsT FEDERAL CoNGRESS: DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THIRD SESSION: DEC. 1790 - MAR. 1791, at 213-14 (William Charles
DiGiacomantonio et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter 14 DEBATES IN THE HOUSE] . Likewise,
Representative Parker questioned whether the government could protect revenue officers
"in their searchings of the houses of your citizens." 14 id. at 221-23.

In response, proponents of the excise bill called attention to the fact that it did not
authorize discretionary searches of houses, but conferred such search authority only over
certain co=ercial premises. In his report to the House, Treasury Secretary Alexander
Hamilton noted that the proposed bill did not give officers "the general power . . . of
VISITING AND SEARCHING INDISCRIMATELY the houses, stores and other build
ings of the dealers in excised articles," but that the officers' "discretionary power of visiting
and searching is to be restricted to those places, which the Dealers themselves shall desig
nate . . . ." 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORIES, AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH FOREIGN OFFICERS BILL
582, 585 (Charlene Bangs Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986) [hereinafter 4 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORIES] (capitalization in original). (Note that "discretionary power of visiting" appears
to refer to ex officio or warrantless search authority.) Similarly, Representative Sherman
asserted that the excise was not odious because it exposed only "distillers and importers" to
"the visits of excise officers." 14 DEBATES IN THE HOUSE, supra, at 247.
Other defenders of the bill also stressed that it did not expose citizen's houses or per
sonal property to searches. Representative Livermore asserted that the proposed legislation
did not allow excise officers "to enter at their pleasure into the most private recesses of a
man's house or store . . . ." 14 id. at 247-49. Representative Lawrance insisted that the pro
posed legislation did not "subject every individual to be searched, and to have his dwelling
inspected by excise officers." 14 id. at 303-04. Representative Smith also observed that one
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addition, a short-lived wartime statute adopted in 1815 authorized cus
toms officers to make warrantless searches of vehicles, pack animals,
or even packages carried by a person. Although that provision was
something of an aberration, it appears to have been aimed at the
transport of commercial goods.472) In sum, although the evidence on
this point is less than definitive, the available linguistic and statutory
evidence suggests that "persons, houses, papers, and effects" was un
derstood to provide clear protection for houses, personal papers, the
sorts of domestic and personal items associated with houses, and even
commercial products or goods that might be stored in houses - while
leaving commercial premises and interests otherwise subject to con
gressional discretion.
of the "principal objections to the excise in England" was that "it throws open the houses (or
they are emphatically stiled, the castles) of British subjects to the inspection of excise offi·
cers"; however, he insisted that objection did not apply to the proposed legislation because
"an excise officer cannot enter a dwelling-house; he has access to those places only, which
the proprietors set a-part for the storage of spirituous liquors. How is domestic tranquility
violated?" 14 id. at 257-59. Indeed, Smith asserted that "the regard shewn in this bill for the
protection of the citizens, exceeds what was provided in the 47th section of the collection
laws of the last session [namely, the search warrant provision of the 1789 Collections Act];
yet, we did not then hear of the dangers of violating either public rights or private property."
14 id. at 259. (The record does not identify the difference Smith perceived between the
search warrant provisions of the two revenue acts; however, the only protection provided in
section 34 of the 1791 Excise Act, but not in section 47 of the 1789 Collections Act, was a
requirement that an excise search warrant be executed only "in the presence of a Constable
or other officer of the peace" - that is, a local officer. This was apparently viewed as a sig·
nificant provision; although the Senate sought to strike it out, the House refused to acqui
esce in that amendment and it was retained. 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, supra, at 609, 625
n. 53.)
as

There do not appear to have been any legal challenges to the general search authority
for registered premises in the federal excise acts. That silence suggests that it was widely
understood that the right to be secure did not protect commercial premises. See also Maclin,
Complexity, supra note 44, at 953-54 {discussing the excise search provisions).
472. The federal collections acts were silent as to searches of wagons until 1815, when
Congress enacted a provision empowering a customs officer "to stop, search and examine
any carriage or vehicle, of any kind whatsoever, and to stop any person travelling on foot, or
beast of burden, on which he shall suspect there are [uncustomed] goods, wares or merchan
dise . . . ." Act of March 3, 1815, ch. 94, § 2, 3 Stat. 231, 232. The statute also provided that
"[t]he necessity for a search warrant arising under this act, shall in no case be considered as
applicable to any carriage, wagon, cart sleigh, vessel, boat, or other vehicle, of whatever form
or construction, employed as a medium of transportation, or to any packages on any animal
or animals, or carried by man on foot." Id. This provision was short-lived, however; its re
peal in 1816, see Act of April 27, 1816, ch. 110, § 3, 3 Stat. 315, suggests that it was viewed as
an extreme wartime measure. There was no further provision of search authority regarding
vehicles until this section of the 1815 act was revived in the closing months of the Civil War,
and then continued. See Act of Feb. 28, 1865, ch. 67, § 1, 13 Stat. 441, 441-42, reenacted in
slightly different language in Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, § 2, 14 Stat. 178, and then incorpo
rated into Revised Statutes, ch. 10, § 3061, 18 Stat. 588. So far as I can determine, the consti
tutionality of this search authority regarding vehicles was never challenged in court.
It may be relevant that customs searches would have looked for items of some bulk;
hence, it is unlikely that the search authority would have been understood to allow highly
intrusive searches. It is also possible that the 1815 legislation was related to the New York
Sailly decision, discussed supra note 283.
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The Committee's Acceptance ofthe Substance and Format of
Madison's Proposal

The Committee's report of the search and seizure provision dif
fered from Madison's proposal in one other significant respect - it
omitted Madison's "against all unreasonable searches and seizures."
That omission was described as a "mistake," however, when the lan
guage was reinserted by motion during the House debate. Hence, it
appears to be only a transcription error that does not reflect any sub
stantive consideration (but "all" was lost in the process).473 The only
other changes the Committee made to Madison's proposal were small
stylistic alterations.474
The most significant feature of the Committee's report is what it
did not change. It endorsed Madison's one-clause format as well as his
proposal to insert the search and seizure provision into the description
of legislative power in Article I. (The decision to use a supplementary
Bill of Rights was not made until shortly after the final floor debate in
the House regarding the content of the search and seizure provision.

473. See HOUSE COMMITIEE OF ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 465; see also COGAN,
supra note 122, at 224-25 (6.1.1.4.a, b, c, d) (excerpting various reported versions of the mo
tion to reinsert "against unreasonable searches and seizures" and the description of the
omission as a "mistake"). The motion to reinsert the language appears to have been made
by Egbert Benson, see infra note 480, a member of the Committee of Eleven, see supra note
465.
Cuddihy states that the Committee "excised" the phrase "against unreasonable searches
and seizures" but omits to mention the reference to the omission being a "mistake." 3 Cud
dihy, supra note 20, at 1408-09. Levy follows Cuddihy by stating that "unreasonable
searches and seizures" was "deleted." LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING, supra note 45, at 243. I
do not think those treatments are supported by the record.
474. Madison's plural "rights" was altered to the singular "right," his "secured" was
changed to "secure," and his "by warrants issued" was changed to "by warrants issuing." In
addition, his repetitive use of "their" was eliminated. See COGAN, supra note 122, at 223-24
(6.1.1.2, 6.1.1.3.a, b, c, d) (excerpting both the House Committee of Eleven Report and vari
ous reports of the House's consideration of the provision). It is not entirely clear whether
these changes were made by the committee report or on the House floor in connection with
the motion to reinsert "against unreasonable searches and seizures," described in the pre
ceding note.
I do not think these small language changes carried any substantive import. Levy, how
ever, has treated these small changes and the reinsertion of "against unreasonable searches
and seizures" as though they somehow transformed Madison's ban against general warrants
into a broad principle against unreasonable searches and seizures:
[A motion was made for] the restoration of "unreasonable searches and seizures." Oddly,
[the movant] said he did so on a presumption that a "mistake" had been made in the word
ing of the clause, which he corrected by changing "rights" to "right" and "secured" to "se
cure." The effect was to provide security or, as we might say, privacy to the people; [this]
motion changed the meaning from a protection of the right to a protection of the individuals
in their persons homes, papers, and effects.

LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING, supra note 45, at 244 (references to Gerry as the movant re
moved because it is unlikely he made the motion in question, see infra note 482). I find
Levy's explanation mystifying.
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Moreover, it does not appear to have reflected any disagreement as to
the content of the rights amendments.475) Thus, the Committee mem
bers must have also understood the proposed search and seizure lan
guage as a ban solely against legislative approval of general war
rants.476
D.

Gerry's Motion to Make Madison's Text More Imperative

Unfortunately, previous commentaries have rushed past the par
ticulars of Madison's proposal and the Committee's approval. Instead,
they have focused on the subsequent change that produced the final
475. The Select Committee that initially reviewed Madison's proposed rights amend
ments endorsed his proposal to insert the amendments into the text of the Constitution.
However, when the full House took up the subject of rights amendments on August 13, 1789,
Roger Sherman moved that the amendments be reformatted into a "supplementary" docu
ment. 2 CONG. REGISTER 161, 167 (Thomas Lloyd reporter, 1789). See the explanation of
the various records of the House debate infra. After debate as to the form of the amend
ments, see 2 id. at 167-79, that motion was defeated on the same day, see 2 id. at 179. The
content of the provision that would become the Fourth Amendment (denoted as the "sev
enth clause of the fourth proposition") was debated on August 17th. 2 Id. at 219, 226 (dis
cussed infra notes 478-493 and accompanying text). On August 19, after the debate on the
search and seizure provision, but before the conclusion of the debate on the rights amend
ments, Sherman renewed his motion to put the amendments in a supplementary document.
After further debate, his motion passed. See 2 id. at 237, 241. Thereafter, on August 20th,
the House formally adopted the search and seizure amendment along with several other
amendments. See 2 id. at 241, 243.

It does not appear that there was any disagreement that the amendments should be
aimed at Congress. Rather, Sherman seems to have sought the supplementary format in tl)e
hope of downgrading the importance of the amendments, and possibly of warding off addi
tional amendments to the Constitution. Sherman's ultimate victory probably reflected the
desire of the members of the House to finish work on the amendments and move on to other
pressing matters. See 2 id. at 167-79, 241.
Lloyd's Congressional Register account of the debate was published in New York in
1789. However, because copies were limited, that account was subsequently republished,
apparently verbatim but without acknowledgment of the Lloyd's edition, in two different
sets of Annals of Congress, both in 1834 (one bearing the running page head "History of
Congress" and the other bearing the running page head "Gale's and Seaton's History of De
bates in Congress"). The paginations of the three versions of the debates each differ from
the others. See BENNEIT B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTII AMENDMENT 98-99
(1955) (distinguishing in an explanatory note the two versions of Annals of Congress) • The
relevant portions of Gale and Seaton's version of the Annals are also republished in id. at
93-217 (but with different pagination). The earlier commentaries on the Fourth Amend
ment often cited to one of the versions of the Annals because they were more available.
However, I have usually cited only Lloyd's original Congressional Register. The corre
sponding material can be located in the various versions of the Annals by reference to the
date of the debate.
476. It is also significant that the Committee did not drop this provision. After Madison
had submitted his proposals, Roger Sherman submitted a shorter alternative proposal for a
bill of rights to the Committee which did not include a protection against general warrants.
See ROGER SHERMAN'S DRAFT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1789), reprinted in THE RIGHTS
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HlsTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTII AMENDMENT
app. at 351-52 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989). However, Sherman does not seem to have
voiced any opposition to the search and seizure proposal made by the Committee.
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two-clause format. Specifically, a motion was made during the House
debate to alter the Committee's statement that "[the right shall not be
violated] by warrants issuing without [probable cause or particular
ity]" to "[the right shall not be violated], and no warrants shall issue
but upon [probable cause and particularity]."4n The most complete
record of the motion is as follows:

Mr. BENSON Objected to the words "by warrants issuing." This de
claratory provision was good as far as it went, but he thought it was not

sufficient; he therefore proposed to alter it so as to read "and no warrant
shall issue."
The question was put on this motion, and lost by a considerable major
ity.478

Regrettably, the record is not entirely accurate.479
The available evidence indicates that it was most likely Elbridge
Gerry of Massachusetts, not Egbert Benson of New York, who made
this motion. The record of the House debate quoted above had at
tributed the earlier motion to correct a "mistake" and reinsert
"against unreasonable searches and seizures" to Gerry, while it attrib
uted the motion to substitute "and no Warrants shall issue" to Egbert
Benson. However, other records show the opposite.480 Moreover, the
latter attributions make more sense in the context. To begin with,
Benson was a member of the Committee of Eleven, but Gerry was
477. See the Committee's proposed text, supra note 465 ("[the right shall not be vio
lated] by warrants issuing [without probable cause or particularity]"); the motion quoted in
the text immediately infra.
478. 2 CONG. REGISTER, supra note 475, at 236 (Aug. 17, 1789), quoted in COGAN, su
pra note 122, at 236 (62.12.a). Lassan quoted this passage from the Gale and Seaton's ver
sion of the Annals of Congress. See LASSON, supra note 16, at 101 (quoting Gale and Sea
ton's Annals, discussed supra note 475). For several shorter renditions of the motion, see
COGAN, supra note 122, at 225, (6.1.1.5.a, b), 236-37 (6.2.12.b, c, d).
479. The House reporter, Thomas Lloyd, made numerous errors. See DAUMBAULD,
supra note 328, at 35 n.6, 41 n28, 42 n32, as cited in Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note
58, at 775 n.66.
480. The documentary evidence is inconsistent as to whether Benson or Gerry made this
motion. There had been an earlier motion to correct the "mistake" of the omission of
"against unreasonable searches and seizures" from the report of the Committee of Eleven.
See discussion supra note 465. The Congressional Register account shows Gerry making the
earlier motion to reinsert "against unreasonable searches and seizures" and shows Benson
making the later motion to substitute "and no warrant shall issue." See 2 CONG. REGISTER,
supra note 478; COGAN, supra note 122, at 224-25 (6.1.1.4.a, 6.1.1.5.a). Gazette ofthe United
States shows the reverse, however, with Benson reinserting "against unreasonable searches
and seizures" and Gerry substituting "and no Warrants shall issue." GAZETTE OF THE U.S.,
Aug. 22, 1789, at 249, col. 3, quoted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 237 (6.2.1.2.d); see also id.
at 225 (6.1.1.4.d, 6.1.1.5.b). A contemporaneous press report that appeared in several New
York newspapers also showed Benson moving to reinsert "against unreasonable searches
aµd seizures," but did not mention the second motion to substitute "and no warrants shall
issue." For two of these identical newspaper accounts, see DAILY ADVERTISER, Aug. 18,
1789, at 2, col. 4, quoted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 236 (6.1.1.4.b); NEW-YORK DAILY
GAZETTE, Aug. 19, 1789, at 802, col. 4, quoted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 224 (6.1.1.4.c).
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not; hence, Benson was in the better position to describe the omission
of "against unreasonable searches and seizures" as a transcription
"mistake."481 In addition, the motion to substitute "and no Warrants
shall issue" sounds like Gerry; he was a frequent and combative par
ticipant in the House debate. and offered several motions to make the
language of proposed rights amendments more explicit or precise.482
In contrast, because Benson did not dissent from his Committee's
proposal, it seems unlikely he would have moved to alter it on the
House floor. Thus, the evidence strongly suggests that Gerry made
the crucial motion. 483
The record showing that this motion "failed" has provoked some
consternation. In fact, the combination of this report and the fact that
the substitute language nevertheless appeared in later versions of the
amendment led prior commentators to formulate a conspiracy theory
in which a committee of style surreptitiously inserted the voted-down
language in the proposals the House sent to the Senate.484 However,

481. The Committee membership is discussed supra note 465.
482. Gerry's biographer has observed that, except for Madison, Gerry was probably the
most active participant in the debate regarding the rights amendments; that Gerry and Madi
son were often at odds; and that Gerry resented Madison's having assumed the role of spon
sor of the rights amendments. See BILLIAS, supra note 439, at 230-35, 398 n.53. Moreover,
the content of the motion to substitute fits Gerry's ideological outlook, because he tended to
insist on the most explicit statements of rights. See infra note 495 and accompanying text.
Gerry's concern with precise language was evident in other aspects of the House debate
over tile rights amendments. For example, he complained that the word "disparage" in the
language that became the Ninth Amendment should have been "inlpair" because " 'dispar
age' was not of plain inlport." See 2 CONG. REGISTER, supra note 478, at 226, reprinted in
COGAN, supra note 122, at 628 (15.1.1.4). Likewise, when the language that became the
Second Amendment was debated, Gerry wanted to expand "a well regulated militia" to "a
well regulated militia trained to arms." Id. at 171 (4.1.1.8). He also wanted to change the
phrase "public danger" at the end of the proposed grand jury provision to "foreign inva
sion." Id. at 268 (7.1.1.7.a, b). And during the debate over the Tenth Amendment, he may
have sought to add "expressly" between "powers" and "delegated to the United States." Id.
at 665 {16.1.1.8) (note, however, that this last motion may have been by Tucker, see id.
{16.1.1.6.a)).
483. Cuddihy has also concluded, based on the newspaper reports (cited supra note
480), that Benson made the first motion to reinsert "against unreasonable searches and sei
zures," thus Gerry must have made the motion to substitute "and no Warrants shall issue."
3 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1409-10 & n.89.
484. The fact that the proposed change nevertheless appeared in the Amendment has
led prior commentators to fashion a conspiracy theory in which a three-member Style Com
mittee subsequently appointed by the House, which Benson chaired, sneaked in the lan
guage change despite the House vote. This scenario, which was probably prompted by the
incorrect notion that Benson was the proponent of the substitute language, was first pro
posed in a 1921 article by Osmond K. Fraenkel, supra note 16, at 366 n.30. It has been
nearly universally repeated by later commentators. See, e.g., LANDYNSKI, supra note 38, at
41-42; LASSON, supra note 16, at 101-03; LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING, supra note 45, at 244;
Maclin, Central Meaning, supra note 9, at 208-09 & n.35; 3 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1411,
1412-13. Bradley rested his interpretation of the intended meaning of the text on the sup
posed failure of this motion. See Bradley, supra note 56, at 827-28. The conspiracy theory
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the documentary evidence on this point also is inconsistent; Amar has
noted that other House records show the change having been made
prior to the appointment of the Style Committee.485 In addition, a
third motion made immediately after the vote on the motion to substi
tute "and no Warrants shall issue" strongly suggests that the motion
must have passed.486 Thus, in all likelihood the report is also errone
ous on this point - the motion passed.
Of course, the crucial question is why the substitution of "and no
warrant shall issue" was made. Lassan paraphrased the record quoted
above by stating that "although [the proposed language] was good as
far as it went, it was not sufficient.".w Thus, he interpreted the change
to add a broad reasonableness principle distinct from the warrant
standards themselves.488 Later commentators almost uniformly have
accepted Lasson's assertion that the change was intended to create a
reasonableness standard for warrantless intrusions,489 and several Su
preme Court opinions have endorsed it.490
has also been repeated in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 611 (1980) (White, J., dissent
ing). Amar has been the only prior skeptic. See infra note 485.
485. Two documentary accounts show that the motion "lost" or "was negatived." See 2
CONG. REGISTER, supra note 478, at 226 (Aug. 17, 1789), quoted in COGAN, supra note 122,
at 236 (6.2.1.2a); GAZETIE OF THE U.S., AUG. 22, 1789, at 249, col. 3, quoted in COGAN, su
pra note 122, at 236 (6.1.1.5.b). However, other evidence shows the outcome of the vote was
probably misreported. Amar has noted documentary evidence that indicates that the altered
language appeared in House records prior to the appointment of the three-person style
committee. See Amar, Boston, supra note 19, at 67 n.54 (citing 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-91, supra note 465, at 159), for the text of the
search and seizure provision appearing as of August 21, 1789, and id. at 165 for the appoint
ment of the Committee of Three on August 22, 1789.
486. A third motion made by Representative Livermore in the House debate immedi
ately after the motion to substitute "and no warrant shall issue . . ." shows that the motion
must have passed. He moved to drop the "not" that appeared between the probable cause
and particularity standards in the Committee's proposal. See 2 CONG. REGISTER, supra note
475, at 236 (Aug. 17, 1789), quoted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 225 (6.1.1.6). Dropping the
"not" makes sense only if the substitution of "and no Warrants shall issue, but upon . . ." had
already been made. That substitution changed the statement of the warrant standards from
a negative statement of what could not be omitted (hence the original "and not" between
probable cause and particularity), to an affirmative statement of conditions that had to be
met, in which the "not" was out of place. Hence, the substitution of "and no Warrants shall
issue" must have already been made by the House. (Interestingly, the record shows
Livermore's motion also "failed," though that change was also made in the version that ap
pears in the House records identified by Amar. See supra note 485.)
487. LASSON, supra note 16, at 103 (emphasis in original).

·

See id.
489. See, e.g., LANDYNSKI, supra note 38, at 41-43; TAYLOR, supra note 49, at 42-43;
Amsterdam, supra note 38, at 468 n.465; Cunningham, supra note 38, at 552; Kamisar, supra
note 38, at 573-74; Maclin, Cure, supra note 44, at 19 n.84. Amar did not discuss the signifi
cance of this change beyond asserting that the motion passed, see supra note 485, but his
488.

statement that "early drafts" of the Fourth Amendment targeted the too-loose warrant as
the enemy, see Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58, at 774-75, implies that he also
thought the content was later broadened by the substitution of "and no warrant shall issue . . • ."
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Although the conventional interpretation makes the text seem to
fit modern doctrine, it does not rest on any historical evidence. As
noted above, the historical records of the framing era show a dearth of
concern about warrantless intrusions,491 nor was any expressed during
the House debate.492 Moreover, Lasson's paraphrase of the record was
incomplete.
The movant did not make a diffuse complaint that the content of
the provision was substantively inadequate. Rather, the record quoted
above shows that he objected to "the words 'by warrants issuing,' "
that he complained that the Committee's "declaratory provision . . .
was not sufficient," and that he proposed substituting imperative lan
guage, "and no warrant shall issue but . ." In other words, the pro
posed language was not sufficiently imperative.493
The source of the movant's complaint is obvious if one compares
the Committee's proposed text to the earlier state provisions and anti
Federalist proposals for a federal protection. Each and every one of
those earlier search and seizure texts had contained an explicit com
mand that noncomplying warrants "ought [or shall] not be granted."494
.

.

Cuddihy did not follow Lasson's treatment, however, because he did not view Madison's
text as focusing on warrant standards but as asserting "multiple categories of unreasonable
searches and seizures," see supra note 265; thus, he described Gerry's motion as only "pol
ish[ing] the language of the right without enlarging its scope," 3 Cuddihy, supra note 20, at
1410. Because Levy interpreted the earlier motion to reinsert "against unreasonable
searches and seizures" as the crucial change, see supra note 474, he did not discuss the sig
nificance of this motion beyond noting that it "split" the provision into two parts. LEVY,
ORIGINAL MEANING, supra note 45, at 244.
490. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 454-55 {1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(citing Lasson for the proposition that the first clause sets out a "more encompassing princi
ple" than the warrant standards); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 303, 317 (1967) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (citing Lasson regarding the enlargement of the text to include a broad rea
sonableness principle); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 183 {1974) (Douglas, J., dis
senting) (citing Lasson regarding the enlargement of the text to include a broad reasonable
ness principle); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 {1980) (opinion of the Court by
Stevens, J.) (citing Lasson regarding the enlargement of the text to include a broad reason
ableness principle); id. at 611 {White, J., dissenting) (same); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 177 {1984) {opinion of the Court by Powell, J.) (same).
491. As described above, there is no persuasive historical evidence of a grievance re
garding warrantless intrusions in the prerevolutionary controversies, see supra notes 135-161
and accompanying text, and no persuasive historical evidence of concern about warrantless
searches during the debates over the need for a federal bill of rights in 1787 and 1788, see
supra notes 162-166 and accompanying text.
492. The First Congress did not enact any warrantless arrest authority when it created
the office of federal marshal in the Judiciary Act of 1789, as discussed supra notes 169-172
and accompanying text.
493. Madison's use of "shall" rather than "ought" appears to have been simply a stylistic
preference, like his avoidance of "therefore." See supra note 350.
494. For the provisions and proposals co=anding that loose warrants not be issued,
see the 1776 Virginia provision, VA. CONST. of 1776, art. X (Deel. of Rights), quoted supra
text accompanying note 347, which was copied by North Carolina, N.C. CONST. of 1776, art.
XI (Deel. of Rights), reprinted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 234-35 (6.1.3.5); the 1776 Penn-
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In contrast, although the Committee's language implied that general
warrants should not be issued, it did not explicitly command that no
unspecific warrant be issued; in fact, it referred to general warrants
"issuing." All the motion did was to clearly forbid even the issuance of
a general warrant, and it did so simply by injecting language that had
been uniformly used for that prohibition in prior constitutional bans
against general warrants.
The likelihood that Gerry made the motion reinforces this inter
pretation because historical evidence suggests he would have found
the "declaratory" tone of the Committee's provision inadequate.
Gerry was a zealous advocate for a federal bill of rights: he had made
the unsuccessful motion to add a bill of rights to the Constitution at
the end of the 1787 Constitutional Convention; he had been one of
three delegates who had refused to sign the Constitution, in part be
cause it lacked a bill of rights; and he "remained suspicious lest the
central government trespass on the liberties of citizens" during the
First Congress.495
Most significantly, Gerry represented a Massachusetts anti
Federalist circle that held a near-paranoid fear that general warrants
would be used to enforce federal tax collections. His close friend
Mercy Otis Warren (James Otis's sister) had written the following in
1788 shortly after discussing with him the shortcomings of the pro
posed constitution:
There is no provision by a bill of rights to guard against the dangerous
encroachments of power in too many instances to be named: but I can
not pass over in silence the insecurity in which we are left with regard to
warrants unsupported by evidence - the daring experiment of granting
writs of assistance in a former arbitrary administration is not yet forgot
ten in the Massachusetts; nor can we be so ungrateful to the memory of
the patriots who counteracted their operation, as so soon after their
manly exertions to save us from such a detestable instrument of arbitrary
power, to subject ourselves to the insolence of any petty revenue officer
to enter our houses, search, insult, and seize at pleasure. . . . The rights of
individuals ought to be the primary object of all government, and cannot

sylvania Provision, PA. CONST. of 1776, art. X (Deel. of Rights), quoted supra text accompa
nying note 353, which was copied by Vermont, VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 1 (Right XI), re
printed in COGAN, supra note 122, at 235 (6.1.3.7); the 1776 Maryland provision, MD.
CONST. of 1776, § 23 (Deel. of Rights), quoted supra note 351, virtually copied by Delaware,
DEL. CONST. of 1776, § 17 (Deel. of Rights), reprinted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 234
(6.1.3.1); the 1780 Massachusetts provision, MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XIV, quoted
supra text accompanying note 379, copied by New Hampshire, N.H. CONST. of 1783, pt. 1,
art. XIX, reprinted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 234 (6.1.3.4); the Pennsylvania and Mary
land anti-Federalist proposals quoted supra note 426; the Virginia ratification convention
resolution, copied by the New York and North Carolina conventions, quoted supra note 429.
495.

See BU.LIAS, supra note 439, at 197, 200, 225.

722

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 98:547

be too securely guarded by the most explicit declarations in their fa.
vor. . . .496

Gerry undoubtedly shared Warren's view that the rights of citizens
"cannot be too securely guarded by the most explicit declarations in
their favor." Thus, he would have insisted on a prohibition against
general warrants that left no need for implication nor room for inter
pretation.497
Gerry's being from Massachusetts also reveals the likely source of
the substitute language he proposed - and why he did not connect
the two clauses with the usual "therefore." He probably borrowed
"and no warrant ought to be issued, but . . ." from the beginning of the
unique third statement in John Adams's Massachusetts provision,493
changed Adams's more traditional "ought" to Madison's "shall," and
moved to substitute "and no warrant shall issue but . . . " for the middle
phrase of the Committee's text.
The final two-clause format of the Fourth Amendment, and the
fact that the resulting first clause ended by stating that the right "shall
not be violated," are mere by-products of a change that was only in
tended to make the ban against issuance of general warrants explicit.
There is no reason to think that the insertion of "and no warrant shall
issue but . . . " was meant to broaden or alter the content of the provi
sion.499
E.

Adoption and Ratification of the Text

Madison's draft for a search and seizure amendment banned gen
eral warrants by setting out standards for arrest or search warrants.
The report of the Committee of Eleven did not alter that content.
Neither did the modification on the House floor that produced the fi496. COLUMBIAN PATRIOT, supra note 166, at 270, 278-79 (4.28.4) (emphasis in origi
nal); see also id. at 270-71 (attributing pamphlet to Warren, and correcting earlier attribution
to Gerry (for example, in pAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION 2, 12-13 (Paul Leicester Ford
ed., 1888, republished 1968))). Warren was prominent among the Massachusetts anti
Federalists, and Gerry was undoubtedly familiar with this passage. In fact, Warren had vis
ited Gerry to discuss the shortcomings of the proposed constitution a month prior to writing
this pamphlet. See BILLIAS, supra note 439, at 214.
497. Examples of Gerry's concern with the precise language of the various rights
amendments are set out supra note 482.
498. The Massachusetts provision is quoted supra text accompanying note 379. Note
that John Adams had used "therefore" at the beginning of the second statement in the
Massachusetts provision, but had not repeated it at the beginning of the third statement.
499. The fact that the first clause of the Fourth Amendment was left to end with "shall
not be violated" appears to be incidental; that was simply the easiest place for Gerry to in
terrupt Madison's text and insert "and no warrant shall issue but." Moreover, a statement
that a "right . . . shall not be violated" is tautological; hence, there was nothing in the result
ing first clause that should have caused the Framers to think that any significant change in its
content had occurred.
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nal two-clause format.soo The proposed amendment still had the same
content when it emerged from the Senate, without any apparent con
troversy;soi and it still had the same content when it was ratified by the
state legislatures, again without any apparent controversy.s02 When
the first two of the twelve amendments Congress submitted to the
states were not ratified (they did not deal with rights), the federal
search and seizure provision that had been submitted to the states as
the Sixth Article of Amendment became known as the Fourth Article
of Amendment, or simply as the Fourth Amendment.s03
F.

Summary: The Original Meaning of the Fourth Amendment

The evidence set out in this Article shows that the Fourth
Amendment had a specific historical meaning. As understood by its
Framers, the two-clause text was neither mysterious nor incomplete.
Likewise, there is no historical basis to think that its Framers under
stood it to be "vague" or "comprehensive."s04 To the contrary, they
adopted the text as a specific response to a specific grievance that had
arisen in a specific historical context and had been shaped by a specific
vulnerability in the protections afforded by common-law arrest and
search authority.sos
500. The punctuation between the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment varied after
passage of the motion. A semicolon initially appeared after "shall not be violated" in a
statement of the provision on August 21, 1787, see COGAN, supra note 122, at 225 (6.1.1.7)
(quoting records of the consideration in the House, August 24, 1789), but it had become a
comma by the time the House sent the proposed amendments to the Senate a few days later,
see id. at 226 (6.1.1.9.a- c) (quoting records of the consideration in the Senate, August 25,
1789). It remained a comma in the enrolled resolution of Congress, see id. at 232 (6.1.1.22),
but was sometimes incorrectly printed with a semi-colon in early collections of statutes, see 1
STATUTES AT LARGE 21, 97-98, reprinted in COGAN, supra note 122, at 232 (6.1.1.23.a, b).
501. There is no record of any debate regarding the Bill of Rights in the Senate. Al
though the Senate made some substantial changes in some of the House rights proposals, it
made no change in the language that became the Fourth Amendment. See COGAN, supra
note 122, at 226-27 (6.1.1.9-6.1.1.12} (quoting records of the consideration in the Senate,
August 25, 1789, and September 4, 1789).
502. There was some controversy over some of the other eleven proposed amendments
that were submitted for ratification to the state legislatures, but there is no record of any
controversy in the state legislatures regarding the search and seizure provision. See 3
Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1443-65.
503. See COGAN, supra note 122, at 231-32 (6.1.1.21.a-b, 6.1.1.22) (setting out the "Sixth
Article of Amendment" submitted to the states).
504. Quoting LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING, see supra note 45, at 246.
505. One objection that is sometimes raised regarding attribution of the original mean
ing or purpose of a constitutional text is that such statements ignore the likely variation of
attitudes and understandings that may have existed among the various groups of persons
(drafters, federal legislators, state legislators, commentators) who might be lumped together
under the label of "Framers." I have no doubt that is a genuine difficulty for assessing the
historical meaning of certain aspects of the Constitution or especially of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It is possible to speak of "the" original meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
however, because there simply is no indication in the historical sources of any controversy or
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The Framers aimed the Fourth Amendment precisely at banning
Congress from authorizing use of general warrants; they did not mean
to create any broad reasonableness standard for assessing warrantless
searches and arrests. Likewise, they did not intend it to guide officers
in the exercise of discretionary arrest or search authority; instead, the
Amendment's ban on too-loose warrants served to reaffirm the com
mon law's general resistance to conferring discretionary authority on
ordinary officers. The silences of the text regarding warrantless intru
sions and when warrants were required or excused were not oversights
or defects of drafting. Rather, in the common-law context the Framers
had no reason to expect that those topics could become unsettled or con
troversial. The Framers were content to state the standards for valid
warrant authority because they believed that would suffice to curb dis
cretionary search and seizure. They wrote what they meant and
meant what they wrote; they simply did not perceive the problem of
search and seizure the same way that we do.

VIII. THE TRANSFORMATION TO MODERN DOCTRINE
That the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment sounds so
strange to modem ears demonstrates the degree and depth of change
that has occurred in constitutional search and seizure doctrine since
the framing. The story of the post-framing changes is complex and can
be understood only in the context of larger institutional and doctrinal
developments that have shaped American constitutional law. This
Part briefly sketches those changes to show how the original meaning
was lost in the transformation to modem doctrine.
Commentators have usually described the post-framing course of
the Fourth Amendment as a smooth and continuous development
from the original meaning. For example, they have described the 1886
decision in Boyd as though it connects modem doctrine to the original
meaning, and likewise have described current doctrine as though it
evolved from Boyd.506 The conventional account is inaccurate, how
ever, because it fails to confront the discontinuities evident in the post
framing development of search and seizure doctrine.
A.

The Loss of Common-Law Restraints Against
Discretionary Authority

As argued above, the Framers adopted the Fourth Amendment
and the other criminal procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights to
disagreement as to its meaning (with the exception of the mysterious choice of "effects")
among any of the persons who could be considered "Framers."
506.

See, e.g., LANDYNSKI, supra note 38, at 49-61; LASSON, supra note 16, at 107-11.
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reinforce those aspects of common-law criminal procedure that they
perceived to be (or that have been) threatened. They did not attempt
to adopt a full statement of common-law rights because they assumed
that the common law would continue as it had in the past, particularly
if they addressed certain vulnerable points such as the threat of legisla
tively authorized general warrants. Their assumption was not borne
out by actual developments.
During the early nineteenth century, the turn to legislative codes
undermined the notion of a permanent common law,507 thereby blur
ring the common-law foundation for the Bill of Rights. In addition,
the transformation of criminal justice institutions further destabilized
the original understanding of search and seizure doctrine. New con
cerns about crime and social disorder during the nineteenth century
gave rise to a perception that the common-law structure of law en
forcement was inadequate to meet the needs of an increasingly com
plex and urban society. Contemporaneously with the advent of police
departments and career officers, courts and legislatures drastically ex
panded the ex officio authority of the warrantless officer.508
These developments pushed warrant authority toward the margins
of law enforcement procedure and thus destroyed the common-law
premises that had grounded the Framers' belief that a ban against
general warrants would suffice to ensure the right to be secure in per
son and house. Likewise, these developments undermined trespass
actions against individual officers as a means of enforcing legal limits
on search and arrest authority.509 By the end of the nineteenth cen
tury, the warrantless officer posed a far more potent threat to the se
curity of person and house than the Framers had ever anticipated.510

507. For a discussion of the codification movement circa 1820-40, see KERMIT L. HALL,
THE MAGIC M!RROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 126-27 (1989).
508. See supra notes 231-251, 254 and accompanying text.
509. There is a large literature assessing a trespass remedy as an alternative to exclusion.
Nonetheless, the co=entators who advocate trespass actions as the historical remedy for
illegal arrests and searches have never accounted for the fact that modem standards for as
sessing arrests and searches are looser than historical standards and do not emphasize the
role of a specific complainant as did the co=on law. See supra text accompanying note
251. For a review and critique of the co=entary supporting "tort" remedies, see Yale Ka
misar, Remembering the "Old World" of Criminal Procedure: A Reply to Professor Grano,
23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 537, 562-69 (1990).

510. Cf. Wasserstrom, Two Clauses, supra note 9, at 1394-95 (noting that the Framers
were primarily concerned with general warrants and expected co=on law to protect citi
zens from unwarranted search and seizure). The irony, of course, is that the incremental
changes that undermined the co=on law right to be secure went virtually unchallenged
during the nineteenth century precisely because federal and state courts took the view that
the constitutional prohibitions against "unreasonable searches and seizures" only banned
legislative approval of general warrants but did not address conduct by warrantless officers.
See supra notes 179-189 and accompanying text.
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During most of the nineteenth century, the courts worried little
over the creation of discretionary police authority. The late nine•
teenth century, however, witnessed a tum toward due process con
cerns. Although that turn likely was stimulated by a number of fac
tors, it was at least in part an elite reaction to the emergence of the
regulatory state.
B.

The Supreme Court's Stretching of the Original
Understanding in Boyd

The 1886 decision in Boyd is a clear example of judicial resistance
to the emergence of heightened government regulation. Indeed, the
Justices adopted a novel and sweeping protection of even ordinary
business records in that case that surpassed anything anticipated by
the Framers.511 In the course of striking down the statutory authority
511. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), declared unconstitutional a statute that
had provided authority for a court order to an importer to produce an invoice regarding the
value of imported glass. The Court held that the statute violated both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. Justice Bradley's majority opinion made four interrelated claims: first, that
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination prohibited compelling any person to
produce potentially incriminating documents, see id. at 637; second, that the Fifth Amend
ment protection against self-accusation applied to customs forfeiture proceedings because
such proceedings were essentially criminal, see id. at 633-34; third, that a compelled produc
tion of documents amounted to a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
at least by analogy, see id. at 635; and fourth, that a compelled production of a document
that violated the Fifth Amendment right would also be "unreasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment, see id. at 634.
The first of these claims is supported by the historical evidence regarding the Framers'
understanding. See the discussion of Roe, supra note 450; see also Rex v. Worsenham, 1 Ld.
Raym. 705, 91 Eng. Rep. 1370 (K.B. 1701) (declining to order customs officers being prosecuted
for fraud to produce their custom-house books because it would be, in effect "to compel the de
fendants to produce evidence against themselves"); Regina v. Mead, 2 Ld. Raym. 927, 92 Eng.
Rep. 119 (K.B. 1703) (declining to order trustees ofa charity to produce books because "it would
be to make a man produce evidence against himself in a criminal prosecution"); Rex v. Purnell, 1
Black. W. 37, 96 Eng. Rep. 20 (K.B. 1748) (denying inspection of a college's books in connection
with a criminal prosecution). For modem sources recognizing a common-Jaw right against com
pelled production of incriminating documents at the time of the Fifth Amendment's framing, see
Richard A Nagareda, Compulsion "To Be a Witness" and the Resu"ection ofBoyd, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REY. 1575, 1619 & n.172 (1999).
However, the other three claims Bradley made in Boyd are another matter. The
Framers added "in any criminal case" to the Fifth Amendment compelled self-accusation
clause to make it clear that the clause did not apply to customs enforcement proceedings.
See supra note 450. Thus, Bradley's conclusion that the Fifth Amendment applied to cus
toms forfeiture proceedings was contrary to the Framers' intent.
Bradley's claims that compelled production constituted a "seizure" and violated the
Fourth Amendment Jack historical support. Both claims were founded only on Bradley's
assertion that "the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other," 116 U.S. at
630, and stand in "intimate relation" to one another, id. at 633. However, those claims rest,
in turn, on Bradley's claim that the Framers were influenced by Lord Camden's remarks as
reported in the longer version of Entick - which is unlikely. See infra note 512. Moreover,
Camden's treatment in Entick of a search of papers as a form of self-incrimination appears
to have been novel claim. See infra note 513.
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for a court order compelling production of an invoice, Justice Bradley
erroneously invoked Lord Camden's statements from the later version of
Entick, the version of which the Framers were probably unaware, as
though they demonstrated that the Framers would have equated a
search or seizure of papers for use as evidence with a violation of the
right against compelled self-accusation512 (thus inventing what became
known as the "mere evidence" doctrine).513 He also declared that any

Professor Nagareda has also recently concluded that Boyd went astray by intermixing
Fourth and Fifth Amendment analysis. See Nagareda, supra, at 1585-90.
512. Bradley's claim that the Framers would have viewed any seizure of papers as com
pelled self-incrimination relied upon Lord Camden's remarks as recorded in the longer case
report of the 1765 proceedings in Entick. See 116 U.S. at 626-30 (quoting Entick v. Carring
ton, 19 Howell St. Tr. 1029, 1066-74 (C.P. 1765)). However, it is unlikely the Framers were
familiar with that version, which was not published until 1781. The analysis that Bradley
quoted is not evident in the earlier, shorter case report of Entick in Wilson's Reports that
the Framers were fanilliar with. See supra note 25. Thus, Bradley's claim that his ruling ac
corded with what was in the "memory" and "minds" of the Framers was fanciful at best.
513. The so-called "mere evidence" rule was an aspect of Fourth Amendment doctrine
from its articulation in Boyd until its rejection in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
Under that doctrine, searches and seizures were permissible only for fruits or instrumentali
ties of crime, but not for papers or other items that were only evidentiary in nature. Justice
Bradley's opinion in Boyd based that doctrine partly on a distinction between items which
the government was entitled to possess (for example, contraband) versus legitimate private
property, see 116 U.S. at 623-24, and partly on language from the longer version of Lord
Camden's observations in Entick, discussed supra note 512, which analogized a search of
papers to self-incrimination.
The analogy between a search of papers and compelled self-incrimination does not ap
pear to have been developed in co=on law sources. I have not located any framing-era
source that treated compelled production as a "seizure." Likewise, I have located only two
pre-Entick claims that a search of papers constituted compelled self-incrimination: one ap
pears in a cryptic report of Pratt's (Camden's) remarks during the 1763 trial in Wilkes v.
Wood, Lofft 3, 19 Howell St. Tr. 1153, 1155, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 490 (C.P. 1763) (case report
first published 1776, see supra note 25) ("Nothing can be more unjust in itself, than that the
proof of a man's guilt shall be extracted from his own bosom."); the other appears in a single
passage in the 1764 pamphlet FATHER OF CANDOR, supra note 23, at 56-59 (Father of Can
dor may have been Pratt, see supra note 23). Likewise, I have not located any analogy of a
search of papers under a warrant to self-incrimination in the American complaints made
during the prerevolutionary general writ of assistance grievance or in any of the statements
made regarding search authority during the ratification debates of 1787-88. See also supra
note 368. Early American discussions of Entick simply described it as standing for the proposi
tion that common law did not provide authority for the issuance of a search warrant other than
for stolen property. See, e.g., HENING, supra note 25, at 415.
Cogan has cited a case refusing a court order to inspect a college's books for evidence
pertinent to a criminal prosecution as though it were a precedent for the Fourth Amendment
and, presumably, the mere evidence doctrine. See COGAN, supra note 122, at 245 (6.3.2.1)
(reprinting the report of The King v. Dr. Purnell, 1 Black. W. at 37, 96 Eng. Rep. at 20).
However, that case report was not published until 1781, see 1 LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra
note 19, at 293, entry 11; a somewhat different report was published in 1770 in 1 Wils. 239, 95
Eng. Rep. 595, see 1 LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 310, entry 131. Although the
motion to review the books was apparently resisted in part because the request was too
broad, I do not think it is likely that the Framers would have understood either report of
Purnell to address a search or seizure.
Although the Framers did understand that warrants could be issued only for purposes
recognized at co=on law or by statute, see supra note 381, it does not appear that they
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compelled production of documents that constituted self-incrimination
also constituted a "seizure" that was "unreasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment. That use of "unreasonable" as a constitutional search
standard distinct from the warrant standards was novel, though Bradley
still used it in a Cokean rather than relativistic sense.514 After concluding
the statute was unconstitutional, Bradley employed exclusion to remedy
the production of the invoice under the unconstitutional statutory
authority.515
Notwithstanding the novelty of Bradley's specific claims, he ar
ticulated the rationale for the expanded protection of papers within
the analytic framework of the original understanding of the Fourth
Amendment - as a limitation on congressional power to create
search authority.
He said nothing about extending the Fourth
Amendment to regulate searches by warrantless officers. Thus, Boyd

were familiar with any "mere evidence" doctrine of the sort Justice Bradley articulated in
Thus, I agree with Professor Taylor's previous conclusion that the "mere evidence"
rule lacked a historical basis, though I do not agree with all of the details of his argument.
See TAYLOR, supra note 49, at 50-71.

Boyd.

514. See 116 U.S. at 622, 630, 631-32, 633. Bradley's use of "unreasonable" as a consti
tutional standard in its own right was novel and probably was a response to the awkward
problem he faced in cr�fting the rationale for declaring the court order compelling produc
tion of an invoice to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment (even putting aside the awk
wardness of describing an order to produce as a "seizure"). The order at issue was not
merely a subpoena (as it is sometimes described), because it could only be issued by a judge
on the government's showing of a particularized need for a specific invoice. See 116 U.S. at
619-20 (quoting Act of June 22, 1874, 18 Stat. 187). Thus, it would have been difficult for
Bradley to assert that the order to produce violated the probable cause and particularity
standards set out in the second clause of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, he simply as
serted that the order's violation of the right against compelled self-accusation also made the
"seizure" of the invoice "unreasonable." 116 U.S. at 633-35.
In condemning the compelled production of the invoice as "unreasonable,'' Bradley
treated "unreasonable" as though it constituted a constitutional standard above and beyond
compliance with the warrant standards. However, there were limits to Bradley's innovation.
He did not treat "unreasonable" as a relativistic standard - he claimed that compelled sei
zures of papers were categorically illegal, not that the seizure was inappropriate in particular
circumstances. Thus, his usage of "unreasonable" was still Cokean in character. Although
Boyd focused new attention on "unreasonable," and opened the way for "unreasonable" to
be viewed as a constitutional standard in its own right, it did not adopt the modern meaning
assigned to that term.

515. After describing the court order as unconstitutional and "void," Bradley stated that
admission of the invoice was erroneous and that any information obtained from the invoice
could not be used in future proceedings. 116 U.S. at 638. He did not explain that aspect of
the ruling; however, it probably seemed like an obvious result of the nullity of the order. In
fact, exclusion of evidence obtained under a "void" statute would seem to flow directly from
the holding of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (holding that federal
courts lack jurisdiction to apply an unconstitutional statute because "a law repugnant to the
constitution is void; and . . . courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instru
ment" (emphasis in original)). The recognition of exclusion in Boyd, however, extended
only to the effect of an unconstitutional statute; it did not identify any basis for excluding
items seized unlawfully by officers not acting under specific statutory authority. Thus, Boyd
stopped short of articulating the modern exclusionary rule.
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should probably be understood as .a late expression of the original un
derstanding - albeit with novel twists - rather than as the beginning
of modem doctrine. Boyd opened the way for later court decisions to
create modem doctrine, but it did not actually do so itself.
C.

The Supreme Court's Extension of the Fourth Amendment to
Warrantless Intrusions in Weeks

The genesis of modem doctrine appears rooted in the awakening
of judicial concern over the newly powerful warrantless officer. By
the early twentieth century, it had become clear that Boyd had not
solved the problem of protecting business records because it failed to
address the seizure of such records by officers acting on their own ini
tiative.516 In addition, at roughly the same time, the Court's redefini
tion of misconduct by officers acting "under color of law" provided a
new doctrinal basis for applying constitutional standards directly to of
ficers' warrantless intrusions.517 The Justices responded to the conflu
ence of those developments by adjusting constitutional search and sei
zure doctrine to modem realities in the 1914 decision Weeks v. United

States.518
The Weeks opinion made several innovations:

it used the new un
derstanding that officer misconduct "under color of' office was a form

516. A 1911 incident demonstrated the potential for warrantless seizures of business
records "incident to" arrest. Federal marshals in New York had arrested the principals of an
import business for alleged customs fraud and then, without obtaining any search warrant,
had seized the records of the import business. The business principals challenged the seizure
by filing a motion for the return of the papers prior to their trial. The federal court ruled the
seizure illegal and ordered the government to return the seized papers, but did not explain
the basis for that order beyond citing Boyd. See United States v. Mills, 185 F. 318, 318-20
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911). The United States Attorney, Henry A. Wise, refused to comply with
the order. The federal court held Wise in contempt, and he filed an appeal and habeas cor
pus petition with the Supreme Court. See Wise v. Mills, 220 U.S. 549 (1911); Wise v. Henkel,
220 U.S. 556 (1911). The Justices dismissed Wise's papers on procedural grounds, while
avoiding the merits of the controversy. See Wise v. Mills, 220 U.S. at 555 {holding that the
lower court's order to return the papers was not "so dehors the authority of the court as to
cause it to be void, and to justify an officer of the court in refusing to respect and obey it");
Wise v. Henkel, 220 U.S. at 558 (stating that the lower court had authority to decide the peti
tion for return of papers "irrespective of whether there was a constitutional right to exact the
return of the books and papers"). The Wise litigation must have alerted the Justices that
there was a significant gap in the protection of business records.
517.

See supra note 323.

518. 232 U.S. 383 {1914). In addition to the Wise litigation, discussed supra note 516,
several other developments may have sensitized the Justices to search authority contempo
raneously with Weeks's appeal. The income tax applicable to corporations and wealthy in
dividuals, with associated enforcement powers, had been enacted in 1913. See Tariff of 1913
(Revenue Act of 1913), Pub. L. No. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166. (A corporate excise tax on net
profits had co=enced a few years earlier. See Tariff of 1909 (Corporate Excise Tax of
1909), ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112-17.) It may also be significant that the Federal Trade
Commission Act, which would create additional federal investigatory powers, was pending
in Congress in 1914.
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of government illegality, to extend the Fourth Amendment to the
conduct of a warrantless officer;519 it explicitly constitutionalized the
common-law requirement of a warrant for a house search;520 and it
then used those innovations as premises for announcing a broad exclu
sionary rule as the legal consequence of an unconstitutional govern
ment search.521 Put simply, Weeks initiated the development of mod
em doctrine by reading the Fourth Amendment as a broad protection
of a right to be secure in one's house and papers rather than as a sim-

519. Early in his opinion, Day declared the Fourth Amendment limited "the courts of
the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority . . . . "
232 U.S. at 391-92. Farther along, he stated that the Amendment's protection of the citizen's
person and property "is equally extended to the action of the Government and officers of the
law acting under it." 232 U.S. at 394 (emphasis added). Day also noted that there were
precedents for applying the Fourth Amendment to invasions under "judicial sanction" (that
is, warrants) and to invasions under "legislative sanction" (that is, seizures made in the exer
cise of statutory authority as in Boyd) - but he finessed the fact that there were no prece
dents for applying the Fourth Amendment directly to the conduct of an officer except in
those settings. Id. He then concluded by characterizing the unlawful search by the marshall
as misconduct "under color ofhis office in direct violation of the constitutional rights of the
defendant . . . ." 232 U.S. at 398 (emphasis added). Note that Weeks was decided only a
year after the Court had clearly held, in Home Telephone and Telegraph, that conduct by a
state regulator alleged to violate state law constituted misconduct "under color of' state law
and thus constituted "state action." Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S.
278, 2Zl (1913); see also discussion supra note 323.
520. The co=on-law rule that a search of houses could not be justified except by a
valid search warrant, see supra notes 259-285 and accompanying text, had not been disturbed
as doctrine prior to Weeks, even though it sometimes may have been ignored in practice, as
it was in the search at issue in Weeks itself. The treatment of the seizure of papers and prop
erty during the warrantless house search in Weeks as an act "in direct violation of the consti
tutional rights of the [resident]," 232 U.S. at 398, had the effect of constitutionalizing what
had previously been a co=on-law warrant requirement for house searches. The Court had
previously implied a warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment in 1877 in dicta in
Ex parte Jackson, but had not articulated any rationale for it. 96 U.S. 727 (1877); see also
discussion supra note 174.
521. Day's characterization of the marshal's invalid warrantless search as a "direct viola
tion of the constitutional rights of the defendant" put it in the same category as the "void"
court order in Boyd and also brought it within the basic constitutional principle that a court
could not give any recognition to an unconstitutional government act. See supra note 515
(discussing the relationship between Boyd's conclusion that the court order was "void" and
the ruling in Marbury that a court has no authority to recognize a "void" government act).
Under that logic, exclusion is a necessary consequence of a government search that violates
constitutional authority.
Indeed, the formal logic of voidness is so strong that it cannot be escaped unless one
adopts the view that the constitutional violation involved in the illegal seizure was completed
and thus distinct from the subsequent use of the unconstitutionally seized information or
items as evidence in court. Thus, when the Burger Court redefined the rationale for exclu
sion as being solely to deter future police misconduct, rather than to enforce a constitutional
imperative, the crucial step in the rationale was the assertion that the constitutional violation
was "accomplished" when the seizure occurred so that the later use of the evidence worked
no "new" constitutional wrong. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974). That
analysis was borrowed (without attribution) from an earlier California decision in People v.
Mayen, 205 P. 435, 440 (1922) - an analysis that the California court subsequently rejected
as artificial in People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 911-12 (1955).
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pie ban against general warrants. The warrant requirement articu
lated in Weeks restored a strong content to the right to be secure with
regard to houses and papers. In addition, the adoption of the exclu
sionary rule enforced the requirement by making compliance with that
standard a matter of consequence.522
D.

The Supreme Court's Articulation of a Relativistic
"Reasonableness" Standard in Carroll

A decade after Weeks, however, the Supreme Court in its 1925 de
cision in Carroll v. United States relaxed the new constitutional war
rant requirement in order to facilitate the enforcement of Prohibi
tion.523 Chief Justice Taft's majority opinion upheld a warrantless
police search of an automobile because the officers had probable
cause to believe it was transporting contraband (albeit employing a
loose notion of "probable cause"524) and the mobility of the automo
bile created an exigency. The Court's holding was novel because
probable cause would not have sufficed to justify a warrantless arrest
and search incident to arrest for the misdemeanor offense involved.525
To justify the warrantless search, Taft declared that the Fourth
Amendment prohibited only those searches that were "unreasonable,"
and that it was "not unreasonable" for the police to conduct a war
rantless search of a car for contraband in the circumstances.526 Thus,

522. The remedy of exclusion was especially appropriate where the police had evaded
the prior judicial assessment of the cause for the search of a house in a warrant application,
as had happened in the warrantless search in Weeh'. See Kamisar, supra note 38, at 592-93.
523. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
524. Taft referred to probable cause as the standard for a lawful seizure of contraband.
See e.g., Carroll, 261 U.S. at 155-56, 159-62. In contrast, Justice McReynolds's dissenting
opinion disputed both the applicable standard for the search, see id. at 163-69, and the sig
nificance of the information possessed by the officers, see id. at 174 ("Has it come about that
merely because a man once agreed to deliver whiskey, but did not, he may be arrested
whenever he ventures to drive an automobile on the road to Detroit!").
525. Probable cause was insufficient to justify an arrest of the persons in the car because
the Prohibition Act classified a first offense as a misdemeanor. A warrantless arrest for a
misdemeanor could not be lawful unless the arresting officer had actually witnessed the
commission of the crime. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156-58; see also supra notes 219-222 and
accompanying text. As a result, Taft analyzed the warrantless search of the automobile for
contraband by analogy to an in rem seizure of a ship or vehicle under the customs laws, while
asserting that the arrest of the occupants was only incidental to the seizure of contraband.
See 267 U.S. at 157-61.
526. 267 U.S. at 147-50. Taft actually employed "reasonableness" only to excuse the
lack of a search warrant when there was probable cause to believe an automobile contained
contraband; he did not employ "reasonableness" as a substitute for the probable cause stan
dard itself. Thus, Taft stopped short of the current generalized-reasonableness construction.
Cf. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 667-68 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
However, the rhetoric of Taft's opinion outran that specific application.
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Taft effectively rewrote the Fourth Amendment in Carroll by impos
ing a modem, relativistic meaning on the word "unreasonable."527
Of course, it is not surprising to find a twentieth-century Court
opinion assessing the constitutionality of a policy according to its "rea
sonableness." During the course of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the Supreme Court had made the flexible notion
of "reasonableness" the central criterion of constitutional law (and
thereby vastly increased the importance of judicial review of legisla
tion).528 Thus, it was a short step to announce that the scope of the
warrant requirement would be determined according to "reasonable
ness."
However, Taft's Carroll opinion did not simply invoke reasonable
ness as the criterion for arriving at appropriate specific standards for
regulating police conduct. Rather, when Taft suggested that the
Fourth Amendment only forbade those police intrusions that were
"unreasonable," he opened the way for replacing specific standards of
police conduct with the open-ended notion of "reasonableness" itself.
Thus, Carroll set search and seizure doctrine on a course away from
the rules model and toward the generalized-reasonableness construe-

527. Taft may have drawn the idea - of treating "unreasonable" as a standard that was
distinct from the warrant standards - from Boyd, although that decision had still used "un·
reasonable" only in a categorical, Cokean fashion. See supra note 514. Taft may also have
been influenced by a 1921 co=entary. See Fraenkel, supra note 16, at 366 (asserting, ap
parently based on Boyd, that "[i]t is significant that the Amendment itself is in two parts one which forbids 'unreasonable searches,' and the other which requires certain specific par
ticulars to be observed before warrants may be issued").
528. The Supreme Court had repeatedly invoked "reasonableness" as a broad constitu
tional standard during the period in which it had asserted a judicial veto over legislation in
connection with economic regulation and substantive due process. See, e.g., The Slaughter·
house Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 109 (1873); id. at 112, 119 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (stat·
ing that all ordinances and regulations must be "reasonable"); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623, 663 (1887) (stating exercise of police power is valid if "reasonable grounds"); Plessy v.
Fergusson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 {1896) (explaining that because "every exercise of the police
power [of a state] must be reasonable," the question is "whether the statute of Louisiana is a
reasonable regulation," and concluding that the statute at issue was not "unreasonable");
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56-57 {1905) (stating the issue as whether the regulation
was "a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the State, or • . • an
unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual" and
concluding that there was "no reasonable ground" for the regulation).
The acceptance of this relativistic notion of "reasonableness" as a constitutional stan
dard was so pronounced by the early twentieth century that even Edwin S. Corwin made a
prochronistic statement, in his 1928 article, by treating Coke's "against co=on right and
reason" in Dr. Bonham's Case as not only foreshadowing judicial review but as also ex
pressing "that very test of 'reasonableness' which is the ultimate flowering of this power."
Corwin, supra note 327, at 368. In fact, Coke was referring to a violation of a settled princi
ple of the law of the land (as Corwin certainly understood based on other statements in his
writing), not to the sort of relativistic balancing standard that became co=onplace in
American law in the nineteenth century. See supra notes 392-397 and accompanying text.
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tion Justice Minton would later announce in his 1950 opinion in

Rabinowitz.529
Carroll also

blurred the intended scope of the Fourth Amend
ment's protections. As noted above, Taft rationalized his conclusion
that warrantless searches of automobiles were "reasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment by pointing to the fact that the Framers had ap
proved of warrantless ship searches in the 1789 Collections Act530 even though there is no historical evidence that the Framers would
have viewed ships as enjoying the common-law right to be secure af
forded "persons, houses, papers, and effects." That rationalization has
contributed to doctrinal developments that broadened the scope of the
Fourth Amendment's protection to commercial as well as personal
and domestic interests.531
Current search and seizure doctrine reflects the working out of the
doctrinal elements announced in Weeks and Carroll. It lacks coher
ence because the elements announced in those decisions do not mesh
very well. Indeed, Weeks and Carroll moved in opposite directions;
the former sought to revive personal and domestic privacy by revital
izing the warrant, while the latter undertook to expand the ex officio
authority of the police to facilitate social control, and thus marginal
ized the warrant process. The lack of theoretical coherence, however,
has not prevented a clear trend from emerging. Despite the interlude
of the Warren Court, search and seizure doctrine since Carroll has
evolved increasingly to favor police power over the security of the citi
zen. Indeed, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have rather consis-

529. See supra notes 15, 155 and accompanying text.
530. 267 U.S. at 150-53. The early "vehicle" searches Taft referred to involved ships and
co=ercial vehicles.
531. The historical distinction between ships and the personal and domestic interests
protected at co=on law is discussed supra notes 146-151 and accompanying text. Taft's
erroneous treatment of warrantless ship searches as intrusions subject to the Fourth
Amendment was a major step in the obliteration of the intended meaning of the words
"houses, papers, and effects." Following Carroll, the Court has construed the Fourth
Amendment as though it had been intended to serve as a global protection of all manner of
privately owned property, including co=ercial property (though not open fields). Indeed,
later cases mixed this understanding of the broad scope of the protection together with the
notion of a relativistic reasonableness standard and redefined the scope of the Amendment's
protections according to whether there was a "reasonable" expectation of privacy. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). Although that formula was initially used to mod
ernize the protection of the Fourth Amendment (by applying it to seizures of telephone con
versations), it has since been employed to limit the protection of the house, see, e.g., Florida
v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989), and of papers, see, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976). It has also been used to limit "standing" to challenge the legality of searches, see,
e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) - including searches of houses, see, e.g.,
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
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tently expanded discretionary police authority under the modern ru
bric of "reasonableness. "532
IX. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE AUTHENTIC ORIGINAL MEANING

The idea of a constitution implies permanence and continuity.
Even though there is little consensus as to precisely how or how much
the intended meaning of a constitutional text should matter in con
temporary constitutional analysis, there is a widely shared sense that
the Framers' meaning should carry some weight, or matter in some
way. Thus, discussion of the historical meaning of a constitutional
provision almost inevitably leads to consideration of its implications
for modern doctrinal issues.
A general caveat should be borne in mind in any such discussion:
inaccurate statements of historical doctrine pose a serious threat to
constitutional interpretation because there is no conceivable basis for
giving normative weight to false statements about the original mean
ing of a constitutional text. Thus, it is crucial to complete the histori
cal inquiry before seeking any implications. The normative impor
tance attached to the original meaning has had both an upside and
downside for constitutional history. It has assured that scholars and
the Court would examine the historical meaning to some extent; but
the historical accounts have sometimes been conducted with one eye
on the implications, rather than both eyes on the evidence. In par
ticular, the concern with fitting the historical meaning to modern doc
trine has tainted prior accounts with prochronistic concerns and ideo
logical slants that were foreign to the authentic history.533 The

532. This point has been made in numerous commentaries.
Davies's Testimony, supra note 3, at 141-43.

My own views are set out in

533. Professor Amar's commentary would appear to be an example of the desired impli
cations leading the historiography. In his initial discussion of the historical Fourth Amend
ment in 1991, Amar asserted that "a jury could subsequently assess [the) reasonableness [of
a search)" and that "[r]easonableness vel non was a classic question of fact for the jury."
Amar, Bill of Rights, supra note 58, at 1179. However, the only support he offered for the
historical-sounding claim that reasonableness "was" the Fourth Amendment legal standard
for assessing the lawfulness of a search was a citation to a purely normative statement in an
article by Justice Scalia to the effect that searches should be assessed according to reason
ableness. See id. at 214 (citing only Scalia, The Rule ofLaw, supra note 2, at 1180·86).
Thereafter, Justice Scalia cited Amar's article as support for Justice Scalia's claim in a

1991 opinion that "colonial juries" could assess damages against an officer for a search "un
less the jury found that his action was 'reasonable.' " California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565,
581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Amar, Bill of Rights, supra note 58, at 1178-80, and
Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763)). Like the other Wilkesite
cases, see supra notes 21-25, Huckle does show that damages could be awarded for unlawful
intrusions, but it says nothing about a "reasonableness" standard. Thus, the only authority
Justice Scalia actually cited regarding a historical reasonableness standard was Amar's cita
tion of Scalia's own earlier normative claim.
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authentic history can be recovered only by respecting the foreignness
of the past and by immersing oneself in its records.534
The primary purpose of this Article has been to lay out the histori
cal evidence, make sense of it, and correct prior . misinterpretations.
The evidence reveals a striking coherence, so much so that it leaves
little room for doubt as to the original meaning. Because the history is
rather clear, it provides a fairly firm platform for exploring the impli
cations of the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.535
That said, it is likely that the normative implications of the histori
cal original meaning will be seen differently by different readers. Un
like the historical meaning, which is ultimately a matter of evidence,
the normative implications one draws depend on the approach to con
stitutional analysis that one adopts. There is such wide variation in the
approaches taken by commentators, and even by Supreme Court Jus
tices, that it will not be surprising if different readers, with different
understandings of constitutional methodology and different ideologi
cal agendas, express contrasting views regarding the implications of
the authentic original meaning.
This final Part initiates discussion of the implications by offering
some thoughts about various ways that the historical meaning might
be brought to bear on modern doctrine. The recovery of the authentic
history exposes the falsehood of originalist claims that are currently
espoused. It also provides a broad perspective · for assessing where
Three years after Justice Scalia had cited Amar, Amar published his fuller exposition of
claims regarding the historical Fourth Amendment in his 1994 article, Fourth Amendment
First Principles. Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 58. There Amar wrote as though
there were evidence of a historical reasonableness standard - even though he did not iden
tify any. See supra notes 109-115 and accompanying text.
534. Immersion in the materials regarding the entire history of a constitutional provision
is the only method that can produce an authentic understanding of the intended meaning. It
cannot be gleaned by making assumptions about what the Framers "must have" thought.
Neither can it be gleaned by ruminating on the "ordinary meaning" of the words of the text;
indeed the important meanings - as in the connotation that "unreasonable" carried in
framing-era constitutional discourse - are not necessarily what modem readers would think
"ordinary." Likewise, the historical meaning cannot be gleaned by relying on the historical
claims that have appeared in United States Reports or in prior commentaries. It cannot even
be gleaned by studying only the historical sources regarding the "origins" of a provision one cannot adequately detect the dogs-that-did-not-bark-in-the-night that expose unex
pected differences between contemporary and historical doctrine unless one also examines
the post-framing interpretations.
535. There is no reason to presume that all constitutional statements will be equally sus
ceptible to historical analysis of original meaning, or that they will all reflect an equal degree
of settled meaning. The criminal procedure-related provisions of the Bill of Rights were
largely based on common law and were largely intended to preserve what were understood
to be existing rights; hence, it is highly likely that the Framers of those provisions shared set
tled understandings of their meanings. In contrast, because the structure of government in
the Constitution was in some ways an experiment, it seems unlikely that the Framers shared
any settled meaning of provisions such as the Necessary and Proper Clause. Likewise, be
cause it was passed at a time of pronounced political controversy, it seems Unlikely that the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment shared any settled understanding of its meaning.
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search and seizure doctrine currently is, and how it got there. I am
skeptical, however, whether even clear history can provide much posi
tive guidance for shaping specific responses to modern search and sei
zure issues.
A.

The Inauthenticity of the Generalized-Reasonableness
Construction

The original meaning does not fully endorse either the warrant
preference or generalized-reasonableness construction; in fact, it
shows that neither is really equivalent to the Framers' understanding.
The generalized-reasonableness construction, however, is especially
distant from the Framers' meaning.
Adherents of the generalized-reasonableness construction, in
cluding a number of Justices, have insisted that the Fourth Amend
ment should not be understood to reflect any preference for the use of
warrants, but rather to posit a global requirement that government of
ficers act "reasonably" when making searches or seizures. The
authentic history reveals that the historical assertions this construction
rests on are plainly false.
The Framers never meant to create a relativistic notion of "rea
sonableness" as a global standard for assessing warrantless intrusions
by officers.536 Rather, they banned general warrants in order to pre
vent the officer from exercising discretionary authority. In the context
of banning general warrants, they used "unreasonable" as a formal
Cokean synonym for inherent illegality. There is no reason to think
they meant for "reasonableness" to be understood as a flexible, rela
tivistic standard for the exercise of discretionary authority.
Along the same vein, it is decidedly not true that the Framers pre
ferred warrantless searches made under a reasonableness standard to
searches made under specific warrants, or that they thought warrant
less searches provided as much protection from abuse as specific war
rants.537 Rather, they believed that specific warrants provided signifi
cant protections against arbitrary intrusions.538 Thus, it is decidedly
not true that the modern notion of a "reasonableness" standard "af
fords the protection that the common law afforded."539 Rather,
framing-era common law resisted the sort of discretionary authority

536. See supra note 13.
537. See supra notes 51-53, 60-61 and accompanying text
538. See supra notes 287-297 and accompanying text.
539. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also su
pra note 2.
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that "reasonableness" analysis confers on modem officers.540 The
modem notion of "reasonableness" would have been distinctly ill
suited to the Framers' concerns; it is such a soft, subjective, conte:iltless
notion that it fosters and enhances, rather than curbs, discretionary
authority.541
The mantra of generalized-reasonableness advocates - that "the
Fourth Amendment prohibits only those searches and seizures that
are unreasonable"542 - accords the modem police officer far greater
authority to arrest or search than the Framers ever intended or antici
pated. It also inclines decisions toward a constant expansion of discre
tionary authority.543 The generalized-reasonableness construction re
flects an endorsement of government power over citizens that is

540. See the framing-era condemnations of discretionary authority quoted supra notes
74-84 and accompanying text.
541. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
("To say that the search must be reasonable is to require some criterion of reason. It is no
gnide at all either for a jury or for district judges or the police to say that an 'unreasonable
search' is forbidden - that the search must be reasonable. What is the test of reason which
makes a search reasonable'?"); RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 250-51 (1995)
(co=enting on the "imagined" objectivity of a standard of reasonableness).
542 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 668 (1995); Maryland v.
Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619
(1989); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
682 (1985); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 806 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
558 (1978); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978); United States v. Ramsey, 431
U.S. 606, 617 (1977); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 371-72 (1976); Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 254 n.23 (1969); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768
(1966); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 147 (1925).
543. The direction from which principles are stated matters because it tends to define
the default rule for close cases. At co=on law, intrusions were judged unlawful unless they
were positively justified. See, e.g., supra note 203; infra note 544. The credo of modem rea
sonableness doctrine, however - that the Fourth Amendment forbids only those intrusions
that are unreasonable - reverses the co=on-law default rule. Indeed, advocates of
generalized-reasonableness tend to treat the asserted reasonableness of police conduct as
though reasonableness itself constitutes a source of police authority. See, for example, dis
cussion of Amar's claims to that effect supra notes 93, 273.
The notion that "reasonableness" presumptively permits the exercise of government
authority over individuals is also evident in Judge Richard Posner's opinion in United States
v. Torres, 751 F. 2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984). The issue was whether wiretaps were legal. Judge
Posner concluded they were because statutory authority for wiretaps should not be con
strued according to "[t]he motto of the Prussian state - that everything which is not permit
ted is forbidden." Id. at 880. However, that conclusion inverted the understanding of gov
ernment authority embraced by the Framers; the principle that "everything that is not
permitted is forbidden" is how the co=on law treated the authority of officers - any in
trusion not authorized by positive law was a trespass. See Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 291,
291, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 807 (C.P. 1765). The Framers understood that restraint of official
authority provides freedom for citizens, but that a permissive treatment of the authority of
officials detracts from citizens' liberty and security. Likewise, Judge Posner's assertion that
a judge has inherent authority to issue search warrants, see 751 F 2d at 880, conflicts with the
basic principle announced in Entick, that no warrant can be issued unless positively provided
for in law. See also supra text accompanying notes 379-381.
.

738

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:547

fundamentally at odds with the Framers' more libertarian view of the
inherent rights of "freemen."544
B.

The Limited Authenticity ofthe Warrant-Preference Construction

The warrant-preference construction comes closer to the original
meaning insofar as it values the specific warrant. The Framers did
view the specific warrant as the most appropriate means for providing
the arrest and search authority necessary for law enforcement. In par
ticular, they valued the specific warrant because it did not confer dis
cretionary search authority on officers. But the current warrant
preference construction differs from the original meaning in signifi
cant ways.
As summarized in Katz v. United States, the central tenet of the
warrant-preference construction is that "searches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."545 (Of
course, the Katz across-the-board warrant "requirement" is not as
strong in practice as in theory. As a number of commentators have
noted, the Court has recognized more than a "few" exceptions to the
warrant requirement, and those exceptions often apply to the settings
in which police searches are most common.546)
A number of features of the Katz statement depart from the origi
nal meaning. To begin with, the warrant-preference construction also
reflects a false understanding of the historic meaning of "unreason
able" as an overarching standard in the Fourth Amendment. Indeed,
any construction of "Fourth Amendment reasonableness" is only
modern. In addition, the Katz formulation that warrantless searches
are "per se unreasonable" posits a theoretical across-the-board war
rant requirement that ignores the differentiation among interests that
was prominent in framing-era common law. The Framers anticipated
that warrants would be the principal (though not exclusive) mode for

544. See, for example, James Wilson's discussion of a "great and important political
maxim" in his law lectures of 1790-91:
Every wanton, or causeless, or unnecessary act of authority, exerted, or authorized, or en
couraged by the legislature over the citizens, is wrong, and unjustifiable, and tyrannical: for
every citizen is, of right, entitled to liberty, personal as well as mental, in the highest possible
degree, which can consist with the safety and welfare of the state. [We are servants of the
law so that we can be free.]

2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 196, at 649 (last sentence in brackets trans
lated from the Latin).
545. 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
546. See, e.g., Craig Bradley,
1468, 1473-74 (1988).

Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L.
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arrests and that specific warrant authority would virtually always be
necessary to justify searches of houses and their personal and domestic
contents.547 Their concern, however, was primarily with that sphere of
personal and domestic security. They viewed general search authority
as appropriate for ships, and it appears unlikely that they meant to
prohibit legislators from conferring general search authority on offi
cers regarding commercial premises.548 The current view that the right
to be secure extends to commercial interests reflects the pro-business
activism of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Supreme
Court - not the original understanding of the Amendment.549
At first blush, the broadening of the scope of interests protected by
the Fourth Amendment may appear to strengthen the right to be se
cure; however, it has had the opposite effect. It is difficult to insist on
rigorous standards for house searches if ships, commercial vehicles,
and warehouses are entitled to an equal measure of protection. In
particular, the blurring of the distinction between personal and com
mercial interests has warped the treatment of automobile searches,
starting with Carroll.550 Thus, the exaggerated scope of the theoretical
warrant requirement has actually tended to undermine the protection
of personal and domestic security.551

547.

See supra notes 136-142 and accompanying text.

548.

See supra notes 143-161 and accompanying text.

549. It is curious that proponents of originalism seldom question the validity of the
Court's 1886 announcement, in Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394
{1886), that business corporations are "persons" for purposes of constitutional law.
550. The automobile was obviously a form of property that was beyond the Framers'
anticipation. However, given that the Framers endorsed a right to be secure for "persons,
houses, papers, and effects" but not for commercial interests, one might have thought that
the appropriate point to begin the analysis in Carroll would have been to ask whether the
auto should be viewed as a protected personal "effect" or should be viewed as comparable
to commercial vehicles. I think the answer should have been that the automobile was within
the sphere of personal and domestic interests that the Fourth Amendment was intended to
protect. Chief Justice Taft, however, never asked that question. Instead, he simply asserted
that automobiles carrying contraband were subject to in rem forfeiture because ships and
commercial vehicles were. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). In effect,
he decreed that the efficient application of statutory forfeiture authority took precedence
over the citizens' constitutional right to be secure in personal automobiles. Id. at 153-56.
551. Modern rulings have even undercut the protection of the house from a variety of
angles. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 {1984), effectively held that the exclusionary rule
usually will not apply (which is to say that there will be no legal consequence at all) if police
enter and search a house pursuant to an unconstitutional warrant. In addition, Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), protects officers from civil liability even when they illegally
enter a house without a warrant. The "standing" doctrines that limit a person's ability to
challenge the legality of a search or seizure have also exposed houses by virtually inviting
police agencies to illegally enter and search the residences of third parties who are not the
primary targets of prosecution themselves. See, e.g., Payner v. United States, 447 U.S. 727
(1980). Were it not for the rulings in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), and Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), prohibiting warrantless entries of houses to make arrests, the
notion of the special protection of the house would be only a historical relic.
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The modem warrant-preference construction also endorses a war
rant process that is different from, and weaker than, its framing-era
counterpart. For example, the modem practice of allowing probable
cause for warrants to be established by an officer's account of hearsay
information supposedly provided by a confidential informant gives the
officer far more control over the process than the Framers expected.552
Thus, while the theoretical warrant "requirement" posits a broader
scope for use of specific warrants than the Framers expected, the
looser process for issuing warrants has weakened the protection that
the specific warrant actually provides.
In sum, neither of the usual modem constructions is equivalent to
the original meaning. Is there any other approach that would be truer
to the historical Fourth Amendment?

The Undesirability of "Returning" to the Literal Original Meaning

C.

It might seem that we could decide to return to the literal original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, reading it merely as a ban on too
loose general warrants, while leaving the regulation of warrantless in
trusions to legislation or judicial decisionmaking. This position is not
without adherents. Professor Taylor hinted at it when he previously
asserted that the Framers were "unconcerned with" warrantless intru
sions.ss3 More recently Professor Gerard Bradley explicitly called for
such an interpretation.s54 Indeed, this approach might even be seen as
the logical destination of Justice Scalia's insistence, in recent commen
tary, that only the original meaning of the language of a constitutional
text, but not the Framers' intention, should matter in constitutional
analysis.sss
The difficulty is obvious. Applying the original meaning of the
language of the Fourth Amendment in a completely changed social

552 See supra notes 287-295 and accompanying text.
553. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
554. See supra note 56.
555. See, e.g., SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 2,

at 38 ("What I
look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of
the text, not what the original draftsman intended.").
The purported distinction between meaning and intention is artificial. One can rarely if
ever arrive at an authentic understanding or application of the "meaning" of a text without
considering its authors' purpose within the context in which it was written. See supra note
388. The fact that a reading based on the "ordinary meaning" of the words of the Fourth
Amendment has fostered a historically false treatment of that provision by misconstruing the
intended meaning of "unreasonable" is an eloquent demonstration of the fallibility of acon
textual textualism. Indeed, why should anyone assume that the Framers intended to use an
"ordinary meaning" when they adopted "unreasonable" in the Fourth Amendment? They
used the peculiar language of constitutional discourse because they were writing a constitu

tion.
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and institutional context would subvert the purpose the Framers had
in mind when they adopted the text. They focused on banning general
warrants because they perceived the general warrant as the only
means by which discretionary search authority might be conferred.556
They did not mean to approve of, nor facilitate the development of,
warrantless discretionary authority; rather, they did not conceive of
the possibility that future generations would confer discretionary
authority on ordinary officers by means other than general warrants.
In a very real sense, the modem mystery associated with the two
clause text of the Fourth Amendment is the product of the Framers'
inability to gauge how criminal justice institutions would actually
evolve. Modem statutes and court rulings that confer substantial ex
officio authority on police officers (for example, by permitting arrests
on mere probable cause of felony557) provide a level of discretionary
authority that the Framers would not have expected a warrantless of
ficer could exercise unless general warrants had been made legal.
Choosing to read the text to forbid only the use of general warrants
while ignoring the unanticipated post-framing conferral of discretion
ary authority on officers would effectively evade the Framers' con
cern. Returning to the literal original meaning in the face of the
deeply changed context would reduce the constitutional text to a
Catch-22.
The text of the Fourth Amendment clearly anticipated that there
would be a "right to be secure" in one's person, house, papers, and ef
fects. If there is any term in the text that might be described as the
core or essence of the provision, "right to be secure" is the leading
candidate. Thus, one should not advocate a modem meaning for the
Fourth Amendment that would render the right to be secure a practi
cal nullity. Hence, I think that the Court's extension of the amendment
to warrantless intrusions in Weeks' was appropriate because it was neces
sary to preserve a meaningful "right to be secure" in the modem con
text.55s

556.

See supra notes 192-286 and accompanying text.

557. As described above, the Framers would have thought that an ex officio arrest based
on mere probable cause alone (without proof of the fact of felony) would be obviously "un
lawful." See supra notes 226-227 and accompanying text. The modem probable cause stan
dard for arrests was adopted after the framing. See supra notes 241-251.
558. Cf. Kamisar, supra note 38, at 574 (arguing that even if the Fourth Amendment had
been literally aimed exclusively against general warrants, courts would still have properly
interpreted the amendment to prohibit indiscriminate, arbitrary, and unjustified warrantless
searches as well).
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The Nonoriginalism ofSelective Originalism

It might seem that there is an alternative to a complete return to
the original meaning - we could select specific aspects of historical
doctrine as guides to decisions. Indeed, in a series of recent cases, Jus
tices Scalia and Thomas have asserted that framing-era common-law
doctrine should be consulted as the starting point for analyzing consti
tutional search and seizure issues. For example, Justice Scalia recently
began a Fourth Amendment analysis by first quoting the first clause of
the text and then writing:

In determining whether a particular government action violates this pro

vision, we inquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful
search or seizure under the common law when the Amendment was
framed. Where that inquiry yields no answer, we must evaluate the
search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness . . .559
.

This approach is not helpful for two reasons. One problem is that
modem judges have not been particularly successful in recounting the
content of framing-era law. In fact, immediately after the passage
cited above, Justice Scalia repeated Chief Justice Taft's historically
false claim that the allowance of warrantless ship searches in the 1789
Collections Act revealed the Framers' understanding of the Fourth
Amendment's "reasonableness" standard.560
Likewise, Justice
Thomas has recently mischaracterized a statement by Blackstone as
though it were relevant to the knock-and-announce rule for serving
warrants.561 Similar examples of erroneous claims regarding historical
standards in Supreme Court opinions are numerous.562

559. Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1300 (1999) (omitting citations to Wilson v.
Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995), and California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991)).
560.

See supra notes 152-155 and accompanying text.

561. Justice Thomas wrote the unanimous decision in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927
(1995), which ruled that officers must "knock and announce" before breaking a house to
execute a warrant if, but only if, it is "reasonable" to so require in the circumstances. Justice
Thomas's opinion correctly recited several framing-era co=on-law sources that articulated
a rigid knock-and-announce rule for serving warrants. See id. at 932. He ended the discus
sion of franring-era law, however, by stating that "Sir William Blackstone stated simply that
the sheriff may 'justify breaking open doors, if the possession be not quietly delivered.' 3
Blackstone [Co=entaries] *412." Id. at 932-33.
The Blackstone passage Thomas quoted has nothing to do with execution of a search
warrant. It refers to a sheriff ejecting squatters after a civil judicial ruling that they have no
claim to the property - a situation that obviously does not pose the usual concern for the
security of a house and its residents. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 412-13.

In addition, Thomas's historical su=ary papers over the large gap between early
American cases that "embraced the co=on-law knock-and-announce principle" and "[o]ur
own cases . . . ." 514 U.S. at 933-34. The simple fact is that the modem flexible reasonable
ness standard applied in Wilson was unknown to the co=on law. The Justices' decision to
relax the requirements for the execution of a search warrant was not based in history; rather
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Getting the common-law doctrine wrong is not the only problem
with this approach. No Justice or commentator is likely to endorse a
wholesale return to common-law doctrine. For example, the common
law did not authorize warrantless arrests for felony on probable cause,
but insisted on proof of "felony in fact." I doubt that anyone will ad
vocate returning to a common-law doctrine that was later judged in
adequate for effective policing. Yet, if common law is not embraced
entirely, the choice of which pieces to embrace may come down to lit
tle more than personal preference.
Singling out and applying a specific common-law doctrine in a
modem - that is, changed and foreign - context will often produce
results that are different from, or even inconsistent with, the purpose
the rule served in its historical milieu. For example, consider the
common-law doctrine that a warrantless constable could break into a
house to arrest a felon, perhaps even to arrest "on suspicion."563
Should that doctrine be viewed as a basis for giving a modem police
officer broad authority to make a warrantless entry of a house to make
a felony arrest? The situations are not nearly as comparable as they
may initially appear to be. The modem police officer is far niore pro
tected from forcible resistance or trespass liability than was a framing
era constable, so he is much more likely to exploit such authority than
a constable would have been. Likewise, the modem officer can justify
a felony arrest by a probable cause standard that is looser than the
common law "on suspicion" standard (which required "felony in
fact"). And the modem category of "felonies" encompasses a much
wider array of offenses than did common-law felonies (the common
law did not permit breaking into a house for a misdemeanor arrest,
even with a warrant). Allowing a modem officer to make a warrant
less entry of a house to effect a felony arrest would leave houses far
more vulnerable to invasion than the superficially comparable com
mon-law rule did at the time of the framing.564

it was a departure from historical doctrine. The suggestion that the decision was in any way
supported by historical doctrine was only pretense.

562. See examples cited supra notes 152-159 and accompanying text; supra notes 171,
187, 247, 252, 340, 425, 450, 467, 484, 490, 511-513, 533; supra notes 559-561 and accompany
ing text. Precisely because judges may feel obliged to concoct historical pedigrees to justify
novel rulings, legal historians should never take judicial descriptions of legal history at face
value.

563. I have simplified the historical doctrine for the purposes of this discussion. As dis
cussed above, Hawkins actually asserted a more restrictive doctrine under which only an
arrest of an actually guilty felon could justify the breaking of a house. See supra notes 265269 and accompanying text. This discussion follows Hale's broader statement regarding the
authority of officers to break into houses to arrest. However, I am also omitting Hale's gen
eral caveat that the breaking could be justified only if the suspected felon was actually pres
ent in the house at the time.
564. These co=ents are directed to Justice White's historical arguments in his dis
senting opinion in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 604-12 (1980). He asserted that there
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In a changed context, specific common-law statements will rarely
produce the same effect they were meant to produce. Hence, piece
meal originalism usually produces only an illusion of continuity. It
fails to come to grips with, or even acknowledge, the full range and
depth of post-framing changes. Piecemeal originalism is not origi
nalism at all.
E.

The Infeasability of "Translating" the Original Meaning for the
Modern Context

Another approach frequently advocated as a viable form of origi
nalism, even by some commentators loosely or popularly identified as
"strict constructionists," is to retreat to a "higher level of abstraction."
Some commentators describe this as extracting the "first principle{s)"
of the constitutional provision.565 Others describe it as "translating"
the text to apply to the modern context.566 Whatever the label, I doubt
this approach can provide valid answers to specific modern questions.
I do not deny that the Fourth Amendment can be restated at
higher levels of abstraction. For example, it is certainly the case that
the Framers intended to preserve a personal and domestic sphere that

was no basis for requiring a warrant for making an arrest in the wanted person's residence
because common law had allowed warrantless entries of houses to make arrests. White's
claim, however, wrenched the common-law statements regarding the justification for break
ing into a house out of the cluster of related historical doctrines.
Common-law doctrine was also taken out of historical context in Justice Scalia's concur
ring opinion in Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998), in which a five-justice majority
held that nonsocial visitors could not challenge the legality of a search of a house. Justice
Scalia asserted that this conclusion was mandated by the Fourth Amendment itself, in part
because "it would have been clear to anyone who knew the English and early American law
of arrest and trespass that underlay the Fourth Amendment" that a nonresident could not
claim the right to be secure in a house that a resident could claim. Id. at 94 (quoting state
ments by Coke, a comment by Cooley regarding a statement by Blackstone, and an 1815
English decision). The cited statements, however, pertain to situations where a nonresident
who was either already lawfully pursued by officers and subject to arrest or already subject
to execution of a civil courtjudgment was attempting to use the house of another as a refuge.
In contrast, there was no basis for arresting the nonresidents in Carter except for evidence
obtained during a search of the house the nonresidents had visited. That scenario does not
seem to have come up during the framing era, probably because the householder still had a
viable trespass remedy for an unlawful entry of his house, as well as a right to use force to
defend his house, and officers were reluctant to expose themselves to those risks. See supra
notes 263-275 and accompanying text. The scenario in Carter arises today because the post
framing development of "qualified immunity" doctrine has vitiated even the householder's
trespass remedy that earlier gave substance to the castle doctrine. See, e.g., Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (opinion of the Court by Scalia, J.). Historical authorities
never foresaw the incentives for unlawful police searches of houses that the current combi
nation of "immunity" and "standing" doctrines create.

565. See, e.g., supra notes 2, 58.
566. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM
(1997).

L. REV.
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would be meaningfully protected against undue intrusions by govern
ment officers. Likewise, it is even possible to draw some more specific
insights from the text and its history.
For example, as Justice
O'Connor has observed, the Framers would not have approved of
searches that were not based on individualized assessments of cause.567
Nevertheless, the retreat to a higher level of abstraction also encoun
ters several obstinate difficulties.
Reading the provisions of the Bill of Rights as statements of broad
principles is itself dubious as a historical matter. The historical record
of the framing indicates that the Framers saw the Fourth Amendment
as a specific constitutional barricade against the unique threat which
legislative approval of general warrants posed for the structure of
common-law authority - not as a general statement of an abstract
principle. Indeed, because they perceived that the common law "the law of the land" - provided the structure of liberty and security,
they saw no need to formulate a comprehensive statement of constitu
tional rights. Likewise, they saw no need to spell out the principles
and values that underlay the common law. Thus, except for the cryp
tic invocation of a "right" to be secure in person and house, the text of
the Fourth Amendment does not explicate the principles and values
that it serves. Those principles and values can be located only by go
ing outside the text and examining the larger historical context.
The fact that we now face issues the Framers never anticipated
may leave us little choice but to treat the constitutional texts as ex
pressions of broad principles, rather than as specific solutions to spe
cific historical threats. Indeed, the expansive treatment now accorded
the Bill of Rights can be justified as a replacement for the Framers'
unfulfilled expectation of a permanent structure of common-law
rights. However, we should not confuse our predicament with the his
torical character of the texts. At least as far as the procedural protec
tions of the Bill of Rights are concerned, the retreat to principles is
only a modem response to changed circumstances; it is not the Fram
ers' understanding of the text.
Furthermore, extracting any "principle" from a text that was writ
ten within the larger structure of common-law concepts and doctrines
is inherently reductionist - and the act of reduction introduces room
for the interpreter to define the "essence" of the text in a way that fur
thers his or her own ideological agenda. "Translation" sounds objec-

567. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 669 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dis
senting). Similarly, Justice Stevens has noted that the Framers would have been less con
cerned to prevent the issuance of too-loose warrants than improper warrantless intrusions.
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 971 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor has also noted that the Framers would have been especially concerned about leg
islation that purported to authorize arrests without a showing of cause. See Illinois v. Krull,
480 U.S. 340, 362 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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tive because, in other contexts, it connotes a fairly rigorous notion of
equivalence. Unlike translating a passage from English to French,
however, there are no dictionaries or grammars available to structure
the translation of a constitutional text from one historical context to
another.
Likewise, the language of "first principles" implies a clear hierar
chy of values or principles, with some being more foundational than
others. But the texts of the Amendments do not identify any such hi
erarchy - the interpreter does.568 The distorting potential of "first
principle(s)" reductionism is demonstrated by the way the supposed
"first principle" of "reasonableness" has been employed to downgrade
the warrant standards in the second clause of the Fourth Amendment.
Yet, the historical sources show that those warrant standards were
central to the Framers' understanding of the text and its purpose.
Indeed, the distorting potential of "translation" and "first princi
ple(s)" is magnified in constitutional discourse because asserted prin
ciples are likely to have been drawn from historical descriptions that
were themselves inauthentic. The very fact that law draws upon
precedent and continuity as sources of legitimation for rulings means
that lawyers and judges will attempt to couch even novel arguments or
rulings as though they are continuous with the original meanings of
constitutional provisions. The result is that commonly accepted un
derstandings of constitutional history are likely to include more than a
few mythical elements. Indeed, the now commonly accepted under
standing of the historical Fourth Amendment is composed largely of
an accretion of false historical claims.
In the final analysis, moving to a higher level of abstraction does
not solve the difficulties that inhere in any attempt to apply a text writ
ten for one historical context to another, different context. Abstrac
tions that are valid are usually too general to answer specific issues,
while the "principles" that seem to provide answers to specific issues
are usually reductionist. In the end, the move to higher levels of ab-

568. There is no historical basis for treating the constitutional statements of rights as
though they were formulated deductively, as the "first principle" language implies. The
Framers undoubtedly thought that there were identifiable principles embedded in the com
mon law (for example, that no man could be judge in his own case), but they also understood
that the common Jaw was the product of accretion. Although the phrase "first principles"
does appear in Blackstone's writing, he used that term to refer virtually to the principles that
inhere in the social contract itself. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 243 ("I say in the
ordinary course of law, for I do not now speak of those extraordinary recourses to first prin
ciples which are necessary when the contracts of society are in danger of dissolution, and the
law proves too weak a defense against the violence of fraud or oppression." (emphasis in the
original)).
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straction only papers over the range and depth of contextual and doc
trinal changes that have occurred since the framing.569
F.

Confronting the lnescapability of Doctrinal Change

The recovery of the authentic original meaning of the Fourth
Amendment and the explication of the post-framing transformation of
the meaning assigned to that text demonstrate that even constitutional
standards cannot remain static when everything to which they relate
undergoes change. Even constitutional law is not autonomous from
larger social, institutional, and political changes. The reality of deep
change since the framing means that the original meaning generally
cannot directly speak to modern issues.
At one level, the discontinuity between the original meaning and
modern doctrine creates an intellectual crisis for constitutional law at least for any positive notion of constitutional law. If one thinks that
constitutional law should represent something more than the personal
judgment of the fifth Justice, the usual bromides about the "living con
stitution" are not particularly soothing. The current quest in constitu
tional commentary is to locate some criterion of validity, and the re
cent "turn to history" is at least partly a response to that quest.570
However, the mere desire to have a firm criterion does not assure that
there is one to be found.
Viewed pragmatically, the central issue in modern Fourth Amend
ment doctrine is the degree to which it is possible and/or desirable to
constrain discretionary police authority by a regime of rules, or at least
partial rules. That issue must be addressed with a realistic under
standing that the law enforcement institutions of the framing era were
not adequate to meet the needs of a more populous, heterogeneous,
and urbanized society. Although the expansion of modern law en
forcement authority undoubtedly reflects a degree of institutional self
aggrandizement, it also reflects a sustained judgment that some degree
of discretionary authority is necessary for effective policing. The issue
is not whether we will allow any discretionary police authority, but

569. Cf. POSNER, supra note 541, at 251 ("Originalism is not an analytic method; it is a
rhetoric that can be used to support any result a judge wants to reach. . . . Some of the most
activist judges, whether of the right or the left . . . have been most drawn to the rhetoric of
originalism. For it is a magnificent disguise. The judge can do the wildest things, all the
while presenting himself as the passive agent of the sainted Founders - don't argue with
me, argue with Them.").

570. For a discussion of the quest for "usable" legal history, see generally Laura
Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Tum to History in Legal Scholarship, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 87 (1997).
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how much discretionary authority will be conferred and in what cir
cumstances.571
In that regard, the history most relevant to modern issues is not the
history of the framing, but the history of the changes made to the
original meaning - for example, by Weeks and Carroll. A critical ex
amination of the entire course of the evolution of constitutional search
and seizure doctrine, viewed in the context of changing social needs
and of the evolution of related institutions and doctrines, would give
us a better understanding of how search and seizure doctrine has come
to take its present shape. A complete history, starting from the
authentic original meaning, would reveal what choices were made, and
might even shed light on whether those choices were appropriate.572
In the final analysis, however, the value of recovering the authentic
history of search and seizure doctrine lies largely in the broader per
spective it provides. Commentators who have made recent claims that
the generalized-reasonableness construction affords the protection in
tended by the Framers have often also suggested that constitutional
doctrine had integrity and continuity until the Warren Court departed
from the true path by imposing unprecedented constraints on police
authority.573 That combination of claims smoothes the way for further
571. To my mind, the crux of the problem of modem search and seizure law is posed by
the somewhat contrasting views offered by Professors Wayne LaFave and Albert Alschuler
as to the degree to which rules of search and arrest authority are desirable and/or feasible.
See Albert W. Alschuler, Bright-Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV.
227 (1984); Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Proce
dures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. Cr. REV. 127; Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth
Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U.
PITT. L. REV. 307 (1982).
My own sense is that a regime of rules would be desirable, but I confess some skepticism
as to how broadly rules can be feasibly formulated. The shortcoming of the Court's recent
embrace of generalized-reasonableness is that it has short-circuited any attempt to formulate
a law of rules for search and seizure.
572. As noted above, I think the adjustments made in Weekr were appropriate and neces
sary, and I hope to explain that view in more detail in a future publication. I do not think the
same can be said of the imposition of the flexible reasonableness-in-the-circumstances standard
in Ca"oll, because the broad endorsement of discretionary authority implied in that standard
was inconsistent with the Framers' larger purpose of foreclosing officers from exercising discre
tionary authority. Of course, I recognize that it was inevitable that some degree of discretionary
authority would be recognized in the twentieth century. However Ca"oll's false claim that the
Framers had envisioned a reasonableness-in-the-circumstances standard blunted a thorough ex
amination of just how much discretionary authority was necessary in modem criminal justice,
and in precisely what circumstances. It effectively converted the Fourth Amendment from a bar
against discretionary police authority to a source of such authority. I think a thorough examina
tion of Ca"ollreveals it to be an expression of statist-inclined judicial activism that runs contrary
to the larger purposes of the Fourth Amendment
573. See, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991) (Scalia, J., dis
senting) (complaining that the Court "in recent years (has] invented novel applications of
the Fourth Amendment to free the guilty"); cfi SCALIA, A MATIER OF IN1ERPRETATION,
supra note 2, at 41 (stating that "[h]istorically, and particularly in the past thirty-five years,
the 'evolving' Constitution has imposed a vast array of new constraints - new inflexibilities
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expansions of police power. However, the authentic history prompts a
different outlook.
The authentic history shows that framing-era doctrine provided a
much stronger notion of a "right to be secure" in person and house
than does modem doctrine. The trajectory of doctrinal evolution has
been away from a sense of the individual's right to be secure from
government intrusions and toward an ever-enlarging notion of gov
ernment authority to intrude.574 (In the larger picture, the Warren
Court was just a brief, moderately libertarian interlude in the longer
range statist trend.) The larger story suggests that we should not have
any particular confidence that current doctrine has reached the right
balance (especially because reasonableness rulings have often been

- upon administrative, judicial, and legislative action," and mentioning, fust, the extension
of the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).

574. The implications of the post-framing expansion of the peace officer's authority for
constitutional standards and rights are not limited to search and arrest authority. The post
framing creation of police interrogation of suspects is equally prominent in the historical
evolution of constitutional doctrine regarding the Fifth Amendment right against compelled
self-accusation.
Framing-era common law did not permit officers to interrogate or take statements or
confessions from suspects. See, for example, Chief Justice Pratt's (Lord Camden's) remark
in the press accounts of Leach to the effect that officers could not be permitted to arrest or
search at their discretion any more than they could be permitted "to take examinations,"
quoted supra note 22. In fact, although English statutory law created authority for justices
of the peace to "examine" arrestees (though not under oath) and record their answers for
evidence in a subsequent trial, there is evidence that at least some American jurisdictions
viewed that practice as violative of the common-law right against compelled self-accusation.
Hening's 1794 Vrrginia justice of the peace manual had this to say:

The justice, before whom the prisoner is brought, is bound immediately to examine the cir
cumstances of the crime alleged. But the power of examining the prisoner himself and
committing his examination to writing seems not to be recognized by our laws. This author
ity was granted by statute of England of Ph[illip] & M[ary], which not having been adopted
by our legislature, is consequently not in force. And that these proceedings are repugnant to
the common law, will appear . . . from judge Blackstone, who says, that at the common law,
no man was bound to betray himself: and his fault was not to be wrung out of himself, but
rather to be discovered by other means and other men.

HENING, supra note 25, at 153 (citations to statutes and other authorities and footnote omit
ted; the Blackstone citation was to 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 293).
The Framers never anticipated that ordinary peace officers would be authorized to inter
rogate arrestees or take admissible statements from them. Thus, the emergence of police
interrogation during the nineteenth century threatened to bypass and nullify the historical
understanding of the right against compelled self-accusation in much the same way that the
expansion of police warrantless arrest authority threatened to bypass and nullify the histori
cal understanding of the right to be secure. Likewise, the initial application of the Fifth
Amendment right to the police interrogation setting in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532,
542 (1897), is best understood as a parallel to the Court's extension of the Fourth Amend
ment to warrantless searches in Weeks - as an effort by the Court to adjust the constitu
tional right to a drastically different threat than the Framers had any reason to anticipate.
As in search and seizure doctrine and practice, the post-framing expansion of police author
ity is the salient feature of the historical evolution of interrogation doctrine and practice.
For other discussions of the historical Fifth Amendment right against compelled self
incrimination, see supra notes 320, 433, 450, 511.
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justified by false history). The authentic history suggests that the bur
den of justification for further expansions of police power - or even
for maintaining recent expansions - should fall squarely on the pro
ponents of police power.
The recognition that we accord far greater authority to the officer
than the Framers intended or anticipated will not provide answers to
specific issues. There is no panacea for that. But the authentic history
of Fourth Amendment doctrine can at least displace fictional origi
nalist distractions and allow us to refocus attention on the critical
question of what a "right to be secure" should mean. That is the idea
that animated the Framers. That, and not question-evading platitudes
about "reasonableness," is the proper concern of modern search and
seizure doctrine.

